Contents: Foreword. Wolfgang BALZER and C. ULISES MOULINES: Introduction. José A. DÍEZ CALZADA: Structuralist Analysis of Theories of Fundamental Measurement. Adolfo GARCÍA DE LA SIENRA and Pedro REYES: The Theory of Finite Games in Extensive Form. Hans Joachim BURSCHEID und Horst STRUVE: The Theory of Stochastic Fairness - its Historical Development, Formulation and Justification. Wolfgang BALZER and Richard MATTESSICH: Formalizing the Basis of Accounting. Werner DIEDERICH: A Reconstruction of Marxian Economics. Bert HAMMINGA and Wolfgang BALZER: The Basic Structure of (...) Neoclassical General Equilibrium Theory. Klaus MANHART: Balance Theories: Two Reconstructions and the Problem of Intended Applications. Rainer WESTERMANN: Festinger's Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Structuralist Theory-Net. Rainer REISENZEIN: Wundt's Three-Dimensional Theory of Emotion. Pablo LORENZANO: Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics. Hinne HETTEMA and Theo A.F. KUIPERS: The Formalisation of the Periodic Table. C. ULISES MOULINES: The Basic Core of Simple Equilibrium Thermodynamics. Thomas BARTELBORTH: An Axiomatization of Classical Electrodynamics. Author's Index. Subject Index. (shrink)

Although heavily overshadowed by renewed study of the religious tradition in Russian philosophy, another tradition that paralleled and sometimes intersected with it is also drawing attention among contemporary Russian philosophers interested in mining the intellectual legacy of the past for ideas applicable to their postcommunist situation. This is the tradition of liberalism in Russian political and legal philosophy, neglected thus far in this journal except for an article on Boris Chicherin by Sergei Chizhkov in the Winter 1991-92 issue and an (...) article on Petr Struve by Piama Gaidenko in the Fall 1994 issue. The present issue is entirely devoted to the liberal strain in Russia's philosophical heritage and its implications for the present day. (shrink)

The following article is a response to K. Mainzer's ‘Knowledge-Based Systems; Remarks on the Philosophy of Technology and Artificial Intelligence’. We show, that Mainzer does not reach any of his aimsto analyse the possibilities and limits of AI-technology.to reduce anxiousness and hostility against AI, which is motivated by phantastic speculations.to evaluate the factual impact of AI on our lives and on society.His article contributes on the contrary to phantastic speculations, which are not technologically justified in any way. There are two (...) main reasons for his misleading view: (a) the state of the art of knowledge-based systems is incorrectly described; (b) the roots, paradigms and alternatives to AI are not in the least sufficiently analysed. We examine issues (a) and (b) in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 we discuss, how the conclusions, which Mainzer draws, have to be modified. In analysing the lines of argumentation of Mainzer we try to clarify the methodological errors and the philosophical attitude of Mainzer, which is in many respects not adequate to the subject of the article. (shrink)

Une des grandes figures de la philosophie russe du XXe siècle, qui s'est voulu le Job de la philosophie, en lutte avec la raison et ses évidences, avec les représentations de Dieu et avec Dieu lui-même.

Probability theory developed in history from problems concerning the fairness of games. The historical development of the associated theory of stochastic fairness is described using concepts embodied in the structuralist meta‐theory. The justification of the theory is discussed using an approach derived from J. Rawls.

The incredible achievements of modern scientific theories lead most of us to embrace scientific realism: the view that our best theories offer us at least roughly accurate descriptions of otherwise inaccessible parts of the world like genes, atoms, and the big bang. In Exceeding Our Grasp, Stanford argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific enterprise. The historical record (...) of scientific inquiry, Stanford suggests, is characterized by what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. Stanford supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. He goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself. Stanford concludes by investigating what positive account of the spectacularly successful edifice of modern theoretical science remains open to us if we accept that our best scientific theories are powerful conceptual tools for accomplishing our practical goals, but abandon the view that the descriptions of the world around us that they offer are therefore even probably or approximately true. (shrink)

The place of the emotions among the passions -- The analytic of the emotions I -- The analytic of the emotions II -- The dialectic of the emotions -- Pride, arrogance, and humility -- Shame, embarrassment, and guilt -- Envy -- Jealousy -- Anger -- Love -- Friendship -- Sympathy and empathy.

Leibniz was an outstanding mathematician of the 17th century and one of the most original philosophers of European history. Against this background it is astonishing that the ideas of Leibniz concerning probability have to date not been appreciated by mathematicians and philosophers. In this article the most important work of Leibniz with respect to probability theory, his De incerti aestimatione , is analysed. Here Leibniz deals with the 'problem of points', the then famous problem as to how to divide justly (...) the stake when two players have to break off a number of prearranged games. The correspondence between Fermat and Pascal about this problem is regarded as the birth of probability theory. Yet, Leibniz favoured another solution to both of these. We reconstruct the underlying normative ideas of Leibniz and of Fermat and Pascal and show that they are equally sound and justifiable. (shrink)

Knowledge-based systems - Utopia and Reality. The following article is a response to K. Mainzer's 'Knowledge-Based Systems; Remarks on the Philosophy of Technology and Artificial Intelligence'. We show, that Mainzer does not reach any of his aims - to analyse the possibilities and limits of AI-technology, - to reduce anxiousness and hostility against AI, which is motivated by phantastic speculations, - to evaluate the factual impact of AI on our lives and on society. His article contributes on the contrary to (...) phantastic speculations, which are not technologically justified in any way. There are two main reasons for his misleading view: (a) the state of the art of knowledge-based systems is incorrectly described; (b) the roots, paradigms and alternatives to AI are not in the least sufficiently analysed. We examine issues (a) and (b) in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 we discuss, how the conclusions, which Mainzer draws, have to be modified. In analysing the lines of argumentation of Mainzer we try to clarify the methodological errors and the philosophical attitude of Mainzer, which is in many respects not adequate to the subject of the article. (shrink)

Are empirical theories empirically testable? In this article Theoretische Begriffe und die Prüfbarkeit von Theorien V. Gadenne comes to the conclusion that theories are testable. On this basis he criticizes the non-statement view which asserts the contrary. It is shown that this criticism, however, is erroneous.

A main subject of philosophy of science is the reconstruction of scientific theories. Not only scientists are holding theories but everybody else, namely theories about everyday knowledge. In this article two geometric theories of this kind are reconstructed. The reconstruction is performed under the structuralist view of theories. It turns out that there are important differences between scientific theories and everyday theories, concerning the intended applications as well as the logical status of the concepts.

Homo Mysticus presents three renowned lectures delivered by Wolfgang Struve from 1974 to 1984, translated into English in this volume. Philosophical and mystical experiences are finally given expression in this remarkable collection.

One of the most famous critiques of the Leibnitian calculus is contained in the essay “The Analyst” written by George Berkeley in 1734. His key argument is those on compensating errors. In this article, we reconstruct Berkeley's argument from a systematical point of view showing that the argument is neither circular nor trivial, as some modern historians think. In spite of this well-founded argument, the critique of Berkeley is with respect to the calculus not a fundamental one. Nevertheless, it highlights (...) central aspects of the calculus that are characteristic of modern scientific theories. (shrink)