Recognition is not only a response to social pathologies. It is also an unstable and often ambivalent relationship that has its own pathologies. Owing to the intertwining between recognition and power, certain forms of recognition turn out to be forms of alienation in or from the world. Such pathologies affect inter-individual recognition as well as the recognition between individuals and the socio-political institutions. The article proposes a joint reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and Philosophy of Right, which provide norms (...) for identifying and dealing with these pathologies. The norm for inter-individual recognition is set out in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the norm for state/citizen recognition in the Philosophy of Right. The analysis envisages two other aspects of recognition: the interference of the ‘I–Me’ with the ‘I–You’ relationship and the incorporation of the ‘I–We’ into the ‘We–Us' dimension of recognition. As regards the interpretation of Hegel’s practical philosophy, the article analyses the link between Hegel’s concept of recognition and his theory of action. In this view, the highest form of recognition has more to do with reconciliation – reconciliation between human beings, reconciliation with the ‘finitude of action’ – than with the problematic of individual and collective identity. (shrink)

This article aims to make two points. First, seeking and granting recognition is an ambivalent process that may lead to results completely the opposite from what was intended. Certain social pathologies, including reification, develop because of the way the desire for recognition is expressed and satisfied. Nevertheless, the concept of recognition remains central to critical theory. A normative concept of recognition is needed in order to identify these pathologies. Second, a critical theory of society that understands itself as praxis must (...) justify the possibility of its ‘reception’ by members of society. The theory’s addressees must ‘recognize themselves’ in the theory. They must recognize in it the conceptual expression of their own experience of society. Therefore, social theory must account for the emergence of a critical standpoint on society. These two main points are addressed by means of a ‘dialectical’ approach. The tensions and interactions between global society, states, and value-communities – the dialectic within and between these spheres – account for the diverse and conflicting meanings of the concept of recognition. At the same time, such a dialectic makes it possible to understand the emergence of a critical viewpoint on society. (shrink)

Europe is in the midst of a double crisis: the rise of illiberal democracies and the reshaping of the so-called “world order.” Illiberal and autocratic regimes are on the rise and the “illiberal temptation” is present even in countries with strong democratic traditions, such as in Europe. The conflict between constitutional democracies and autocratic regimes is at the heart of the current struggle for a new international order. In this context, the confidence we have in our shared democratic and humanist (...) values is in crisis. Not only is there a debate about how these values should be interpreted—which is normal—it also seems that these values are no longer widely shared. Significant segments of the public no longer take democratic principles and the rule of law for granted. As a result, the use of violence is no longer taboo, not only in international relations but also within our own societies. This crisis is unfolding on a global scale, but it has implications for the European narrative, which is about both Europe’s post-nationalist, democratic identity, and Europe’s role in the world. In this article, I begin with some comments on this narrative, with an emphasis on the specificity of European cultural diversity. I then try to situate the role of intellectuals in this context. I examine (1) the task of interpreting the current historical situation, of raising collective awareness with regard to problems that require collective action (e.g. climate change, the reduction of gender and cultural discrimination, the prevention of armed conflicts, etc.); (2) the “universalization of tradition”, that is, the hermeneutic process by which a tradition (ethical, religious, political, etc.) reinterprets itself in such a way as to make it understandable and meaningful to other traditions; (3) the impact that the practice of dialogue, as understood in the human and social sciences, should have on actual political discussion; and (4) the role that the human and social sciences have in articulating, within a meaningful discourse, the demands for greater justice and for a meaningful existence that arise in the form of collective feelings, emotions, etc. (shrink)

This paper deals with the relationships between ethics and the environment in Rousseau’s thought. The concept of environment is understood in its various dimensions. What is at stake is the natural, as well as the social and political, environment of human beings. The notion of ethics is also understood in a broad sense. We do not set ethics, understood as the search for happiness (or for the good life) against morality, understood as the fulfillment of duty. However, we take up (...) two main questions. The first question concerns the influence of the environment, both natural and social, upon the ethical development of human beings. The second question concerns the responsibility of human beings towards nature. We examine what Rousseau teaches us regarding these two questions. Finally, we envisage liberty from the point of view of the relationships between nature and the political order. Human liberty is a matter of rights. It depends upon the republican nature of the state. However, liberty is also a sentiment that is intimately related to the living experience of nature. In order to understand what Rousseau means by liberty, we must grasp this intimate relationship between nature and politics. (shrink)

This volume explores the relation between legal reasoning and logic from both a historical and a systematic perspective. The topics addressed include, among others, conditional legal acts, disjunctions in legal acts, presumptions and conjectures, conflicts of values, Jørgensen´s Dilemma, the Rhetor´s Dilemma, the theory of legal fictions and the categorization of contracts. The unifying problematic of these contributions concerns the conditional structures and, more particularly, the relationship between legal theory and legal reasoning in the context of conditions.

La reprise est un concept fondamental de la philosophie d’Eric Weil. Conjointement avec le couple attitude/catégorie de la Logique de la philosophie, il désigne l’acte même par lequel se constitue, pour Eric Weil, le discours philosophique. C’est aussi un concept opéra­toire par lequel il est possible d’appliquer les catégories philosophiques à l’analyse histo­rique des discours humains dans leur complexité. Il fait ainsi le lien entre logique et pratique de la philosophie, sous la forme d’une logique appliquée et d’une pratique du (...) dialogue philosophique. Cet article commence par situer la reprise par rapport aux concepts d’attitude et de catégorie. Puis, il envisage quelques uns des usages possibles du concept de reprise avant de conclure en esquissant, sans prétendre à l’exhaustivité, quelques unes des orientations possibles de la recherche sur ce concept. (shrink)

This contribution presents the idea that the functioning of modern democracy implies a reciprocal education of the governed and those who govern, of public opinion and the political class, within the framework of the rule of law. Such reciprocal interaction is a prerequisite for the development of a collective intelligence (phronesis) that make the achievement of sound political decisions possible. However, the democratic process develops in such a way that it also generates counter-educational effects. This is due to the fact (...) that the same process includes a contest for power that arouses antisocial feelings and achieves a kind of counter-education. One of the reasons for this ambivalence lies in the way in which political parties operate: they are both laboratories for the development and implementation of collective projects and instruments for the conquest and exercise of power. A similar ambivalence characterizes the role of states at the level of international relations concerning the handling of global problems. What is at stake is the possibility of dealing in a sensible way with problems that, at both the national and international levels, can only be solved through concerted and cooperative action. (shrink)

Without society there is no nature. Paradoxically, this is what Rousseau’s texts teach us. The paradox lies in the fact that the Discourse on Inequality seems to say the exact opposite. In the second Discourse, the history of the human species appears to unfold within the framework of an immutable, ahistorical natural order. In this article, I will highlight two points. First, I will show that nature understood as a whole does not really exist for the human being in the (...) state of nature. It only exists for the educated, cultured, and therefore socialized human being. Second, I will analyze a passage from Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages, which brings to the fore the “negentropic” function of human labor. Without human labor, the natural order disintegrates. This, I will argue, makes nature a political problem for both Rousseau and for us. (shrink)

s political theory apparently leads us to choose between patriotism and cosmopolitism. The two major works published in 1762, On the Social Contract and Emile , would represent the two sides of the alternative. However, the opposition between patriotism and cosmopolitism is the ultimate development of an internal tension between two aspects of Rousseau’s political concept of people: the intersubjectivity that permits the formation of the general will; and the individual’s devotion to the state. On the one hand, the political (...) community appears as a distributive totality. On the other hand, it is viewed as a collective totality. When generalized, intersubjectivity leads to the formation of both the social concept of people and the moral concept of humanity, while patriotism requires the individual’s loyalty to the nation. In order to maintain the coherence of the very political concept of people and to solve the main political problem - which is to reconcile security and liberty - it is necessary to overcome the dichotomy between cosmopolitism and patriotism. Emile and Rousseau’s original plan for On the Social Contract are consistent on that point. Key Words: cosmopolitism • general will • intersubjectivity • nation • patriotism • people. (shrink)

L’education du citoyen n’a pas à former le militant politique. Elle ne doit pas non plus se contenter d’informer l’usager des services publics ou le client des administrations. Dans les limites d’une pratiqueréaliste, elle se conçoit comme une éducation du jugement fournissant aux élèves les critères formeIs du droit. Elle s’appuie sur les droits de l’homme en évitant de les transformer en un nouveau catéchisme. Elle noue la réflexion à l’action en visant à faire de l’idée de droit une véritable (...) force politique. (shrink)

L’education du citoyen n’a pas à former le militant politique. Elle ne doit pas non plus se contenter d’informer l’usager des services publics ou le client des administrations. Dans les limites d’une pratiqueréaliste, elle se conçoit comme une éducation du jugement fournissant aux élèves les critères formeIs du droit. Elle s’appuie sur les droits de l’homme en évitant de les transformer en un nouveau catéchisme. Elle noue la réflexion à l’action en visant à faire de l’idée de droit une véritable (...) force politique. (shrink)

Dans Soi-même comme un autre, Paul Ricoeur propose une reconstitution réflexive du "soi" dans son rapport à autrui.

This article deals with the notion of transnational democracy, which is an object of debate in contemporary political philosophy. The analysis focuses on a few central issues. First, the notion of transnationality is developed in contrast with the ideal-type of the nation-state (I). Two possible viewpoints on transnational democracy are envisaged, in relation to the opposition between state and society and the alternative between representation and participation (II). Then, three paradigms of transnational democracy are defined (III) and their respective limits (...) are examined (IV). An extended conclusion develops some remarks regarding the transformation and “universalization” of traditions (V). (shrink)

La relation entre privé et public est thématisée par Hannah Arendt et par Eric Weil sous des angles différents. Notre intérêt est de trouver dans la manière dont les auteurs élaborent les problèmes de la relation privé-public, quelques propositions pour comprendre la situation moderne de l’individu. La confrontation de la phénoménologie arendtienne et de la philosophie réflexive et formelle de Weil nous conduit à entrevoir le problème du rapport de la réflexion au concret, qui en l’occurrence est celui de la (...) vie dans l’Etat : le problème méthodologique est lié au problème politique. (shrink)

Partant de l'expérience politique commune, l'article examine trois caractéristiques des conflits politiques. Les conflits politiques ne concernent pas des individus mais des groupes de toute sorte. Directement ou indirectement, ils impliquent les institutions étatiques. Ils demandent une ' solution politique ', c'est-à-dire, une solution par la discussion et non par la violence. L'analyse de ces caractéristiques nous conduit à formuler quelques réflexions sur la politique et la signification du compromis.

(No abstract is available for this citation).

In Rousseau’s political theory, the Legislator’s task is to draft the best possible Constitution for a given people. His goal is to maintain the public liberties and to ensure the preservation and prosperity of the State. However, the main problem is “to put law above men” – that is: above the citizens in general and the members of the executive in particular. This paper examines how the Legislator takes up the problem by educating the citizens. The process of education implies (...) the development of reasonable thinking as well as the education of desire. Reasonable thinking is achieved through the formation of the general will. Education of human desire must be understood with respect to the distinction between amour-propre and amour-de-soi. The extension of amour-de-soi to a communityof fellow citizens plays a central role in the formation of the general will and contributes to the development of solidarity among the different social classes. Education of amour-propre plays a role in the development of a national identity. It plays also a role in the political governance of individual desires by means of an administration based on a hierarchy of functions, supervised by public opinion. However, the political governance of desire is challenged by the invisible power of money, which Rousseau tried to neutralize by limiting and slowing down the monetary circulation. (shrink)