Ce travail pose la question des critères de la „progression biologique“ , d'après les documents fossiles, dans le monde des organismes, c'est-à-dire de ce perfectionnement (...) qui ne s'arrête pas à l'intérieur du cadre d'un phylum donné, comme le „perfectionnement de l'adaptation“, mais qui conduit, au-de-là de phylums de rang différent, à des types supérieurs, par exemple, des Poissons pas les Amphibies et les Reptiles jusqu'aux Mammifères ou aux Oiseaux. Deux groupes de critères y sont recensés en détail, leur contenu est exposé, et on les examine pour voir s'ils caractérisent sans ambiguïté la „progression biologique“. Le premier groupe comprend les critères de „différenciation croissante“ et „d'intégration harmonique”. Ils sont fondés sur la différenciation morphophysiologique ou plus exactement sur la „totalité” des organismes, c'est-à-dire leur multiplicité dans l'unité. Le second groupe de critères, à savoir „indépendance croissante du milieu” et „autonomie individuelle croissante”, part des relations de l'organisme au milieu et aux autres formes vivantes et souligne la „subsistence” des individus, c'est-à-dire leur plus ou moins grande indépendence ou leur stabilité interne. Comme „totalité” et „subsistence” sont les éléments décisifs d'une définition biologique de l'individu, on peut dire que la „progression biologique“ d'un organisme est d'autant plus élevée que sa totalité et subsistence et par là son être individuel sont plus accusés.Tous les critères mentionnés ne sont pas uniformes. Les motifs de leur imprécision sont divers. Tout d'abord, il n'y a pas encore de définition unique et complète de l'individu biologique, de sorte qu'on ne peut circonscrire d'une manière univoque ce qui confère à un organisme une individualité plus forte ou moins forte. Ensuite les lignées au-delà desquelles s'accomplissent des perfectionnements, et dont l'une reste intérieur au phylum , tandis que l'autre le transcende , sont entrelacées si intimement et d'une façon si particulière qu'elles ne se laissent pas séparer franchement et décrire rigoureusement selon leurs signes distinctifs. Tout représentant d'un phylum, peu importe son palier, est en effet nécessairement inséré dans un milieu et en quelque façon spécialisé. Il n'existe pas des types à caractères phylétiques purs, qui ne montrent dans aucune direction un „perfectionnement de l'adaptation”, mais seulement des marques caractéristiques de la „progression biologique”. Enfin nous ne connaissons pas les restes fossiles que le développement ou la formation des grands phylums du règne animal, à savoir du rameau des Vertébrés et des divers groupes des Invertébrés, mais non pas le plus intéressant et le plus important, leur „progression biologique” jusqu'au degré d'organisation qu'ils présentent déjà à l'époque du Silurien ou plutôt du Cambrien. C'est cela seulement qui permettrait une vue plus profonde sur la nature de la „progression biologique”.Die Arbeit stellt die Frage nach den Kriterien des fossil belegten Biologischen Aufstiegs” der Organismenwelt, d.h. derjenigen Vervollkommnung, die sich nicht innerhalb des Rahmens eines gegebenen Bauplans hält, wie die „Anpassungsvervollkommnung”, sondern über verschiedenrangige Baupläne hinweg zu höheren Typen führt, z.B. von den Fischen über die Amphibien und Reptilien zu den Säugern bzw. Vögeln. Ausführlich werden zwei Gruppen von Kriterien besprochen, ihr Inhalt dargelegt und ihre Eindeutigkeit zur Charakterisierung des „Biologischen Aufstiegs” untersucht. Die erste Gruppe umfasst die Kriterien der „zunehmenden Differenzierung” und „harmonischeren Integration”. Diese legen die morphologisch-physiologische Differenzierung oder genauer die „Ganzheit” der Organismen zugrunde, d.h. ihre Vielheit in der Einheit. Die zweite Kriteriengruppe, nämlich „zunehmende Umweltunabhängigkeit” und „zunehmende individuelle Autonomie”, geht von den Beziehungen des Organismus zur Umwelt und zu andern Lebensformen aus und betont die „Subsistenz” der Individuen, d.h. ihr grösseres oder geringeres Losgelöstsein oder ihre Selbständigkeit. Da nun „Ganzheit” und „Subsistenz” die entscheidenden Elemente einer biologischen Definition des Individuums sind, lässt sich sagen, dass der „Biologische Aufstieg” eines Organismus um so höher ist, je stärker seine Ganzheit und Subsistenz und damit sein Individuumsein ist.Eindeutigkeit kommt allen genannten Kriterien nicht zu. Die Gründe für ihre Unschärfe sind verschiedener Art. Zunächst gibt es noch keine eindeutige und vollständige Definition des biologischen Individuums, so dass sich nicht eindeutig umreissen lässt, was einem Organismus eine stärkere oder weniger starke Individualität verleiht. Dann sind die Linien, über die sich Vervollkommnungen vollziehen und von denen die eine innerhalb des Bauplans bleibt , die andere aber über ihn hinausführt so innig und in so eigenartiger Weise miteinander verflochten, dass sie sich nicht sauber scheiden und in ihren charakteristischen Merkmalen genau beschreiben lassen. Jeder Vertreter eines Bauplans, ganz gleich von welcher Ranghöhe, ist nämlich notwendig in eine Umwelt eingepasst und irgendwie spezialisiert. Es gibt keine Typen mit reinen Bauplanmerkmalen, die nach keiner Richtung hin eine „Anpassungsvervollkommnung”, sondern nur Merkmale des „Biologischen Aufstiegs” aufweisen. Schliesslich kennen wir fossil nur die Entfaltung oder Ausgestaltung der Grossbaupläne des Tierreichs, nämlich des Wirbeltierstammes und der verschiedenen Gruppen der Wirbellosen, nicht aber das Interessanteste und Wichtigste, nämlich ihren „Biologischen Aufstieg” zu der organisatorischen Höhe, mit der sie sich im Silur bzw. im Kabrium bereits vorstellen. Das erst würde einen tieferen Einblick in das Wesen des „Biologischen Aufstiegs” vermitteln.This article deals with the question of the criteria for the “biological ascent” of the organic world, resting on fossil evidence. That is, of that improvement which is not only restricted to the framework of a given “general structure” as is the “improvement of adaptation”, but which also leads beyond general structures of differentiated levels to a higher type,e.g. from the fishes through the amphibians and reptiles to the mammals or birds. Two groups of criteria are discussed at length, their content exposed and their univocity for the characterisation of this “biological ascent” is examined. The first group includes the criteria of “increasing differentiation” and “more harmonious integration”. The basis for these is the morphological-physiological differentiation, or more exactly, the “totality” of the organisms,i.e., their variety-in-unity. The second group of criteria, “increasing independence of environment” and “increasing individual autonomy”, is derived from the relationships of the organism to its environment and to other living forms, and stresses the “subsistence” of individuals,i.e., their greater or lesser degree of independence or self-sufficiency. Now since “totality” and “subsistence” are the decisive elements in a biological definition of the individual, it may be said that the “biological ascent” of an organism is higher, the more perfect its totality and subsistence and therefore its individuality is.The criteria mentioned are not univocal. The reasons for this lack of clarity are varied. First of all, there is no univocal and complete definition of the biological individual, so that it cannot be exactly stated just what gives an organism a more or less perfect individuality. Then the lines, along which improvements are made, and according to which the one remains within the general structure and the other goes beyond the general structure , are so intimately and singularly bound together, that they cannot be cleanly distinguished, and their characteristic notes exactly described. For each representative of a general structure, regardless of its level, is necessarily fitted into an environment and somehow or other specialised. There are no types with only notes of the general structure which show in no direction an “improvment of adaption”, but only the signs of “biological ascent”. Finally, we only have fossil evidence for the development or deployment of the “great general structures” of the animal world, namely that of the vertebrates and of the different groups of invertebrates, not for the most interesting and most important, that is, their “biological ascent” to the level of organisation with which they are found in the Silurian or Cambrian periods. Only that would give us a deeper insight into the essence of “biological ascent”. (shrink)

The prospect of using cell-based interventions to treat neurological conditions raises several important ethical and policy questions. In this target article, we focus on issues related (...) class='Hi'>to the unique constellation of traits that characterize CBIs targeted at the central nervous system. In particular, there is at least a theoretical prospect that these cells will alter the recipients' cognition, mood, and behavior—brain functions that are central to our concept of the self. The potential for such changes, although perhaps remote, is cause for concern and careful ethical analysis. Both to enable better informed consent in the future and as an end in itself, we argue that early human trials of CBIs for neurological conditions must monitor subjects for changes in cognition, mood, and behavior; further, we recommend concrete steps for that monitoring. Such steps will help better characterize the potential risks and benefits of CBIs as they are tested and potentially used for treatment. (shrink)

The study examined the influence of the Pond Report on the teaching of medical ethics in the London medical schools. A questionnaire was given to both medical (...) students and college officers. All medical colleges reported that ethics was included in the curriculum. However, from students' replies, it seems that attendance of optional courses is low and that not all current final year medical students have had any formal teaching in medical ethics. Stronger guidelines are necessary to ensure appropriate ethical training in London medical schools. (shrink)

Background Empirical studies of surrogate decision-making tend to assume that surrogates should make only a 'substituted judgement'—that is, judge what the patient would want if they (...) class='Hi'> were mentally competent. Objectives To explore what people want in a surrogate decision-maker whom they themselves select and to test the assumption that people want their chosen surrogate to make only a substituted judgement. Methods 30 undergraduate students were recruited. They were presented with a hypothetical scenario about their expected loss of mental capacity in the future and asked to answer some questions about their choice of surrogate. These data were analysed qualitatively using thematic content analysis. Results Most respondents talked about choosing someone who was caring and competent in certain ways, giving interesting evidence for their judgements. Surprisingly few highlighted how well they thought their chosen surrogate knew their preferences and would be able to make a substituted judgement. Moreover, few specified that their chosen surrogate had similar attitudes and values to their own and so would make a similar decision to theirs in the circumstances presented. Some respondents also referred to the social role of their chosen surrogate or the social dynamics of their situation which influenced their choices, as well as to ideas of reciprocity and characteristics of honesty and loyalty. Conclusion In the event that they lose mental capacity, many people will not select a surrogate to decide about medical treatments on their behalf solely on the basis that they expect their surrogate to make a substituted judgement. (shrink)

Research Objective: This study focuses on ADs in the Netherlands and introduces a cross-cultural perspective by comparing it with other countries. Methods: A questionnaire was sent (...) class='Hi'>to a panel comprising 1621 people representative of the Dutch population. The response was 86%. Results: 95% of the respondents didn't have an AD, and 24% of these were not familiar with the idea of drawing up an AD. Most of those familiar with ADs knew about the Advanced Euthanasia Directive (AED, 64%). Both low education and the presence of a religious conviction that plays an important role in one's life increase the chance of not wanting to draw up an AD. Also not having experienced a request for euthanasia from someone else, and the inconceivability of asking for euthanasia yourself, increase the chance of not wanting to draw up an AD. Discussion: This study shows that the subjects of palliative care and end-of-life-decision-making were very much dominated by the issue of euthanasia in the Netherlands. The AED was the best known AD; and factors that can be linked to euthanasia play an important role in whether or not people choose to draw up an AD. This differentiates the Netherlands from other countries and, when it comes to ADs, the global differences between countries and cultures are still so large that the highest possible goals, at this moment in time, are observing and possibly learning from other cultural settings. (shrink)

"O'Meara masterfully situates Pryzwara in relation to the traditional and contemporary theological, philosophical, ecclesial, cultural, and social contexts within which he wrote." --_William P. Loewe, professor (...) class='Hi'>of religious studies, Catholic University of America_ Erich Przywara, S.J. is one of the important Catholic intellectuals of the twentieth century. Yet, in the English-speaking world Przywara remains largely unknown. Few of his sixty books or six hundred articles have been translated. In this engaging new book, Thomas O'Meara offers a comprehensive study of the German Jesuit Erich Przywara and his philosophical theology. Przywara's scholarly contributions were remarkable. He was one of three theologians who introduced the writings of John Henry Cardinal Newman into Germany. From his position at the Jesuit journal in Munich, _Stimmen der Zeit_, he offered an open and broad Catholic perspective on the cultural, philosophical, and theological currents of his time. As one of the first Catholic intellectuals to employ the phenomenologies of Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler, he was also responsible for giving an influential, more theological interpretation of the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola. Przywara was also deeply engaged in the ideas and authors of his times. He was the first Catholic dialogue partner of Karl Barth and Paul Tillich. Edmund Husserl was counted among Przywara's friends, and Edith Stein was a close personal and intellectual companion. Through his interactions with important figures of his age and his writings, ranging from speculative systems to liturgical hymns, Przywara was of marked importance in furthering a varied dialogue between German Catholicism and modern culture. Following a foreword by Michael Fahey, S.J., O'Meara presents a chapter on Pryzwara's life and a chronology of his writings. O'Meara then discusses Pryzwara's philosophical theology, his lecture-courses at German universities on Augustine and Aquinas, his philosophy of religion, and his influence on important intellectual contemporaries. O'Meara concludes with an in-depth analysis of Pryzwara's theology, focusing particularly on his Catholic views of person, liturgy, and church. (shrink)

A survey of works on automatic theorem-proving in the ussr 1964-1970. the philosophical problems are not touched.

Shepherdson [14] showed that for a discrete ordered ring I, I is a model of IOpen iff I is an integer part of a real closed ordered (...) field. In this paper, we consider integer parts satisfying PA. We show that if a real closed ordered field R has an integer part I that is a nonstandard model of PA (or even IΣ₄), then R must be recursively saturated. In particular, the real closure of I, RC (I), is recursively saturated. We also show that if R is a countable recursively saturated real closed ordered field, then there is an integer part I such that R = RC(I) and I is a nonstandard model of PA. (shrink)

The principal aim of this work, which is a combination of revised versions of essays that have appeared elsewhere together with some new material, is considerably broader (...) than the title might suggest. Rather than specifically focusing upon Hegel’s relation to romanticism or the vicissitudes of his Grecophilia, the real thrust is nothing less than an attempt to place Hegel’s theory of the state within its historical and systematic context, to rescue it from the many misappropriations and misinterpretations which it has suffered, and to sound out its implications for contemporary political theory and practice. If one were to single out a limited number of the most important themes that serve to unify this collection of essays, at least the following would have to be mentioned. First, Kelly insists at the outset that Hegel’s political philosophy can only be adequately understood within the context of his broader systematic project. Specifically, Hegel’s theory of the state must be approached from out of the more general problematic of his views on the systematic interrelationships between philosophy, politics, history, and religion. Though the author’s discussion of the complex issues lurking in the interstices here will seem to many Hegel scholars much too brief and superficial, particularly given Kelly’s own insistence upon their crucial importance, his discussion at least suffices to allow him to make the point that Hegel’s theory of the state cannot be easily assimilated into either the liberal, conservative, or radical traditions, as understood either in the pre- or post-Hegelian context. Rather, Hegel’s thought contributed to an important shift in the fundamental conceptual constellations which governed political discourse in his own time and which formed the bridge to our epoch. On this basis, Kelly proposes to examine Hegel’s theory of the state, both on its own terms and with an eye to the implications which it might yet have for understanding political phenomena. In both respects, the key notion is that of ‘the neutral state’ which knows "how to compose man’s spiritual strivings and intellectual curiosity... in a stable social whole", a dialectical ‘unity-in-diversity’ "checked by the monarchy from above and the people organized in corporations from below", and ballasted by an impartial legal system and a dedicated phalanx of educated civil servants. For Kelly, Hegel’s idea of the ‘neutral state’ was too soon "buried" in the post-Hegelian reaction, with the result that an original source of insight into the modern political problematic, if not of answers to contemporary political conundrums, was unfortunately and unfairly discredited. Kelly carries through with this idea by showing how Hegel’s theory of the state can serve to shed light on the history and current state of American politics and how it can lead to a renewed reflection upon the meaning and significance of history for contemporary thought. Kelly is at his best at those points where he contrasts Hegel’s political thought to other positions in the context of the modern intellectual and political milieu but is a bit weaker when issues arise which seem to require a shift from political theory to philosophical presuppositions. Nonetheless, especially when read together with the contributions of Avineri and Shklar, this work is helpful in the current re-evaluation of the importance and contemporary relevance of Hegel’s political thought.—J.P.S. (shrink)

The principal aim of this work, which is a combination of revised versions of essays that have appeared elsewhere together with some new material, is considerably broader (...) than the title might suggest. Rather than specifically focusing upon Hegel’s relation to romanticism or the vicissitudes of his Grecophilia, the real thrust is nothing less than an attempt to place Hegel’s theory of the state within its historical and systematic context, to rescue it from the many misappropriations and misinterpretations which it has suffered, and to sound out its implications for contemporary political theory and practice. If one were to single out a limited number of the most important themes that serve to unify this collection of essays, at least the following would have to be mentioned. First, Kelly insists at the outset that Hegel’s political philosophy can only be adequately understood within the context of his broader systematic project. Specifically, Hegel’s theory of the state must be approached from out of the more general problematic of his views on the systematic interrelationships between philosophy, politics, history, and religion. Though the author’s discussion of the complex issues lurking in the interstices here will seem to many Hegel scholars much too brief and superficial, particularly given Kelly’s own insistence upon their crucial importance, his discussion at least suffices to allow him to make the point that Hegel’s theory of the state cannot be easily assimilated into either the liberal, conservative, or radical traditions, as understood either in the pre- or post-Hegelian context. Rather, Hegel’s thought contributed to an important shift in the fundamental conceptual constellations which governed political discourse in his own time and which formed the bridge to our epoch. On this basis, Kelly proposes to examine Hegel’s theory of the state, both on its own terms and with an eye to the implications which it might yet have for understanding political phenomena. In both respects, the key notion is that of ‘the neutral state’ which knows "how to compose man’s spiritual strivings and intellectual curiosity... in a stable social whole", a dialectical ‘unity-in-diversity’ "checked by the monarchy from above and the people organized in corporations from below", and ballasted by an impartial legal system and a dedicated phalanx of educated civil servants. For Kelly, Hegel’s idea of the ‘neutral state’ was too soon "buried" in the post-Hegelian reaction, with the result that an original source of insight into the modern political problematic, if not of answers to contemporary political conundrums, was unfortunately and unfairly discredited. Kelly carries through with this idea by showing how Hegel’s theory of the state can serve to shed light on the history and current state of American politics and how it can lead to a renewed reflection upon the meaning and significance of history for contemporary thought. Kelly is at his best at those points where he contrasts Hegel’s political thought to other positions in the context of the modern intellectual and political milieu but is a bit weaker when issues arise which seem to require a shift from political theory to philosophical presuppositions. Nonetheless, especially when read together with the contributions of Avineri and Shklar, this work is helpful in the current re-evaluation of the importance and contemporary relevance of Hegel’s political thought.—J.P.S. (shrink)