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Philip Gerrans [48]P. Gerrans [12]Philip S. Gerrans [1]
  1. The Disposition of Things: Spontaneous Order in the Esprit des Lois1.Philip Gerrans - 2004 - The European Legacy 9 (6):751-765.
    The article states that in the "Esprit des Lois" Charles Louis de Secondat Montesquieu famously proposes a version of the doctrine of the separation of judicial, executive and legislative power as a way of protecting political liberty ("the opinion each has of his security"). Given the context in which he situates his arguments: an immense and theoretically opaque excursus which discusses almost everything known to political theory, anthropology and economics before his time, and essentially descriptive methodology, it is not easy (...)
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  2. The Theory of Mind Module in Evolutionary Psychology.Philip Gerrans - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (3):305-321.
  3. Self Unbound: Ego Dissolution in Psychedelic Experience.Chris Letheby & Philip Gerrans - 2017 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 3:1-11.
    Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or ‘I’ distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such ‘ego dissolution’ experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which representations are bound. (...)
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  4. Generous or Parsimonious Cognitive Architecture? Cognitive Neuroscience and Theory of Mind: Articles.Philip Gerrans & Valerie E. Stone - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2):121-141.
    Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it suggests (...)
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  5.  6
    The Measure of Madness: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Neuroscience and Delusional Thought.P. Gerrans - 2014 - MIT Press.
    Drawing on the latest work in cognitive neuroscience, a philosopher proposes that delusions are narrative models that accommodate anomalous experiences.
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  6. Neurosentimentalism and Moral Agency.Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):585-614.
    Metaethics has recently been confronted by evidence from cognitive neuroscience that tacit emotional processes play an essential causal role in moral judgement. Most neuroscientists, and some metaethicists, take this evidence to vindicate a version of metaethical sentimentalism. In this paper we argue that the ‘dual process’ model of cognition that frames the discussion within and without philosophy does not do justice to an important constraint on any theory of deliberation and judgement. Namely, decision-making is the exercise of a capacity for (...)
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  7. A One-Stage Explanation of the Cotard Delusion.Philip Gerrans - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):47-53.
    Cognitive neuropsychiatry (CN) is the explanation of psychiatric disorder by the methods of cognitive neuropsychology. Within CN there are, broadly speaking, two approaches to delusion. The first uses a one-stage model, in which delusions are explained as rationalizations of anomalous experiences via reasoning strategies that are not, in themselves, abnormal. Two-stage models invoke additional hypotheses about abnormalities of reasoning. In this paper, I examine what appears to be a very strong argument, developed within CN, in favor of a twostage explanation (...)
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  8. Mental Time Travel, Somatic Markers and "Myopia for the Future".Philip Gerrans - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):459 - 474.
    Patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) are often described as having impaired ability for planning and decision making despite retaining intact capacities for explicit reasoning. The somatic marker hypothesis is that the VMPFC associates implicitly represented affective information with explicit representations of actions or outcomes. Consequently, when the VMPFC is damaged explicit reasoning is no longer scaffolded by affective information, leading to characteristic deficits. These deficits are exemplified in performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) in which (...)
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  9. Refining the Explanation of Cotard's Delusion.Philip Gerrans - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (1):111-122.
    An elegant theory in cognitive neuropsychiatry explains the Capgras and Cotard delusions as resulting from the same type of anomalous phenomenal experience explained in different ways by different sufferers. ‘Although the Capgras and Cotard delusions are phenomenally distinct, we thus think that they represent patients’ attempts to make sense of fundamentally similar experiences’ (Young and Leafhead, 1996, p. 168). On the theory proposed by Young and Leafhead, the anomalous experience results from damage to an information processing subsystem which associates an (...)
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  10. Mechanisms of Madness: Evolutionary Psychiatry Without Evolutionary Psychology.Philip Gerrans - 2007 - Biology and Philosophy 22 (1):35-56.
    Delusions are currently characterised as false beliefs produced by incorrect inference about external reality (DSM IV). This inferential conception has proved hard to link to explanations pitched at the level of neurobiology and neuroanatomy. This paper provides that link via a neurocomputational theory, based on evolutionary considerations, of the role of the prefrontal cortex in regulating offline cognition. When pathologically neuromodulated the prefrontal cortex produces hypersalient experiences which monopolise offline cognition. The result is characteristic psychotic experiences and patterns of thought. (...)
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  11.  48
    Cognitive Theories of Mental Illness.Brendan A. Maher, A. W. Young, Philip Gerrans, John Campbell, Kai Vogeley, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Owen Flanagan, Robert L. Woolfolk, Barry Smith & Joëlle Proust - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):658-670.
    For years a debate has raged within the various literatures of philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology over whether, and to what degree, the concepts that characterize psychopathology are social constructions that reflect cultural values. While the majority position among philosophers has been normativist, i.e., that the conception of a mental disorder is value-laden, a vocal and cogent minority have argued that psychopathology results from malfunctions that can be described by terminology that is objective and scientific. Scientists and clinicians have tended to (...)
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  12. Delusions as Performance Failures.Philip Gerrans - 2001 - Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 6 (3).
    Delusions are explanations of anomalous experiences. A theory of delusion requires an explanation of both the anomalous experience _and _the apparently irrational explanation generated by the delusional subject. Hence, we require a model of rational belief formation against which the belief formation of delusional subjects can be evaluated. _Method. _I first describe such a model, distinguishing procedural from pragmatic rationality. Procedural rationality is the use of rules or procedures, deductive or inductive, that produce an inferentially coherent set of propositions. Pragmatic (...)
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  13.  38
    Delusional Attitudes and Default Thinking.Philip Gerrans - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):83-102.
    Jennifer Radden has drawn attention to two features of delusion, ambivalence and subjectivity, which are problematic for theories of delusion that treat delusions as empirical beliefs. She argues for an ‘attitude’ theory of delusion. I argue that once the cognitive architecture of delusion formation is properly described the debate between doxastic and attitude theorists loses its edge. That architecture suggests that delusions are produced by activity in the ‘default mode network’ unsupervised by networks required for decontextualized processing. The cognitive properties (...)
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  14.  4
    A One-Stage Explanation of the Cotard Delusion.Philip Gerrans - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):47-53.
  15.  55
    Dream Experience and a Revisionist Account of Delusions of Misidentification.Philip Gerrans - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):217-227.
    Standard accounts of delusion explain them as responses to experience. Cognitive models of feature binding in the face recognition systems explain how experiences of mismatch between feelings of "familiarity" and faces can arise. Similar mismatches arise in phenomena such as déjà and jamais vu in which places and scenes are mismatched to feelings of familiarity. These cognitive models also explain similarities between the phenomenology of these delusions and some dream states which involve mismatch between faces, feelings of familiarity and identities. (...)
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  16. Tacit Knowledge, Rule Following and Pierre Bourdieu's Philosophy of Social Science.Philip Gerrans - unknown
    Pierre Bourdieu has developed a philosophy of social science, grounded in the phenomenological tradition, which treats knowledge as a practical ability embodied in skilful behaviour, rather than an intellectual capacity for the representation and manipulation of propositional knowledge. He invokes Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following as one way of explicating the idea that knowledge is a skill. Bourdieu’s conception of tacit knowledge is a dispositional one, adopted to avoid a perceived dilemma for methodological individualism. That dilemma requires either the explanation of (...)
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  17.  51
    Mad Scientists or Unreliable Autobiographers? Dopamine Dysregulation and Delusion.Philip Gerrans - 2009 - In Matthew Broome & Lisa Bortolotti (eds.), Psychiatry as Cognitive Neuroscience: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
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  18.  56
    Authorship and Ownership of Thoughts.Philip Gerrans - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2):231-237.
  19.  3
    What's Domain-Specific About Theory of Mind?V. Stone & P. Gerrans - unknown
    Twenty years ago, Baron-Cohen and colleagues argued that autistic performance on false belief tests was explained by a deficit in metarepresentation. Subsequent research moved from the view that the mind has a domain-general capacity for metarepresentation to the view that the mind has a domain-specific mechanism for metarepresentation of mental states per se, i.e., the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM). We argue that 20 years of data collection in lesion patients and children with autism supports a more parsimonious view closer (...)
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  20. Multiple Paths to Delusion.Philip Gerrans - 2002 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 9 (1):65-72.
  21.  28
    Alien Landscapes? Interpreting Disordered Minds, by Jonathan Glover: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014, Pp. Xi + 433, £US35. [REVIEW]Philip Gerrans - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (2):400-402.
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  22.  96
    Nativism and Neuroconstructivism in the Explanation of Williams Syndrome.Philip Gerrans - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):41-52.
    Nativists about syntactic processing have argued that linguisticprocessing, understood as the implementation of a rule-basedcomputational architecture, is spared in Williams syndrome, (WMS)subjects – and hence that it provides evidence for a geneticallyspecified language module. This argument is bolstered by treatingSpecific Language Impairments (SLI) and WMS as a developmental doubledissociation which identifies a syntax module. Neuroconstructivists haveargued that the cognitive deficits of a developmental disorder cannot beadequately distinguished using the standard gross behavioural tests ofneuropsychology and that the linguistic abilities of the (...)
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  23.  91
    Does the Normal Brain Have a Theory of Mind?Valerie E. Stone & Philip Gerrans - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):3-4.
  24.  36
    Imitation, Mind Reading, and Social Learning.Philip S. Gerrans - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (1):20-27.
    Imitation has been understood in different ways: as a cognitive adaptation subtended by genetically specified cognitive mechanisms; as an aspect of domain general human cognition. The second option has been advanced by Cecilia Heyes who treats imitation as an instance of associative learning. Her argument is part of a deflationary treatment of the “mirror neuron” phenomenon. I agree with Heyes about mirror neurons but argue that Kim Sterelny has provided the tools to provide a better account of the nature and (...)
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  25.  46
    Mental Time Travel, Dynamic Evaluation, and Moral Agency.Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):259-268.
    Mental time travel is the ability to simulate alternative pasts and futures. It is often described as the ability to project a sense of self in the service of diachronic agency. It requires not only semantic representation but affective sampling of alternative futures. If people lose this ability for affective sampling their sense of self is diminished. They have less of a self to project hence are compromised as agents. If they cannot “feel the future” they cannot imaginatively inhabit it (...)
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  26.  46
    Experience and Expectations: Bayesian Explanations of the Alternation Between the Capgras and Cotard Delusions.Philip Gerrans - 2012 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 19 (2):145-148.
  27.  25
    Depersonalization Disorder, Affective Processing and Predictive Coding.Philip Gerrans - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):401-418.
    A flood of new multidisciplinary work on the causes of depersonalization disorder provides a new way to think about the feeling that experiences “belong” to the self. In this paper I argue that this feeling, baptized “mineness” or “subjective presence” : 565–573, 2013) emerges from a multilevel interaction between emotional, affective and cognitive processing. The “self” to which experience is attributed is a predictive model made by the mind to explain the modulation of affect as the organism progresses through the (...)
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  28.  34
    Introduction: Is Cognitive Penetrability the Mark of the Moral?Philip Gerrans & Jeanette Kennett - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):3 – 12.
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  29.  54
    Delusional Misidentification as Subpersonal Disintegration.Philip Gerrans - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):590-608.
    In this paper I consider a theory developed within cognitive neuropsychiatry to explain two delusions of misidentification, the Capgras and the Cotard delusions. These delusions are classified together with others in which the subject misidentifies persons, places or objects, including parts of her own body. Strictly speaking, the Cotard may not, at the level of content, be a delusion of misidentification, but I have described it as such because the theory I discuss treats it as sharing a causal and a (...)
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  30. Cognitive Architecture and the Limits of Interpretationism.Philip Gerrans - 2004 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 11 (1):42-48.
  31.  42
    Wired for Despair The Neurochemistry of Emotion and the Phenomenology of Depression.Philip Gerrans & Klaus Scherer - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (7-8):7-8.
    Although depression is characterized as a mood disorder it turns out that, like moods in general, it cannot be explained independently of a theory of emotion. In this paper I outline one promising theory of emotion and show how it deals with the phenomenon of depressive mood. An important aspect of MAT is the role it assigns to peripheral information processing systems in setting up emotional responses. The operations of these systems are automatic and opaque to consciousness, but they represent (...)
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  32.  24
    Feeling the Future: Prospects for a Theory of Implicit Prospection.Philip Gerrans & David Sander - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (5):699-710.
    Mental time travel refers to the ability of an organism to project herself backward and forward in time, using episodic memory and imagination to simulate past and future experiences. The evolution of mental time travel gives humans a unique capacity for prospection: the ability to pre-experience the future. Discussions of mental time travel treat it as an instance of explicit prospection. We argue that implicit simulations of past and future experience can also be used as a way of gaining information (...)
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  33.  47
    Theory of Mind in Autism and Schizophrenia: A Case of Over-Optimistic Reverse Engineering.P. Gerrans & V. McGeer - unknown
  34.  41
    The Norms of Cognitive Development.Philip Gerrans - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (1):56-75.
    Once the notion of a precursive relationship between developmental stages is fully articulated in terms of the distinction between ‘role’ and ‘realiser’ states, it turns out that the ‘Theory of Mind’ literature operates with a notion of precursive relationships described at too high a level of abstraction to explain actual mechanisms of development. Furthermore, the tendency within that literature to explain precursive relationships in terms of role states with isomorphic linguistic/computational structures is misleading. Developmental relationships are more likely to exist (...)
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  35.  10
    Modularity Reconsidered.P. Gerrans - unknown
    An orthodoxy in classical cognitive science is that representation is symbolic and that functional architecture is modular. That modular theory is the cornerstone of Cognitive Neuropsychology (CN), which identifies functionally discrete neurocomputational entities by observing psychological disorder. While the symbolic theory of representation is optional for CN, the modular hypothesis is essential to it and depends on a distinction between modular and central processing. Jerry Fodor has refined that distinction with the concept of Informational Encapsulation. This paper defends the encapsulation (...)
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  36.  74
    Nativism, Neuroconstructivism, and Developmental Disorder.Philip Gerrans - 2002 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):757-758.
    Either genetically specified modular cognitive architecture for syntactic processing does not exist (neuroconstructivism), or there is a module but its development is so abnormal in Williams syndrome (WS) that no conclusion can be drawn about its normal architecture (moderate nativism). Radical nativism, which holds that WS is a case of intact syntax, is untenable. Specific Language Impairment and WS create a dilemma that radical nativism cannot accommodate.
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  37.  29
    Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, Ed., Moral Psychology Volume 2. The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008, Pp. Xviii + 585, US$30. [REVIEW]Philip Gerrans - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):525-528.
  38.  1
    Delusional Misidentification as Subpersonal Disintegration.Philip Gerrans - 1999 - The Monist 82 (4):590-608.
    In this paper I consider a theory developed within cognitive neuropsychiatry to explain two delusions of misidentification, the Capgras and the Cotard delusions. These delusions are classified together with others in which the subject misidentifies persons, places or objects, including parts of her own body. Strictly speaking, the Cotard may not, at the level of content, be a delusion of misidentification, but I have described it as such because the theory I discuss treats it as sharing a causal and a (...)
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  39.  32
    Agency and Policy.Garrett Cullity & Philip Gerrans - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):315–325.
    The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com.
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  40.  5
    La lecture de pensée pour débutants.Philip Gerrans - 2006 - Philosophiques 33 (1):125-145.
    Some evolutionary psychologists (EP) are strong nativists about Theory of Mind (TOM). They argue that the development of specialised cognitive competence required for TOM requires genetic specification of the developmental trajectory of a specialised cognitive system. EP arrives at this conclusion via conceptual arguments concerning the inadequacy of blank slate neuroconstructivism (strong neuroconstructivism) and empirical evidence from developmental and neuropsychology. I argue that the correct understanding of the conceptual argument applied to the case of TOM supports a moderate form of (...)
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  41.  3
    Agency and Policy.Garrett Cullity & Philip Gerrans - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):315-325.
  42.  12
    Immaginazione, Default Thinking E Incorporamento.Philip Gerrans & Kevin Mulligan - 2013 - Rivista di Estetica 54:239-271.
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  43.  13
    Cognitive Science.Terry Dartnall, Steve Torrance, Mark Coulson, Stephen Nunn, Brendan Kitts, R. F. Port, T. van Gelder, Donald Peterson & Philip Gerrans - 1996 - Metascience 5 (1):95-166.
  44.  32
    Unraveling the Mind.Philip Gerrans - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (3):214-215.
    A radical interpretation of the predictive coding approach suggests that the mind is “seamless” – that is, that cancellation of error signals can propagate smoothly from highest to lowest levels of the control hierarchy, dissolving a distinction between belief and perception. Delusions of alien control provide a test case. Close examination suggests that while they are evidence of predictive coding within the cortex, they are not evidence for the seamless interpretation.
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  45.  50
    Introduction.Kathleen Akins & Philip Gerrans - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):1-11.
  46.  8
    Passivity Experience in Schizophrenia.P. Gerrans - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. London, U.K.: MIT Press. pp. 325-345.
    In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness.
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  47.  36
    Is Cognitive Penetrability the Mark of the Moral?P. Gerrans & J. Kennett - unknown
  48.  38
    How to Be a Conformist, Part II. Simulation and Rule Following.Philip Gerrans - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):566 – 586.
  49.  31
    Individualism and Cognitive Development.Philip Gerrans - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):107-108.
    Individualism is not inconsistent with social interaction; it is required to explain it. Social exchanges, evidenced in gaze monitoring, social referencing, emotional responses, protodeclarative and imperative pointing, pretence, play, and conversation all play a role in development, but the nature of that role is opaque without an understanding of the cognitive mechanisms on which they depend.
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  50.  11
    Immaginazione, default thinking e incorporamento.Philip Gerrans & Kevin Mulligan - 2013 - Rivista di Estetica 53:55-87.
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