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Oliver Thomas Spinney
University of Manchester
  1.  28
    Logical form and logical space in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.Oliver Thomas Spinney - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-23.
    In this article I offer a novel explanation of Wittgenstein’s claim, in his Tractatus, that to represent the logical form of a proposition would require our being positioned outside of logic. The account here presented aims to exploit a connection, widely noticed, between the logical forms of objects and those of the propositions in which the names of those objects figure. I show that the logical forms of propositions may, on Wittgenstein’s view, be identified with places in logical space, and (...)
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  2.  17
    Analysis, Decomposition, and Unity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.Oliver Thomas Spinney - 2022 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 10 (2).
    I argue, through appeal to the distinction between analysis and decomposition described by Dummett, that Wittgenstein employs both of those notions in the Tractatus. I then bring this interpretation to bear upon the issue of propositional unity, where I formulate an objection to the views of both Leonard Linksy and José Zalabardo. I show that both Linsky and Zalabardo fail to acknowledge the distinction between analysis and decomposition present in the Tractatus, and that they consequently mischaracterise Wittgenstein’s position with respect (...)
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  3.  72
    Priority and Unity in Frege and Wittgenstein.Oliver Thomas Spinney - 2018 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6 (5).
    In the following article I intend to examine the problem of the unity of the proposition in Russell, Frege, and Wittgenstein. My chief aim will be to draw attention to the distinction between Russell’s conception of propositional constituents, on the one hand, with Frege and Wittgenstein’s on the other. My focus will be on Russell’s view of terms as independent, propositions being built up out of these building blocks, compared with Frege and Wittgenstein’s ‘top down’ approach. Furthermore, I will argue (...)
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  4.  44
    Bradley and Moore on Common Sense.Oliver Thomas Spinney - 2020 - Idealistic Studies 50 (3):291-313.
    It is well appreciated that Moore, in the final years of the nineteenth century, emphatically rejected the monistic idealism of F. H. Bradley. It has, however, been less widely noticed that Moore’s concern to defeat monism remained with him well into the 1920s. In the following discussion I describe the role that Moore’s adoption of a ‘common sense’ orientation played in his criticisms of Bradley’s monism. I begin by outlining certain distinctive features of Bradley’s sceptical methodology, before describing the contrasting (...)
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