This paper analyzes a model of sequential parimutuel betting described as a two-horse race with a finite number of noise bettors and a finite number of strategic and symmetrically informed bettors. For generic objective probabilities that the favorite wins the race, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized. Additionally, two explanations for the favorite–longshot bias—according to which favorites win more often than the market's estimate of their winning chances imply—are offered. It is shown that this robust anomalous empirical (...) regularity might be due to the presence of transaction costs and/or to strategic bettors' subjective attitude to probabilities. (shrink)

L’article a pour objectif de rendre compte du réalisme critique introduit par le théologien Ian Barbour afin d’établir un « pont » entre science et théologie. Nous verrons pourquoi et comment Ian Barbour utilise cette philosophie qui relie le mieux, selon lui, l’ontologie et l’épistémologie pour proposer un dialogue voire une intégration entre science et théologie. Ce réalisme critique a ensuite été repris par d’autres scientifiques-théologiens notamment Peacocke et Polkinghorne avec quelques nuances qui sont ici analysées.

L’article a pour objectif de rendre compte du réalisme critique introduit par le théologien Ian Barbour afin d’établir un « pont » entre science et théologie. Nous verrons pourquoi et comment Ian Barbour utilise cette philosophie qui relie le mieux, selon lui, l’ontologie et l’épistémologie pour proposer un dialogue voire une intégration entre science et théologie. Ce réalisme critique a ensuite été repris par d’autres scientifiques-théologiens notamment Peacocke et Polkinghorne avec quelques nuances qui sont ici analysées.

Modern individuality is the not-so-secret protagonist of Hegel’s practical philosophy.

If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...) Hitchcock argues that this credence follows from calculating her fair betting odds, plus the assumption that Sleeping Beauty’s credences should track her fair betting odds. We will show that this last assumption is false. Sleeping Beauty’s credences should not follow her fair betting odds due to a peculiar feature of her epistemic situation. (shrink)

A study is reported testing two hypotheses about a close parallel relation between indicative conditionals, if A then B , and conditional bets, I bet you that if A then B . The first is that both the indicative conditional and the conditional bet are related to the conditional probability, P(B|A). The second is that de Finetti's three-valued truth table has psychological reality for both types of conditional— true , false , or void for indicative conditionals and win , lose (...) , or void for conditional bets. The participants were presented with an array of chips in two different colours and two different shapes, and an indicative conditional or a conditional bet about a random chip. They had to make judgements in two conditions: either about the chances of making the indicative conditional true or false or about the chances of winning or losing the conditional bet. The observed distributions of responses in the two conditions were generally related to the conditional probability, supporting the first hypothesis. In addition, a majority of participants in further conditions chose the third option, “void”, when the antecedent of the conditional was false, supporting the second hypothesis. (shrink)

If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...) Hitchcock argues that this credence follows from calculating her fair betting odds, plus the assumption that Sleeping Beauty’s credences should track her fair betting odds. We will show that this last assumption is false. Sleeping Beauty’s credences should not follow her fair betting odds due to a peculiar feature of her epistemic situation. (shrink)

BET proteins such as Brd3 and Brd4 are chromatin‐associated factors, which control gene expression programs that promote inflammation and cancer. The Nrf2 transcription factor is a master regulator of genes that protect the organism against xenobiotic attack and oxidative stress. Nrf2 has demonstrated anti‐inflammatory activity and can support cancer cell malignancy. This review describes the discovery, mechanism and biomedical implications of the regulatory interplay between Nrf2 and BET proteins. Both Nrf2 and BET proteins are established drug targets. Small molecules that (...) either activate or suppress these proteins are currently tested in clinical trials. The crosstalk between Nrf2 and BET proteins may have important, and until now overlooked, implications for the therapeutic effects of these drugs. Based on the information covered in this review, it should be possible to design combinatorial treatment strategies for cancer and inflammatory diseases, which may improve the efficacy of targeting a Nrf2 or BET proteins individually. (shrink)

The ‘cosmological constant problem’ has historically been understood as describing a conflict between cosmological observations in the framework of general relativity and theoretical predictions from quantum field theory, which a future theory of quantum gravity ought to resolve. I argue that this view of the CCP is best understood in terms of a bet about future physics made on the basis of particular interpretational choices in GR and QFT, respectively. Crucially, each of these choices must be taken as itself grounded (...) in the sucesses of the respective theory for this bet to be justified. 1 Introduction 2 The Cosmological Constant Problem 2.1 The physics that anticipates ‘vacuum energy’ 2.2 Getting to zero-point energies 2.3 Getting to the cosmological constant 3 The Epistemology of Physical Interpretation 4 The View from High-Energy Physics 5 Concluding Remarks. (shrink)

It is often thought that bets on the truth of known propositions become irrational if the losing costs are high enough. This is typically taken to count against the view that knowledge involves assigning credence 1. I argue that the irrationality of such extreme bets can be explained by considering the interactions between the agent and the bookmaker. More specifically, the agent’s epistemic perspective is altered by the fact that the bookmaker proposes that unusual type of bet. Among other things, (...) being willing to offer a bet with unnecessarily harmful losing costs is likely to undermine the baseline level of trustworthiness required for it to be rational to engage in betting exchanges. This sort of explanation does not require granting either that we assign credence lower than 1 to known propositions or that knowledge is sensitive to practical stakes. Moreover, I show that, in our ordinary lives, we frequently perform actions that we know would be disastrous if certain conditions did not obtain. This behaviour can be seen as a form of implicit extreme betting and, nevertheless, it is often rational. (shrink)

This book is a major contribution to decision theory, focusing on the question of when it is rational to accept scientific theories. The author examines both Bayesian decision theory and confirmation theory, refining and elaborating the views of Ramsey and Savage. He argues that the most solid foundation for confirmation theory is to be found in decision theory, and he provides a decision-theoretic derivation of principles for how many probabilities should be revised over time. Professor Maher defines a notion of (...) accepting a hypothesis, and then shows that it is not reducible to probability and that it is needed to deal with some important questions in the philosophy of science. A Bayesian decision-theoretic account of rational acceptance is provided together with a proof of the foundations for this theory. A final chapter shows how this account can be used to cast light on such vexed issues as verisimilitude and scientific realism. (shrink)

Bacteria have developed an impressive ability to survive and propagate in highly diverse and changing environments by evolving phenotypic heterogeneity. Phenotypic heterogeneity ensures that a subpopulation is well prepared for environmental changes. The expression bet hedging is commonly (but often incorrectly) used by molecular biologists to describe any observed phenotypic heterogeneity. In evolutionary biology, however, bet hedging denotes a risk‐spreading strategy displayed by isogenic populations that evolved in unpredictably changing environments. Opposed to other survival strategies, bet hedging evolves because the (...) selection environment changes and favours different phenotypes at different times. Consequently, in bet hedging populations all phenotypes perform differently well at any time, depending on the selection pressures present. Moreover, bet hedging is the only strategy in which temporal variance of offspring numbers per individual is minimized. Our paper aims to provide a guide for the correct use of the term bet hedging in molecular biology. (shrink)

We develop a systematic approach to quantum probability as a theory of rational betting in quantum gambles. In these games of chance, the agent is betting in advance on the outcomes of several (finitely many) incompatible measurements. One of the measurements is subsequently chosen and performed and the money placed on the other measurements is returned to the agent. We show how the rules of rational betting imply all the interesting features of quantum probability, even in such (...) finite gambles. These include the uncertainty principle and the violation of Bell's inequality among others. Quantum gambles are closely related to quantum logic and provide a new semantics for it. We conclude with a philosophical discussion on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

We develop a systematic approach to quantum probability as a theory of rational betting in quantum gambles. In these games of chance the agent is betting in advance on the outcomes of several incompatible measurements. One of the measurements is subsequently chosen and performed and the money placed on the other measurements is returned to the agent. We show how the rules of rational betting imply all the interesting features of quantum probability, even in such finite gambles. (...) These include the uncertainty principle and the violation of Bell's inequality among others. Quantum gambles are closely related to quantum logic and provide a new semantics to it. We conclude with a philosophical discussion on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

According to the preference-centric approach to understanding partial belief, the connection between partial beliefs and preferences is key to understanding what partial beliefs are and how they’re measured. As Ramsey put it, the ‘degree of a belief is a causal property of it, which we can express vaguely as the extent to which we are prepared to act on it’ The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, Routledge, Oxon, pp 156–198, 1931). But this idea is not as popular as (...) it once was. Nowadays, the preference-centric approach is frequently dismissed out-of-hand as behaviouristic, unpalatably anti-realist, and/or prone to devastating counterexamples. Cases like Eriksson and Hájek’s :183–213, 2007) preferenceless Zen monk and Christensen’s :356–376, 2001) other roles argument have suggested to many that any account of partial belief that ties them too closely to preferences is irretrievably flawed. In this paper I provide a defence of preference-centric accounts of partial belief. (shrink)

Horse racing has begun to enter an economic decline in many countries, notably represented by a decline in revenues in betting volumes. A number of reasons may be attributed to this: the success of...

The question of the rationality of conspiratorial belief ¬divides philosophers into mainly two camps. The particularists believe that each conspiracy theory ought to be examined on its own merits. The generalist, by contrast, argues that there is something inherently suspect about conspiracy theories that makes belief in them irrational. Recent empirical findings indicate that conspiratorial thinking is commonplace among ordinary people, which has naturally shifted attention to the particularists. Yet, even the particularist must agree that not all conspiracy belief is (...) rational, in which case she must explain what separates rational from non-rational conspiratorial thinking. In this paper, I contrast three strategies to this end: 1) the probabilistic objectivist, who assesses the objective probability of conspiracies; 2) the subjectivist, who rather focuses on the perspective of the believer, and typically views the decision to believe in a conspiracy as a problem of decision making under risk. Approaches 1) and 2) rely on assessments of the probability of conspiracy which, I argue, limits their applicability. Instead, I explore 3) viewing the problem facing the potential believer as a decision problem under uncertainty about probabilities. I argue, furthermore, that focusing solely on epistemic utilities fails to do justice to the particular character of conspiracy beliefs, which are not exclusively epistemically motivated, and I investigate the rationality of such beliefs under a number of standard decision rules. (shrink)

At the turn of the last century, paleontologists wagered that they could find the missing link between lobe-finned fish and early terrestrial vertebrates. Given how these evolutionary relatives are distributed in the fossil record, Daeschler et al. predicted that some transitional form awaited discovery in late Devonian outcrops of the Canadian Arctic. It was there that they won their bet: the team soon found Tiktaalik roseae, a “fishopod” with a mix of aquatic and terrestrial traits. Tiktaalik’s discovery now stands as (...) paleontologists’ textbook case of scientific reasoning done right. (shrink)

Only one traditional objection to Pascal's wager is telling: Pascal assumes a particular theology, but without justification. We produce two new objections that go deeper. We show that even if Pascal's theology is assumed to be probable, Pascal's argument does not go through. In addition, we describe a wager that Pascal never considered, which leads away from Pascal's conclusion. We then consider the impact of these considerations on other prudential arguments concerning what one should believe, and on the more general (...) question of when and why belief formation ought to be based solely on the evidence. (shrink)

The Puzzle of the Hats is a puzzle in social epistemology. It describes a situation in which a group of rational agents with common priors and common goals seems vulnerable to a Dutch book if they are exposed to different information and make decisions independently. Situations in which this happens involve violations of what might be called the Group-Reflection Principle. As it turns out, the Dutch book is flawed. It is based on the betting interpretation of the subjective probabilities, (...) but ignores the fact that this interpretation disregards strategic considerations that might influence betting behavior. A lesson to be learned concerns the interpretation of probabilities in terms of fair bets and, more generally, the role of strategic considerations in epistemic contexts. Another lesson concerns Group-Reflection, which in its unrestricted form is highly counter-intuitive. We consider how this principle of social epistemology should be re-formulated so as to make it tenable. (shrink)

This paper works with Pascal's Wager with "life has meaning" replacing "God exists" as the proposition that we "bet on". This change shows that we should choose to believe that life is meaningful. This argument does not fall prey to the "many gods" objection. People looking for what makes makes life meaningful do not get many clues from this argument which only justifies the search for meaning.

This paper examines the preference-based approach to the identification of beliefs. It focuses on the main problem to which this approach is exposed, namely that of state-dependent utility. First, the problem is illustrated in full detail. Four types of state-dependent utility issues are distinguished. Second, a comprehensive strategy for identifying beliefs under state-dependent utility is presented and discussed. For the problem to be solved following this strategy, however, preferences need to extend beyond choices. We claim that this a necessary feature (...) of any complete solution to the problem of state-dependent utility. We also argue that this is the main conceptual lesson to draw from it. We show that this lesson is of interest to both economists and philosophers. (shrink)

Wolfgang Freitag claims to have developed a proposal that solves Goodman's famous New Riddle of Induction. His proposal makes use of the notion of ‘derivative defeat’; the claim is that in certain circumstances, the projection of some predicates is derivatively defeated, i.e., it is inductively invalid. Freitag develops the proposal using some compelling examples, and then shows that it likewise applies to the argument at the basis of the New Riddle. There, he alleges, the projection of ‘grue’ is derivatively defeated, (...) whereas the projection of ‘green’ is not. We thus have a justification for preferring the green induction over the grue induction. I do not think Freitag has solved the New Riddle. The problem is that his proposal tacitly assumes certain counterfactual claims that a grue-speaker would dispute. I thus argue that Freitag's claims beg the question against the grue-speaker, and I show why the grue-speaker would reject them. (shrink)

‘I Bet They Are Going to Read It’: Reported Direct Speech in Titles of Research Papers in Linguistic Pragmatics Titles of research articles in the humanities, including linguistics, tend to be more creative and less informative than corresponding titles in exact sciences or medicine. In linguistics, pragmatic studies are an area where reported discourse, i.e. direct speech in the form of a full speech act, occurs relatively frequently in titles of research papers. This paper analyses the metonymic and cataphoric relations (...) between such titles and article texts on the background of the functions of text titles. It also presents the results of a survey conducted among graduate students and aimed at finding out whether titles containing reported discourse in the form of speech acts are easier to memorize and attract more attention among the articles' potential readers. (shrink)

The perennial fear associated with the free will problem is the prospect of hard determinism being true. Unlike prevalent attempts to reject hard determinism by defending compatibilist analyses of freedom and responsibility, this article outlines a pragmatic argument to the effect that we are justified in betting that determinism is false even though we may retain the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible. The basic argument is that as long as we accept that libertarian free will is (...) worth wanting, there is a defensible rationale, given the uncertainty which remains as to whether determinism is true or false, to refrain from acting on hard determinism, and thus to bet that libertarian free will exists. The article closes by discussing two potentially decisive objections to this pragmatic argument. (shrink)

Basic Emotion Theory, or BET, has dominated the affective sciences for decades (Ekman, 1972, 1992, 1999; Ekman and Davidson, 1994; Griffiths, 2013; Scarantino and Griffiths, 2011). It has been highly influential, driving a number of empirical lines of research (e.g., in the context of facial expression detection, neuroimaging studies and evolutionary psychology). Nevertheless, BET has been criticized by philosophers, leading to calls for it to be jettisoned entirely (Colombetti, 2014; Hufendiek, 2016). This paper defuses those criticisms. In addition, it shows (...) that we have good reason to retain BET. Finally, it reviews and puts to rest worries that BET’s commitment to affect programs renders it outmoded. We propose that, with minor adjustments, BET can avoid such criticisms when conceived under a radically enactive account of emotions. Thus, rather than leaving BET behind, we show how its basic ideas can be revised, refashioned and preserved. Hence, we conclude, our new BET is still a good bet. (shrink)