Childhood innocence has often been treated by scholars as an empty, idealised signifier. This article contests such accounts, arguing that innocence is best regarded as a powerfully unmarked training in heternormativity, alongside class and race norms. This claim will be demonstrated through attention to two recent films addressing childhood: Celine Sciamma’s Tomboy and P.J. Hogan’s Peter Pan. The films characterise young femininity as an ‘impossible space’, in which subjects face the contradictory, schizoid demands to simultaneously show both childhood innocence (...) and heteronormative femininity – or else face the threat of a spoiled identity. The plot of each film traces how the protagonist attempts to manoeuvre in the face of and precisely using this contradiction. In dramatising such manoeuvring, the films reveal the surprising forms of subjectivity that can be inhabited for a time in the interstices between age and gender norms, and which might have lasting value. Both films thus drama... (shrink)
This paper documents the types and amounts of aid exchanged between adults and their non-coresidential parents. Data for the study are drawn from a representative national sample survey of Americans age 19 and older conducted in 1987–1988. Exchanges of monetary and material resources, childcare, household assistance, and companionship and advice are considered.Patterns of intergenerational exchange are found to differ by gender, family structure, age, ethnicity, and socioeconomic situation. Differences in exchange between males and females and between whites and Mexican-Americans are (...) related to other life-course characteristics, and to the availability and proximity of kin. Blacks and persons living in poverty are shown to be less involved than other groups in intergenerational exchanges. Finally, patterns of prior assistance and the available needs and resources of the respondents and their parents are found to influence current patterns of exchange. (shrink)
Everyone, it seems, is talking and arguing about Evidence-Based Practice. Those therapies and assessments designated as EBP increasingly determine what is taught, researched, and reimbursed in health care. But exactly what is it, and how do you do it? The second edition of Clinician's Guide to Evidence-Based Practices is the concise, practitioner-friendly guide to applying EBPs in mental health. Step-by-step it explains how to conduct the entire EBP process-asking the right questions, accessing the best available research, appraising the research, translating (...) that research into practice, integrating that research with clinician expertise and patient characteristics, evaluating the entire enterprise, attending to the ethical considerations, and when done, moving the EBP process forward by teaching and disseminating it. This book will help you:. Formulate useful questions that research can address. Search the research literature efficiently for best practices. Make sense out of the research morass, sifting wheat from chaff. Incorporate patient values and diversity into the selection of EBP. Blend clinician expertise with the research evidence. Translate empirical research into practice. Ensure that your clients receive effective, research-supported services. Infuse the EBP process into your organizational setting and training methods. Identify and integrate ethics in the context of EBP Coauthored by a distinguished quartet of clinicians, researchers, and a health care librarian, the Clinician's Guide has become the classic for graduate students and busy professionals mastering EBP. ". (shrink)
We examine the problem of deducing the geodesic motion of test particles from Einstein's vacuum field equations and its extension to include gravitational radiation reaction. In the latter case we obtain an equation of motion for a particle which incorporates radiation reaction of the electrodynamical type, but due to shearing radiation, together with a mass-loss formula of the Bondi-Sachs type.
Retrieval of relevant unstructured information from the ever-increasing textual communications of individuals and businesses has become a major barrier to effective litigation/defense, mergers/acquisitions, and regulatory compliance. Such e-discovery requires simultaneously high precision with high recall (high-P/R) and is therefore a prototype for many legal reasoning tasks. The requisite exhaustive information retrieval (IR) system must employ very different techniques than those applicable in the hyper-precise, consumer search task where insignificant recall is the accepted norm. We apply Russell, et al.’s cognitive task (...) analysis of sensemaking by intelligence analysts to develop a semi-autonomous system that achieves high IR accuracy of F1 ≥ 0.8 compared to F1 < 0.4 typical of computer-assisted human-assessment (CAHA) or alternative approaches such as Roitblat, et al.’s. By understanding the ‘Learning Loop Complexes’ of lawyers engaged in successful small-scale document review, we have used socio-technical design principles to create roles, processes, and technologies for scalable human-assisted computer-assessment (HACA). Results from the NIST-TREC Legal Track’s interactive task from both 2008 and 2009 validate the efficacy of this sensemaking approach to the high-P/R IR task. (shrink)
This article began as a paper read at the ‘Embedded Memory and the Theological Contours of Division’ seminar held at Trinity College, Dublin in December 2011. I should like to thank Professor Linda Hogan of the Irish School of Ecumenics at Trinity for the opportunity of rehearsing these ideas in that forum.
The relevance of the research is manifested in the fact that organizational culture is an important and penetrating everywhere concept with regards to influence on organizational change programmes. Literature analysis shows that there is ambiguity in the assessment of organizational culture. A certain outcome of a cultural variable may have not the same effect on all organizational processes associated with management activity.. According to Melnick, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the processes of management and management culture changes (...) hapenning in the modern world, it is appropriate to evaluate contemporary management practices that reflect the effects of historically composed life modes and stereotypes that manifest themselves in management activities. The research aim: to discuss the factors and stages forming organizational culture development. Analysis of recent research and publications. Organizational culture is analyzed in various contexts. Organizational culture models and their components have been defined by Schein, Ostroff et al., et al., the significance of organizational culture is analyzed ; McLoughlin and Miura ; Di Pietro and Di Virgilio et al. The issues of forming/changing organizational culture remain of topical significance. Researches on this topic were carried out and the summarized results were submitted in their scientific papers by Bititci et al ; Gibbons and Kaplan, Mungiu-Pupăzan ; Hogan et al et al. In the study Hogan et al a key result is how layers of organizational culture, particularly norms, artifacts, and innovative behaviors, partially mediate the effects of values that support innovation on measures of firm performance. The objectives of the research: to define the organizational culture components and importance for the results of organizational performance; to identify the main factors of business culture that influence the results of the performance; to discuss the stages of implementation of the organizational culture development management plan. Research methodology. To achieve the goal, scientific literature analysis and synthesis methods are used. (shrink)
It is fortunate for my purposes that English has the two words ‘almighty’ and ‘omnipotent’, and that apart from any stipulation by me the words have rather different associations and suggestions. ‘Almighty’ is the familiar word that comes in the creeds of the Church; ‘omnipotent’ is at home rather in formal theological discussions and controversies, e.g. about miracles and about the problem of evil. ‘Almighty’ derives by way of Latin ‘omnipotens’ from the Greek word ‘ pantokratōr ’; and both this (...) Greek word, like the more classical ‘ pankratēs ’, and ‘almighty’ itself suggest God's having power over all things. On the other hand the English word ‘omnipotent’ would ordinarily be taken to imply ability to do everything; the Latin word ‘omnipotens’ also predominantly has this meaning in Scholastic writers, even though in origin it is a Latinization of ‘ pantocratōr ’. So there already is a tendency to distinguish the two words; and in this paper I shall make the distinction a strict one. I shall use the word ‘almighty’ to express God's power over all things, and I shall take ‘omnipotence’ to mean ability to do everything. (shrink)
In recent years philosophers have given much attention to the ‘ontological problem’ of events. Donald Davidson puts the matter thus: ‘the assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our common talk; or so, at any rate, I have been arguing. I do not know of any better, or further, way of showing what there is’. It might be thought bizarre to assign to philosophers the task of ‘showing what (...) there is’. They have not distinguished themselves by the discovery of new elements, new species or new continents, nor even of new categories, although there has often been more dreamt of in their philosophies than can be found in heaven or earth. It might appear even stranger to think that one can show what there actually is by arguing that the existence of something needs to be assumed in order for certain sentences to make sense. More than anything, the sober reader will doubtlessly be amazed that we need to assume , after lengthy argument, ‘that there are events’. (shrink)
A compilation of all previously published writings on philosophy and the foundations of mathematics from the greatest of the generation of Cambridge scholars that included G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Maynard Keynes.
Throughout its history philosophy has been thought to be a member of a community of intellectual disciplines united by their common pursuit of knowledge. It has sometimes been thought to be the queen of the sciences, at other times merely their under-labourer. But irrespective of its social status, it was held to be a participant in the quest for knowledge – a cognitive discipline.
My topic is personal identity, or rather, our identity. There is general, but not, of course, unanimous, agreement that it is wrong to give an account of what is involved in, and essential to, our persistence over time which requires the existence of immaterial entities, but, it seems to me, there is no consensus about how, within, what might be called this naturalistic framework, we should best procede. This lack of consensus, no doubt, reflects the difficulty, which must strike anyone (...) who has considered the issue, of achieving, just in one's own thinking, a reflective equilibrium. The theory of personal identity, I feel, provides a curious contrast. On the one side, it seems highly important to know what sort of thing we are, but, on the other, it is hard to find any answer which has a ‘solid’ feel. (shrink)
In Western thought, the relationship between the moral and political domains has been dominated by a version of political philosophy which, based on the distinction between ?public? and ?private?, argues that the moral is different from the political. In parallel, and related to this, has been a delineation of the ?political? as concerned with structural aspects of representative democracy, privileging electoral behaviour in particular. We challenge this distinction on the basis that it is not useful for addressing the motivational dimensions (...) of political behaviour, which are crucial for crafting citizenship education. We explore the ways in which the concept of citizenship has become contested in the realities of the range of contemporary political engagement, and how current debates, for example that between liberals and communitarians, expose the underlying moral perspectives behind their theory and their prescriptions. Emerging from this we present an argument for three different modes of civic engagement; voting, helping and making one's voice heard, in which the moral and political play out differently. This model is explored through data from a study of British young people's involvement with civic issues and actions. (shrink)
An underappreciated aspect of The lord of the rings by JRR Tolkien is in how the author dealt with death, longevity and ageing in the work. During his early years, Tolkien endured first the passing of both parents and then the deaths of most of his friends during the First World War. It was not surprising that a search for the meaning of life and death became a preoccupation of Tolkien. Tolkien’s Roman Catholic faith underpinned his thoughts about mortality. He (...) also found solace in Northern myths that held that there was intrinsic worth to courage in the face of our inevitable demise. Along with his colleague, CS Lewis, he took an opposing stand to JBS Haldane, Olaf Stapledon and other precursors of transhumanists, who felt that bioengineering would allow us to extend human life span virtually without limit. Although Tolkien acknowledged the urge to try to escape our mortality, TLOTR is a story about accepting the need to let go with all of the attendant regrets and sorrow. (shrink)
This is the twenty-sixth volume in the Library of Living Philosophers, a series founded by Paul A. Schilpp in 1939 and edited by him until 1981, when the editorship was taken over by Lewis E. Hahn. This volume follows the design of previous volumes. As Schilpp conceived this series, every volume would have the following elements: an intellectual autobiography of the philosopher, a series of expository and critical articles written by exponents and opponents of the philosopher's thought, replies to these (...) critics and commentators by the philosopher, and as nearly complete a bibliography of the published work of the philosopher as possible. (shrink)
ABSTRACTThe basis of my argument is that the cultural trauma now identified as the Holocaust occupied a latency period of around thirty years, or one generation, before surfacing in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Alongside theorists such as Ron Eyerman and Jeffrey Alexander I argue that cultural trauma, the trauma experienced by a social group, functions in a similar way to individual trauma. In this article I examine a number of texts that exhibit expressions of the trauma of the (...) Holocaust before that trauma was identified and narrativised. These texts include the television series Hogan’s Heroes, the film The Producers, and the musical Fiddler on the Roof. My approach to the texts has been through the idea of haunting as developed by Jacques Derrida. I argue that during the period of latency texts are haunted in various ways by the traumatic events that were later integrated as the Holocaust. (shrink)
Traditionally Hume is seen as offering an ‘empiricist’ critique of ‘rationalism’. This view is often illustrated – or rejected – by comparing Hume's views with those of Descartes'. However the textual evidence shows that Hume's most sustained engagement with a canonical ‘rationalist’ is with Nicolas Malebranche. The author shows that the fundamental differences between the two on the self and causal power do indeed rest on a principled distinction between ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’, and that there is some truth in the (...) traditional story. This, however, is very far from saying that Hume's general orientation is an attack on something called ‘rationalism’. (shrink)
Human conflict and its resolution is obviously a subject of great practical importance. Equally obviously, it is a vast subject, ranging from total war at one end of the spectrum to negotiated settlement at its other end. The literature on the subject is correspondingly vast and, in recent times, technical, thanks to the valuable contributions made to it by game theorists, economists, and writers on industrial and international relations. In this essay, however, I shall discuss only one familiar form of (...) conflict-resolution. There is room for such a discussion, because philosophers have lately neglected compromise, despite the interest shown in it by the aforementioned experts, and despite the classic treatments of it by Halifax, Burke and Morley. Truly, ‘…compromise is not so widely discussed by philosophers as one might expect’, and ‘…the idea of compromise has been largely neglected by Anglo-American jurisprudence’. (shrink)
With a book as wide ranging and insightful as Barry's Justice as Impartiality, it is perhaps a little churlish to criticize it for paying insufficient attention to one's own particular interests. That said, in what follows I am going to do just that and claim that in an important sense Barry does not take utilitarianism seriously. Utilitarianism does receive some discussion in Barry's book, and in an important section which I will discuss he even appears to concede that utilitarianism provides (...) a rival though ultimately inadequate theory of justice. Nevertheless, utilitarianism is not considered a rival to ‘justice as impartiality’ in the way that ‘justice as mutual advantage’ and ‘justice as reciprocity’ are. One response, and perhaps the only adequate response, would be to construct a rival utilitarian theory. I cannot provide such a theory in this paper, and I certainly would be very cautious about claiming that I could provide such a theory elsewhere. What I want to suggest is that utilitarianism is a genuine third theory to contrast with ‘justice as mutual advantage’ and ‘justice as impartiality’ – ‘justice as reciprocity’ being merely a hybrid of ‘justice as mutual advantage’, at least as Barry presents it. I also want to argue that it poses a more significant challenge to a contractualist theory such as Barry's than his discussion of utilitarianism reveals. (shrink)
In medieval writers an important distinction was drawn between two applications of the term ‘ logica ’: there was logica utens , the practice of thinking logically about this or that subject-matter, and there was logica docens , the construction of logical theory. Of course the English word ‘logic’ and its derivative ‘logical’ have a corresponding twofold meaning, and we ignore the distinction at the risk of serious confusion. ‘Logical thought’ may mean thinking that is being commended as orderly, consistent, (...) and consequent, whatever its subject-matter; or it may mean the thinking of logicians about logic, which alas has not always exhibited these virtues. Similarly for ‘teaching logic’: there is trying to get people, by precept and example, to be orderly, consistent, and consequent in their thinking, and there is the endeavour to train logicians for the next generation. In any respectable philosophy department there will be someone teaching logic in the first sense; in my own university there are very many first-year undergraduates who do a course called Reason and Argument with this aim. But we hold that the teacher of such logica utens must himself have a sufficient skill in logica docens if he is to do his job properly; and we undertake the further task of training people in logical theory so that some of them, who have sufficient native ability and motivation, may take up the torch from their teachers. (shrink)
The principle that One cannot deliberate over what one already knows is going to happen, when suitably qualified, has seemed to many philosophers to be about as secure a truth as one is likely to find in this life.Fortunately, poses little restriction on human deliberation, since the conditions which would trigger its prohibition seldom arise for us: our knowledge of the future is intermittent at best, and those things of which we do have advance knowledge are not the sorts of (...) things over which we would deliberate in any case. But matters appear to stand otherwise with an all-knowing agent such as God is traditionally conceived to be; for what an omniprescient deity ‘already knows is going to happen’ is everything that is going to happen; and if He cannot deliberate over such things, there is nothing over which He can deliberate. (shrink)
Paul Sheehy has argued that the modal realist cannot satisfactorily allow for the necessity of God's existence. In this short paper I show that she can, and that Sheehy only sees a problem because he has failed to appreciate all the resources available to the modal realist. God may be an abstract existent outside spacetime or He may not be: but either way, there is no problem for the modal realist to admit that He exists at every concrete possible world.
Between 1787, and the end of his life in 1832, Bentham turned his attention to the development and application of economic ideas and principles within the general structure of his legislative project. For seventeen years this interest was manifested through a number of books and pamphlets, most of which remained in manuscript form, that develop a distinctive approach to economic questions. Although Bentham was influenced by Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, he (...) neither adopted a Smithian vocabulary for addressing questions of economic principle and policy, nor did he accept many of the distinctive features of Smith's economic theory. One consequence of this was that Bentham played almost no part in the development of the emerging science of political economy in the early nineteenth century. The standard histories of economics all emphasize how little he contributed to the mainstream of late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century debate by concentrating attention on his utilitarianism and the psychology of hedonism on which it is premised. Others have argued that the calculating nature of his theory of practical reason reduced the whole legislative project to a crude attempt to apply economics to all aspects of social and political life. Put at its simplest this argument amounts to the erroneous claim that Bentham's science of legislation is reducible to the science of political economy. A different but equally dangerous error would be to argue that because Bentham's conception of the science of legislation comprehends all the basic forms of social relationships, there can be no science of political economy as there is no autonomous sphere of activity governed by the principles of economics. This approach is no doubt attractive from an historical point of view given that the major premise of this argument is true, and that many of Bentham's ‘economic’ arguments are couched in terms of his theory of legislation. Yet it fails to account for the undoubted importance of political economy within Bentham's writings, not just on finance, economic policy, colonies and preventive police, but also in other aspects of his utilitarian public policy such as prison reform, pauper management, and even constitutional reform. All of these works reflect a conception of political economy in its broadest terms. However, this conception of political economy differs in many respects from that of Bentham's contemporaries, and for this reason Bentham's distinctive approach to problems of economics and political economy has largely been misunderstood. (shrink)
In ‘Wittgenstein on Language and Rules’, Professor N. Malcolm took us to task for misinterpreting Wittgenstein's arguments on the relationship between the concept of following a rule and the concept of community agreement on what counts as following a given rule. Not that we denied that there are any grammatical connections between these concepts. On the contrary, we emphasized that a rule and an act in accord with it make contact in language. Moreover we argued that agreement in judgments and (...) in definitions is indeed necessary for a shared language. But we denied that the concept of a language is so tightly interwoven with the concept of a community of speakers as to preclude its applicabilty to someone whose use of signs is not shared by others. Malcolm holds that ‘This is an unwitting reduction of Wittgenstein's originality. That human agreement is necessary for “shared” language is not so striking a thought as that it is essential for language simpliciter.’ Though less striking, we believe that it has the merit of being a true thought. We shall once more try to show both that it is correct, and that it is a correct account of Wittgenstein's arguments. (shrink)