Results for 'Olle Hellström'

78 found
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  1.  60
    Practical Knowledge and Acting Together.Blomberg Olle - 2018 - In J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Socially Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 87-111.
    According to one influential philosophical view of human agency, for an agent to perform an action intentionally is essentially for her to manifest a kind of self-knowledge: An agent is intentionally φ-ing if and only if she has a special kind of practical and non-observational knowledge that this is what she is doing. I here argue that this self-knowledge view faces serious problems when extended to account for intentional actions performed by several agents together as a result of a joint (...)
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  2. Electronic Publishing in France: Closed [Temporarily] for Stock-Taking.Jean-Michel Ollé & Jean-Pierre Sakoun - 2002 - Diogenes 49 (196):80-85.
  3.  10
    Decent Work: A Psychological Perspective.David L. Blustein, Chad Olle, Alice Connors-Kellgren & A. J. Diamonti - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  4.  7
    Preparation for Meaningful Work and Life: Urban High School Youth’s Reflections on Work-Based Learning 1 Year Post-Graduation.Maureen E. Kenny, Christine Catraio, Janine Bempechat, Kelly Minor, Chad Olle, David L. Blustein & Joanne Seltzer - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  5.  12
    L'édition électronique en France : fermeture [provisoire] pour inventaire.Jean Michel Ollé & Jean Pierre Sakoun - 2001 - Diogène 196 (4):104.
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  6. Ollé sesé, manuel; Martín carretero, José moisés; escobar, silvia; castresana, Carlos; lamarca Pérez, carmen; bernabeu, almudena; hormazábal malarée, hernán; aranibar quiroga, antonio; Rodríguez, María elena; Medina Rey, José María; Santos, Carlos (2007). Derechos humanos Y desarrollo. Justicia universal: El Caso latinoamericano. [REVIEW]Marta Figueras I. Badia - 2008 - Enrahonar 40 (41):199.
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  7. Léon Ollé-Laprune.Maurice Blondel - 1923 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 96 (2):306-306.
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  8.  2
    Olle Ferm, Ingela Hedström, Sofia Lodén, Jonatan Pettersson, and Mia Åkestam, Eds., The “Eufemiavisor” and Courtly Culture: Time, Texts and Cultural Transfer. Stockholm: Kungliga Vitterhetsakademien, 2015. Paper. Pp. 288; 17 Color Figures and 11 Tables. 235kr. ISBN: 978-91-7402-436-4.Table of Contents Available Online at Http://Vitterhetsakad.Bokorder.Se/Sv-SE/Article/2750/the-Eufemiavisor-and-Courtly-Culture. [REVIEW]Stefka G. Eriksen - 2019 - Speculum 94 (2):529-531.
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  9. Léon Ollé-Laprune : L'achèvement et l'avenir de son œuvre.Maurice Blondel - 1925 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 32 (4):1-3.
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  10. Léon Ollé-Laprune.Maurice Blondel - 1933 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 40 (4):7-8.
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  11. La vie et les oeuvres de Léon Ollé-Laprune.Émile Boutroux - 1905 - Revue de Philosophie 6:351.
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  12. R. CRIPPA, "Il pensiero di L. Ollé-Laprune". [REVIEW]Emilio Chiocchetti - 1948 - Giornale di Metafisica 3 (4):351.
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  13. Léon Ollé-Laprune et son enseignement à l'École normale.V. Delbos - 1906 - Revue de Philosophie 8:19.
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  14. Vita e Pensiere d'Ollè-Laprune.Romeo Grippa, F. Sciacca & Du même - 1957 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 147:91-91.
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  15. Long-Term Trajectories of Human Civilization.Seth D. Baum, Stuart Armstrong, Timoteus Ekenstedt, Olle Häggström, Robin Hanson, Karin Kuhlemann, Matthijs M. Maas, James D. Miller, Markus Salmela, Anders Sandberg, Kaj Sotala, Phil Torres, Alexey Turchin & Roman V. Yampolskiy - 2019 - Foresight 21 (1):53-83.
    Purpose This paper aims to formalize long-term trajectories of human civilization as a scientific and ethical field of study. The long-term trajectory of human civilization can be defined as the path that human civilization takes during the entire future time period in which human civilization could continue to exist. -/- Design/methodology/approach This paper focuses on four types of trajectories: status quo trajectories, in which human civilization persists in a state broadly similar to its current state into the distant future; catastrophe (...)
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  16. The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    It’s commonly held that particular moral facts are explained by ‘natural’ or ‘descriptive’ facts, though there’s disagreement over how such explanations work. We defend the view that general moral principles also play a role in explaining particular moral facts. More specifically, we argue that this view best makes sense of some intuitive data points, including the supervenience of the moral upon the natural. We consider two alternative accounts of the nature and structure of moral principles—’the nomic view’ and ‘moral platonism’—before (...)
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  17. In Defence of My Favourite Theory.Johan E. Gustafsson & Olle Torpman - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2):159-174.
    One of the principles on how to act under moral uncertainty, My Favourite Theory, says roughly that a morally conscientious agent chooses an option that is permitted by the most credible moral theory. In defence of this principle, we argue that it prescribes consistent choices over time, without relying on intertheoretic comparisons of value, while its main rivals are either plagued by moral analogues of money pumps or in need of a method for making non-arbitrary intertheoretic comparisons. We rebut the (...)
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  18. Common Knowledge and Reductionism About Shared Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.
    Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It (...)
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  19. Shared Goals and Development.Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):94-101.
    In 'Joint Action and Development', Stephen Butterfill argues that if several agents' actions are driven by what he calls a "shared goal"—a certain pattern of goal-relations and expectations—then these actions constitute a joint action. This kind of joint action is sufficiently cognitively undemanding for children to engage in, and therefore has the potential to play a part in fostering their understanding of other minds. Part of the functional role of shared goals is to enable agents to choose means that are (...)
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  20.  84
    The Preemption Problem.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):351-365.
    According to the standard version of the counterfactual comparative account of harm, an event is overall harmful for an individual if and only if she would have been on balance better off if it had not occurred. This view faces the “preemption problem.” In the recent literature, there are various ingenious attempts to deal with this problem, some of which involve slight additions to, or modifications of, the counterfactual comparative account. We argue, however, that none of these attempts work, and (...)
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  21. Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action.Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
    According to a widely accepted constraint on the content of intentions, here called the exclusivity constraint, one cannot intend to perform another agent’s action, even if one might be able to intend that she performs it. For example, while one can intend that one’s guest leaves before midnight, one cannot intend to perform her act of leaving. However, Deborah Tollefsen’s (2005) account of joint activity requires participants to have intentions-in-action (in John Searle’s (1983) sense) that violate this constraint. I argue (...)
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  22.  75
    From Simple to Composite Agency: On Kirk Ludwig’s From Individual to Plural Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2019 - Journal of Social Ontology 5 (1):101-124.
    According to Kirk Ludwig, only primitive actions are actions in a primary and non-derivative sense of the term ‘action’. Ludwig takes this to imply that the notion of collective action is a façon de parler – useful perhaps, but secondary and derivative. I argue that, on the contrary, collective actions are actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. First, this is because some primitive actions are collective actions. Secondly, individual and collective composites of primitive actions are also actions in the (...)
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  23. Shared Intention and the Doxastic Single End Condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if (...)
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  24.  58
    Individual and Collective Action: Reply to Blomberg.Kirk Ludwig - 2019 - Journal of Social Ontology 5 (1):125-146.
    Olle Blomberg challenges three claims in my book From Individual to Plural Agency (Ludwig, Kirk (2016): From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action 1. Vols. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.). The first is that there are no collective actions in the sense in which there are individual actions. The second is that singular action sentences entail that there is no more than one agent of the event expressed by the action verb in the way required by that verb (the (...)
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  25.  36
    Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-11.
    Suppose that, for every possible event and person who would exist whether or not the event were to occur, there is a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were to occur, and a...
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  26.  39
    Intentional Cooperation and Acting as Part of a Single Body.Olle Blomberg - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of him- or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action (...)
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  27.  72
    A New Route From Moral Disagreement to Moral Skepticism.Olle Risberg & Folke Tersman - 2019 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (2):189-207.
    Moral disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for moral realism because it shows that we cannot achieve knowledge of the moral facts the realists posit. In particular, it is "fundamental" moral disagreement—that is, disagreement that is not due to distorting factors such as ignorance of relevant nonmoral facts, bad reasoning skills, or the like—that is supposed to generate skeptical implications. In this paper, we show that this version of the disagreement challenge is flawed as it stands. The reason is (...)
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  28.  41
    The Problem of Justified Harm: A Reply to Gardner.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):735-742.
    In this paper, we critically examine Molly Gardner’s favored solution to what she calls “the problem of justified harm.” We argue that Gardner’s view is false and that her arguments in support of it are unconvincing. Finally, we briefly suggest an alternative solution to the problem which avoids the difficulties that beset Gardner’s proposal.
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  29.  53
    Motor Intentions and Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action: A Standard Story.Olle Blomberg & Chiara Brozzo - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):137-146.
    According to the standard story given by reductive versions of the Causal Theory of Action, an action is an intrinsically mindless bodily movement that is appropriately caused by an intention. Those who embrace this story typically take this intention to have a coarse-grained content, specifying the action only down to the level of the agent's habits and skills. Markos Valaris argues that, because of this, the standard story cannot make sense of the deep reach of our non-observational knowledge of action. (...)
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  30.  29
    Collective Responsibility and Acting Together.Olle Blomberg & Frank Hindriks - 2020 - In Saba Bazargan-Forward & Deborah Tollefsen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility. Routledge.
    What is the moral significance of the contrast between acting together and strategic interaction? We argue that while collective moral responsibility is not uniquely tied to the former, the degree to which the participants in a shared intentional wrongdoing are blameworthy is normally higher than when agents bring about the same wrong as a result of strategic interaction. One argument for this claim focuses on the fact that shared intentions cause intended outcomes in a more robust manner than the intentions (...)
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  31. An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour.Olle Blomberg - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag.
    Philosophical accounts of joint action are often prefaced by the observation that there are two different senses in which several agents can intentionally perform an action Φ, such as go for a walk or capture the prey. The agents might intentionally Φ together, as a collective, or they might intentionally Φ in parallel, where Φ is distributively assigned to the agents, considered as a set of individuals. The accounts are supposed to characterise what is distinctive about activities in which several (...)
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  32. Disentangling the Thick Concept Argument.Olle Blomberg - 2007 - SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):63-78.
    Critics argue that non-cognitivism cannot adequately account for the existence and nature of some thick moral concepts. They use the existence of thick concepts as a lever in an argument against non-cognitivism, here called the Thick Concept Argument (TCA). While TCA is frequently invoked, it is unfortunately rarely articulated. In this paper, TCA is first reconstructed on the basis of John McDowell’s formulation of the argument (from 1981), and then evaluated in the light of several possible non-cognitivist responses. In general, (...)
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  33. Do Socio-Technical Systems Cognise?Olle Blomberg - 2009 - Proceedings of the 2nd AISB Symposium on Computing and Philosophy.
    The view that an agent’s cognitive processes sometimes include proper parts found outside the skin and skull of the agent is gaining increasing acceptance in philosophy of mind. One main empirical touchstone for this so-called active externalism is Edwin Hutchins’ theory of distributed cognition (DCog). However, the connection between DCog and active externalism is far from clear. While active externalism is one component of DCog, the theory also incorporates other related claims, which active externalists may not want to take on (...)
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  34.  93
    We‐Experiences, Common Knowledge, and the Mode Approach to Collective Intentionality.Olle Blomberg - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):183-203.
    According to we-mode accounts of collective intentionality, an experience is a "we-experience"—that is, part of a jointly attentional episode—in virtue of the way or mode in which the content of the experience is given to the subject of experience. These accounts are supposed to explain how a we-experience can have the phenomenal character of being given to the subject "as ours" rather than merely "as my experience" (Zahavi 2015), and do so in a relatively conceptually and cognitively undemanding way. Galotti (...)
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  35.  78
    Intelligent Design and the NFL Theorems.Olle Häggström - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (2):217-230.
    Another look is taken at the model assumptions involved in William Dembski’s (2002a, No Free Lunch: Why Specified Complexity Cannot be Purchased without Intelligence. Roman & Littlefield, Lanham, MA) use of the NFL theorems from optimization theory to disprove the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection, and his argument is shown to be irrelevant to evolutionary biology.
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  36.  47
    Weighting Surprise Parties: Some Problems for Schroeder.Olle Risberg - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (1):101-107.
    In this article I argue against Schroeder's account of the weight of normative reasons. It is shown that in certain cases an agent may have reasons she cannot know about without them ceasing to be reasons, and also reasons she cannot know about at all. Both possibilities are troubling for Schroeder's view.
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  37.  19
    The Importance of Being Rational by Errol Lord. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, Xv + 253 Pp. ISBN: 9780198815099. [REVIEW]Olle Risberg - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):800-804.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  38.  9
    Layered Science and Science Policies.Olle Edqvist - 2003 - Minerva 41 (3):207-221.
    This essay discusses the ways in which `Mode 1' and `Mode 2' interact, by reviewing the development of research funding in Sweden during the twentieth century. It argues that `Mode 2' has been the traditional mode of practice. `Mode 1' is a post-war phenomenon, but it is presently the dominant layer of Swedish publicly-funded science and science policy. This essay argues that we are seeing not an increase in uncertainty, but rather a decreasing tolerance of uncertainty.
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  39.  23
    The Case for Emissions Egalitarianism.Olle Torpman - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (3):749-762.
    There is a fixed limit on the greenhouse gas emissions that the atmosphere can absorb before triggering dangerous climate changes. One of the debates in climate ethics concerns how the available emissions should be divided between people. One popular answer, sometimes called “Emissions Egalitarianism”, proposes a distribution of emissions permits that gives everyone an equal per capita share of the atmospheric absorptive capacity. However, several debaters have objected to EE. First, it has been argued that there is no principled reason (...)
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  40.  79
    The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy.Olle Risberg - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):542-559.
    According to many popular views in normative ethics, meta-ethics and axiology, facts about what we ought to do or what is good for us depend on facts about the attitudes that some agent would have in some relevant idealized circumstances. This paper presents an unrecognized structural problem for such views which threatens to be devastating.
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  41.  19
    Experimental Philosophy, Ethnomethodology, and Intentional Action: A Textual Analysis of the Knobe Effect.Gustav Lymer & Olle Blomberg - 2019 - Human Studies 42 (4):673-694.
    In “Intentional action and side-effects in ordinary language” (2003), Joshua Knobe reported an asymmetry in test subjects’ responses to a question about intentionality: subjects are more likely to judge that a side effect of an agent’s intended action is intentional if they think the side effect is morally bad than if they think it is morally good. This result has been taken to suggest that the concept of intentionality is an inherently moral concept. In this paper, we draw attention to (...)
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  42.  28
    Harming and failing to benefit: a reply to purves.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1539-1548.
    A prominent objection to the counterfactual comparative account of harm is that it classifies as harmful some events that are, intuitively, mere failures to benefit. In an attempt to solve this problem, Duncan Purves has recently proposed a novel version of the counterfactual comparative account, which relies on a distinction between making upshots happen and allowing upshots to happen. In this response, we argue that Purves’s account is unsuccessful. It fails in cases where an action makes the subject occupy a (...)
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  43.  40
    Bennett W. Helm: Communities of Respect – Grounding Responsibility, Authority, and Dignity: Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017. Hardback 57.13€. 261 + X Pp. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (2):441-443.
  44.  14
    Asynchronous Recruitment of Low-Threshold Motor Units During Repetitive, Low-Current Stimulation of the Human Tibial Nerve.Jesse C. Dean, Joanna M. Clair-Auger, Olle Lagerquist & David F. Collins - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
  45.  42
    Review of Lilian O’Brien’s ‘Philosophy of Action’. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2017 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 21 (3).
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  46.  73
    Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together By Michael Bratman. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):346-348.
  47.  1
    Isolationism and the Equal Per Capita View.Olle Torpman - forthcoming - Environmental Politics 7:2020.
    In climate ethics, there is a debate about how the carbon budget, in terms of emissions permits, should be divided between people. One popular proposal, sometimes called The Equal per Capita View, says that everyone should have an equal share of the available emissions permits. Several authors have objected to this view, arguing that: (i) the equal per capita view implies isolationism since it treats emissions permits in isolation from other considerations of justice such as development, poverty and trade; and (...)
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  48.  33
    Review of Kirk Ludwig, From Individual to Plural Agency, Collective Action: Volume 1. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):626-628.
  49.  24
    Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind", by Ian Apperly. [REVIEW]Olle Blomberg - 2011 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 15 (13).
  50.  4
    News in Our Minds.Olle Findahl - 1998 - Communications 23 (4):409-426.
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