This book explores an important central thread that unifies Russell's thoughts on logic in two works previously considered at odds with each other, the Principles of Mathematics and the later Principia Mathematica. This thread is Russell's doctrine that logic is an absolutely general science and that any calculus for it must embrace wholly unrestricted variables. The heart of Landini's book is a careful analysis of Russell's largely unpublished "substitutional" theory. On Landini's showing, the substitutional theory reveals the unity (...) of Russell's philosophy of logic and offers new avenues for a genuine solution of the paradoxes plaguing Logicism. (shrink)
Wittgenstein's Tractatus has generated many interpretations since its publication in 1921, but over the years a consensus has developed concerning its criticisms of Russell's philosophy. In Wittgenstein's Apprenticeship with Russell, Gregory Landini draws extensively from his work on Russell's unpublished manuscripts to show that the consensus characterises Russell with positions he did not hold. Using a careful analysis of Wittgenstein's writings he traces the 'Doctrine of Showing' and the 'fundamental idea' of the Tractatus to Russell's logical atomist research program, (...) which dissolves philosophical problems by employing variables with structure. He argues that Russell and his apprentice Wittgenstein were allies in a research program that makes logical analysis and reconstruction the essence of philosophy. His sharp and controversial study will be essential reading for all who are interested in this rich period in the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)
Zermelo once wrote that he had anticipated Russell's contradiction of the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. Is this sufficient for having anticipated Russell's Paradox — the paradox that revealed the untenability of the logical notion of a set as an extension? This paper argues that it is not sufficient and offers criteria that are necessary and sufficient for having discovered Russell's Paradox. It is shown that there is ample evidence that Russell satisfied the criteria and (...) that Zermelo did not. (shrink)
This paper offers an interpretation of Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgment which characterizes it as direct application of the 1905 theory of definite descriptions. The paper maintains that it was by regarding propositional symbols (when occurring as subordinate clauses) as disguised descriptions of complexes, that Russell generated the philosophical explanation of the hierarchy of orders and the ramified theory of types of _Principia mathematica (1910). The interpretation provides a new understanding of Russell's abandoned book _Theory of Knowledge (1913), the 'direction (...) problems' and Wittgenstein's criticisms. (shrink)
Principia Mathematic goes to great lengths to hide its order/type indices and to make it appear as if its incomplete symbols behave as if they are singular terms. But well-hidden as they are, we cannot understand the proofs in Principia unless we bring them into focus. When we do, some rather surprising results emerge ? which is the subject of this paper.
Unaware of Frege's 1879 Begriffsschrift, Russell's 1903 The Principles of Mathematics set out a calculus for logic whose foundation was the doctrine that any such calculus must adopt only one style of variables–entity (individual) variables. The idea was that logic is a universal and all-encompassing science, applying alike to whatever there is–propositions, universals, classes, concrete particulars. Unfortunately, Russell's early calculus has appeared archaic if not completely obscure. This paper is an attempt to recover the formal system, showing its philosophical background (...) and its semantic completeness with respect to the tautologies of a modern sentential calculus. (shrink)
On investigating a theorem that Russell used in discussing paradoxes of classes, Graham Priest distills a schema and then extends it to form an Inclosure Schema, which he argues is the common structure underlying both class-theoretical paradoxes (such as that of Russell, Cantor, Burali-Forti) and the paradoxes of ?definability? (offered by Richard, König-Dixon and Berry). This article shows that Russell's theorem is not Priest's schema and questions the application of Priest's Inclosure Schema to the paradoxes of ?definability?.1 1?Special thanks to (...) Francesco Orilia for criticisms of an early draft of this article. (shrink)
In his new introduction to the 1925 second edition of Principia Mathematica, Russell maintained that by adopting Wittgenstein's idea that a logically perfect language should be extensional mathematical induction could be rectified for finite cardinals without the axiom of reducibility. In an Appendix B, Russell set forth a proof. Godel caught a defect in the proof at *89.16, so that the matter of rectification remained open. Myhill later arrived at a negative result: Principia with extensionality principles and without reducibility cannot (...) recover mathematical induction. The finite cardinals are indefinable in it. This paper shows that while Gödel and Myhill are correct, Russell was not wrong. The 1925 system employs a different grammar than the original Principia. A new proof for *89.16 is given and induction is recovered. (shrink)
This article compares the theory of Meinongian objects proposed by Edward Zalta with a theory of fiction formulated within an early Russellian framework. The Russellian framework is the second-order intensional logic proposed by Nino B. Cocchiarelly as a reconstruction of the form of Logicism Russell was examining shortly after writing The Principles of Mathematics. A Russellian theory of denoting concepts is developed in this intensional logic and applied as a theory of the "objects' of fiction. The framework retains the Orthodox (...) early Russellian ontology of existents, possible non-existents, and properties and relations in intension. This avoids the assumption, found in Meinongian theories, of impossible and incomplete objects. It also obviates the need to preserve consistency by distinguishing a new "mode of predication", or a "distinction in kinds of predicates". Thus, it is argued that an early Russellian theory forms a powerful rival to a Meinongian theory of objects. (shrink)
This is a critical discussion of Nino B. Cocchiarella’s book “Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism.” It focuses on paradoxes of hyperintensionality that may arise in formal systems of intensional logic.
Frege seems to hold two incompatible theses:(i) that sentences differing in structure can yet express the same sense; and (ii) that the senses of the meaningful parts of a complex term are determinate parts of the sense of the term. Dummett offered a solution, distinguishing analysis from decomposition. The present paper offers an embellishment of Dummett?s distinction by providing a way of depicting the internal structures of complex senses?determinate structures that yield distinct decompositions. Decomposition is then shown to be adequate (...) as a foundation for the informativity and analyticity of logic. (shrink)
This paper examines Russell's substitutional theory of classes and relations, and its influence on the development of the theory of logical types between the years 1906 and the publication of Principia Mathematica (volume I) in 1910. The substitutional theory proves to have been much more influential on Russell's writings than has been hitherto thought. After a brief introduction, the paper traces Russell's published works on type-theory up to Principia. Each is interpreted as presenting a version or modification of the substitutional (...) theory. New motivations for Russell's 1908 axiom of infinity and axiom of reducibility are revealed. (shrink)
This paper examines the quantification theory of *9 of Principia Mathematica. The focus of the discussion is not the philosophical role that section *9 plays in Principia's full ramified type-theory. Rather, the paper assesses the system of *9 as a quantificational theory for the ordinary predicate calculus. The quantifier-free part of the system of *9 is examined and some misunderstandings of it are corrected. A flaw in the system of *9 is discovered, but it is shown that with a minor (...) repair the system is semantically complete. Finally, the system is contrasted with the system of *8 of Principia's second edition. (shrink)
The second printing of Principia Mathematica in 1925 offered Russell an occasion to assess some criticisms of the Principia and make some suggestions for possible improvements. In Appendix A, Russell offered *8 as a new quantification theory to replace *9 of the original text. As Russell explained in the new introduction to the second edition, the system of *8 sets out quantification theory without free variables. Unfortunately, the system has not been well understood. This paper shows that Russell successfully antedates (...) Quine's system of quantification theory without free variables. It is shown as well, that as with Quine's system, a slight modification yields a quantification theory inclusive of the empty domain. (shrink)
This book offers a thought-provoking critique of analytic philosophy focusing on four central figures--Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Quine. In Wang's view, what lies "beyond" analytic philosophy is the abandonment of Empiricist accounts of how we know and epistemological limitations on what can be known. In making the foundations of science the center of "legitimate" philosophy, Analytic Empiricism has blocked important global perspectives found, for example, in continental and oriental philosophies. Wang advocates a Kantian transcendental dialectic: What explanation is required if (...) we are to do justice to the many facets of knowledge, including artistic, poetic, emotional, and ethical as well as scientific? His thesis is that "intuition" must reclaim a central place in the answer. (shrink)
Usualmente, los estudios sobre clientelismo tienden a generar una interpretación externa del fenómeno y a dejar fuera del análisis los procesos culturales y psicosociales de carácter comunitario en que se apoyan estas prácticas. Por esta razón, se realizó un estudio de caso en una localidad campesina de la provincia de Formosa, Argentina, con el fin abordar la dimensión subjetiva del clientelismo y la búsqueda de asistencia personalizada como estrategia de supervivencia. Se concluye que las relaciones de reciprocidad entre campesinos y (...) actores pudientes como políticos y patrones constituyen un elemento propio de la cultura campesina. No obstante, se aclara que esta práctica es mucho más amplia y no siempre se articula en términos de clientelismo político. Finalmente, se afirma que si bien el clientelismo muchas veces puede explicarse a partir de relaciones de poder, en otros casos el sentimiento de gratitud entre campesinos y patrones constituye el aspecto más destacado. (shrink)
Cet article examine les conditions d’élaboration et la fortune éditoriale de la traduction latine d’un texte italien, le Commentario de le cose de' Turchi de Paolo Giovio publié à Rome en 1532. Ce texte politique voulant donner des éléments à Charles Quint pour engager la croisade contre les Turcs est traduit en latin en 1537 à Strasbourg par un italien en exil pour motifs religieux, Francesco Negri. Publiée cinq fois à Strasbourg, Wittenberg et Paris entre 1537 et 1539, cette (...) traduction détourne le texte de ses premiers objectifs pour servir à la propagande réformée du parti de la paix : cette lecture politique est construite par l’association des autres textes avec lesquels il est publié, qui en orientent le sens. Une fois sortie de l’actualité, cette traduction est publiée parmi les œuvres latines de Giovio, sans mention du traducteur, et se fige en un texte historiographique à simple valeur documentaire. (shrink)
Este trabajo pretende mostrar que la suspensión es la temporalidad inmanente a la noción de éxodo en Paolo Virno, a través de la potencia negativa tal como es entendida en el pensamiento de G. Agamben. La argumentación se articulará en tres momentos: en primer lugar, atenderemos a la lectura de “El Fragmento de las máquinas” de los Grundrisse de Marx que realiza Paolo Virno, en la que sostiene que la propia naturaleza del General Intellect implica que una parte (...) importante de los conocimientos no sea susceptible de ser depositada en las máquinas, sino que contiene como condición necesaria su manifestación directa del trabajo vivo y, por tanto, en fuerza de trabajo; en segundo lugar, analizaremos cómo el cuerpo biológico del individuo, en tanto que potencia puesta a producir, es el fundamento de la biopolítica; y, finalmente, nos adentraremos en el pensamiento de G. Agamben para sostener la tesis planteada. (shrink)
The article draws attention to two particularly significant examples of the problematic relationship between religious authority and secular power, which has characterized the history of the West: Marsilius of Padua and Paolo Sarpi. Both are supporters of the secular state and it is not excluded that the Sarpi was aware of the doctrines contained in the Defensor pacis. In any case, Marsilius’ position is much more radical than that sustained by the Republic of Venice in the dispute of the (...) Interdict, also due to the strictly ‘scientific’ approach that characterizes the first part of the Defensor pacis. The conflict between State and Church has traditionally been seen as an obstacle to the affirmation of the modern State, but today, in the post-modern, it can also be interpreted as a double guarantee: against the pretensions of theocracy, of course, but also against the temptations of totalitarianism. (shrink)
The paper compares the ideas developed by Bozzi and Stumpf with regard to unity, identity, and causality. Although Bozzi’s formulation is independent from the one made by Stumpf in his Erkenntnislehre, these two positions share the same innovative importance granted to perceptual experience and to the problem of the origin of categories. Thus, despite different levels of awareness and formalization, in both authors we see the features of what we can call – analogous- ly to Bozzi’s naïve physics – a (...) “naïve metaphysics”, at whose core lie the refusal of intellectualism, and the determination of the origin of categories in the concrete stream of perception. (shrink)
In this work, I discuss the role of Husserl’s phenomenology in Paolo Parrini’s positive philosophy. In the first section, I highlight the presence of both empiricist and constructivist elements in Parrini’s anti-foundationalist and anti-absolutist conception of knowledge. In the second section, I stress Parrini’s acknowledgement of the crucial role of phenomenology in investigating the empirical basis of knowledge, thanks to its analysis of the relationship between form and matter of cognition. In the third section, I point out some lines (...) of development of the phenomenological form of empirical realism as revealed in Parrini’s reflection, through a comparison of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, Mary Hesse’s network model and the tradition of neutral monism. (shrink)
Final instalment of a book-review symposium on: Jeff Kochan (2017), Science as Social Existence: Heidegger and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Cambridge UK: Open Book Publishers). -- Author's response to: Paolo Palladino (2018), 'Heidegger Today: On Jeff Kochan’s Science and Social Existence,' Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7(8): 41-46; and Adam Riggio (2018), 'The Very Being of a Conceptual Scheme: Disciplinary and Conceptual Critiques,' Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7(11): 53-59.
Despite his demanding religious responsibilities, Paolo Sarpi maintained an active involvement in science between 1578 and 1598 – as hisPensierireveal. They show that from 1585 onwards he studied the Copernican theory and recorded arguments in its favour. The fact that for 1595 they include an outline of a Copernican tidal theory resembling Galileo'sDialoguetheory is well known. But examined closely, Sarpi's theory is found to be different from that of theDialoguein several important respects. That Sarpi was a Copernican by 1592 (...) is revealed by other of hispensieri, whereas at that time we know that Galileo was not. The examination of Sarpi's tidal theory and of the work of Galileo in this period indicates that the theory Sarpi recorded in 1595 was of his own creation. The appreciation that the theory was Sarpi's and that Galileo subsequently came to change his views on the Copernican theory and adopted the tidal theory has major implications for our understanding of the significance of Sarpi's contribution to the Scientific Revolution. Moreover, it appears that several of the most significant theoretical features of the tidal theory published by Galileo in theDialogue –and which proved of lasting value – were in reality Sarpi's. (shrink)
In his review of my book, Le voyage de Nietzsche à Sorrente, Emmanuel Salanskis writes that it is an agreeable read and philologically precise, but that it presents some philosophical difficulties.The first alleged difficulty lies in the conception of “epiphany.” Salanskis asks, “Can we really include Nietzsche among adherents of an aesthetics of the ‘instant’ (170) like Virginia Woolf ?” No, certainly not. On the page cited, I discuss James Joyce’s conception of epiphany (and mention Virginia Woolf only in passing) (...) in order to distinguish Joycean epiphanies and the aesthetics of the instant from Nietzsche’s epiphanies. The latter, I argue shortly thereafter, are “from an epistemological point of view not moments .. (shrink)
In his late work Nietzsche professed profound admiration for Dostoevsky, calling him “the only psychologist [...] from whom I had something to learn”. He also said, characteristically complicating matters, “I am grateful to him in a remarkable way, however much he goes against my deepest instincts”. There is, however, another well-established way of connecting the two authors, due to the Symbolist writer and critic Dmitri Merezhkovsky, which regards Dostoevsky as preemptively refuting Nietzsche’s teachings through his portrayal of the nihilistic protagonists (...) of his great novels. Paolo Stellino takes up both these ways of connecting the two authors... (shrink)
Paolo Bozzi developed his «experimental phenomenology» from the Gestalt psychology tradition, particularly from Gaetano Kanizsa’s method. The distinction between «phenomenal description» and «causal explanation» of the «perception» springs up from the analysis of Bozzi’s «S-D psychophysical scheme». What Frege, who was well-known by Bozzi, deals with in paragraph 71 of The Thought theoretically mirrors what is outlined in the Scheme and could also be intended as its source. The juxtaposition between a «science of observable things» or «experimental phenomenology» – (...) conceived as a science which is autonomous from what happens in the brain – and logics, which is set up autonomously from the thinking processes, is a programmatic element that is openly indicated by the author. Frege’s anti-psychologism and realism are both widely shared by Bozzi. The realism and the «naïve physics» Bozzi was a pioneer of lie at the basis of the so-called «New Realism». The following essay aims to localize and highlight some theoretical implications – up to their phenomenological origins – which can be detected particularly in paragraph 71 of The Thought. The present work tries to sketch out the boundaries and the autonomy of the «first person» perceptive experience and to define the scientific explanation that we can give of it. The distinction between science and experience, and the autonomy of experience from science and of the immediate experience of the content of consciousness from neuroscience, entail the impossibility of a naturalization of the phenomenological experience. In the examples taken from Frege can be found a theoretical bridge which connects the Gestalt perceptological tradition, Wittgenstein’s investigations of the philosophy of psychology, and the so called «New Realism». (shrink)
The widespread use of brain imaging techniques encourages conceiving of neuroscience as the forthcoming “mindscience.” Perhaps surprisingly for many, this conclusion is still largely unwarranted. The present paper surveys various shortcomings of neuroscience as a putative “mindscience.” The analysis shows that the scope of mind (both cognitive and phenomenal) falls outside that of neuroscience. Of course, such a conclusion does not endorse any metaphysical or antiscientific stance as to the nature of the mind. Rather, it challenges a series of assumptions (...) that the undeniable success of neuroscience has fostered. In fact, physicalism is here taken as the only viable ontological framework – an assumption that does not imply that the central nervous system exhausts the physical domain. (shrink)
The article is the consequence of some critical notes to the contribution of Paolo Bellan, arising from reading of essays of Francesco Emmolo and Carlo Sini and the assumption of a purely phenomenological perspective in the interpretation of the processes of acquisition of scientific knowledge.