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  1.  58
    Does everyone love everyone? The psychology of iterative reasoning.Paolo Cherubini & P. N. Johnson-Laird - 2004 - Thinking and Reasoning 10 (1):31 – 53.
    When a quantified premise such as: Everyone loves anyone who loves someone, occurs with a premise such as: Anne loves Beth, it follows immediately that everyone loves Anne. It also follows that Carol loves Diane, where these two individuals are in the domain of discourse. According to the theory of mental models, this inference requires the quantified premise to be used again to update a model of specific individuals. The paper reports four experiments examining such iterative inferences. Experiment 1 confirmed (...)
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  2.  49
    Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part II”.Massimiliano Carrara, Paolo Cherubini & Pierdaniele Giaretta - 2007 - Mind and Society 6 (1):35-39.
    This is an excerpt from the contentIn the introduction to part I of the symposium we stated that a rational agent could be thought of as an agent who has good reasons for its actions. In formal analyses of economic, medical, political, military and forensic decisions rationality, that is the “goodness” of those reasons, is inextricably intertwined with probability. Typically, those analyses concern decisions in a particular class of uncertain situations, namely “risky” situations, where all the relevant available alternative actions (...)
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  3.  65
    Conditionals and conditional thinking.Andrea Manfrinati, Pierdaniele Giaretta & Paolo Cherubini - 2008 - Mind and Society 7 (1):21-34.
    In this paper, we claim that the problem of conditionals should be dealt with by carefully distinguishing between thinking conditional propositions and conditional thinking, i.e. thinking on the basis of some supposition. This distinction deserves further investigation, if we are to make sense of some old and new experimental data concerning the understanding and the assertion of conditional sentences. Here we will argue that some of these data seem to refute the mental models theory of conditional reasoning, setting the ground (...)
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  4.  20
    Nothing new under the sun, or the moon, or both.Luca L. Bonatti, Paolo Cherubini & Carlo Reverberi - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  5. Brief Notices.Paolo Cherubini - 2008 - Speculum 83 (1):257.
  6.  67
    A Re-examination of illusory inferences based on factual conditional sentences.Paolo Cherubini, Alberto Mazzocco, Simona Gardini & Aurore Russo - 2001 - Mind and Society 2 (2):9-25.
    According to mental model theory, illusory inferences are a class of deductions in which individuals systematically go wrong. Mental model theory explains them invoking the principle of truth, which is a tendency not to represent models that falsify the premises. In this paper we focus on the illusory problems based on conditional sentences. In three experiments, we show that: (a) rather than not representing models that falsify the conditionals, participants have a different understanding of what falsifies a conditional (Experiment I); (...)
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  7.  51
    Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part I”. [REVIEW]Massimiliano Carrara, Paolo Cherubini & Pierdaniele Giaretta - 2006 - Mind and Society 5 (2):167-171.
    This is an excerpt from the contentThis symposium on Cognition and Rationality originated from two conferences held in Padua on March 17–21, 2003. The title of the first conference was Reasoning and understanding: mental models, relevance, and limited rationality approaches. The second one was entitled: Being rational. Models and limits of rationality in scientific research, economic behaviour, common sense reasoning. The papers published in these two issues are a selection of the ones presented.Why Cognition and Rationality? Let a cognitive agent (...)
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