History of Logic and Semantics offers a collection of studies on the development of the Aristotelian and terminist approaches to language, from the Boethian reception of Aristotle to the post-medieval terminism. These articles were also published in Vivarium, Volume 53, Nos. 2-4.

The complexity of the scholastic view of descent stems from the attempt to find a reply to three different questions at the same time: those pertaining to the meaning of propositions, the relationships of inference between propositions, and the truth conditions of propositions. From each of these issues there arises a different sequence of developments to this doctrine, each of which has its own problems and solutions. Initially, the concept of descent is introduced in response to the problem of determining (...) the meaning of quantified propositions. This is the first axis of the development of the doctrine of descent, according to which descent consists of the construction of individual propositions which make explicit the meaning of the quantified proposition. The appearance of these new propositions, however, gives rise to the second axis in the development of the doctrine of descent. As soon as we have this multiplicity of singular propositions, it is possible to forget where they came from and how, simply considering the problem of their logical relationship with the original quantified proposition. This is how descent comes to be viewed not as an analysis of the meaning of the proposition, but as a relationship of consequence: that which could be established between a quantified proposition and a set of singular propositions. Lastly, when descent is considered as a relationship of consequence, it is possible to develop this doctrine in a third direction, given that this relationship between a quantified proposition and a set of singular propositions can be used as a means of showing the truth or falsehood of the quantified proposition. Pardo’s text is a good example of the problems which the concept of descent inevitably encounters when it is approached from three points of view which are superimposed upon each other without regard for their radical diversity. (shrink)

In 1980 L. M. de Rijk edited some texts connected with medieval disputation ( Die mittelaterlichen Traktate De modo opponendi et respondendi ), towards which he showed a strikingly contemptuous attitude. The reason for his contempt was that the treatises did not fit the obligationes and sophismata tradition. In this article I focus on the original version, the Thesaurus Philosophorum , to highlight the distinction of this family of treatises with respect to the “modern“ tradition. First, I study the features (...) of the disputation that can be recognised through the collection of fallacious arguments contained in the Thesaurus . Second, I briefly examine the contents of the treatise and their arrangement, showing that they are closely related to the kind of disputation in question. I hope to support the idea that neither the technique of disputation nor the contents and their arrangement deserve a straightforward rejection. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 53, Issue 2-4, pp 405 - 423 This article deals with a brief _difficultas_ in the _Tractatus de compositione propositionis mentalis_ by Fernando de Enzinas: _qualiter copule significent tempus et an copule de presenti et preterito sint synonime_. A progressive determination of the signification of the copula is analysed: first, Enzinas defines his position about the principal syncategorematic signification of the copula; then, he analyses the sense of the consignification of time traditionally attributed to the copula. The (...) originality of Enzinas’ position is highlighted, given the fact that he gives preference to the question as to _how_ the copulae signify time rather than the question as to _which_ time the copulae signify. (shrink)

Originally motivated by a sophism, Pardo's discussion about the unity of mental propositions allows him to elaborate on his ideas about the nature of propositions. His option for a non-composite character of mental propositions is grounded in an original view about syncategorems: propositions have a syncategorematic signification, which allows them to signify aliquid aliqualiter, just by virtue of the mental copula, without the need of any added categorematic element. Pardo's general claim about the simplicity of mental propositions is developed into (...) several specific thesis about mental propositions: a) it is not judgement which gives its unity to mental propositions, but judicative acts always follow some previous apprehensive act that is simple in its own right; b) this simplicity is compatible with a certain kind of complexity, that can be explained in terms of the "causal history" of the acts of knowing; c) traditional conceptions about subject and predicate must be recast, while keeping their usual explicative power concerning logical properties; d) of course, the traditional conception about the copula has been modified, giving rise to a fully innovative conception of the nature of mental propositions. Nevertheless, this innovative conception of mental language seems still infected by certain "common sense" prejudices, which lead Pardo to propose also a provocative conception of vocal language, which I consider unnecessary. (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to rethink from two perspectives Buridan’s ideas concerning knowledge: On the one hand, I explore Buridan’s theory of knowledge in the hope that it will shed some light on the intuition that the structure of propositions determines the justification of our beliefs on various different levels. On the other hand, I would like to contribute to demonstrating the consistency of Buridan’s thought,which has been remarked by almost all scholars working on Buridan: in particular, I am (...) interested in exploring the benefits of using supposition theory when applied to the theory of knowledge. I will start by examining Buridan’s conception of scientia (as opposed to error, opinio and fides), from the perspective of two distinctions which are very important to Buridan’s theory of the proposition: complexio/enunciatio and enunciatio/assensus. Then I will recall Buridan’s analysis of propositions (and his use of supposition to define truth conditions) to show their consistency with this conception of knowledge. (shrink)

From the medieval and post-medieval analyses dealing with propositions and time one gathers that their relation can be considered from various points of view. It could be said that there is not one "time" connected with a proposition, but several "times": following d'Ors, I will distinguish at least three: the time of the utterance, the time of the copula, and the time of truth. These three times of the proposition may or may not coincide. In these pages I propose to (...) examine one of the problems raised by the possible separation of times. I will use as a guide the reflections of the Spanish logician Jerónimo Pardo (†1502) regarding the question of whether or not the mental true contingent proposition can be falsified. (shrink)

I examine a sixteenth-century development of the anti-realist propositional semantics which is based on the notion of ‘mode’. Pardo uses this notion to offer a personal interpretation of the Buridanian criticism of complexe significabilia. He develops a middle way between the reduction of the significate of propositions to particular things and the postulation of non-standard entities which are only complexly signifiable. The key to this middle way is Pardo's understanding of the notion of ‘mode’ as connoting a relation between individual (...) things. He offers a new interpretation of the signification of syncategorematic terms, and a definition of ‘comparative’ notions, by which something is known ‘relatively’ with respect to some other thing. And a real relational correlate is postulated for these relational ways of knowing. Relations are thus used to grant a specific significate of propositions, without renouncing the strict Buridanian rejection of any extra-categorial complexe significabilia. The role of r... (shrink)

The aim of this paper is rather modest: we do not intend to reconstruct Aristotle’s theory of truth (although we are convinced that there is such a thing), and we will not try to settle the issue concerning Bivalence in Aristotle. We merely want, on the one hand, to argue for the consistency between the main Aristotelian texts on truth and a possible rejection of Bivalence; and on the other hand, to investigate the conditions of a possible counterexample to Bivalence. (...) The motivation for this research is also very specific. We are interested in the apparent violation of Bivalence introduced by vague predicates, and in particular we want to respond to a family of arguments put forward by T. Williamson in support of the idea that allowing for exceptions to Bivalence would be incoherent. We have focused on these arguments for two reasons. On the one hand, what is allegedly threatened by a denial of Bivalence is no less than the very “nature of truth or falsity”. On the other hand, Aristotle is explicitly mentioned as one of the defendants of this “natural” conception of truth, and we are reminded about the connection between Aristotle’s theory and Tarski’s semantic conception. These arguments, therefore, give us an occasion to explore Aristotle’s analysis of the nature of truth and falsity, and to examine its connection with the Tarskian conception of truth. In particular, we would like to question the assumption, which has become a commonplace in the field of analytical philosophy, that Aristotle’s notion of truth can be encoded in the pair of disquotational biconditionals that derive from Tarski’s “T schema”. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to help to clarify the role which Aristotle gives to definition in his theory of demonstration. I shall begin by examining his handling of the relations between definition and demonstration in chapters 8-10 of the second book of the Posterior Analytics, in order to provide an outline for an interpretation of Aristotle's thought. Secondly, I shall examine chapter 10 in more detail, bringing out the contrast between the commentary by Averroes and that of Grosseteste. (...) I have chosen these two commentators because, both being generally magnificent interpreters of Aristotle, as far as the nature and types of definition are concerned their understanding of Aristotle is strikingly different. (shrink)

This paper presents an outline of Carlos Vaz Ferreira's moderate anti-intellectualism, paying special attention to the relations between science and philosophy as complementary aspects of human knowledge. Explicitly opposing William James's radical anti-intellectualism, and thus apparently anti-Pragmatist, Vaz is in fact very close to the central ideas of Pragmatism. A defense of reason as a valuable help for penetrating into reality, combined with the recognition of extra-rational elements that contribute to human apprehension of reality, results in a position that can (...) be characterized by its anti-rationalism, fallibilism and pluralism. (shrink)

Jerónimo Pardo's analysis of the problems raised by some popular trinitarian paralogisms is studied in this paper. The purpose is to show how the notions employed by the theologians in order to solve theological problems were introduced into a textbook on logic to deal with some genuinely logical problems. First, the problem, common to all logical approaches, of achieving a fine-grained analysis of the logical form of syllogistical inferences. Second, the problem, typical of the terminist approach to logic, of guaranteeing (...) that Latin is an adequate vehicle for logical analysis. (shrink)

The first section of this article offers a reconstruction of Buridan's theory of propositions, along the following lines: on the syntactic plane, propositions obtain a special type of unity from the presence of a copula; on the semantic plane, the fact that a proposition does not have any specific significate (different from the significate of terms), does not erase the distinction between propositions and terms: the copula performs an act of saying, in virtue of which propositions can be true or (...) false. The second section sumarises Pardo's theory of propositions, showing how in this case a Buridanian starting point led to a result very different from that which Buridan reached. (shrink)

UNICEF España ocupa un local bastante amplio en Mauricio Legendre, a espaldas de la estación de Chamartín y a poca distancia de la Plaza de Castilla en la capital madrileña. Un local que luce, dentro y fuera, el característico azul de la organización. Se respira, en esta sede, un ambiente de intenso trabajo� entusiasmante. Da la impresión de que quienes están en la tarea lo hacen con ilusión, con ganas. Lacalidez de la acogida y el clima de confianza facilitan una (...) entrevista muy cordial y amigable. Paloma Escudero es quien dirige estos laboriosos equipos. Una mujer joven y animosa, que llegó a UNICEF tras una larga trayectoria de éxito profesional pero también de aventuras como voluntaria alrededor del mundo� Me pregunto, sin embargo, si realmente estas organizaciones son eficaces en países como España, el los que la infancia no parece malnutrición y parece estar bien atendida en todos los aspectos. Es lo primero que planteo�. (shrink)

Dieses Arbeitsinstrument bietet eine Aktualisierung des erstmals 1987 publizierten kritischen Überblicks über die Quellen zu dem im Titel genannten Streit. Es geht dem Verf. vor allem darum, den seit 1987 nicht unerheblichen Fortschritt in Editionen und Forschung zu dokumentieren. Die Regesten der Quellen werden zum einen durch einen knappen Bericht zur Forschungslage , zum Wert der Quellen , zum reichskirchlichen Ursprung des Streits im sog. Neuchalkedonismus , zu seinen politischen Hintergründen und zu seinem Verlauf eingeleitet und zum anderen durch prosopographische (...) Hinweise zu den Regesten erschlossen, die, wie der Verf. S. VII feststellt, „durch die Vorarbeiten“ in der PmbZ „wesentlich erleichtert“ wurden. Als Anhang bietet dieses Instrument eine Zeittafel, ein Glossar zu den wichtigsten Termini und ein Stellen- und Sachregister . Eingearbeitet hat der Verf. vor allem die Edition der ACO II,2 von R. Riedinger und der Scripta saeculi VII vitam Maximi Confessoris illustrantia, die P. Allen und B. Neil im Band 39 des CCSG vorgelegt haben . Auf Grund der bisher schwer zugänglichen Ausgabe von S.L. Epifanovic und ihrer Wiedergabe in der CPG sind zumindest zwei Dubletten in die Regesten aufgenommen worden. Denn die Texte Nr. 67, 67a ; Nr. 90 und Nr. 89 ; Nr. 91 sind jeweils nur verschiedene Rezensionen. – Die Regesten zur Vorgeschichte des Streits im 6. Jahrhundert , die als „Spitze eines Eisberges“ eingeführt werden , sind nicht vollständig; insbes. fehlen hier die Zeugnisse aus Kaiser Justinians Schriften . Zurecht betont der Verf., dass der Streit schon im Konzil von Chalkedon angelegt ist, sofern durch dessen „Verdammungen … der Grat für die weitere christologische Arbeit … sehr schmal geworden“ war . Dass hier die historische Forschung ansetzen und ihre Begriffe schärfen muss, hat der Rez. in Studia Patristica 34, 2001, 572–604, gezeigt. Ausführlich belegen die Regesten zum einen die Aussagen von Maximos dem Bekenner, sieht man von seinen „vielen beiläufigen Bemerkungen“ ab , und zum anderen den Streit der römischen Kirche seit „der Kampfansage“ unter Papst Johannes IV. . Dabei wird der Verf. der historischen Kritik an Maximos gerecht, die 1967 mit W. Lackner's Beurteilung der griechischen Vita des Maximos begann, 1973 durch die Publikation der syrischen Vita einen neuen Anstoß erhielt, 1985 mit R. Riedinger's Nachweis, dass die Akten der Lateransynode von 649 „ein Werk der Byzantiner um Maximos“ sind, der diese Synode als 6. Ökumenisches Konzil bezeichnet hat , und seit 1999 auf Grund der kritischen Ausgabe jener Dokumentation, die Maximos' Anhänger nach 655 publizierten zum Urteil geführt hat: „Maximos und seine Schüler“ sind „zu sehr einseitiger Darstellung und zu bewussten Irreführungen fähig gewesen“ . Dies gilt auch dann, wenn man in der Beurteilung der theologischen Intentionen des Maximos nicht dem Verf. , sondern W. Elert , dessen Verdienste der Verf. zurecht würdigt, und anderen Autoren folgt und vor allem eine Entwicklung in Maximos' Christologie aufweist. Eine solche zeigt sich z.B. in Maximos' Interpretation des Geschehens von Gethsemani und der Oratio 30,12 des Gregor von Nazianz. Hier wäre auch Maximos' Korrektur an der neuchalkedonischen Basis zu nennen, die eine Entwicklung von 633 über den Höhepunkt der Krise um 640 voraussetzt. Wenn es zur zuletzt genannten Quelle heißt, Anastasios I. von Antiochien werde hier „als völlig orthodox beurteilt“, dann sollte man hinzufügen, dass Maximos der Nachweis nur über eine höchst subtile Interpretation gelingt, die auf die durch Anastasios' Text gestellte Frage nach dem einen Subjekt des Wirkens nicht eingeht. Es sei hier die Bemerkung erlaubt, dass es der Maximos–Forschung gut täte, wieder nach Entwicklungen im Denken dieses bedeutenden Theologen zu fragen. – Im Vergleich zum vorgenannten Dossier ist jenes des Anastasios Sinaites nicht vollständig erfasst. Dies ist bedauerlich, weil dieser Autor kein Neuchalkedoniker ist und darum die Christologie Kyrills von Alexandrien und somit Chalkedon im Ausgang von der Unterscheidung von drei Klassen christologischer Aussagen der Bibel beurteilt, auf der die Union von 433 gründet, in der sich Kyrill mit den Orientalen verständigt hatte und auf die das Konzil von Chalkedon in der Einleitung zu seiner definitio fidei hinweist. Die dritte Klasse, jene der theandrischen Aussagen, erlaubte es Anastasios gegen seine reichskirchlichen Gegner in Ägypten und Syrien, von ihm Harmasiten genannt, den Tomus Leonis und so die antiochenische Christologie einzubringen und das Zeitalter Justinians und dessen Folgen einfach nicht zur Kenntnis zu nehmen, auch wenn er um das 5. Ökumenische Konzil von Konstantinopel wusste, dessen Sprache jene des sog. Neuchalkedonismus gewesen ist. Abschließend sei betont, dass dieses Arbeitsinstrument höchst sorgfältig zusammengestellt und eingeleitet ist. Dem Rez. ist nur eine Inkonsistenz aufgefallen. Der Verf. vertritt auf S. 23 als historisch gesichert, dass Kaiser Herakleios „später die Verantwortung für die Ekthesis von sich gewiesen hat“, und verweist dazu auf das in CPG 7736 wiedergegebene Zitat der Keleusis , dessen Authentizität er jedoch auf S. 97 zurecht bezweifelt. (shrink)

It is fortunate for my purposes that English has the two words ‘almighty’ and ‘omnipotent’, and that apart from any stipulation by me the words have rather different associations and suggestions. ‘Almighty’ is the familiar word that comes in the creeds of the Church; ‘omnipotent’ is at home rather in formal theological discussions and controversies, e.g. about miracles and about the problem of evil. ‘Almighty’ derives by way of Latin ‘omnipotens’ from the Greek word ‘ pantokratōr ’; and both this (...) Greek word, like the more classical ‘ pankratēs ’, and ‘almighty’ itself suggest God's having power over all things. On the other hand the English word ‘omnipotent’ would ordinarily be taken to imply ability to do everything; the Latin word ‘omnipotens’ also predominantly has this meaning in Scholastic writers, even though in origin it is a Latinization of ‘ pantocratōr ’. So there already is a tendency to distinguish the two words; and in this paper I shall make the distinction a strict one. I shall use the word ‘almighty’ to express God's power over all things, and I shall take ‘omnipotence’ to mean ability to do everything. (shrink)

One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of religious diversity, and truth.

Festschrift honoring P.F. Strawson; includes contributed articles on his contributions in logic and on logic.

In recent years philosophers have given much attention to the ‘ontological problem’ of events. Donald Davidson puts the matter thus: ‘the assumption, ontological and metaphysical, that there are events is one without which we cannot make sense of much of our common talk; or so, at any rate, I have been arguing. I do not know of any better, or further, way of showing what there is’. It might be thought bizarre to assign to philosophers the task of ‘showing what (...) there is’. They have not distinguished themselves by the discovery of new elements, new species or new continents, nor even of new categories, although there has often been more dreamt of in their philosophies than can be found in heaven or earth. It might appear even stranger to think that one can show what there actually is by arguing that the existence of something needs to be assumed in order for certain sentences to make sense. More than anything, the sober reader will doubtlessly be amazed that we need to assume , after lengthy argument, ‘that there are events’. (shrink)

Desde que 1975 fue declarado por las Naciones Unidas Año Internacional de las Mujeres, han sido numerosas las medidas legales y políticas para asegurar la participación de las mujeres en todos los ámbitos de acción de la sociedad. Sin embargo, los logros no se sitúan solamente en un incremento cuantitativo de mujeres en sectores como el laboral o los procesos de toma de decisiones. La integración de la igualdad de género en la estructuración de la sociedad abre interrogantes sobre la (...) nueva lectura del poder, de la ciudadanía y de las relaciones personales. Y al mismo tiempo, cuestiona si las medidas de apoyo a la participación de las mujeres están teniendo o no un efecto positivo en favor de la igualdad. (shrink)

The study presented is the result of a field survey conducted in Latvia in 1991. The brief of this research was to trace the role of the ‘private’ farm sector that has begun to emerge in the wake of the transition from a central-command to a market-oriented economy. Thus a look at the legislative acts embodying the agrarian reform is ccompanied by an analysis of the recent developments in local production systems. The study of ‘production systems’, or that part of (...) economic analysis that comes under the rubric of ‘farm systems’, was employed here for the first time to analyze a Soviet-type economic system in transition. The first and second sections, which focus on the historical evolution of Latvia's agriculture and the economics underpinning it, range in compass from the ‘first’ agrarian reform to collectivization and on to the present situation. This is followed by a look at the current, or ‘third’, land reform initiative (section 3), particular emphasis being accorded the emergence of new production structures and the problems posed by the transformation of the old ones (sections 4 and 5). The next section includes a discussion of the links between the farms of the socialized sector and of the nascent private one (section 6). The concluding remarks provide a recapitulation of the study's main findings. (shrink)