PREFACE When in the year 1940 I ventured a small volume under the title The Secret of Pascal, I honestly did not expect to write further on the topic. But circumstances ordered otherwise. The needs of Cambridge students and the difficulty, ...
ome Remarks on the Crisis of Capitalism What are the causes and consequences of the crisis of capitalism ? What are the plausible scenarios forthe outcome of the crisis ? To what extent is the current crisis comparable to that of 1929, and to whatextent does it differ from the crisis of the 1970s ? To what extent can one speak of a crisis of neoliberalism ? These are some of the questions which the authors of The Crisis of Neoliberalism (...) address here. (shrink)
This assignment is to be worked alongside other homework and is due at the class period following the midterm exam. Though you should do reading and start thinking about the issues right away, details will make most sense after we have made some progress with other assignments.
C'est une question classique de la théologie que celle de la vertu des païens. Sur ce sujet aussi se manifeste au XVIIe siècle l' antagonisme des molinistes et des augustiniens. Le camp de Pascal ne fait aucun doute, mais on n'a pas mesuré les inflexions que sa stratégie argumentative imprime à la thématique païenne des Provinciales aux Pensées. Dans les Provinciales, non seulement la morale jésuite est exclue de la sphère éthique chrétienne, mais elle est présentée comme inférieure à (...) la morale des païens. Or, dans les Pensées, le statut des païens semble beaucoup moins enviable : de possible référence morale aux yeux du polémiste, ils sont transformés en repoussoirs par l'apologiste, qui les exhibe en preuves historiques de la misère de l'homme sans Dieu. On ne peut cependant en demeurer à cette vision réductrice : les Pensées reconnaissent une valeur aux sentiments, aux lois, et même à la religion, des païens, et cette appréciation est lourde de conséquences métaphysiques en ce qu'elle signifie la validité de l'instance naturelle - outre qu'elle contribue à établir entre Provinciales et Pensées une continuité qui met à mal la thèse de la prétendue « rupture idéologique ». The question of the virtues of pagans is a classical one in theology. This subject was also a focus of the antagonism between Molinists and A ugustinians in the seventeenth century. There is no doubt as to which side Pascal supported, but as yet the different inflections of his argumentative strategy with respect to the theme of paganism in the Provinciales and the Pensées have not been accurately assessed. In the Provinciales, Jesuit morals are not only excluded from the sphere of Christian ethics, but also presented as lower than the ethics of the pagans. In the Pensées, on the other hand, the status of pagans seems much less enviable ; no longer a possible moral reference for the polemist, they are transformed into wholly negative models by the apologist, who exhibits them as historic evidence of man's wretchedness without God. Yet this reductive vision is not the whole truth : the Pensées also acknowledge that there is a certain value in the feelings, the laws, and even the religion, of pagans. This estimate has many metaphysical consequences, as it implies the validity of natural standards, in addition to contributing to the establishment of a continuity between the Provinciales and the Pensees, contrary to the claim that there is an « ideological break » between the two works. (shrink)
Le relevé des affleurements de la référence explicite à Pascal, dans les textes de Heidegger, montre que celle-ci n’est nullement aussi erratique qu’il y paraît. Ce gisement de références se concentre autour de quelques thèmes fondamentaux, tels : l’excédentarité de l’« Être » ; la description du caractère mouvementé de la « condition humaine » ; mais aussi : la « logique du cœur » ; et surtout : la place singulière de Pascal, eu égard à Descartes et (...) à l’inflexion décisive que celui-ci apporte à la configuration des Temps modernes, dans un épisode majeur de l’histoire de la métaphysique occidentale. – Mais rien de la thématique pascalienne de la révélation du « Dieu caché » n’y est expressément relevé. – Pourtant, une puissante et quelque peu énigmatique analogie pourrait devoir venir s’y nouer et s’y faire jour – quoique sur un mode « sigétique » – entre la « théologie » pascalienne de la révélation du « Dieu caché », d’une part, et la méditation heideggerienne de la structure paradoxale du « retrait de l’Être », d’autre part, avec l’étrange révélation qui s’y annonce de la fugitive parution du « signe de la passée du dernier Dieu » des Compléments à la philosophie [Beiträge zur Philosophie].Texte intégral Searching for the outcrops of explicit references to Pascal’s thought in Heidegger’s writings, it clearly appears that these references are by far not so erratic as it could have seemed at first sight. They concentrate – for the most part – on a few essential topics, such as Pascal’s taking into account of the irreducibility of « being » to any possible definition, or Pascal’s vivid, passionate description of human « condition » ; such as Pascal’s « Logic of the Heart » too, or the significant historical « situation » of Pascal’s thought in regard to Descartes’ bold renewal of the whole way of thinking of that time, as a pioneer of a new European Age, at the turning point of a major episode of the History of Metaphysics. – Nevertheless, Heidegger does not even hint at Pascal’s meditation of the paradoxical revelation of the Jansenistic « Deus absconditus »: the « Hidden God ». – An enigmatically tight analogy, however, might have been woven there – in a « sigetical », silent way – between Pascal’s theology of the « Hidden God » and Heidegger’s thought of the « withdrawal of Being » and the inherent fugitive revelation of the mysterious « hint of the passing of the Last God », in Heidegger’s Complements to Philosophy [Beiträge zur Philosophie]. (shrink)
Many think that Pascal’s Wager is a hopeless failure. A primary reason for this is because a number of challenging objections have been raised to the wager, including the “many gods” objection and the “mixed strategy” objection. We argue that both objections are formal, but not substantive, problems for the wager, and that they both fail for the same reason. We then respond to additional objections to the wager. We show how a version of Pascalian reasoning succeeds, giving us (...) a reason to pay special attention to the infinite consequences of our actions. (shrink)
Pascal’s Wager does not exist in a Platonic world of possible gods, abstract probabilities and arbitrary payoffs. Real decision-makers, such as Pascal’s “man of the world” of 1660, face a range of religious options they take to be serious, with fixed probabilities grounded in their evidence, and with utilities that are fixed quantities in actual minds. The many ingenious objections to the Wager dreamed up by philosophers do not apply in such a real decision matrix. In the situation (...)Pascal addresses, the Wager is a good bet. In the situation of a modern Western intellectual, the reasoning of the Wager is still powerful, though the range of options and the actions indicated are not the same as in Pascal’s day. (shrink)
Subtitled "The Lazy Gambler's Guide to Choosing a Religion," this essay presents an account of Pascal's Wager that avoids most of the major traditional objections to Pascal's appeal to self-interest as an incentive to the investigation of Christian evidences. I then turn to what I call "the Lazy Objection" to the wager, which claims that there are too many religions all of which can make a similar appeal and argue that this is simply false. I conclude that, considered (...) as a rhetorical strategy, the Wager is really a Challenge, one we decline at our peril. (shrink)
Most students of Tocqueville know of his remark, “There are three men with whom I live a little every day; they are Pascal, Montesquieu, and Rousseau.” In this paper I trace out the contours of Pascal’s influence upon Tocqueville’s understanding of the human condition and our appropriate response to it. Similar temperaments lead both Tocqueville and Pascal to emphasize human limitations and contingency, as Peter Lawler rightly emphasizes. Tocqueville and Pascal both emphasize mortality, ignorance of the (...) most important subjects, the effects of historical contingency on what we take to be human nature, and both represent the complex internal dynamic of human nature in terms of the interplay of “angel” and “brute.” The most important difference between them concerns their relative estimates of human power and the significance of human action. Whereas the motif of human weakness is fundamental for Pascal, Tocqueville repeatedly affirms that, under the right conditions, human beings are “powerful and free.” Beginning from Pascalian premises, and endeavoring to be more faithful to some of those premises than Pascal himself was, Tocqueville aims to illuminate the possibility of an amelioration of the human condition through a “new political science” that redeems the political realm without divinizing it. -/- . (shrink)
The Many Gods Objection (MGO) is widely viewed as a decisive criticism of Pascal’s Wager. By introducing a plurality of hypotheses with infinite expected utility into the decision matrix, the wagerer is left without adequate grounds to decide between them. However, some have attempted to rebut this objection by employing various criteria drawn from the theological tradition. Unfortunately, such defenses do little good for an argument that is supposed to be an apologetic aimed at atheists and agnostics. The purpose (...) of this paper is to offer a defensive strategy of a different sort, one more suited to the Wager’s apologetic aim and status as a decision under ignorance. Instead of turning to criteria independent of the Wager, it will be shown that there are characteristics already built into its decision theoretic structure that can be used to block many categories of theological hypotheses including MGO’s more outrageous “cooked-up” hypotheses and “philosophers’ fictions”. -/- Please note that there are editorial errors in the published version. They have been corrected in the attached. (shrink)
Pascal’s wager has to face the many gods objection. The wager goes wrong when it asks us to chose between Christianity and atheism, as if there are no other options. Some have argued that we’re entitled to dismiss exotic, bizarre, or subjectively unappealing religions from the scope of the wager. But they have provided no satisfying justification for such a radical wager-saving dispensation. This paper fills that dialectical gap. It argues that some agents are blameless or even praiseworthy for (...) ignoring all but one religion as they face the wager. The argument leads us to multiple Pascals: a Jewish one, a Christian one, a Muslim one, and more. (shrink)
The essay is a comparative look at Descartes' and Pascal's epistemology. For so vast a topic, I shall confine myself to comparing three crucial epistemological topics, through which I hope to evince Descartes' and Pascal's differences and points of contact. Firstly, I will concentrate on the philosophers' engagement with skepticism, which, for each, had different functions and motivations. Secondly, the thinkers' relation to Reason shall be examined, since it is the fulcrum of their thought—and the main aspect that (...) separates them. Lastly, I will examine each philosopher's theist epistemology; this section, of course, will focus on how and by what means Descartes and Pascal set out to prove God's existence. The latter aspect shall take us back to each philosopher's relationship to Doubt: the title, " The Giants of Doubt ", in fact, implies a fundamental link between Descartes and Pascal through Doubt. In addition, and most importantly, the contrast between the two thinkers' epistemology inaugurates a decisive scission in modern thought of enormous repercussion: Descartes' sturdy rationalism initiated the great branch of modern scientific inquiry , while Pascal's appeal to the power of intuition and feelings would eventually be the precursor of the reaction to the enlightenment that invested Europe by the second half of the eighteenth century. This departure of thought, which in my view may be traced back to them, has not been the common conceit of the history of philosophy: the reaction to the enlightenment has customarily been regarded as stemming from its internal contradictions or at best from its more radical doctrines. The essay shall show that these strands of thought were both parallel and born out of the antithetical epistemologies of Descartes and Pascal. (shrink)
How were reliable predictions made before Pascal and Fermat's discovery of the mathematics of probability in 1654? What methods in law, science, commerce, philosophy, and logic helped us to get at the truth in cases where certainty was not attainable? The book examines how judges, witch inquisitors, and juries evaluated evidence; how scientists weighed reasons for and against scientific theories; and how merchants counted shipwrecks to determine insurance rates. Also included are the problem of induction before Hume, design arguments (...) for the existence of God, and theories on how to evaluate scientific and historical hypotheses. It is explained how Pascal and Fermat's work on chance arose out of legal thought on aleatory contracts. The book interprets pre-Pascalian unquantified probability in a generally objective Bayesian or logical probabilist sense. (shrink)
The standard version of Pascal’s Wager suffers from serious problems. In this paper I present a modified version of a Wager-style argument that avoids several of the most serious objections to the standard version, viz., the objections of Duff and Hájek relating to infinite utilities, moral objections concerning the use of pragmatic considerations, and the many-gods objection. I argue that a serious commitment to living a Christian life is rational if one is rational in assigning a credence to Christianity (...) of at least one-half. The upshot is that considerations of practical rationality dramatically lower the bar for natural theology. (shrink)
This paper argues that Pascal's formulation of his famous wager argument licenses an inference about God's nature that ultimately vitiates the claim that wagering for God is in one's rational self-interest. In particular, it is argued that if we accept Pascal's premises, then we can infer that the god for whom Pascal encourages us to wager is irrational. But if God is irrational, then the prudentially rational course of action is to refrain from wagering for him.
Purpose. The paper aims at substantiating the meaningful relationship between Descartes’ and Pascal’s positions as two variants in responding to the demand of the era in the development of anthropology. The realization of this purpose involves defining the spiritual climate of the era and addressing to the texts of two great French thinkers of the 17th century to demonstrate common moments in interpreting the phenomenon of a man. Theoretical basis. The methodological basis in the research is the conceptual propositions (...) of the representatives of phenomenology and hermeneutics. Originality. The existence of the doctrine of human nature by Descartes is argued and the manifestations of common moments with Pascal’s doctrine are outlined. The latter include the context of the Copernican unfinished Revolution, the emphasis on restrictions in the methodology of the natural sciences, the intense search for description language beyond the rational components of human nature, the high opinion in the Christian understanding of man, critique of atheism. Conclusions. The paper substantiates the meaningful relationship in the doctrine of man from both French thinkers, which manifests itself in the vision of the initial situation as a person’s choice of their own foundations in the course of conceptualization the scientific revolution, understanding of Christianity as a basic paradigm of thinking, priority of the anthropological interest over natural-science one, the dominant role of the ethical philosophizing motive. (shrink)
O presente artigo visa explorar as relações entre Pascal e Pessoa tendo por base o impacto da obra do autor francês tanto na estruturação quanto nas temáticas presentes ao longo do projeto do Livro do Desassossego. Com efeito, na Biblioteca Particular de Pessoa encontramos livros de e sobre Pascal que se encontram sublinhados e anotados pelo autor português e nos possibilitam certificar o interesse de Pessoa pelo pensamento pascaliano. Para além disso, o espólio de Pessoa oferece-nos um conjunto (...) de fragmentos que nos permitem elucidar até que ponto a leitura da obra de Pascal viria a ser importante para a elaboração dos fragmentos do Livro do Desassossego. Assim, tendo por base a análise da presença do nome e do pensamento de Pascal em fragmentos do espólio de Pessoa, o presente artigo explicita qual o papel da leitura pessoana de Pascal na elaboração do projeto do Livro do Desassossego. (shrink)
The article suggests an ethical-anthropological reading of Thoughts, magna opera of the French mathematician and philosopher Blaise Pascal, which was published after his death by his relatives and friends. Such a reading is presented in three moments: Firstly, an anthropological description aimed at answering the question ‘who is man?’; secondly, an analysis of Pascal’s erotic condition; and, finally, an ethical proposal as cura amoris. The main argument of the article is that every human being has a motivation in (...) acting, that of love and being loved. Thus, having a happy or unhappy life depends on the care for this erotic condition, and the latter is achieved through thought. (shrink)
Recent scholarship has shown that the success of Pascal’s wager rests on precarious grounds. To avoid notorious problems, it must appeal to considerations such as what probability we assign to the existence of various gods and what religion we think provides the greatest happiness in this life. Rational judgments concerning these matters are subject to change over time. Some claim that the wager therefore cannot support a steadfast commitment to God. I argue that this conclusion does not follow. By (...) drawing upon the line of reasoning employed in getting married, I explain how unstable considerations can provide a sufficient rational foundation for a stable commitment. (shrink)
Em Pascal, por meio da crítica à razão discursiva que estava à sua época em vias de consagração, está em curso a defesa de uma concepção alargada da racionalidade, que procura estendê-la a partir de uma perspectiva anti-intuicionista e antifundacionista radical para dimensões da realidade que o arranjo epistemológico gestado pela filosofia cartesiana quer deixar de fora. A hipótese que gostaríamos de discutir é a de que essa subversão se dá pela desestabilização desse arranjo por meio da descrição que (...)Pascal realiza, em Pensamentos, da faculdade imaginação, cujo interesse para o estudo da verdade deve ser considerado para que se possa entender a inflexão que a epistemologia pascaliana tenta empreender ante as outras de seu tempo. (shrink)
Doctors and dentists have traditionally used antibiotic prophylaxis in certain patient groups in order to prevent infective endocarditis (IE). New guidelines, however, suggest that the risk to patients from using antibiotics is higher than the risk from IE. This paper analyses the relative risks of prescribing and not prescribing antibiotic prophylaxis against the background of Pascal’s Wager, the infamous assertion that it is better to believe in God regardless of evidence, because of the prospective benefits should He exist. Many (...) doctors seem to believe the parallel proposition that it is better to prescribe antibiotics, regardless of evidence, because of the prospective benefit conferred upon the patient. This has been called the “no lose philosophy” in medicine: better safe than sorry, even if the evidence inconveniently suggests that following this mantra is potentially more likely to result in sorry than safe. It transpires that, just as Pascal’s Wager fails to convince because of a lack of evidence to support it and the costs incurred by trying to believe, so the “belts and braces” approach of prescribing antibiotic prophylaxis is unjustifiable given the actual evidence of potential risk and benefit to the patient. Ultimately, there is no no-lose if your clinical decisions, like Pascal’s Wager, are based on faith rather than evidence. (shrink)
An adaptation of Pascal’s Wager argument has been considered useful in deciding about the provision of life-sustaining treatment for patients in persistent vegetative state. In this article, I assess whether people making such decisions should resort to the application of Pascal’s idea. I argue that there is no sufficient reason to give it an important role in making the decisions.
In this paper the question of the object in Freud’s metapsychology is sketched out from an economical point of view, that is in terms of pleasure and displeasure. This allows for a reading of Pascal’s wager that makes clear what interest Lacan had in discussing this one pensée at length in his Seminar on the Object of Psychoanalysis. The central issue in Lacan’s reading concerns the object a as a stake the subject has lost.
In a recent paper A. Tabarrok [Believe in Pascal’s Wager? Have I Got a Deal for You!, Theory and Decision 48, 123--128, 2000] argued that a believer who accepts Pascal’s Wager should in addition accept payment of any given fee in return for a given increase in the probability of reaching God. However the conclusion is obtained from manipulations of infinities which are not valid in an expected utility model. In this note, an alternative model is formulated in (...) which Tabarrok’s conclusion can be obtained. (shrink)
Pascal's wager is an argument in support of religious belief taking its name from the seventeenth century polymath Blaise Pascal. Unlike more traditional arguments for the existence of God, Pascal's wager is a pragmatic argument, concluding not that God exists but that one should wager for God; that is, one should live as if God exists. After an introduction to the elements of decision theory needed to understand the wager, I discuss the interpretation of Pascal's reasoning (...) in the Infini rien fragment of the Pensees, in which he presents several versions of a wager-style argument. Recent discussions of the role of the wager within Pascal's overall project of Christian apologetics are also examined. I then review contemporary formulations of, attacks on, and objections to Pascal's wager. Recent authors have pressed moral objections, epistemological objections, objections relating to infinite utilities, the many Gods objection, and objections to the expectation rule, among others. After an examination of this literature, I conclude with a brief discussion of noncanonical versions of the wager, including Jeff Jordan's Jamesian wager. (shrink)
O ceticismo desempenha um papel decisivo na filosofia pascaliana. De fato, amplamente influenciado por autores como Michel de Montaigne e Pierre Charron, Blaise Pascal acaba por contrariar a tendência geral do século do grande Racionalismo, levantando profundas objeções relativamente à pretensão – tipicamente cartesiana – de se conhecer a Verdade de maneira certa e segura. Como se pode depreender mesmo de uma rápida leitura de seus escritos, a obra pascaliana é toda perpassada por uma notável desconfiança de nossa suposta (...) capacidade de adquirir certezas inabaláveis sobre o que quer que seja: desconfiança esta que, diga-se de passagem, está em profunda sintonia com a chocante posição do autor concernente às consequências do pecado original. Assim sendo, o que pretendemos neste artigo é: i) apresentar os argumentos céticos subscritos por Pascal em sua principal obra filosófica – os Pensamentos; e ii) analisando a obra Do espírito geométrico e da arte de persuadir, indicar que nem mesmo os conhecimentos oferecidos pela luz natural são capazes de nos livrar das dúvidas suscitadas pela argumentação cética. (shrink)
Pragmatic arguments seek to justify the performance of an action by appealing to the benefits that may follow from that action. Pascal’s wager, for instance, argues that one should inculcate belief in God because there is everything to gain and little to lose by doing do. In this chapter I critically examine Pascal’s wager and William James’s famous “Will-to-Believe” argument by first explaining the logic of each argument and then by surveying the objections commonly arrayed against them. Finally, (...) I suggest that among the various versions of the wager found in Pascal’s Pensées is a neglected version that anticipates the Jamesian argument and that avoids the many-gods objection. (shrink)
Pascal and the „Proof by Power“. Nietzsche’s Examination of a wounded intellectual conscience. This paper sheds new light on Nietzsche’s praise of Pascal’s probity by analysing what the German philosopher calls the „proof by power“. This proof, adopted by Christianity at large, consists in making pleasure and well-being the very criteria of truth and, as such, it represents for Nietzsche a sheer dishonest form of reasoning. When Pascal finally decides to use this proof in the Pensées, he (...) is already conscious of its lack of scientific value and of its dishonesty. Nietzsche thus reveals in Pascal’s thinking the torments of a wounded intellectual conscience, torn between its fidelity to the Christian tradition and its probity inspired by this very piety. In this respect, the famous wager’s argument appears as a testimony of this tension: it is a brilliant but desperate attempt of giving this „proof by power“, which the scientific rigor it is fundamentally lacking. (shrink)
Blaise Pascal is highly regarded as a religious moralist, but he has rarely been given his due as an ethical theorist. The goal of this article is to assemble Pascal's scattered thoughts on moral judgment and moral wrongdoing into an explicit, coherent account that can serve as the basis for further scholarly reflection on his ethics. On my reading, Pascal affirms an axiological, social-intuitionist account of moral judgment and moral wrongdoing. He argues that a moral judgment is (...) an immediate, intuitive perception of moral value that we willfully disregard in favor of the attractive, though self-deceptive, deliverances of our socially constructed imaginations. We can deceive ourselves so easily because our capacity to evaluate goods is broken, a dark legacy of the fall. In the article's concluding section, I briefly compare Pascal to contemporary ethicists and suggest directions for future research. (shrink)
In this paper I will examine what Blaise Pascal means by “infinite distance”, both in his works on projective geometry and in the apologetics of the Pensées’s. I suggest that there is a difference of meaning in these two uses of “infinite distance”, and that the Pensées’s use of it also bears relations to the mathematical concept of heterogeneity. I also consider the relation between the finite and the infinite and the acceptance of paradoxical relations by Pascal.
The nineteenth century English Jesuit poet, Gerard Manley Hopkins struggled throughout his life with desolation over what he saw as a spiritually, intellectually and artistically unproductive life. During these periods, he experienced God’s absence in a particularly intense way. As he wrote in one sonnet, “my lament / Is cries countless, cries like dead letters sent / To dearest him that lives alas! away.” What Hopkins faced was the existential problem of suffering and hiddenness, a problem widely recognized by analytic (...) philosophers to be left relatively untouched by conceptual explanations. In this essay, I argue that Hopkins’ poems themselves fill this gap left by conceptual approaches by articulating the existential crisis faced by those who feel the searing pain of suffering and the numbing, leaden echo of silence. His lyric speaks into existential suffering in ways akin to biblical laments and, as such, creates a space in which those who suffer can meet God, even if only to contend. Understood within Hopkins’ view of the incarnation and passion, these poems also suggest a way to identify with Christ in the experience of hiddenness, thereby making God present even in divine absence. (shrink)
_ Source: _Volume 55, Issue 4, pp 340 - 359 Gerard of Abbeville was a secular master of theology at the University of Paris and a contemporary of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure. In the context of reviewing Stephen Metzger’s new two-volume book on Gerard, this paper first adds some new information about Gerard’s early career, notably concerning benefices he claimed in Saint-Omer, Tournai, and Amiens. Afterwards, the salient features of Metzger’s volumes are presented: his placement of Gerard in his institutional (...) context; his characterization of Gerard’s doctrines of wisdom, knowledge, and contemplation in comparison with those of Gerard’s contemporaries; and his editions of texts. In the end, the chronological repercussions of maintaining that Vat. lat. 1015 reflects the original sequence of Gerard’s _Quodlibeta_, Metzger’s future focus, are discussed. (shrink)
Cet article est destiné à montrer qu’antérieurement au développement par Ockham d’une doctrine de l’intuition du non-existant, deux théologiens parisiens avaient déjà construit, chacun à sa manière, une théorie de la connaissance intuitive qui établissait, contre Duns Scot, la possibilité de l’intuition d’une chose non-existante ou absente : Gérard de Bologne et Hervé de Nédellec. L’étude philosophique de ce thème chez ces deux penseurs s’appuie sur l’édition critique de leurs Quodlibeta qu’a réalisée l’auteur de l’article.
Le conseil d’administration du CNRS a adopté le 23 juin 2011 la charte interne de l’expertise, qui adapte aux spécificités de ses propres activités le texte de la Charte nationale de l’expertise. La charte interne du CNRS est guidée par la volonté de répondre efficacement à deux enjeux majeurs de l’expertise scientifique : la crédibilité des experts et la qualité du processus et du produit de l’expertise.The CNRS governing board adopted its internal Charter on Expert Studies on 23 June 2011, (...) which adapts the National Charter on Expert Studies to the specific features of CNRS activities. The internal CNRS Charter rests on the principle of efficient striving to address two major issues concerning scientific expert studies : the credibility of experts and the quality of expert study processes and output. (shrink)
For Pascal, how are human beings related, or how do they relate themselves, to the summum bonum in this life? In what sense do they share in it, and how do they come to share in it? These are questions that emerge in many ways in Pascal’s writing, significantly in his concept of repos. To answer these questions, especially by elucidating what repos is for human beings in this life, I would like to begin with Graeme Hunter’s “Motion (...) and Rest in the Pensées”. Hunter’s account of Pascal is important because his purpose is to specifically address how certain aspects of modernity affect how Pascal understood repos. Hunter is certainly correct when he argues that for Pascal, repos is an orderly, directed seeking of truth—what Hunter designates as “search.” However, Hunter’s account of Pascal’s repos falls short of completion, because he neglects a crucial part of Pascal’s articulation of repos: his emphasis on the role of God’s grace in searching. By neglecting Pascal’s emphasis on grace, Hunter inadvertently depicts Pascal as reducing repos to motion, rather than envisioning them together in dialectical unity. I argue that for Pascal, it is correct to say that someone who is anxiously searching has indeed “already found,” but this cannot be solely due to human efforts: rather, it because the whole enterprise is entirely infused by grace. (shrink)
Este artigo tem como objetivo um olhar histórico-teológico para a reflexão do mistério pascal principalmente no que diz respeito à questão celebrativa. No caminhar de dois milênios é notória a divisão deste tema em dois momentos: No primeiro milênio a força teológico-celebrativa do mistério pascal. No segundo milênio o caminho mudou sua rota com atitudes que levaram a se distanciar da proposta inicial na sua teologia e na sua celebração. O Concílio Vaticano II, momento eclesial de extrema importância (...) tenta retomar o caminho desviado e propõe uma volta às fontes a fim de que o mistério celebrado seja realmente o mistério de Jesus, ou seja, o Mistério Pascal na sua originalidade e inteireza. Vale lembrar que esta reflexão e também a liturgia não esgotam o tema. A teologia em seus desdobramentos e sua amplitude tem um vasto campo para sempre mais ajudar a refletir e celebrar este mistério. (shrink)