8 found
Order:
See also
  1.  39
    Rule A.P. Roger Turner & Justin Capes - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):580-595.
    Rule A: if it's metaphysically necessary that p, we may validly infer that no one is even partly morally responsible for the fact that p. Our principal aim in this article is to highlight the importance of this rule and to respond to two recent challenges to it. We argue that rule A is more important to contemporary theories of moral responsibility than has previously been recognized. We then consider two recent challenges to the rule and argue that neither challenge (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Truth and Moral Responsibility.P. Roger Turner - forthcoming - In Fabio Bacchini Massimo Dell'Utri & Stefano Caputo (eds.), New Advances in Causation, Agency, and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Most philosophers who study moral responsibility have done so in isolation of the concept of truth. Here, I show that thinking about the nature of truth has profound consequences for discussions of moral responsibility. In particular, by focusing on the very trivial nature of truth—that truth depends on the world and not the other way around—we can see that widely accepted counterexamples to one of the most influential incompatibilist arguments can be shown not only to be false, but also impossible.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  19
    Kearns on Rule A.P. Roger Turner - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):205-215.
    The so-called Direct Argument for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism depends on a rule of inference called Rule A, a rule that says no one is even partly morally responsible for a necessary truth. While most philosophers think that Rule A is valid, Stephen Kearns has recently offered several alleged counterexamples to the rule. In the paper, I show that Kearns’ counterexamples are unsuccessful.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4.  1
    David E. Alexander and Daniel Johnson, Eds. Calvinism and the Problem of Evil.P. Roger Turner - 2018 - Journal of Analytic Theology 6:806-810.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Jesus' Return as Lottery Puzzle: A Reply to Donald Smith.P. Roger Turner - 2012 - Religious Studies 48 (3):305-313.
    In his recent paper, “Lottery Puzzles and Jesus’ Return,” Donald Smith says that Christians should accept a very robust skepticism about the future because a Christian ought to think that the probability of Jesus’ return happening at any future moment is inscrutable to her. But I think that Smith’s argument lacks the power to rationally persuade Christians who are antecedently uncommitted as to whether or not we can or do have any substantive knowledge about the future. Moreover, I think that (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  32
    More on Defending Religious Exclusivism.P. Roger Turner - 2015 - Faith and Philosophy 32 (2):188-204.
    In his “Plantinga on Exclusivisim,” Richard Feldman argues that Alvin Plantinga, in an earlier paper, has not sufficiently addressed a particular problem for the religious exclusivist. The particular problem that Feldman thinks Plantinga has failed sufficiently to address is the problem of epistemic peer disagreement—that is, disagreement between two (or more) equally competent thinkers who share equally good reasons for, and are in equally good epistemic situations regarding, their contradictory beliefs—in matters of religious belief. To demonstrate that Plantinga has so (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  45
    More On Religious Exclusivism: A Reply to Richard Feldman.P. Roger Turner - forthcoming - Faith and Philosophy.
    In his “Plantinga on Exclusivisim,” Richard Feldman argues that Alvin Plantinga, in an earlier paper, has not sufficiently addressed a particular problem for the religious exclusivist. The particular problem that Feldman thinks Plantinga has failed sufficiently to address is the problem of epistemic peer disagreement—that is, disagreement between two (or more) equally competent thinkers who share equally good reasons for, and are in equally good epistemic situations regarding, their contradictory beliefs—in matters of religious belief. To demonstrate that Plantinga has so (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  3
    W. Matthews Grant. Free Will and God’s Universal Causality: The Dual Sources Account.P. Roger Turner - 2020 - Journal of Analytic Theology 8 (1):715-720.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark