194 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Pascal Engel [193]Pascale Engel [1]
  1. Doxastic Correctness.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
    Normative accounts of the correctness of belief have often been misconstrued. The norm of truth for belief is a constitutive norm which regulates our beliefs through ideals of reason. I try to show that this kind of account can meet some of the main objections which have been raised against normativism about belief: that epistemic reasons enjoy no exclusivity, that the norm of truth does not guide, and that normativism cannot account for suspension of judgement.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  2. Belief and Normativity.Pascal Engel - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (23):179-203.
    The thesis that mental content is normative is ambiguous and has many forms. This article deals only with the thesis that normativity is connected to our mental attitudes rather than with the content of the attitudes, and more specifically with the view that it is connected to belief. A number of writers have proposed various versions of a ‘norm of truth’ attached to belief. I examine various versions of this claim, and defend it against recent criticisms according to which this (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  3. Mental Causation. [REVIEW]Pascal Engel - 1995 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 185 (1):105-106.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  4. Truth.Pascal Engel - 2002 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    Engel argues that, although the minimalist conception of truth is basically right, it does not follow that truth can be eliminated from our philosophical thinking, as is claimed by some radical deflationists. In particular, he shows that some deflationist views have a definitively relativist and "postmodernist" ring and should be rejected. Even if a metaphysically substantive theory of truth has little chance to succeed, he argues, truth plays a central role as a norm or guiding value of our rational inquiries (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  5. Epistemic Responsibility Without Epistemic Agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.
    This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian' views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  6. Believing, Holding True, and Accepting.Pascal Engel - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140 – 151.
    Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other riters argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees - holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  7.  27
    I—Doxastic Correctness.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.
    Normative accounts of the correctness of belief have often been misconstrued. The norm of truth for belief is a constitutive norm which regulates our beliefs through ideals of reason. I try to show that this kind of account can meet some of the main objections which have been raised against normativism about belief: that epistemic reasons enjoy no exclusivity, that the norm of truth does not guide, and that normativism cannot account for suspension of judgement.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  8. What's the Use of Truth?Pascal Engel & Richard Rorty - 2007 - Columbia University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  9.  8
    Kant and the Mind.Pascal Engel - 1998 - Synthese 115 (3):375-393.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  10. Believing and Accepting.Pascal Engel (ed.) - 2000 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  11. In What Sense is Knowledge the Norm of Assertion?Pascal Engel - 2008 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1):45-59.
    The knowledge account of assertion (KAA) is the view that assertion is governed by the norm that the speaker should know what s/he asserts. It is not the purpose of this article to examine all the criticisms nor to try to give a full defence of KAA, but only to defend it against the charge of being normatively incorrect. It has been objected that assertion is governed by other norms than knowledge, or by no norm at all. It seems to (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  12. The False Modesty of the Identity Theory of Truth.Pascal Engel - 2001 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):441 – 458.
    The identity theory of truth, according to which true thoughts are identical with facts, is very hard to formulate. It oscillates between substantive versions, which are implausible, and a merely truistic version, which is difficult to distinguish from deflationism about truth. This tension is present in the form of identity theory that one can attribute to McDowell from his views on perception, and in the conception defended by Hornsby under that name.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  13. Sosa on the Normativity of Belief.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):617-624.
    Sosa takes epistemic normativity to be kind of performance normativity: a belief is correct because a believer sets a positive value to truth as an aim and performs aptly and adroitly. I object to this teleological picture that beliefs are not performances, and that epistemic reasons or beliefs cannot be balanced against practical reasons. Although the picture fits the nature of inquiry, it does not fit the normative nature of believing, which has to be conceived along distinct lines.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  14. Truth.Pascal Engel - 2002 - Routledge.
    In this critical introduction to contemporary philosophical issues in the theory of truth Pascal Engel provides clear and authoritative exposition of recent and current ideas while providing original perspectives that advances discussion of the key issues. This book begins with a presentation of the classical conceptions of truth - the correspondence theory, the coherence theory and verificationist and pragmatist accounts - before examining so-called minimalist and deflationist conceptions that deny truth can be anything more than a thin concept holding no (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  15. Is Truth a Norm?Pascal Engel - unknown
    This paper tries to say in what sense truth is a norm, a thesis that Donald Davidson, whose view are examined, denies. After skteching his conception of rationality, it is argued that truth is a norm in only the sense that we ought to believe what we believe is true, not that we all to believe everything which is true. This minimal norm of truth is isolated and defended.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  16.  35
    The Norm of Truth: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic.Pascal Engel - 1991 - University of Toronto Press.
  17. Belief and the Right Kind of Reason.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):19-34.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  18.  90
    Believing, Accepting, and Holding True.Pascal Engel - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (2):140-151.
    Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other riters argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper - a dispositional state which can have degrees - holding true - which can occur without understanding what one believes - and accepting - a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  19. The Norms of Thought: Are They Social?Pascal Engel - 2001 - Mind and Society 2 (1):129-148.
    A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein's rule following considerations, Davidson's triangulation argument, and Brandom's inferential pragmatics, and criticizes each. It is argued that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20. Frank Ramsey: Truth and Success.Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel - 2003 - London: Routledge.
    Despite his tragic death at the age of 26, Frank Ramsey remains one of the most intriguing minds of the twentieth century. His thought had a profound influence on both Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell, and many strands of contemporary analytic philosophy find their origin in Ramsey's ideas. _ Frank Ramsey: Truth and Success_ provides a much-needed introduction to the work of this undervalued thinker, and makes an important and profound contribution to our understanding of Ramsey's work and his place (...)
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  21.  88
    Trust and the Doxastic Family.Pascal Engel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.
    This article examines Keith Lehrer's distinction between belief and acceptance and how it differs from other accounts of belief and of the family of doxastic attitudes. I sketch a different taxonomy of doxastic attitudes. Lehrer's notion of acceptance is mostly epistemic and at the service of his account of the "loop of reason", whereas for other writers acceptance is mostly a pragmatic attitude. I argue, however, that his account of acceptance underdetermines the role that the attitude of trust plays in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  22.  4
    The Ontology of Mind. [REVIEW]Pascal Engel - 1999 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 189 (4):496-496.
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  23.  75
    Dispositional Belief, Assent, and Acceptance.Pascal Engel - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (3-4):211–226.
    I discuss Ruth Marcus' conception of beliefs as dispositional states related to possible states of affaires. While I agree with Marcus that this conception accounts for the necessary distinction between belief and linguistic assent, I argue that the relationship between dispositional beliefs and our assent attitudes is more complex, and should include other mental states, such as acceptances, which, although they contain voluntary elements, are further layers of dispositional doxastic attitudes.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  24.  75
    Frank Ramsey: Truth and Success.Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel - 2002 - London: Routledge.
    This book provides a much-needed critical introduction to the main doctrines of Frank Ramsey's work and assesses their contemporary significance.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  25. Va Savoir: De la Connaissance En Général.Pascal Engel - 2007 - Hermann.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  26. Dummett, Achilles and the Tortoise.Pascal Engel - unknown
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27. Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value.Pascal Engel - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  28.  11
    The Epistemology of Stupidity.Pascal Engel - 2016 - In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press UK.
    This chapter analyzes stupidity as a problem for epistemology. Its proper home belongs to virtue epistemology, as a specific epistemic vice, which has to be studied along the lines of both reliabilist virtue epistemology and of responsibilist virtue epistemology. The author distinguishes between two kinds of stupidity: stupidity proper and foolishness. The former is a defect in the competence of an agent, as well as in the performance of judgment, and it is generally studied as a failure of rationality along (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  29.  54
    Volitionism and Voluntarism About Belief.Pascal Engel - 1999 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):265-281.
    This paper attempts to clarify some issues about what is usually called “doxastic voluntarism”. This phrase often hides a confusion between two separate (although connected) issues: whether beliefis or can be, as a matter of psychological fact, under the control of the will, on the one hand, and whether we can have practical reasons to believe something, or whether our beliefs are subject to any sort of “ought”, on the other hand. The first issue -- which I prefer to call (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  30.  89
    Logical Reasons.Pascal Engel - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):21 – 38.
    Simon Blackburn has shown that there is an analogy between the problem of moral motivation in ethics (how can moral reasons move us?) and the problem of what we might call the power of logical reasons (how can logical reasons move us, what is the force of the 'logical must?'). In this paper, I explore further the parallel between the internalism problem in ethics and the problem of the power of logical reasons, and defend a version of psychologism about reasons, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  31.  29
    Trois conceptions de la connaissance littéraire : cognitive, affective, pratique.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophiques 40 (1):121.
    Pascal Engel | : À partir d’une typologie des formes de connaissance, je soutiens qu’il y a trois formes principales de connaissance littéraire : cognitive propositionnelle, affective et pratique. La conception propositionnelle est erronée : la littérature ne fournit pas directement une forme de savoir que. La conception affective ou expressiviste peut au mieux dire qu’il y a des effets cognitifs des oeuvres littéraires. La conception pratique a le plus de chances d’être correcte, mais seulement si l’on accepte l’idée que (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  32.  34
    Replies: On Norms of Belief and Knowledge.Pascal Engel - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1555-1564.
    These replies to commentators on my work focus on the nature of epistemic norms, on the nature of truth and on the nature and value of knowledge. A normative account of belief and knowledge is committed to substantial and objective epistemic norms. But not everyone agrees on their form. I try here to reply to some doubts raised by my critics.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33. Logic, Reasoning and the Logical Constants.Pascal Engel - 2006 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):219-235.
    What is the relationship between logic and reasoning? How do logical norms guide inferential performance? This paper agrees with Gilbert Harman and most of the psychologists that logic is not directly relevant to reasoning. It argues, however, that the mental model theory of logical reasoning allows us to harmonise the basic principles of deductive reasoning and inferential perfomances, and that there is a strong connexion between our inferential norms and actual reasoning, along the lines of Peacocke’s conception of inferential role.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34.  9
    Le droit de ne pas croire.Pascal Engel - 2012 - ThéoRèmes 2 (1).
    Dans cet article, je défends la position évidentialiste à propos des croyances religieuses, à la suite de la fameuse maxime de Clifford et contre l'interprétation pragmatiste de l'éthique des croyances. Je défends, en suivant Shah que le test de transparence est mieux expliqué par l'existence d'une norme de correction de la croyance. Les croyances religieuses, si elles sont des croyances, doivent obéir à cette norme. Si elles n'y obéissent pas, ce ne sont pas des croyances. Et la non croyance est (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  35.  83
    Is Epistemic Agency Possible?Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):158-178.
    There are mental actions, and a number of epistemic attitudes involve activity. But can there be epistemic agency? I argue that there is a limit to any claim that we can be epistemic agents, which is that the structure of reasons for epistemic attitudes differs fundamentally from the structure of reasons for actions. The main differences are that we cannot act for the wrong reasons although we can believe for the wrong reasons, and that reasons for beliefs are exclusive in (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  36. Wherein Lies the Normative Dimension in Meaning and Mental Content?Pascal Engel - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100 (3):305-321.
    This paper argues that the normative dimension in mental and semantic content is not a categorical feature of content, but an hypothetical one, relative to the features of the interpretation of thoughts and meaning. The views of Robert Brandom are discussed. The thesis defended in this paper is not interpretationist about thought. It implies that the normative dimension of content arises from the real capacity of thinkers and speakers to self ascribe thoughts to themselves and to reach self knowledge of (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  37. Wherein Lies the Normative Dimension in Mental Content?Pascal Engel - unknown
    I argue that the normative dimension in mental content does not figure in the content as a direct feature of this content. But I do not take is as an extrinsic feature due to the properties of our ascriptions either. I suggest that the normativity has to do with the possibility of self attribution of mental states. The views of Robert Brandom are examined in this respect.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  38.  5
    Is Identity a Functional Property?Pascal Engel - 2015 - In Michael Frauchiger (ed.), Modalities, Identity, Belief, and Moral Dilemmas: Themes From Barcan Marcus. De Gruyter. pp. 75-94.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39.  60
    The Unimportance of Being Modest: A Footnote to McDowell’s Note.Pascal Engel - 2005 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (1):89 – 93.
    (2005). The unimportance of being modest: a footnote to McDowell’s note. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 89-93. doi: 10.1080/0967255042000324362.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  40.  11
    Les Fake News Et L’Avenir de la Vérité.Michael P. Lynch & Pascal Engel - 2018 - Diogène 1:5.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  42
    Alethic Functionalism and the Norm of Belief.Pascal Engel - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 69.
  42.  4
    Origins of Analytical Philosophy.Pascal Engel - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (179):268-271.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  43. I. Categorical Vs Relational Normativity.Pascal Engel - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 100:305-321.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  44.  10
    Y a-t-il eu vraiment une rencontre entre Ricœur et la philosophie analytique?Pascal Engel - 2014 - Études Ricoeuriennes / Ricoeur Studies 5 (1):125-141.
    Paul Ricœur made a lot to introduce analytic philosophy in France during the 70s and 80s, and he engaged in a dialogue with a number of authors from this tradition, such as Austin, Strawson, Davidson or Parfit. This dialogue, though, was one-sided, since there was no discussion of his views by analytic philosophers. Moreover, Ricœur often misunderstood or misprepresented the analytic views that he was discussing. So in many ways the Ricœur’s encounter with analytic philosophy was unsuccessful, which does not (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45. Analytic Philosophy and Cognitive Norms.Pascal Engel - 1999 - The Monist 82 (2):218-234.
    What is the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy? That the former has not withdrawn norms of justification and truth, whereas the latter has bred suspicion about them.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  46.  21
    Introduction.Jérôme Dokic & Pascal Engel - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (4):459–459.
  47. Self-Ascriptions of Belief and Transparency.Pascal Engel - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):593-610.
    Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one asks oneself whether P.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48.  87
    Free Believers.Pascal Engel - 2002 - Manuscrito 25 (3):155-175.
    Is there such a thing as free belief? This paper is not about free expression of belief or free speech. It is about freedom of belief as a mental state. In the sense in which the believer would be the cause of his or her own belief, and could believe at will, it is, for well-known reasons, impossible. Some writers, however, like McDowell, have argued, in a Kantian spirit, that obeying the norms of thought and setting oneself as a member (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. Davidson et la philosophie du langage.Pascal Engel - 1997 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 187 (1):65-67.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  50. A Theoria Round Table on Philosophy Publishing.Bengt Hansson, Hans van Ditmarsch, Pascal Engel, Sven Ove Hansson, Vincent Hendricks, Søren Holm, Pauline Jacobson, Anthonie Meijers, Henry S. Richardson & Hans Rott - 2011 - Theoria 77 (2):104-116.
    As part of the conference commemorating Theoria's 75th anniversary, a round table discussion on philosophy publishing was held in Bergendal, Sollentuna, Sweden, on 1 October 2010. Bengt Hansson was the chair, and the other participants were eight editors-in-chief of philosophy journals: Hans van Ditmarsch (Journal of Philosophical Logic), Pascal Engel (Dialectica), Sven Ove Hansson (Theoria), Vincent Hendricks (Synthese), Søren Holm (Journal of Medical Ethics), Pauline Jacobson (Linguistics and Philosophy), Anthonie Meijers (Philosophical Explorations), Henry S. Richardson (Ethics) and Hans Rott (Erkenntnis).
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
1 — 50 / 194