It is argued that Block's thought experiment on superblindsight and “the Inverse Anton's syndrome” are not cases of A-consciousness without P-consciousness. “Weak dispositional states” should be excluded from the set of A-conscious states, and a subject's being reflectively conscious of a P-conscious state is suggested as a better candidate for A-consciousness. It is further pointed out that dreams, according to Block's own criterion but contrary to what he claims, are A-unconscious and it is argued that Block should not accept the (...) idea that high-information representational content is an empirically sufficient condition of phenomenality in human beings. (shrink)

The paper is an investigation of the concept ‘reflexivity’ and its possible relation to consciousness. By taking advantage of Knud Grue-Sørensens discussions of ‘reflexivity’ in his treatise Studier over refl eksivitet. En fi losofi sk afhandling, I discuss a number of arguments to the effect that there is an intimate connection between reflexivity, consciousness and epistemology. The idea that pedagogy is somehow essentially related to reflexivity is also briefly taken into consideration.

The following two questions are addressed: to what extent and in what sense are concepts of consciousness subject to plasticity? And what is the relation between brain plasticity and phenomenal consciousness in particular? To answer these questions I discuss the extension thesis of the mind and also take advantage of a number of results from experimental brain science that demonstrate the brain's plasticity with respect to the processing of sensory information and associated qualitative expression. Interpretations of these results in the (...) hands of some researchers within the field of 'embodied cognition' are drawn upon. (shrink)

John Dewey has played a major role for philosophy of education and for educational theory as such. This paper deals with Dewey’s conception of consciousness, an issue which is rarely dealt with. It is claimed that Dewey’s thoughts on this issue are original and has actuality in the light of recent attempts to understand cognition and consciousness as intimately related to the subject’s interaction with the environment.

This paper deals with the epistemological foundations of Jean Piaget’s theory of learning and genetic epistemology. The purpose is to estimate the form of Piaget’s constructivism. I take advantage of Ernst von Glasersfeld’s ‘radical constructivist’ interpretation of Piaget. Contrary to von Glasersfeld, it is argued that Piaget at the same time is a realist with respect to the existence of the external world, and a ‘genetic-transcendental constructivist’ in relation to the development of knowledge. I interpret this paradox as Piaget’s acknowledgement (...) of the co-existence of a 3. person and a 1. person epistemological perspective in the scientific investigation of cognition. (shrink)