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  1. Comparing Phases of Skepticism in Al-Ghazālī and Descartes: Some First Meditations on Deliverance From Error.Omar Edward Moad - 2009 - Philosophy East and West 59 (1):pp. 88-101.
    Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī (1058–1111 c.e .) is well known, among other things, for his account, in al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl (Deliverance from error), of a struggle with philosophical skepticism that bears a striking resemblance to that described by Descartes in the Meditations . This essay aims to give a close comparative analysis of these respective accounts, and will concentrate solely on the processes of invoking or entertaining doubt that al-Ghazālī and Descartes describe, respectively. In the process some subtle differences between them (...)
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    Al-Ghazali’s Occasionalism and the Natures of Creatures.Omar Edward Moad - 2005 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 58 (2):95-101.
  3. Al-Ghazali’s Occasionalism and the Natures of Creatures.Omar Edward Moad - 2005 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 58 (2):95 - 101.
    Occasionalism is the doctrine that God is the sole immediate cause of all events, to the exclusion of any causal participation on the part of creatures. While this doctrine clearly has interesting implications with regard to causation and the philosophy of natural science, few have noticed that it also seems to entail, not only that creatures have no causal power whatsoever, but that they are completely devoid of intrinsic natures, conceived as intrinsic dispositional properties. In this paper, I will outline (...)
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    Reasons, Resultance and Moral Particularism.Moad Omar Edward - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):112-116.
    According to Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism, the way in which a given moral reason functions as a reason for or against an action can vary from case to case. Dancy also asserts that reasons are resultance bases. But a reason why something ought to be done is that in virtue of which it is something that ought to be done. If the function of a reason can vary, then resultance bases cannot be reasons. Perhaps the particularist might conceive a reason (...)
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