Neurological disorders of body representation have for a long time suggested the importance of multisensory processing of bodily signals for self-consciousness. One such group of disorders – illusory own body perceptions affecting the entire body – has been proposed to be especially relevant in this respect, based on neurological data as well as philosophical considerations. This has recently been tested experimentally in healthy subjects showing that integration of multisensory bodily signals from the entire body with respect (...) to the three aspects: self-location, first-person perspective, and self-location, is crucial for bodily self-consciousness. Here we present clinical and neuroanatomical data of two neurological patients with paroxysmal disorders of full body representation in whom only one of these aspects, self-identification, was abnormal. We distinguish such disorders of global body representation from related but distinct disorders and discuss their relevance for the neurobiology of bodily self-consciousness. (shrink)

El objetivo principal de este artículo es sostener que el sentimiento de lo sublime - tal como es planteado por Kant en la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar- supone el vínculo de la mente con el cuerpo propio. De otro modo, no podríamos explicar la variación de las fuerzas vitales que caracteriza al sentimiento de lo sublime. Ahora bien, la conciencia de la propia corporalidad constituye una condición necesaria - aunque no suficiente- del sentimiento de lo sublime. Consideramos que (...) además de la conciencia de las propias fuerzas vitales, el sentimiento de lo sublime supone la referencia a un principio espiritual. Por estos motivos, creemos que el sentimiento de lo sublime implica una superposición del sentimiento de vida y el sentimiento del espíritu. Con el fin de iluminar algunos aspectos problemáticos presentes en la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar, analizaremos algunos pasajes pertenecientes a la Antropología en sentido pragmático. The principal aim of this article is to support that the feeling of the sublime -as it is considered by Kant in the Critique of the power of Judgment- supposes the link of the mind with the own body. Otherwise, we might not explain the variation of the vital forces that characterizes the feeling of the sublime. However, the conscience of the own corporeality constitutes a necessary condition -though not sufficient- of the feeling of the sublime. We think that besides the conscience of the own vital forces, the feeling of the sublime supposes the reference to a spiritual principle. For these reasons, we think that the feeling of the sublime implies an overlapping of the feeling of life and the feeling of the spirit. In order to illuminate some problematic aspects in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, we will analyze some passages belonging to the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. (shrink)

How do we know the position and movements of our limbs? Wittgenstein repeatedly deals with one received answer to this epistemological question: our ‘kinaesthetic sensations’ teach us about our posture and movements. However, he does not reject only this specific solution. He puts into question the very idea of an epistemology of bodily awareness. His critical arguments are not simply reductionist, but neither are they “mainly introspective”, and nor does he lean towards a “perceptual view”. The paper also touches upon (...) the issue of how Wittgenstein's views relate to Anscombe’s much discussed claim that one ordinarily knows the position of one’s limbs “without observation”. (shrink)

What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.

Autoscopic phenomena are complex experiences that include the visual illusory reduplication of one’s own body. From a phenomenological point of view, we can distinguish three conditions: autoscopic hallucinations, heautoscopy, and out-of-body experiences. The dysfunctional pattern involves multisensory disintegration of personal and extrapersonal space perception. The etiology, generally either neurological or psychiatric, is different. Also, the hallucination of Self and own body image is present during dreams and differs according to sleep stage. Specifically, the representation of the Self (...) in REM dreams is frequently similar to the perception of Self in wakefulness, whereas in NREM dreams, a greater polymorphism of Self and own body representation is observed. The parallels between autoscopic phenomena in pathological cases and the Self-hallucination in dreams will be discussed to further the understanding of the particular states of self awareness, especially the complex integration of different memory sources in Self and body representation. (shrink)

Locke claims that a person’s identity over time consists in the unity of consciousness, not in the sameness of the body. Similarly, the phenomenological approach refuses to see the criteria of identity as residing in some externally observable bodily features. Nevertheless, it does not accept the idea that personal identity has to consist either in consciousness or in the body. We are self-aware as bodily beings. After providing a brief reassessment of Locke and the post-Lockean discussion, the article (...) draws on phenomenological arguments that show the body as lived, that is, lived as one’s own body, but also possibly as “other” or “strange.” Against what has been claimed in recent writing, especially in literature on Merleau-Ponty, the author argues that the “mineness” of the body and its “alterity” are not two mutually exclusive features. In the final part of the article, the author suggests that the becoming strange of one’s own body may legitimately be considered as a prominent experience of what it means to be a person. (shrink)

Dysfunctional body- and shape-related attentional biases are involved in the aetiology and maintenance of eating disorders (ED). Various studies suggest that women, particularly those with ED diagnoses, focus on negatively evaluated parts of their own body, which leads to an increase in body dissatisfaction. The present study aims to empirically test the hypothesis that non-ED women show an attentional bias towards negative body parts, and that the focus on positive and negative parts of one’s own (...) class='Hi'>body can be modified by attentional bias modification training based on a dot-probe task. Although several studies have measured body-related attentional biases by using pictures of participants’ own bodies, the approach of investigating attentional bias via a dot-probe task while presenting pictures of the participants’ own body parts and modifying the biased attention using such pictures is novel. Women (n = 60) rank-ordered ten parts of their own body regarding their attractiveness. To examine and modify the attentional focus, pictures of the self-defined positive and negative parts of one’s own body were presented by means of a dot-probe task. A paired-sample t-test revealed no difference between reaction times to negative compared to positive body parts, indicating no attentional bias towards negative parts of one’s own body. A two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of time for pictures of positive and negative parts of one’s own body, with a decrease in reaction times from pre- to post-training. However, there was no significant interaction between time and training condition concerning reaction times to positive and negative body parts. Our findings replicate previous evidence of a balanced attentional pattern regarding one’s own body in women without ED diagnoses. However, the dot-probe task failed to modify the attentional focus. As the modifiability of state body image increases with more pronounced body dissatisfaction, the next step would be to test this approach in clinical samples of women with ED diagnoses. (shrink)

The paper discusses the unique relationship that exists between the ego and one’s own body. There are two fundamental possibilities to grasp it – using the verb “to be” or “to have,” which results in two known formulas: “to be the body” or “to have the body.” However, after careful examination, it turns out that they are one-sided and entangle us in numerous aporias. A more complete picture of the relationships with one’s own body is made (...) possible by a phenomenological description, which is a first-person and direct approach. The body, given in numerous experiences, turns out to be paradoxical and ambiguous. This is also my relation with it – it is feeling myself and others, getting to know myself and the world; an internal and at the same time external bond, at most my own experience along with the need to transcend the body. Finally, we consider whether the category of “relationship” resp. “relation” matches the experience of one’s own body. Perhaps a better solution is to give up this term and describe the body as a character of human being. (shrink)

In this essay I take issue with Derek Parfit's reductionist account of personal identity.Parfit is concerned to respond to what he sees as flaws in the conception of the role of 'person' in self-interest theories. He attempts to show that the notion of a person as something over and above a totality of mental and physical states and events (in his words, a 'further fact'), is empty, and so, our ethical concerns must be based on something other than this. My (...) objections centre around the claim that Parfit employs an impoverished conception of 'life'. Parfit misconceives the connection between 'I' and one's body, and, so, despite his rejection of a metaphysical conception of 'self', remains within the logic of Cartesianism. What Parfit and other reductionists call an 'impersonal' perspective, I shall call the third-person perspective: a perspective which one in general may take. Against Parfit I shall offer a more complex conception of 'self' through the concept of 'bodily perspective'. I emphasize the irreducible ambiguities of human embodiment in order to show the presuppositions and the limitations of Parfit's view. Of interest is the conception of time and the model of continuity that is appropriate to an embodied subject's life. I employ Paul Ricoeur's concept of 'human time' to argue that the reflective character of human experience demands a model of temporality and continuity that differs significantly from the one Parfit employs. (shrink)

What are the epistemic bases of the knowledge of the reality of our own body? Proprioception plays a primordial role in body representation and more particularly at the level of body schema. Without proprioception people can feel amputated and the mislocalization of proprioceptive information through the remapping of the Penfield Homonculus induces illusions of phantom limbs, illusions that contradictory visual feedback cannot erase. However, it turns out that it is not as simple as that and that vision (...) also intervenes in body knowledge: vision of one's own body allows deafferented patients to move and phantom limbs to disappear. Finally, the existence of phantom limbs in aplasic patients as well as studies on neonates provide evidence of an innate component of body representation. (shrink)

Subtle bodily sensations such as itching or fluttering that occur in the absence of any external trigger may serve to locate the spatial boundaries of the body. They may constitute the normal counterpart of extreme conditions in which body-related hallucinations and perceptual aberrations are experienced. Previous investigations have suggested that situations in which the body is spontaneously experienced as being deformed are related to the ability to perform own-body transformations, i.e., mental rotations of the body (...) requiring disembodiment. We therefore decided to consider whether the perception of SPS might relate to embodiment as assessed through the ability to perform own-body transformations and schizotypal traits, since high degrees of schizotypy in the general population have been associated with more vivid perceptions and aberrant perceptual experiences. Then participants completed a standard SPS task. Our analysis revealed that the slower the response time in the OBT task, the more frequent the perception of SPS. This suggests that difficulties in disembodying and mentally transforming one’s own body facilitate feeling oneself. Furthermore, a greater number of correct responses in the OBT task was associated with less frequent perception of SPS. This suggests that finding it easier to disembody and perform mental own-body transformations interferes with the ability to sense oneself. The results also show that higher schizotypal traits, as assessed through the SPQ, are associated with more frequent perception of SPS. Taken together, these results provide a coherent picture and suggest that embodiment is required in order to correctly feel oneself, as expressed through the perception of SPS. The ability to easily experience disembodiment reduces the sense of feeling oneself, and proneness to schizotypal traits produces body misperceptions that enhance and amplify this feeling. The results are discussed in the light of current knowledge and theories about body representations, taking into account attention and interoception as factors that influence body awareness. We offer explanations for perceptual aberrations, body-related delusions, and hallucinations based on misperceived or misinterpreted SPS, and we discuss possible mechanisms that may contribute to feeling and misperceiving oneself. (shrink)

In the abstract the word “self-location” is repeated twice. The second “self-location” was meant to be “self-identification”. The correct sentence reads below:This has recently been tested experimentally in healthy subjects showing that integration of multisensory bodily signals from the entire body with respect to the three aspects: self-location, first-person perspective, and self-identification, is crucial for bodily self-consciousness.

Focusing on the reception of Maine de Biran by Alexis Bertrand in his thesis, L’aperception du corps humain par la conscience (1880), I will demonstrate how the “corps propre” (one’s own body) becomes a key concept in order to re-orientate the French spiritualist movement. To do so, Bertrand’s neo-Biranism uses a new methodology with phenomenological issues. The image of the body, the primitive space or the engagement within the world becomes new research themes for spiritualism. His interpretation of (...) Biran’s philosophy leads him to criticize mechanistic epistemology, and especially the concept of reflex. In this context, Bertrand proposes an animist metaphysics, aiming to reconcile his Biranism with the advances of science. As a consequence, the history of the concept of one’s own body must take into account metaphysical perspectives and not only scientific and experimental researches. (shrink)

This paper examines phenomenology’s idea of the body as «one’s own» by establishing a dialogue between Merleau-Ponty and the Brazilian novelist, Clarice Lispector. Central to this study is the question of to what extent the anonymous undercurrent of existence is threat to bodily integrity. In response to this question, the paper unfolds in two stages. First, I pursue an analysis of the body in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, giving special focuses to the role anonymity plays in the constitution of the (...) body as one’s own. Arguing that Merleau-Ponty tends to underplay the disruptive implications of his thought, I then turn to Clarice Lispector’s novel The Passion According to G.H. The motivation for pairing Lispector and Merleau- Ponty is twofold: first, Lispector provides a subtle and incisive analysis of the affective experience of anonymity; two, Lispector issues a challenge to phenomenology to rethink the division between selfhood and elemental materiality. (shrink)

Scholars have long recognized the importance of liberty in Milton's early prose, but they tend to center their analysis on republicanism. Although he would go on to express republicanism, Milton's early tracts tie liberty to English political and legal traditions rather than classical ones. Milton, in his early tracts, utilizes the language of the ancient constitution and the common law as he centers liberty on the property and bodies of English citizens, thus framing liberty in distinctly English terms. Additionally, Milton's (...) early prose accepts the power of the monarch, revealing Milton's initial commitment to the existing political structure. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the reasons why sometimes good arguments in health communication leaflets fail to convince the targeted audience. As an illustrative example it uses the age-dependent eligibility of women in the Netherlands to receive routine breast cancer screening examinations: according to Dutch regulations women under 50 are ineligible for them. The present qualitative study rests on and complements three experimental studies on the persuasiveness of mammography information leaflets; it uses interviews to elucidate reasons why the arguments in (...) the health communication leaflets for the exclusion of women under 50 from routine mammographic screenings do not work. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to present the vision that Merleau-Ponty has on the human body approached in a way that could be called the phenomenology of corporeality – in which what is actually important is the experience of being embodied, perception, bodily scheme, the structural unit and the meaning. By deliberately blending ambiguity and clarity of allegations, Merleau-Ponty creates a background which supports perception as a way of access toward the Being.

RESUMEN Se defiende la tesis de que la teoría kantiana del espacio, en el contexto del idealismo trascendental, constituye un marco adecuado para solucionar la paradoja de las contrapartidas incongruentes. Se incluyen dos hipótesis: a) la solución kantiana implica una referencia a la conciencia de la propia corporalidad, para comprender cómo poseemos la capacidad para orientarnos en el espacio; b) no existe contradicción en el uso kantiano de las contrapartidas incongruentes en diferentes estadios de su pensamiento. La solución kantiana de (...) 1768 constituye una versión germinal del desarrollo que culminará en la teoría idealista trascendental acerca del espacio como una forma de nuestra sensibilidad. ABSTRACT The article argues that the Kantian theory of space, in the context of transcendental idealism, constitutes an adequate framework to resolve the paradox of incongruent counterparts. Two hypotheses are considered: a) the Kantian solution implies a reference to the awareness of one's corporeity in order to understand how we have the capacity to orient ourselves in space; b) there is no contradiction in the Kantian use of incongruent counterparts throughout the different stages of his thought. The Kantian solution of 1768 is a germinal version of the development leading up to the transcendental idealist theory of space as a form of our sensibility. (shrink)

I argue here that our rights in our bodies are not well explained by self-ownership – and thus, also, that we cannot infer any further distributive implications of self-ownership from intuitions about body rights via inference to the best explanation. And I sketch an alternative view, on which we do indeed own our bodies, but not because we own ourselves. Self-ownership, I argue, provides a satisfying explanation only if we take it seriously: not as a mere metaphor, but as (...) an expression of a literal, reflexive ownership relation between me and myself, whatever I myself am. I go on to canvas the most prominent theories of what human beings like me literally are, arguing that each of these theories makes it hard to see how our self-ownership can ground our rights in our bodies. In the second half I consider and refine alternative, interest-based, explanations of our rights in our bodies, drawing on suggestions in this direction from Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen and Alan Wertheimer. I show how it is possible in principle to affirm that body ownership rights remain (in a sense) natural rights, even on the sort of interest-based view of ownership that many (including myself) take to preclude all or most fully natural property rights. I argue that many body rights can be grounded prefiguratively, in facts about the possible emergence of sufficiently just authority-assigning practices, rather than (as with most property rights) in their actual existence. Finally, I return to the distributive issues that motivated much interest in self-ownership in the first place – particularly, the question of whether and in what way our rights in our bodies generate rights in other things, by labor or otherwise. Without actually answering this question, I show how the account developed here would proceed in doing so: not by positing body rights as a methodologically prior constraint on rights of other kinds, but rather by considering the implications entire systems of rights and duties have for the interests of those who possess and are bound by them. (shrink)

Monstrosity has its recognized place in cultural narratives but in philosophical discourse it remains mostly untouched. In my paper I make an attempt at phenomenological inquiry into the experience of the Other’s monstrous body. I am beginning with some remarks concerning Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault, the philosophers who devoted some attention to the problem of monstrosity and the monstrous, but my analysis is mainly based on the works of Bernhard Waldenfels, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Waldenfels emphasizes that (...) the corporeal self is somehow perceived as alien, always somewhat distanced and not totally graspable. He also argues that the closer the Other, the stronger activation of the boundary between the spheres of the ownness and the alienness is caused. A promising framework for the analysis of the ambivalent reaction brought about by the encounter with a monstrous human body can be provided by Husserl’s phenomenological inquiry into the process of pairing, developed in his Cartesian meditations. It seems that in this experience the pairing process is frustrating and deranged because the process of apperception is disturbed by a cluster of untypical or quite unique characteristics of the monstrous body. In result, its sense remains unclear, puzzling and challenging. Interesting light on the experience of the Other’s monstrous body could shed Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, especially the ideas of flesh and chiasm outlined in his last work. The radical character of the monster, while does not render it something totally different from the own, elucidates, however, the contingency of the order under which the human corporeality is subsumed. (shrink)

The body mandala, or, How your brain maps the world -- The little man in the brain, or, Why your genitals are even smaller than you think -- Dueling body maps, or, Why you still feel fat after losing weight -- The homunculus in the game, or, When thinking is as good as doing -- Plasticity gone awry, or, When body maps go blurry -- Broken body maps, or, Why Dr. Strangelove couldn't keep his hand down (...) -- The bubble around the body, or, Why you seek elbow room -- Sticks and stones and cyberbones, or, The end of the body as we know it? -- Mirror, mirror, or, Why yawning is contagious -- Heart of the mandala, or, My insula made me do it -- Afterword, or, The you-ness of you. (shrink)

This essay investigates the idea of self-proprietorship as the concealed ideological basis beneath our most fraught ethical discourses on bodily matters pertaining to birth, health, sex and death. It questions the sense in which such discourses, and their corresponding societal practices, in turn serve as a practical apology for this troubling anthropology that has come to sustain capitalism. ‘Self-proprietorship’ is analysed for its phenomenological basis in the actual task of learning to own one’s body, and traced in its early (...) philosophical instantiations in Hobbes and Locke. These sources are then contrasted with an account of non-proprietary possession of one’s body, rooted in the astonishing authority granted the spouses in Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, a nuanced treatment of porneia and chastity, and the evocative bodily receptions of Christian worship. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Preface ix -- Chapter One: Technology, Technique, and the Body 3 --Chapter Two: The First Technology: Bottle-Feeding 30 --Chapter Three: Slow Motion: Zori 51 --Chapter Four: Double Time: Athletic Shoes 75 --Chapter Five: Sitting Up Straight: Posture Chairs 104 --Chapter Six: Laid Back: Reclining Chairs 134 --Chapter Seven: Mechanical Arts: Musical Keyboards 161 --Chapter Eight: Letter Perfect?: Text Keyboards 187 --Chapter Nine: Second Sight: Eyeglasses 213 --Chapter Ten: Hardheaded Logic: Helmets 238 --Epilogue: Thumbs Up 263 (...) -- Notes 269 --Suggestionsfor Further Reading 302 --Index 305. (shrink)

In 1890 a man sold the rights to his body after death to the Royal Caroline Institute in Sweden for research purposes. Later, he tried to return the money and cancel the contract. In the subsequent lawsuit, the court held that he must turn his body over to the Institute and also ordered him to pay damages for diminishing the worth of his body by having two teeth removed.Today, it would be an anathema for a person's (...) class='Hi'>body to be used against his wishes and for a research subject not to be allowed to withdraw from a study. In fact, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act allows people to change their minds and withdraw a previous agreement to donate organs and tissue after their death and the federal research regulations allow people to withdraw from studies without penalty or loss of benefits. (shrink)

This essay examines control discourse in and out of educational settings, arguing that illusions of control are among the means by which governance is accomplished in domains far from schools. The tactical productivity of such illusions in non-school settings "necessitates" and explicates their prevalence in education. The first installment of this essay identifies some assumptions undergirding dominant control and management discourse; analyzes discussions of control in fields other education; and briefly examines the role that social location plays in fostering specific (...) understandings of control. A later installment will focus more narrowly on education, music education specifically. The author maintains that recognizing the limits of governmentality, bankrupting illusions of control, and uncoupling associations between uncertainty and terror, are powerful political disruptions. Acknowledging that classroom control may be neither achievable nor desirable may open the door to different understandings of classroom power relations and to re-articulations of the purposes of schooling. (shrink)

In the final installment of her two-part essay, Julia Eklund Koza analyzes prevalent control and management discourse in education, specifically, music education. Arguing that dominant understandings are hierarchical, gendered, illusory, and integrally related to projects and practices largely unrelated to schooling, she invites teachers and teacher educators to explore the possibilities created when different assumptions about teaching and control are applied. Koza maintains that recognizing the limits of governmentality, bankrupting illusions of control, and uncoupling associations between uncertainty and terror are (...) powerful political disruptions. Acknowledging that classroom control may be neither achievable nor desirable may open the door to different understandings of classroom power relations and to re-articulations of the purposes of schooling. Koza calls for the use of different metaphors and frames as a first step in achieving different educational outcomes. (shrink)

In the final installment of her two-part essay, Julia Eklund Koza analyzes prevalent control and management discourse in education, specifically, music education. Arguing that dominant understandings are hierarchical, gendered, illusory, and integrally related to projects and practices largely unrelated to schooling, she invites teachers and teacher educators to explore the possibilities created when different assumptions about teaching and control are applied. Koza maintains that recognizing the limits of governmentality, bankrupting illusions of control, and uncoupling associations between uncertainty and terror are (...) powerful political disruptions. Acknowledging that classroom control may be neither achievable nor desirable may open the door to different understandings of classroom power relations and to re-articulations of the purposes of schooling. Koza calls for the use of different metaphors and frames as a first step in achieving different educational outcomes. (shrink)

Washington University v. Catalona revolves around ownership of tissue samples provided by patients for research purposes, raising significant ethical and legal questions concerning patient rights, current human research practices, and the treatment of samples as capital resources by the research institution.

Courts usually treat control over human bodies and body parts as a property issue and find that people do not have property rights in themselves. This contradicts the liberal philosophical principle that people should be able to perform any self-regarding actions that do not cause harm to others. The philosophical inconsistencies under pinning the legal treatment of body parts arguably stem from a misplaced judicial preoccupation with‘ property ’. A better approach would be to hold a policy inquiry (...) into the degree of liberty a society wishes to grant its inhabitants. Only once this substantive issue has been addressed should property be raised as a possible method of implementing the policy. (shrink)

When part of a person's body is separated from them, or when a person dies, it is unclear what legal status the item of bodily material is able to obtain. A 'no property rule' which states that there is no property in the human body was first recorded in an English judgment in 1882. Claims based on property rights in the human body and its parts have failed on the basis that the human body is not (...) the subject of property. Despite a recent series of exceptions to the 'no property rule', the law still has no clear answer as to the legal status of the body or its material. In this book, Wall examines the appropriate legal status of bodily material, and in doing so, develops a way for the law to address disputes over the use and storage of bodily material that, contrary to the current trend, resists the application of property law. Wall assesses when a person ought to be able to possess, control, use, or profit from, his or her own bodily material or the bodily material of another person. Bodily material may be valuable because it retains a functional unity with the body or is a material resource that is in short supply. With this in mind, Wall measures the extent to which property law can represent the rights and duties that protects the entitlement that a person may exercise in bodily material, and identifies the limits to the appropriate application of property law. An alternative to property law is developed with reference to the right of bodily integrity and the right to privacy. (shrink)