Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

Autonomy is one of the central concepts of contemporary moral thought, and Kant is often credited with being the inventor of individual moral autonomy. But how and why did Kant develop this notion? The Emergence of Autonomy in Kant's Moral Philosophy is the first essay collection exclusively devoted to this topic. It traces the emergence of autonomy from Kant's earliest writings to the changes that he made to the concept in his mature works. The essays offer a close historical and (...) philosophical analysis of what prompted Kant to develop his conception of autonomy, charting the historical background which prompted his search, and thoroughly analysing different stages of his writings in order to see which element of autonomy was introduced at which point. The resulting volume will be of interest to both scholars and students of Kantian moral philosophy, as well as to anyone interested in the subject of autonomy. (shrink)

I argue that Helen Knight and Margaret Macdonald expressed views on the nature of ‘good’ in aesthetic contexts which anticipate to a striking extent the dispute between Peter Geach and R. M. Hare over ethical uses of ‘good’ several years later. I show that Knight introduced a distinction between uses of adjectives later drawn also by Geach, and that she employed that distinction, as Geach did, in order to defend a descriptivist approach to ‘good’ according to which ‘good’ is not (...) ambiguous. I also show that Macdonald conceived of evaluative statements as commendatory, and that her conception of evaluative language therefore closely resembles the position which Hare would later advance. (shrink)

In ____Womanizing Nietzsche,__ Kelly Oliver uses an analysis of the position of woman in Nietzsche's texts to open onto the larger question of philosophy's relation to the feminine and the maternal. Offering readings from Nietzsche, Derrida, Irigaray, Kristeva, Freud and Lacan, Oliver builds an innovative foundation for an ontology of intersubjective relationships that suggests a new approach to ethics.

A crucial insight in Michelman’s ‘Constitutional Essentials’ is that constitutions may serve a justificatory or proceduralizing aim in modern liberal democracies. Yet the pervasiveness of moral disagreement – all-the-way-up; all-the-way-down – suggests, as I will argue, a democratic-experimentalist turn, which focuses on a non-hierarchical process of stakeholder deliberation and the court’s role in instigating and overseeing that process, ensuring non-domination. I believe that Frank is exactly right in arguing that a liberally justification-worthy political framework-law-in-place is normatively necessary for democratic politics (...) to succeed in divided societies. But I want to suggest that democratic experimentalism can offer further support to this claim. (shrink)

This paper examines freedom and the determination of the will in §4 of Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in light of Aristotle’s concept of leading arts (architektonikē technē) from Metaphysics A.1–2. Traditionally, intellect determines truth, while will determines action—a distinction central to Aristotle’s differentiation between theoretical and practical philosophy. Hegel, however, challenges this division, arguing that will is an extension of intelligence, integrating insight and goal-setting into a unified self-determination. By engaging with contemporary interpretations—Fulda, Pippin, and Pinkard—this paper explores (...) the tension between theory and practice. While Fulda defends philosophy’s indirect political relevance, Pippin argues it lacks practical justification. Pinkard links philosophy to institutional self-understanding, grounding practical reasoning in human biology. Reassessing Hegel’s implicit use of Aristotle’s leading arts, this paper argues that freedom of the will in §4 should be understood as intersubjective self-determination—not a mere choice among possibilities, but an identification with a politically and normatively determined highest practical ground. This reading reconciles theory and practice while emphasizing the institutional and social dimensions of self-determination. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Mit dem Ausdruck „Odysseus-Anweisung“ werden dokumentierte Behandlungswünsche kompetenter Personen für Phasen einer vorübergehenden Kompetenzbeeinträchtigung bezeichnet, mittels derer diese Personen ein Handeln _gegen_ ihre Präferenzen in der vorausgesehenen Situation der Kompetenzbeeinträchtigung autorisieren. Im Zentrum der ethischen Diskussion der Odysseus-Anweisungen steht im Allgemeinen die Frage nach ihrer „moralischen Autorität“ oder „Respektabilität“. Es wird gefragt, ob Odysseus-Anweisungen moralische Autorität in dem Sinne besitzen, dass sie bei Einschlägigkeit und Anwendbarkeit in der Akutsituation ein Handeln gegen den Patientenwillen moralisch geboten machen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag (...) wird argumentiert, dass es in der Akutsituation Gründe geben kann, _gegen_ eine einschlägige und anwendbare Odysseus-Anweisung zu handeln, da ein Handeln entsprechend einer Odysseus-Anweisung _gerechtfertigt_, aber gleichwohl _falsch_ sein kann. Dazu wird nach einer einleitenden Darstellung des Problems und einigen terminologischen Präzisierungen zunächst die Unterscheidung zwischen Gerechtfertigt Sein und Richtig Sein auf einer allgemeinen Ebene erläutert und dann auf Odysseus-Anweisungen übertragen und zwischen der Anwendung dieser Unterscheidung auf der Einzelfallebene und der Prinzipienebene differenziert. Abschließend wird dafür plädiert, dass, da ein Handeln entsprechend einer Odysseus-Anweisung gerechtfertigt, aber falsch sein kann, Odysseus-Anweisungen die von ihnen autorisierten Zwangsbehandlungen auch bei vorhandener Einschlägigkeit und Anwendbarkeit _nicht_ zu moralisch gebotenen machen und deren Befolgung nicht rechtlich bindend gemacht werden sollte. Sie sind nicht als normativ gleichrangig mit anderen Patientenverfügungen, die sich z. B. auf Zustände der Demenz beziehen, anzusehen. (shrink)

According to a common reading of Kant, autonomy refers to the idea that pure reason gives the moral law to itself. Pauline Kleingeld and Marcus Willaschek reject this standard view both on textual as well as philosophical grounds. Instead, they argue that autonomy only selects mid-level principles, such as ‘help others,’ and that the moral law is a priori and not given. – In this paper, I first analyze on textual grounds what Kant means when he says that a principle (...) is a priori. I argue that Kant does not conceive of a priori laws as permanently existing entities. Rather they are the product of how reason necessarily functions if it is prompted by sensibility. Kant also uses the word ‘autonomy’ in this context. I then argue that this non-standard view of autonomy as an activity can meet the philosophical objections that Kleingeld and Willaschek raise against autonomy as a giving of the moral law. (shrink)

The following article is concerned with the life and the literary work of Margareta Klopstock, a figure commonly overshadowed by her more prominent husband. Previous research has usually interpreted Margareta Klopstock’s contributions to Der Messias as mere assistance work (›Hilfsarbeit‹) and labeled her Hinterlaßne Schriften (posthumously 1759) as epigonal. This study, in contrast, argues for an understanding of her marriage as a literary cooperation and attempts the very first systematical description of the author’s work as a devotional poetics in its (...) own right. Via transcription and dictation, Margareta Klopstock was not only, and in various ways, involved in her husband’s writing; more crucially, she created a space of literary-critical resonance for F. G. Klopstock’s works, and made efforts to introduce Der Messias into the anglophone sphere. In turn, typical for her own writing are relations to enlightenment theology and contemporary English literature (Elizabeth Singer Rowe and Samuel Richardson), to Der nordische Aufseher (polemics against the freethinkers), and women’s religious education. Thus, the article shows that the verdicts of secondariness gravely underestimate both the historical significance of Margareta Klopstock and her literary legacy. (shrink)

Modern science excels at pattern recognition but frequently confuses statistical significance with truth. The precision-scope trade-off forces researchers into a dilemma: precise but impractical studies or broad but causally weak ones. As data scales exponentially, spurious correlations proliferate, exacerbating the reproducibility crisis. To restore credibility, science must move beyond statistical detection and adopt frameworks that prioritize coherence and causal structure.

This volume offers an array of newly commissioned essays, addressing the topic of love in the Christian tradition. Drawn from a range of expert theologians and philosophers in contemporary analytic and non-analytic theology, these essays join current debates within the theology of love, and aim to propose new avenues for future research. Including the last essay written by Marilyn McCord Adams, Love, Divine and Human deals with a rich variety of issues related to divine and human love. The broad scope (...) of the book includes divine transcendence and its methodological bearing on the doctrine of divine love, the nature and scope of divine love, the interrelation between God's love and wrath, the plausibility of an impassable God of love, and the application of various conceptions of divine love to the problem of divine hiddenness, human ethics, and human free will, among other topics. This unified collection of cutting-edge papers will advance discussion for all those focused on the theology of love. (shrink)

Definition of the problem “Ulysses contracts” are advance directives by means of which a patient authorizes compulsory treatment for a phase of a temporary inhibition of competence. Ethical discussion of Ulysses contracts usually focuses on the question of the “moral authority” or the “binding force” of Ulysses contracts, i.e., of whether Ulysses contracts should be honored or whether the competent patient’s prospective wishes for compulsory treatment are overridden by the patient’s actual preferences in the situation of treatment. Arguments In this (...) contribution, I argue that, even if the Ulysses contract undoubtedly applies to the actual situation, there may be reasons for not acting upon it. The main argument is that acting in conformity to a Ulysses contract may be justified but nevertheless wrong. After some terminological clarifications, I argue that Ulysses contracts justify the use of compulsory treatment but do not necessarily make it the right course of action. They authorize physicians to act in accordance with the patient’s advance directive and, thereby, protect them from blame and sanctions in case they administer compulsory treatment. Whether compulsory treatment is right or wrong, however, hinges on whether the patient retrospectively consents to it. It may be the case that administering compulsory treatment in conformity to the Ulysses contract is justified but turns out to be wrong if the patient does not retrospectively consent to it. It may also be the case that not obeying the Ulysses contract turns out to be right if the patient retrospectively consents to not following it. Conclusion In view of this, I conclude that Ulysses contracts should not be seen as morally binding and that they should not be made legally binding. They are not normatively on par with other advance directives that relate to, for example, states of dementia. (shrink)

Systematically improving patient safety is of the utmost importance, but it is also an extremely complex and challenging task. This illuminating study evaluates the role of professionalism, regulation and law in seeking to improve safety, arguing that the 'medical dominance' model is ill-suited to this aim, which instead requires a patient-centred vision of professionalism. It brings together literatures on professions, regulation and trust, while examining the different legal mechanisms for responding to patient safety events. Oliver Quick includes an examination (...) in areas of law which have received little attention in this context, such as health and safety law, and coronial law, and contends in particular that the active involvement of patients in their own treatment is fundamental to ensuring their safety. (shrink)

Before American alt-rock band R.E.M. lost their religion in the 1990s and “the Donald” anointed himself as God’s chosen to resurrect a 1950s white utopian fantasy in 2024, The Beatles were perhaps...

Leopoldo Zea of Mexico and Miguel de Unamuno of Spain are two exemplary philosophers in twentieth-century transatlantic Hispanism. In this article, these thinkers are put in conversation to explore their contrasting orientations toward existence, which reveal both the breadth of modern Hispanic thought and the benefit of Emilio Uranga’s concept of zozobra, in this case applied by holding in tension the differing approaches of Zea and Unamuno rather than choosing one over the other.

In my brief remarks, I consider what it means to return and rebind—that is to say, the significance of the re for Kristeva’s thought. Kristeva does not just talk about binding or birth, or unbinding or death, but rather rebinding and rebirth, suggesting that it is a retrospective return rather than an original moment that is crucial. The most significant moment, then, is not the moment of imaginary plenitude, nor the moment of originary loss, but rather the moment of rebirth (...) that comes through rebinding after the loss of plenitude. Indeed, Kristeva’s insistence on re-turning suggests that there is no originary moment of plenitude nor of castration or loss, but rather a constant movement of compensation for a recurrent loss. By emphasizing rebinding and rebirth, she underscores not the loss as cutting wound but rather the healing power of signification, always already inherent within loss. The flip-side of separation is reattachment. And rather than just focus on the separation or cut, Kristeva looks to that which allows us to rebind and reattach in order to create relations that sustain us. Both unbinding and binding are necessary for rebinding. Thus, by focusing on rebinding, Kristeva insists on the process of unbinding and binding, and the oscillation between them. (shrink)

Manussos Marangudakis traces the roots of environmental concern within both Left and Right political thought.1 He examines the anti-technological and occasionally authoritarian stances of Hamsun, Williamson, Haeckel and Heidegger, and their associations with National Socialism, and compares them to the more recent ideologies of Deep Ecology, Ecofeminism, Eco-Socialism and Social Ecology, and their politics of egalitarianism, equality and autonomy. He concludes that, insofar as ecologists have opted for nature as the prominent pole in the nature and culture divide, their politics (...) has become a pseudo-religion, with “the natural” providing the objective and transcendent source of a new politics and ethics:…. (shrink)

In this review article, the book entitled Emergence Christianity, What it is, Where it is Going, and Why it Matters, written by Phyllis Tickle in 2012, is discussed. The discussion is both informative and critical. The publication, being a follow-up of a book she wrote in 2008, refers to the Great Emergence that is almost in full swing all over the Western and Latinised world. According to Tickle, an Emergence happens approximately every 500 years, and this concerns Christianity as well. (...) As the world is in the 500-year slot after the previous Emergence, the so-called fifth Emergence, nicknamed the Great Emergence, is imminent. (shrink)