I will argue that making a certain assumption allows us to conceptualize more clearly our agency over our minds. The assumption is this: certain attitudes (most uncontroversially, belief and intention) embody their subject’s answer to some question or set of questions. I will first explain the assumption and then show that, given the assumption, we should expect to exercise agency over this class of attitudes in (at least) two distinct ways: by answering for ourselves the question they embody and by (...) acting upon them in ways designed to affect them according to our purposes—in roughly the way we exercise agency over most ordinary objects. (shrink)

In Deep Space Nine's Chief of Security Odo is one who finds his identity in his job, which is a sufficient burden to keep him plenty occupied. In a more benign laboratory than what Odo experienced, philosophical instead of exobiological, he presents an ideal case study of George Herbert Mead's theory of how the self is formed and transformed. According to Mead, language starts with meaningful gestures. When creatures act in coordination through a gesture, signaling that the gesture means the (...) same to them; it becomes language. Focused attention is one of the ways one has of influencing the clarity and extent of memories. Over the arc of Deep Space Nine's tales, all the characters change. Yet Odo goes from being a one‐dimensional to a multidimensional character by learning languages from those who start out as generalized others, but become specific others as time goes on. (shrink)

Se è spontaneo associare i concetti di immagine e immaginario, in quanto sembrano due nozioni strettamente legate, non è affatto semplice determinare il modo in cui si configura il loro rapporto. Per tracciare i distingua di tale relazione e i metodi che possono aiutarci a chiarirla, partiremo dalla descrizione della coscienza d’immagine — si tratta di un termine husserliano — per arrivare al mito. La nostra riflessione si dividerà in diversi fasi. Analizzeremo infatti la struttura fenomenica dell’immagine mentale, del segno (...) e del simbolo e seguiremo, brevemente, anche il cammino inverso che va dal simbolo all’immagine. I punti salienti della nostra dimostrazione saranno i seguenti: il rapporto immagine-immaginario non può essere definito in modo univoco, in quanto cambia in base al tipo di immagine; a livello della coscienza d’immagine, un approccio psicologico può rivelarsi utile, poiché il supporto percettivo costituisce un momento essenziale dell’immagine reale; nel caso della phantasia o immagine mentale, il metodo psicoanalitico sembra quello più appropriato, poiché l’assenza del supporto percettivo rende le immagini mentali libere da ogni costrizione. Pertanto la comprensione delle dinamiche affettive-desiranti può fornire una spiegazione al corso apparentemente sregolato di associazioni che qui si manifestano. Per quanto riguarda il segno, il simbolo e il mito, le dimensioni affettiva, percettiva, transizionale e fantastica sono strettamente correlate. Questo tipo di immagini sembrano insistere su “schermi” diversi e pertanto si richiede un approccio metodologico variegato. (shrink)

Many people begin to practice yoga for its physical benefits-from exercise to stress relief-but over time more than 60 percent of practitioners say that their primary reason for practice changes from physical to spiritual. Threads of Yoga is written for these practitioners who crave a deeper experience of yoga, as well as the teachers who want to share it. Written by a veteran yoga teacher, Threads of Yoga introduces some of the basics of yoga philosophy, as well as meditations, breathwork, (...) and other subtle practices. Short chapters can serve as inspiration for personal practice or a yoga class. (shrink)

This multidisciplinary collection explores the ethics of social media use during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a focus on misinformation, truth, well-being, and authenticity.

PONIC P, REID C and FRISBY W.Nursing Inquiry2010;17: 324–335 Cultivating the power of partnerships in feminist participatory action research in women’s healthFeminist participatory action research integrates feminist theories and participatory action research methods, often with the explicit intention of building community–academic partnerships to create new forms of knowledge to inform women's health. Despite the current pro‐partnership agenda in health research and policy settings, a lack of attention has been paid to how to cultivate effective partnerships given limited resources, competing agendas, (...) and inherent power differences. Based on our 10+ years individually and collectively conducting women's health and feminist participatory action research, we suggest that it is imperative to intentionally developpower‐withstrategies in order to avoid replicating the power imbalances that such projects seek to redress. By drawing on examples from three of our recent feminist participatory action projects we reflect on some of the tensions and complexities of attempting to cultivate power‐with research partnerships. We then offer skills and resources needed by academic researchers to effectively harness the collective resources, agendas, and knowledge that each partner brings to the table. We suggest that investing in the process of cultivating power‐with research partnerships ultimately improves our collective ability to understand and address women's health issues. (shrink)

In the classical Turing test, participants are challenged to tell whether they are interacting with another human being or with a machine. The way the interaction takes place is not direct, but a distant conversation through computer screen messages. Basic forms of interaction are face-to-face and embodied, context-dependent and based on the detection of reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Our idea is that interaction detection requires the integration of proprioceptive and interoceptive patterns with sensorimotor patterns, within quite short time lapses, so that (...) they appear as mutually contingent, as reciprocal. In other words, the experience of interaction takes place when sensorimotor patterns are contingent upon one’s own movements, and vice versa. I react to your movement, you react to mine. When I notice both components, I come to experience an interaction. Therefore, we designed a “minimal” Turing test to investigate how much information is required to detect these reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies. Using a new version of the perceptual crossing paradigm, we tested whether participants resorted to interaction detection to tell apart human from machine agents in repeated encounters with these agents. In two studies, we presented participants with movements of a human agent, either online or offline, and movements of a computerized oscillatory agent in three different blocks. In each block, either auditory or audiovisual feedback was provided along each trial. Analysis of participants’ explicit responses and of the implicit information subsumed in the dynamics of their series will reveal evidence that participants use the reciprocal sensorimotor contingencies within short time windows. For a machine to pass this minimal Turing test, it should be able to generate this sort of reciprocal contingencies. (shrink)

According to sensorimotor theory perceiving is a bodily skill involving exercise of an implicit know-how of the systematic ways that sensations change as a result of potential movements, that is, of sensorimotor contingencies. The theory has been most successfully applied to vision and touch, while perceptual modalities that rely less on overt exploration of the environment have not received as much attention. In addition, most research has focused on philosophically grounding the theory and on psychologically elucidating sensorimotor laws, but the (...) theory’s ramifications for neuroscience still remain underexamined. Here we sketch the beginnings of a research program that could address these two outstanding challenges in terms of auditory perception. We review the neuroscience literature on passive listening, which is defined as listening without overt bodily movement, and conclude that sensorimotor theory provides a unique perspective on the consistent finding of motor system activation. In contrast to competing theories, this activation is predicted to be involved not only in the perception of speech- and action-related sounds, but in auditory perception in general. More specifically, we propose that the auditory processing associated with supplementary motor areas forms part of the neural basis of the exercise of sensorimotor know-how: these areas’ recognized role in facilitating spontaneous motor responses to sound and supporting flexible engagement of sensorimotor processes to guide auditory experience and enable auditory imagery, can be understood in terms of two key characteristics of sensorimotor interaction, its “alerting capacity” and “corporality”, respectively. We also highlight that there is more to the inside of the body than the brain: there is an opportunity to develop sensorimotor theory into new directions in terms of the still poorly understood active processes of the peripheral auditory system. (shrink)

This paper explains conceptual modeling within the framework of Frame-Based Terminology (Faber, 2012; 2015; 2022), as applied to EcoLexicon (ecolexicon.ugr.es), a specialized knowledge base on the environment (León-Araúz, Reimerink &, Faber, 2019; Faber & León-Araúz, 2021). It describes how a frame-based terminological resource is currently being restructured and reengineered as an initial step towards its formalization and subsequent transformation into an ontology. It also explains how the information in EcoLexicon can be integrated in environmental ontologies such as ENVO (Buttigieg, Morrison, (...) Smith, Mungall & Lewis, 2013; Buttigieg, Pafilis, Lewis, Schildhauer, Walls & Mungall, 2016), particularly at the bottom tiers of the Ontology Learning Layer Cake (Cimiano, 2006; Cimiano, Maedche, Staab & Volker, 2009). The assumption is that frames, as a conceptual modeling tool, and information extracted from corpora can be used to represent the conceptual structure of a specialized domain. (shrink)

Although theoretically rigorous, the book is comprehensible to the beginning qualitative researcher.

In this rich cultural history, Pamela Robertson Wojcik examines America's ambivalent and shifting attitude toward homelessness through a close study of film cycles from five distinct historical moments that show characters as unhomed and placeless, mobile rather than fixed: failing, resisting, or opting out of the mandate for a home of one's own. From the tramp films of the Silent Era to the Oscar-winning Nomadland in 2021, Wojcik shows how film cycles reveal a tension in the American imaginary between (...) viewing homelessness as, on the one hand, deviant or threatening, and, on the other, emblematic of freedom and independence. Blending social history with insights drawn from a complex array of films, both canonical and fringe, Wojcik effectively 'unhomes' dominant narratives that cast aspirations for success and social mobility as the focus of American cinema, reminding us that genres of precarity have been central to the American cinema (and American story) all along. (shrink)

The philosophical foundation -- Using the environment as a teaching tool -- Assessing the pillars of the physical environment for academic learning -- The physical environment to support meaningful learning -- The physical environment to support social learning -- The physical environment to support purposeful learning -- The physical environment to support responsible learning -- The physical environment to support continuous learning -- The physical environment to support in-depth learning -- Using the APPEAL for professional development and research -- General (...) procedures for administering the APPEAL. (shrink)

A good number of people currently thinking and writing about reasons identify a reason as a consideration that counts in favor of an action or attitude.1 I will argue that using this as our fundamental account of what a reason is generates a fairly deep and recalcitrant ambiguity; this account fails to distinguish between two quite different sets of considerations that count in favor of certain attitudes, only one of which are the “proper” or “appropriate” kind of reason for them. (...) This ambiguity has been the topic of recent discussion, under the head “the wrong kind of reasons problem.”2 I will suggest that confusion about “the wrong kind of reason” will be dispelled by changing our account of what a reason is. While I agree both that reasons are considerations and that certain.. (shrink)

Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees (...) that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible. (shrink)

This book focuses in an in-depth way on the particular problems faced by nurses in various advanced practice roles across the life-span and in front-line care. It is comprehensive textbook broken out into three sections: philosophical foundation, ethics, and specialty focus.

I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.

According to ‘Excluders’, descriptive uncertainty – but not normative uncertainty – matters to what we ought to do. Recently, several authors have argued that those wishing to treat normative uncertainty differently from descriptive uncertainty face a dependence problem because one's descriptive uncertainty can depend on one's normative uncertainty. The aim of this paper is to determine whether the phenomenon of dependence poses a decisive problem for Excluders. I argue that existing arguments fail to show this, and that, while stronger ones (...) can be found, Excluders can escape them. (shrink)

In this paper I consider fairness of blaming a wrongdoer. In particular, I consider the claim that blaming a wrongdoer can be unfair because blame has a certain characteristic force, a force which is not fairly imposed upon the wrongdoer unless certain conditions are met--unless, e.g., the wrongdoer could have done otherwise, or unless she is someone capable of having done right, or unless she is able to control her behavior by the light of moral reasons. While agreeing that blame (...) has a characteristic force, I am skeptical of this charge of unfairness. My skepticism concerns itself less with the particular conditions of fairness proposed than with the idea that blame can be rendered unfair by its characteristic force. If to blame a person were simply to perform certain intentional actions, then, as we will see, blame could be rendered unfair by its force. But to blame a person is not just to act in certain ways. It is, at least in large part, to make certain judgments or adopt certain attitudes. However, it is unclear how these attitudes or judgments carry "force"? and also unclear whether they can be rendered unfair by their force. Examining these issues, I will suggest that much of the force of blame is found in a set of judgments--most centrally, the judgment that one person failed to show proper regard for others. But, I will argue, once it is granted that such judgments are true, their characteristic force cannot render them unfair. (shrink)

I first pose a challenge which, it seems to me, any philosophical account of forgiveness must meet: the account must be articulate and it must allow for forgiveness that is uncompromising. I then examine an account of forgiveness which appears to meet this challenge. Upon closer examination we discover that this account actually fails to meet the challenge—but it fails in very instructive ways. The account takes two missteps which seem to be taken by almost everyone discussing forgiveness. At the (...) end, I sketch an alternative account of forgiveness, one that I think meets the challenge and avoids the missteps. (shrink)

A common line of thought claims that we are responsible for ourselves and our actions, while less sophisticated creatures are not, because we are, and they are not, self-aware. Our self-awareness is thought to provide us with a kind of control over ourselves that they lack: we can reflect upon ourselves, upon our thoughts and actions, and so ensure that they are as we would have them to be. Thus, our capacity for reflection provides us with the control over ourselves (...) that grounds our responsibility. I argue that this thought is subtly, but badly, confused. It uses, as its model for the control that grounds our responsibility, the kind of control we exercise over ordinary objects and over our own voluntary actions: we represent to ourselves what to do or how to change things, and then we bring about that which we represent. But we cannot use this model to explain our responsibility for ourselves and our actions: if there is a question about why or how we are responsible for ourselves and our actions, it cannot be answered by appeal to a sophisticated, self-directed action. There must be some more fundamental account of how or why we are responsible. I replace the usual account with a novel but natural view: responsible mental activity can be modeled, not as an ordinary action, but as the settling of a question. This shift will require abandoning the tempting but troublesome thought that responsible activity involves discretion and awareness—which, I argue, we must abandon in any case. (shrink)

Examines the relationship between making objects and knowing nature in Europe from the mid-15th to mid-19th centuries.

I argue to a conclusion I find at once surprising and intuitive: although many considerations show trust useful, valuable, important, or required, these are not the reasons for which one trusts a particular person to do a particular thing. The reasons for which one trusts a particular person on a particular occasion concern, not the value, importance, or necessity of trust itself, but rather the trustworthiness of the person in question in the matter at hand. In fact, I will suggest (...) that the degree to which you trust a particular person to do a particular thing will vary inversely with the degree to which you must rely, for the motivation or justification of your trusting response, on reasons that concern the importance, or value, or necessity of having such a response. (shrink)

Este artículo explora la gestualidad multisensorial, háptica y motriz como forma de habitar las atmósferas. Contribuye al desarrollo de epistemologías relacionales sobre la dimensión corporal, al abordar la experiencia corporeizada vivida con entornos aéreos, materiales, ecológicos y sociales, en lugar de centrarse en el significado conceptual y semántico para su explicación. El marco conceptual, se basa en la teoría de las affordances, las ciencias cognitivas enactivas y la fenomenología, que ofrecen una vía para configurar la interacción piel-atmósfera. Consideramos la unidad (...) organismo-entorno y lo que en la literatura se identifica con el concepto de atmósfera sonora. Se introduce la noción de affordances multisensoriales y hápticas como encuentro sensual y atencional de la presencia, para argumentar que tanto el enfoque contemporáneo del cuerpo háptico y gestual con posibilidades afectivas y de movimiento, como la perspectiva estética y ecológico-social de la performatividad -aunque conceptualmente útiles-, pasan por alto la existencia de una fenomenología háptica del reino sensual de las atmósferas. Así, se describe el entrelazamiento de las experiencias sensibles y estéticas con territorios sonoros habitados desde la experiencia táctil. Se discute cómo lo sonoro y la materialidad se utilizan para vivir experiencias particulares del espacio dentro de uno específico: la instalación arpa de fricción. Finalmente, con base en la distinción entre la sensibilidad y la consciencia, se orienta hacia una pedagogía de experiencias háptico-sonoras durante procesos de aprendizaje, útil en contextos de educación corporeizada, estética y crítica. Y se ofrece un lugar para imaginar y escenificar este tipo de entornos de aprendizaje de una manera deliberada, con cualidades permeables, inmersivas, afectivas y colectivas, para acompañar en la co-creación de mundos alternativos. (shrink)

We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire-like attitudes as opposed to belief-like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a completely satisfactory account. Here, we argue that noncognitivists should exploit the formal analogy between (...) moral uncertainty and moral multi-objective decision problems. Our ‘multi-objective story’ enables noncognitivists to save our moral uncertainty thought and talk by explaining how the underlying phenomenon could be noncognitive. (shrink)

El objetivo de este estudio es determinar la relación entre las habilidades psicolingüísticas y el rendimiento escolar. El presente estudio es cuantitativo, descriptivo correlacional, transversal no experimental. La muestra estuvo compuesta por 35 estudiantes de 4° año de un colegio particular subvencionado de Chillán, Chile. La recolección de datos se obtuvo mediante la aplicación del Test de Illinois de Aptitudes Psicolingüísticas y el promedio final de las asignaturas de Lenguaje, Matemáticas, Ciencias Sociales e Historia y Geografía. Por medio de la (...) presente investigación se concluye que se logra establecer una relación parcial entre las Habilidades Psicolingüísticas y el Rendimiento Académico. (shrink)

The case method approach to introducing ethical issues is a traditional tool for applying critical thinking skills to a specific dilemma (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001). It allows for personal reflection and clarification of an individual's conceptual framework for deciding what is and is not ethical behavior. However, it also affords the student distance from the story line and may, through providing a retrospective critique, prevent sufficient challenge to the student to articulate and defend personal value assessments in addressing the ethical (...) dynamics reflected in the case. Providing teaching exercises that encourage the creation of language to form that conceptual framework and a comfort in using that language allows the student to not only identify ethical issues but also recognize and more effectively communicate the struggles with molding a personal values portrait to apply to such cases. (shrink)

Nearly sixty years after its publication, P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” continues to inspire important work. Its main legacy has been the notion of “reactive attitudes.” Surprisingly, Strawson’s central argument—an argument to the conclusion that no general thesis (such as the thesis of determinism) could provide us reason to abandon these attitudes—has received little attention. When the argument is considered, it is often interpreted as relying on a claim about our psychological capacities: we are simply not capable of abandoning (...) the reactive attitudes, across the board, in something like the way we are simply not capable of remembering everything we are told. A different line interprets Strawson as relying on something like a conceptual point: you can neither support nor call into question the whole of a practice using notions that are, themselves, constituted by that practice. Neither interpretation would lead to you to expect what you will find, looking at the central text: Strawson twice accuses his opponent of being caught in some kind of contradiction. So neither interpretation, on its own, is correct. By providing a close reading of the central text, I do my best to articulate Strawson’s more interesting, and more powerful, argument. The argument depends on an underlying picture of the nature of moral demands and moral relationships—a picture that has gone largely unnoticed, that is naturalistic without being reductionistic, and that is, I think, worthy of serious consideration. (shrink)

Background and aims: Recent investigations have highlighted the value of neuropsychological testing for the assessment and screening of Alcohol-Related Brain Damage. The aim of the present study was to evaluate the suitability of the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination and the Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status for this purpose. Methods: Comparing 28 participants with ARBD and 30 alcohol-dependent participants without ARBD we calculated Area Under the Curve statistics, sensitivity and specificity values, base-rate adjusted predictive values, and likelihood ratios for (...) both tests. Results: High levels of screening accuracy were found for the total scores of both the ACE-III and RBANS at multiple cut-off points. Removing participants with a history of polysubstance from the samples improved the diagnostic capabilities of the RBANS substantially, while only minor improvements to the ACE-III’s accuracy were observed. Conclusions: Overall, both the ACE-III and RBANS are suitable tools for ARBD screening within an alcohol-dependent population, though the RBANS is the superior of the two. Clinicians using these tools for ARBD screening should be cautious of false-positive outcomes and should therefore combine them with other assessment methods and more detailed neuropsychological testing before reaching diagnostic decisions. (shrink)

The teaching profession -- The purpose of schools -- Trends in education -- Philosophical foundations of education -- International influences on the foundations of education -- Historical foundations of American education -- Legal and ethical issues in education -- Social issues in education -- The administration and governance of schools -- School funding -- Teachers in the schools -- The school curriculum -- Effective instructional strategies -- Managing the classroom environment -- Schools and their environment -- Education in other countries.