EMPIRICAL. PROBLEM. INTRODUCTION The unity of science movement was itself far from unified.1 There may have been unity on the rallying call for a unity of science but that is as far as it went. Not only was there disagreement among the ...
...its identity in the pragmatics of elucidation, and not in some sort of special knowledge...yer's essay (`Implicit Thoughts: Quine, Frege and Kant on Analytic Propositions...by Quine, and attributed to Kant, Frege and Carnap, has nothing in common..
For a long time–--maybe starting from the well known 1929 meeting in Davos–--the philosophy of exact and natural sciences deriving from Neo-positivism and hermeneutics followed separate ways. Post-positivistic philosophy of science and epistemology, though, saw the emerging of theses showing the existence of some affinities between the empirical method and the hermeneutical method. The paper singles these affinities out and discusses their consequences from the point of view of the problems of objectivity and truth. In particular, it supports the ideas (...) of objectivity as achievement and of truth as empty regulative ideal. (shrink)
Answering to the questions posed by students, I clarify my position on four main topics: the pragmatic maxim; the relation between my conception of truth on one hand, and epistemic conceptions of truth and the idea of the convergence of our cognitive efforts on the other; the skeptical challenge; the relationship between science and philosophy.
By referring to two paradigm shifts - the passage from classical physics to relativistic physics on the one hand and the one from folk psychology to cognitive science on the other - Nannini aims at explaining “why neurological theories that reduce consciousness and the Self to aspects of brain dynamics appear implausible from a common sense perspective despite being sound from a scientific point of view”. In the comment I underline the importance of the articulated attempt made by Nannini, whilst (...) asking at the same time for some clarifications regarding four epistemological aspects of the perspective he defends. (shrink)
In the inter-war period Italian philosophical culture was dominated by idealistic, spiritualistic and religious brands of philosophies, among which Benedetto Croce’s and Giovanni Gentile’s kinds of idealism were the prevailing ones. These idealistic philosophies were characterized by a strong aversion for positivistic, pragmatist and scientific philosophies which, in the first decades of our century, were represented in Italy above all by Giovanni Vailati, Mario Calderoni , Giuseppe Peano and Federigo Enriques. Italian ‘scientific philosophy’ lost in the battle with Croce’s and (...) Gentile’s idealistic philosophies. On the political level, the hegemony of Croce and Gentile coincided with the years of Fascist dictatorship . On the cultural level, this hegemony caused the suppression of scientific culture and philosophy in comparison with humanistic culture, and the subsequent philosophical isolation of Italy from the majority of the movements of scientific philosophy working in those years in the other European countries and in the United States of America. (shrink)
In this paper Boghossian better specifies his conception and defends it against some objections moved to previous formulations. In particular, he tries to reply to the objection that ‘there can be no epistemically analytic sentences that are not also metaphysically analytic, and that the notion of implicit definition cannot explain a priori entitlement’ . He thus introduces the distinction between an inferential and a constitutive way in which ‘facts about meaning might generate facts about entitlement’ and concludes his paper by (...) outlining a theory of the constitutive way that modifies some of his preceding ideas. (shrink)
The author discusses the evolution of Heidegger’s conception of science and brings out its limits as well as its possible developments. An eminent representative of contemporary thinking in the theory of knowledge, Paolo Parrini stands in a line of critical realism in the Kantian neopositivist tradition. This paper returns to and develops the lectio delivered at the award of the ‘Giulio Preti’ Prize in November 2008.