Trust is valuable when placed in trustworthy agents and activities, but damaging or costly when placed in untrustworthy agents and activities. So it is puzzling that much contemporary work on trust – such as that based on polling evidence – studies generic attitudes of trust in types of agent, institution or activity in complete abstraction from any account of trustworthiness. Information about others’ generic attitudes of trust or mistrust that take no account of evidence whether those attitudes are well or (...) ill placed can offer little or no help for those who aim to place or refuse trust well. Information about attitudes is evidently useful to those who aim to influence those who hold them, which explains why polls about attitudes are popular with political parties, advertisers and other campaigning organisations. But where we aim not to influence others, but to place and refuse trust intelligently we must link trust to trustworthiness, and must focus on evidence of honesty, competence and r... (shrink)
Kant’s Groundwork is the most read and surely the most exasperating of his works on practical philosophy. Both its structure and its arguments remain obscure and controversial. A quick list of unsettled questions reminds one how much is in doubt. The list might include the following: Why does Kant shift the framework of his discussion three times in a short work? Does he establish that there is a supreme principle of morality? Does he show that the Categorical Imperative is that (...) supreme principle? Does he show that human beings are free agents for whom such principles of morality are important? What is the relationship between the various apparently distinct formulations of the Categorical Imperative? To what extent are any of them action-guiding? (shrink)
Human rights have been the principal ethical ingredients of ‘ethical foreign policy’. Some human rights promulgated in UN and other Declarations are more aspirational than achievable; others are of variable importance. So we need to look behind the Declarations to see which human rights claims should be taken most seriously. I shall argue that we take rights seriously only if we take the counterpart obligations seriously, and can take obligations seriously only if we connect them to the capabilities of the (...) agents and agencies who will have to discharge them. A realistic view of those agents and agencies cannot be based on the assumption that the relevant agents are all of them states, since this line of thought collapses where states are weak or failing. A realistic account of agency, or of obligations, a fortiori of rights has to take certain types of non-state actors and their obligations seriously. (shrink)
Kant’s essay Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose differs in deep ways from standard Enlightenment views of human history. Although he agrees with many contemporaries that unsocial sociability can drive human progress, he argues that we know too little about the trends of history to offer either metaphysical defence or empirical vindication of the perfectibility of man or the inevitability of progress. However, as freely acting beings we can contribute to a better future, so have grounds for (...) committing ourselves to human progress even if we cannot guarantee or know that it will continue indefinitely. As Kant sees, it, human progress is better seen as a practical assumption—an Idea of Reason—than as a theoretical claim.Keywords: Cosmopolitanism; Historical trends; Ideas of Reason; Immanuel Kant; Philosophy of history; Optimism; Pessimism; Progress; Unsocial sociability. (shrink)