14 found
Order:
See also
  1. Entitlement as a Response to I–II–III Scepticism.Patrice Philie - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):459-466.
    In this paper, Crispin Wright’s unified strategy against scepticism is put under pressure through an examination of the concept of entitlement. Wright’s characterisation of a generalised form of scepticism is first described, followed by an examination of the concept of entitlement and of the role played by presuppositions in his strategy. This will make manifest the transcendental structure of this response to scepticism. The paper ends with a discussion of the effectiveness of this transcendental strategy in providing a satisfying response (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  2.  7
    A Vindication of Logical Necessity Against Scepticism.Patrice Philie - unknown
    Some philosophers dispute the claim that there is a notion of logical necessity involved in the concept of logical consequence. They are sceptical about logical necessity. They argue that a proper characterisation of logical consequence - of what follows from what - need not and should not appeal to the notion of necessity at all. Quine is the most prominent philosopher holding such a view. In this doctoral dissertation, I argue that scepticism about logical necessity is not successful. Quine's scepticism (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Carroll's Regress and the Epistemology of Logic.Patrice Philie - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):183 - 210.
    On an internalist account of logical inference, we are warranted in drawing conclusions from accepted premises on the basis of our knowledge of logical laws. Lewis Carroll’s regress challenges internalism by purporting to show that this kind of warrant cannot ground the move from premises to conclusion. Carroll’s regress vindicates a repudiation of internalism and leads to the espousal of a standpoint that regards our inferential practice as not being grounded on our knowledge of logical laws. Such a standpoint can (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  5
    Sellars and McDowell on Objectivity.Patrice Philie - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):63-92.
    On the surface, one of the main differences between John McDowell and Wilfrid Sellars when it comes to their conceptions of intentionality has to do with their respective accounts of meaning. McDowell advocates a relational account of meaning, whereas Sellars holds, on the contrary, that a correct view of intentionality is only possible through a non-relational account of meaning. According to McDowell, Sellars does not consider the possibility of his own relational view because he suffers from a ‘blind spot’. It (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  12
    Intentionality and Content in McDowell.Patrice Philie - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (4-5):656-678.
    In its most general form, the issue of intentionality takes the following shape: How can something be about something else? In basic cases, this relation is one between a subjective occurrence and a state of affairs, allowing the problem of intentionality to be articulated in this manner: What makes it the case that a subjective occurrence has the capacity to be about something external to it? The views of John McDowell on intentionality form the focus of this article. They are (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  11
    Carroll’s Regress and the Epistemology of Logic.Patrice Philie - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):183-210.
    On an internalist account of logical inference, we are warranted in drawing conclusions from accepted premises on the basis of our knowledge of logical laws. Lewis Carroll's regress challenges internalism by purporting to show that this kind of warrant cannot ground the move from premises to conclusion. Carroll's regress vindicates a repudiation of internalism and leads to the espousal of a standpoint that regards our inferential practice as not being grounded on our knowledge of logical laws. Such a standpoint can (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  38
    Meaning-Scepticism and Analyticity.Patrice Philie - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):357–365.
    In his paper "Analyticity", Boghossian defends the notion of analyticity against Quine's forceful criticism. Boghossian's main contention is that nonfactualism about analyticity of the kind advocated by Quine entails scepticism about meaning -- and this shows that Quine's argument can't be right. In other words, Boghossian presents us with a _reductio of Quine's thesis. In this paper, I present an argument to the effect that Boghossian's attempted _reductio fails. In the course of making this case, I will suggest that Quine's (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  9
    Wittgenstein et Ortega sur les lois logiques de base.Patrice Philie - 2015 - Philosophiques 42 (2):391-399.
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  3
    Intuition et lois logiques.Patrice Philie - 2017 - Philosophiques 44 (1):73-83.
    PATRICE PHILIE | : Cet article a pour objectif d’examiner le rôle des intuitions dans le cadre du problème de la justification des lois logiques de base. Une revue des différentes conceptions de l’intuition permet de mettre les choses en place et d’identifier la conception qui convient le mieux au problème — c’est une conception modale qui sera retenue. Je soumettrai ensuite cette conception à un examen critique, lequel se fera en deux temps. D’une part, il s’agira de montrer la (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10.  11
    La Conception Disjonctive de L'Expérience.Patrice Philie - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (3):539.
    RÉSUMÉ : La conception traditionnelle de l’expérience — aussi nommée conception causale de l’expérience — a vu sa prédominance menacée depuis une trentaine d’année avec l’arrivée de la conception disjonctive de l’expérience. Le présent article porte sur un argument récemment proposé par John McDowell en faveur du disjonctivisme. De façon très générale, son argument peut être caractérisé comme une tentative de montrer que la conception traditionnelle est incapable de rendre compte d’un certain aspect de l’expérience, contrairement à la conception disjonctive. (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  4
    Situating Cornerstone Propositions.Patrice Philie - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):260-267.
    Ostensibly, Wittgenstein’s last remarks published in 1969 under the title On Certainty are about epistemology, more precisely about the problem of scepticism. This is the standard interpretation of On Certainty. But I contend, in this paper, that we will get closer to Wittgenstein’s intentions and perhaps find new and illuminating ways to interpret his late contribution if we keep in mind that his primary goal was not to provide an answer to scepticism. In fact, I think that the standard reading (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  2
    Wright Et la Naturalisation de L'Intentionnalité. Étude Critique de Crispin Wright, Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth & Objectivity, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003, 549 Pages.Étude Critique de Crispin Wright, Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth & Objectivity, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003, 549 Pages. [REVIEW]Patrice Philie - 2004 - Philosophiques 31 (2):417-429.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  1
    Meaning‐Scepticism and Analyticity.Patrice Philie - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (3):357-365.
    In his paper ‘Analyticity’, Boghossian defends the notion of analyticity against Quine's forceful criticism. Boghossian's main contention is that non‐factualism about analyticity of the kind advocated by Quine entails scepticism about meaning – and this shows that Quine's argument can’t be right. In other words, Boghossian presents us with a reductio of Quine's thesis. In this paper, I present an argument to the effect that Boghossian's attempted reductio fails. In the course of making this case, I will suggest that Quine's (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  1
    Wright et la naturalisation de l’intentionnalité: Étude critique de Crispin Wright, Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth & Objectivity, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2003, 549 pages. [REVIEW]Patrice Philie - 2004 - Philosophiques 31:417-429.
    No categories
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography