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Profile: Patricia Greenspan (University of Maryland, College Park)
  1.  8
    Patricia S. Greenspan (1988). Emotions and Reasons: An Enquiry Into Emotional Justification. Routledge.
    In Emotions and Reasons, Patricia Greenspan offers an evaluative theory of emotion that assigns emotion a role of its own in the justification of action. She analyzes emotions as states of object-directed affect with evaluative propositional content possibly falling short of belief and held in mind by generalized comfort or discomfort.
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  2. Patricia S. Greenspan, Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem.
    I was led to this clarificatory job initially by some puzzlement from a philosopher's standpoint about just why free will questions should come up particularly in connection with the genome project, as opposed to the many other scientific research programs that presuppose determinism. The philosophic concept of determinism involves explanation of all events, including human action, by prior causal factors--so that whether or not human behavior has a genetic basis, it ultimately gets traced back to _something_ true of the world (...)
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  3. Patricia S. Greenspan (2003). Responsible Psychopaths. Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):417 – 429.
    Psychopaths are agents who lack the normal capacity to feel moral emotions (e.g. guilt based on empathy with the victims of their actions). Evidence for attributing psychopathy at least in some cases to genetic or early childhood causes suggests that psychopaths lack free will. However, the paper defends a sense in which psychopaths still may be construed as responsible for their actions, even if their degree of responsibility is less than that of normal agents. Responsibility is understood in Strawsonian terms, (...)
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  4. Patricia S. Greenspan (2004). Emotions, Rationality, and Mind-Body. In Robert C. Solomon (ed.), Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions. Oxford University Press 113-125.
    This paper attempts to connect recent cross-disciplinary treatments of the cognitive or rational significance of emotions with work in contemporary philosophy identifying an evaluative propositional content of emotions. An emphasis on the perspectival nature of emotional evaluations allows for a notion of emotional rationality that does not seem to be available on alternative accounts.
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  5. Patricia S. Greenspan (1978). Behavior Control and Freedom of Action. Philosophical Review 87 (April):225-40.
  6. Patricia S. Greenspan (1981). Emotions as Evaluations. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 62 (April):158-169.
     
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  7.  80
    Patricia S. Greenspan (1983). Moral Dilemmas and Guilt. Philosophical Studies 43 (1):117 - 125.
    I use a version of the case in "sophie's choice" as an example of the strongest sort of dilemma, With all options seriously wrong, And no permissible way of choosing one of them. This is worse, I argue, Than a choice between conflicting obligations, Where the agent has an overriding obligation "to choose", And does nothing wrong, Once the choice is made, By ignoring one of his prior obligations. Here, "contra" marcus, Guilt seems inappropriate.
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  8. Patricia S. Greenspan (2004). Practical Reasoning and Emotion. In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press
    The category of emotions covers a disputed territory, but clear examples include fear, anger, joy, pride, sadness, disgust, shame, contempt and the like. Such states are commonly thought of as antithetical to reason, disorienting and distorting practical thought. However, there is also a sense in which emotions are factors in practical reasoning, understood broadly as reasoning that issues in action. At the very least emotions can function as "enabling" causes of rational decision-making (despite the many cases in which they are (...)
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  9. Patricia S. Greenspan (1993). Free Will and the Genome Project. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1):31-43.
    Popular and scientific accounts of the U.S. Human Genome Project often express concern about the implications of the project for the philosophic question of free will and responsibility. However, on its standard construal within philosophy, the question of free will versus determinism poses no special problems in relation to genetic research. The paper identifies a variant version of the free will question, free will versus internal constraint, that might well pose a threat to notions of individual autonomy and virtue in (...)
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  10. Patricia S. Greenspan (2001). Genes, Electrotransmitters, and Free Will. In Patricia S. Greenspan, David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit (eds.), Genetics and Criminal Behavior: Methods, Meanings, and Morals. Cambridge University Press
    There seems to be evidence of a genetic component in criminal behavior. It is widely agreed not to be "deterministic"--by which discussions outside philosophy seem to mean that by itself it is not sufficient to determine behavior. Environmental factors make a decisive difference--for that matter, there are nongenetic biological factors--in whether and how genetic.
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  11.  33
    Patricia S. Greenspan (1980). Emotions, Reasons, and 'Self-Involvement'. Philosophical Studies 38 (2):161 - 168.
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  12. Patricia S. Greenspan (1993). Guilt as an Identificatory Mechanism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):46-59.
     
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  13.  31
    Patricia S. Greenspan (1986). Identificatory Love. Philosophical Studies 50 (3):321 - 341.
  14.  30
    Patricia S. Greenspan (1976). Wiggins on Historical Inevitability and Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 29 (April):235-247.
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  15. Patricia S. Greenspan (1992). Emotions and Reasons. Noûs 26 (2):250-252.
     
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  16. Patricia S. Greenspan (1993). Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry Into Emotional Justification. Routledge.
    In ____Emotions and Reasons,__ Patricia Greenspan offers an evaluative theory of emotion that assigns emotion a role of its own in the justification of action. She analyzes emotions as states of object-directed affect with evaluative propositional content possibly falling short of belief and held in mind by generalized comfort or discomfort.
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  17. Patricia S. Greenspan (2016). Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry Into Emotional Justification. Routledge.
    In ____Emotions and Reasons,__ Patricia Greenspan offers an evaluative theory of emotion that assigns emotion a role of its own in the justification of action. She analyzes emotions as states of object-directed affect with evaluative propositional content possibly falling short of belief and held in mind by generalized comfort or discomfort.
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  18. Patricia S. Greenspan, David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit (eds.) (2001). Genetics and Criminal Behavior. Cambridge University Press.
    In this 2001 volume a group of leading philosophers address some of the basic conceptual, methodological and ethical issues raised by genetic research into criminal behavior. The essays explore the complexities of tracing any genetic influence on criminal, violent or antisocial behavior; the varieties of interpretations to which evidence of such influences is subject; and the relevance of such influences to the moral and legal appraisal of criminal conduct. The distinctive features of this collection are: first, that it advances public (...)
     
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  19. Patricia S. Greenspan (2004). The Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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