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Paul Noordhof [66]P. Noordhof [14]
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Paul Noordhof
University of York
  1. In Pain.P. Noordhof - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):95-97.
    When I feel a pain in my leg, how should we understand the.
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  2.  74
    A Defence of Owens' Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):453-457.
    In this paper we argue that Steglich-Petersen’s response to Owens’ Exclusivity Objection does not work. Our first point is that the examples Steglich-Petersen uses to demonstrate his argument do not work because they employ an undefended conception of the truth aim not shared by his target (and officially eschewed by Steglich-Petersen himself). Secondly we will make the point that deliberating over whether to form a belief about p is not part of the belief forming process. When an agent enters into (...)
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  3. Another Defence of Owen’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):147-153.
    David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appeal to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed (...)
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  4. Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):426-455.
    A number of philosophers have argued in favour of the Dependency Thesis: if a subject sensorily imagines an F then he or she sensorily imagines from the inside perceptually experiencing an F in the imaginary world. They claim that it explains certain important features of imaginative experience, in brief: the fact that it is perspectival, the fact that it does not involve presentation of sensory qualities and the fact that mental images can serve a number of different imaginings. I argue (...)
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  5. Moral Requirements Are Still Not Rational Requirements.P. Noordhof - 1999 - Analysis 59 (3):127-136.
    Moral requirements apply to rational agents as such. But it is a conceptual truth that if agents are morally required to act in a certain way then we expect them to act in that way. Being rational, as such, must therefore suffice to ground our expectation that rational agents will do what they are morally required to do. But how could this be so? It could only be so if we think of the moral requirements that apply to agents as (...)
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  6. Prospects for a Counterfactual Theory of Causation.Paul Noordhof - 2004 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
     
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  7.  64
    Do Tropes Resolve the Problem of Mental Causation?Paul Noordhof - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):221-226.
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  8.  43
    Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument: A Response to Kim.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):115-18.
  9.  88
    Probabilistic Causation, Preemption and Counterfactuals.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Mind 108 (429):95-125.
    Counter factual theories of Causation have had problems with cases of probabilistic causation and preemption. I put forward a counterfactual theory that seems to deal with these problematic cases and also has the virtue of providing an account of the alleged asymmetry between hasteners and delayers: the former usually being counted as causes, the latter not. I go on to consider a new type of problem case that has not received so much attention in the literature, those I dub catalysts (...)
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  10. Mental Causation : Ontology and Patterns of Variation.Paul Noordhof - 2013 - In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
  11. Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World.Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.) - 2003 - Routledge.
    Philosophers have long been fascinated by the connection between cause and effect: are 'causes' things we can experience, or are they concepts provided by our minds? The study of causation goes back to Aristotle, but resurged with David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and is now one of the most important topics in metaphysics. Most of the recent work done in this area has attempted to place causation in a deterministic, scientific, worldview. But what about the unpredictable and chancey world we (...)
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  12. Counterfactuals and Preemptive Causation.J. Ganeri, P. Noordhof & M. Ramachandran - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):219-225.
    David Lewis modified his original theory of causation in response to the problem of ‘late preemption’ (see 1973b; 1986b: 193-212). However, as we will see, there is a crucial difference between genuine and preempted causes that Lewis must appeal to if his solution is to work. We argue that once this difference is recognized, an altogether better solution to the preemption problem presents itself.
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  13.  99
    Expressive Perception as Projective Imagining.Paul Noordhof - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (3):329–358.
    I argue that our experience of expressive properties (such as the joyfulness or sadness of a piece of music) essentially involves the sensuous imagination (through simulation) of an emotion-guided process which would result in the production of the properties which constitute the realisation of the expressive properties experienced. I compare this proposal with arousal theories, Wollheim’s Freudian account, and other more closely related theories appealing to imagination such as Kendall Walton’s. I explain why the proposal is most naturally developed in (...)
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  14.  76
    Believe What You Want.Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-265.
    The Uncontrollability Thesis is that it is metaphysically impossible consciously to believe that p at will. I review the standard ways in which this might be explained. They focus on the aim or purpose of belief being truth. I argue that these don't work. They either explain the aim in a way which makes it implausible that the Uncontrollability Thesis is true, or they fail to justify their claim that beliefs should be understood as aimed at the truth. I further (...)
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  15.  38
    Making the Change: The Functionalist's Way.Paul Noordhof - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):233-50.
    The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious. It outlines two ways of formulating the doctrine that mental properties are Functional properties and shows that both allow mental properties to be efficacious. The first (Lewis) approach takes functional properties to be the occupants of causal roles. Block [1990] has argued that mental properties should not be characterized in this way because it would make them properties of the ?implementing science?, e. g. neuroscience. I show (...)
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  16.  11
    Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument: A Response to Kim: Discussion.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):109-114.
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  17.  99
    Tooley on Backward Causation.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Analysis 63 (2):157–162.
  18. Emergent Causation and Property Causation.Paul Noordhof - 2010 - In Cynthia Macdonald & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford University Press.
  19. In Defence of Influence?Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):323–327.
    there is a substantial range of C1, C2, … of different not-too- distant alterations of C and a range E1, E2, of alterations of E, at least some of which differ, such that if C1 had occurred, E1 would have occurred, if C2 had occurred, E2 would have occurred and so on (Lewis 2000).
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  20. Morgenbesser's Coin, Counterfactuals and Independence.Paul Noordhof - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):261–263.
    In assessing counterfactuals, should we consider circumstances which match the actual circumstances in all probablistically independent fact or all causally independent fact? Jonathan Schaffer argues the latter and claims that the former approach, advanced by me, cannot deal with the case of Morgenbesser’s coin. More generally, he argues that, where there is a difference between the two, his account yields our intuitive verdicts about the truth of counterfactuals where mine does not (Schaffer 2004: 307, n. 16). In this brief note, (...)
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  21.  41
    A Coherentist Response to Stoneham's Reductio.Paul Noordhof - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):267–268.
  22.  65
    Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):75-100.
    I argue that the extant theories of self-deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self-deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for Interpretism. Principles of reasoning—in particular, the requirement of (...)
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  23.  8
    The Transparent Failure of Norms to Keep Up Standards of Belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-15.
    We argue that the most plausible characterisation of the norm of truth—it is permissible to believe that p if and only if p is true—is unable to explain Transparency in doxastic deliberation, a task for which it is claimed to be equipped. In addition, the failure of the norm to do this work undermines the most plausible account of how the norm guides belief formation at all. Those attracted to normativism about belief for its perceived explanatory credentials had better look (...)
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  24.  12
    The Essential Instability of Self-Deception.Paul Noordhof - 2009 - Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):45-71.
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  25.  64
    Causation by Content?Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (3):291-320.
  26. More in Pain.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):153-154.
    made with any ambitions for ontological reduction (e.g. denying that there are pains but only states of having pain). So I'm afraid that Tye's objections deriving from attributing to me such a view and pointing out that Representationalism is needed to capture, amongst other things, the fact that we experience pains in phantom limbs are all beside the point. Instead, the question is entirely a matter of whether the inferences mentioned in my original paper and Tye's reply fail because, although (...)
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  27.  3
    Not Old... But Not That New Either.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic. pp. 85.
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  28. Outsmarting the McKinsey-Brown Argument?Paul Noordhof - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):48-56.
    Externalists about mental content are supposed to face the following dilemma. Either they must give up the claim that we have privileged access to our own mental states or they must allow that we have privileged access to the world. The dilemma is posed in its most precise form through the McKinsey-Brown argument (McKinsey 1991; Brown 1995). Over the years since it was ?rst published in 1991, our understanding of the precise character of the premisses which constitute the argument has (...)
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  29. Not Old... But Not That New Either: Explicability, Emergence, and the Characterisation of Materialism.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
     
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  30.  38
    For a (Revised) PCA-Analysis.Jonardon Ganeri, Paul Noordhof & Murali Ramachandran - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):45–47.
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  31.  18
    Morgenbesser's Coin, Counterfactuals and Independence.P. Noordhof - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):261-263.
  32.  10
    Outsmarting the McKinsey-Brown Argument?P. Noordhof - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):48-56.
  33.  59
    Environment-Dependent Content and the Virtues of Causal Explanation.Paul Noordhof - 2006 - Synthese 149 (3):551-575.
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  34.  89
    Something Like Ability.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.
    One diagnosis of what is wrong with the Knowledge Argument rests on the Ability Hypothesis. This couples an ability analysis of knowing what an experience is like together with a denial that phenomenal propositions exist. I argue against both components. I consider three arguments against the existence of phenomenal propositions and find them wanting. Nevertheless I deny that knowing phenomenal propositions is part of knowing what an experience is like. I provide a hybrid account of knowing what an experience is (...)
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  35.  9
    In Defence of Influence?P. Noordhof - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):323-327.
  36.  89
    Problems for the M-Set Analysis of Causation.Paul Noordhof - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):457-463.
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  37.  4
    XII*-Believe What You Want.Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-266.
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  38. Sungho Choi and the ‘Actual Events’ Clause.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):46–47.
    In order to keep matters brief, I shall assume knowledge of my Mind paper and Sungho Choi’s paper printed before this brief response (Noordhof 1999; Choi 2002). Sungho Choi claims that the example I gave to motivate my formulation of the ‘actual events’ clause fails to motivate it and that the formulation, in fact, contains a redundant element, namely my appeal to supersets. I think he is right that my example doesn’t work. However, I think he is wrong that the (...)
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  39.  12
    Tooley on Backward Causation.P. Noordhof - 2003 - Analysis 63 (2):157-162.
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  40.  46
    The Overdetermination Argument Versus the Cause-and-Essence Principle--No Contest.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):367-375.
    Scott Sturgeon has claimed to undermine the principal argument for Physicalism, in his words, the view that 'actuality is exhausted by physical reality' (Sturgeon 1998, p. 410). In noting that actuality is exhausted by physical reality, the Physicalist is not claiming that all that there is in actuality are those things identified by physics. Rather the thought is that actuality is made up of all the things identified by physics and anything which is a compound of these things. So there (...)
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  41. In a State of Pain.Paul Noordhof - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
    Michael Tye and I are both Representationalists. Nevertheless, we have managed to disagree about the semantic character of ‘in’ in ‘There is a pain in my fingertip’ (see Noordhof (2001); Tye (2002); Noordhof (2002)). The first section of my commentary will focus on this disagreement. I will then turn to the location of pain. Here, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be much more agreement between Tye and me. I restrict myself to three points. First, I argue that Tye has (...)
     
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  42.  9
    More in Pain..P. Noordhof - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):153-154.
  43.  1
    Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World.Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):728-733.
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  44.  14
    Reviews. [REVIEW]Paul Noordhof & Emma Borg - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (5):538–551.
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  45.  1
    Introduction.Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof - 2004 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and chance : Causation in an indeterministic world. London, U.K.: Routledge. pp. 1-11.
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  46.  17
    Getting Personal: Pietroski's Dualism.Paul Noordhof - manuscript
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  47.  2
    Something Like Ability.P. Noordhof - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.
    One diagnosis of what is wrong with the Knowledge Argument rests on the Ability Hypothesis. This couples an ability analysis of knowing what an experience is like together with a denial that phenomenal propositions exist. I argue against both components. I consider three arguments against the existence of phenomenal propositions and find them wanting. Nevertheless I deny that knowing phenomenal propositions is part of knowing what an experience is like. I provide a hybrid account of knowing what an experience is (...)
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  48.  78
    Critical Notice. Causation, Probability, and Chance.P. Noordhof - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):855-876.
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  49.  7
    Causation, Probability, and Chance. [REVIEW]Paul Noordhof - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):855-875.
  50.  39
    Mind in a Physical World, by Jaegwon Kim.P. Noordhof - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):1080-1085.
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