59 found
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  1. Voluntary Action and Conscious Awareness.Patrick Haggard, Sam Clark & Jeri Kalogeras - 2002 - Nature Neuroscience 5 (4):382-385.
  2. Conscious Intention and Motor Cognition.Patrick Haggard - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):290-295.
  3.  21
    What is Embodiment? A Psychometric Approach.Matthew R. Longo, Friederike Schüür, Marjolein P. M. Kammers, Manos Tsakiris & Patrick Haggard - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):978-998.
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  4.  29
    Modulating the Sense of Agency with External Cues.James W. Moore, Daniel M. Wegner & Patrick Haggard - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):1056-1064.
    We investigate the processes underlying the feeling of control over one’s actions . Sense of agency may depend on internal motoric signals, and general inferences about external events. We used priming to modulate the sense of agency for voluntary and involuntary movements, by modifying the content of conscious thought prior to moving. Trials began with the presentation of one of two supraliminal primes, which corresponded to the effect of a voluntary action participants subsequently made. The perceived interval between movement and (...)
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  5.  6
    Feelings of Control: Contingency Determines Experience of Action.James W. Moore, David Lagnado, Darvany C. Deal & Patrick Haggard - 2009 - Cognition 110 (2):279-283.
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  6.  16
    Who is Causing What? The Sense of Agency is Relational and Efferent-Triggered.Kai Engbert, Andreas Wohlschläger & Patrick Haggard - 2008 - Cognition 107 (2):693-704.
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  7.  8
    A Specific Role for Efferent Information in Self-Recognition.Manos Tsakiris, Patrick Haggard, Nicolas Franck, Nelly Mainy & Angela Sirigu - 2005 - Cognition 96 (3):215-231.
  8. Intentional Action: Conscious Experience and Neural Prediction.Patrick Haggard & S. Clark - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):695-707.
    Intentional action involves both a series of neural events in the motor areas of the brain, and also a distinctive conscious experience that ''I'' am the author of the action. This paper investigates some possible ways in which these neural and phenomenal events may be related. Recent models of motor prediction are relevant to the conscious experience of action as well as to its neural control. Such models depend critically on matching the actual consequences of a movement against its internally (...)
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  9.  18
    Subliminal Priming of Actions Influences Sense of Control Over Effects of Action.Dorit Wenke, Stephen M. Fleming & Patrick Haggard - 2010 - Cognition 115 (1):26-38.
  10. Exploring Implicit and Explicit Aspects of Sense of Agency.James W. Moore, D. Middleton, Patrick Haggard & Paul C. Fletcher - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (4):1748-1753.
    Sense of agency refers to the sense of initiating and controlling actions in order to influence events in the outside world. Recently, a distinction between implicit and explicit aspects of sense of agency has been proposed, analogous to distinctions found in other areas of cognition, notably learning. However, there is yet no strong evidence supporting separable implicit and explicit components of sense of agency. The so-called ‘Perruchet paradigm’ offers one of the few convincing demonstrations of separable implicit and explicit learning (...)
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  11. Anomalous Control: When "Free Will" is Not Conscious.Patrick Haggard, P. Catledge, M. Dafydd & David A. Oakley - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):646-654.
    The conscious feeling of exercising ‘free-will’ is fundamental to our sense of self. However, in some psychopathological conditions actions may be experienced as involuntary or unwilled. We have used suggestion in hypnosis to create the experience of involuntariness in normal participants. We compared a voluntary finger movement, a passive movement and a voluntary movement suggested by hypnosis to be ‘involuntary.’ Hypnosis itself had no effect on the subjective experience of voluntariness associated with willed movements and passive movements or on time (...)
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  12.  27
    Brain Correlates of Subjective Freedom of Choice.Elisa Filevich, Patricia Vanneste, Marcel Brass, Wim Fias, Patrick Haggard & Simone Kühn - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1271-1284.
    The subjective feeling of free choice is an important feature of human experience. Experimental tasks have typically studied free choice by contrasting free and instructed selection of response alternatives. These tasks have been criticised, and it remains unclear how they relate to the subjective feeling of freely choosing. We replicated previous findings of the fMRI correlates of free choice, defined objectively. We introduced a novel task in which participants could experience and report a graded sense of free choice. BOLD responses (...)
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  13. Conscious Intention and Brain Activity.Patrick Haggard & Benjamin W. Libet - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (11):47-63.
    The problem of free will lies at the heart of modern scientific studies of consciousness. An influential series of experiments by Libet has suggested that conscious intentions arise as a result of brain activity. This contrasts with traditional concepts of free will, in which the mind controls the body. A more recent study by Haggard and Eimer has further examined the relation between intention and brain processes, concluding that conscious awareness of intention is linked to the choice or selection of (...)
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  14.  8
    Sense of Control Depends on Fluency of Action Selection, Not Motor Performance.Valerian Chambon & Patrick Haggard - 2012 - Cognition 125 (3):441-451.
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  15.  63
    Awareness of Action in Schizophrenia.Patrick Haggard, Flavie Martin, Marisa Taylor-Clarke, Marc Jeannerod & Nicolas Franck - 2003 - Neuroreport 14 (7):1081-1085.
  16.  9
    Experience of Agency and Sense of Responsibility.Giovanna Moretto, Eamonn Walsh & Patrick Haggard - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1847-1854.
    The experience of agency refers to the feeling that we control our own actions, and through them the outside world. In many contexts, sense of agency has strong implications for moral responsibility. For example, a sense of agency may allow people to choose between right and wrong actions, either immediately, or on subsequent occasions through learning about the moral consequences of their actions. In this study we investigate the relation between the experience of operant action, and responsibility for action outcomes (...)
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  17.  13
    What Are Self-Generated Actions?Friederike Schüür & Patrick Haggard - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1697-1704.
    The concept of self-generated action is controversial, despite extensive study of its neural basis. Why is this concept so troublesome? We analyse the concept of self-generated action as employed by and. There are two definitions of self-generated action; as operant action and as underdetermined action. The latter draws on subjective experience. Experiments on action awareness suggest that experience may not be a good guide for defining self-generated action. Nevertheless, we agree with Passingham and colleagues that self-generated actions exist distinct from (...)
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  18.  7
    Subliminal Action Priming Modulates the Perceived Intensity of Sensory Action Consequences.Max-Philipp Stenner, Markus Bauer, Nura Sidarus, Hans-Jochen Heinze, Patrick Haggard & Raymond J. Dolan - 2014 - Cognition 130 (2):227-235.
  19.  42
    Intentional Binding and Higher Order Agency Experience.James W. Moore & Patrick Haggard - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):490-491.
    Recent research has shown that human instrumental action is associated with systematic changes in time perception: The interval between a voluntary action and an outcome is perceived as shorter than the interval between a physically similar involuntary movement and an outcome. The study by, Ebert and Wegner suggests that this change in time perception is related to higher order agency experience. Notwithstanding certain issues arising from their study, which are discussed, we believe it offers validation of binding as a measure (...)
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  20.  18
    Priming of Actions Increases Sense of Control Over Unexpected Outcomes.Nura Sidarus, Valérian Chambon & Patrick Haggard - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1403-1411.
  21.  2
    Subliminal Priming of Intentional Inhibition.Jim Parkinson & Patrick Haggard - 2014 - Cognition 130 (2):255-265.
  22.  2
    How Action Structures Time: About the Perceived Temporal Order of Action and Predicted Outcomes.Andrea Desantis, Florian Waszak, Karolina Moutsopoulou & Patrick Haggard - 2016 - Cognition 146:100-109.
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  23.  36
    Motor Awareness Without Perceptual Awareness.Helen Johnson & Patrick Haggard - 2005 - Neuropsychologia. Special Issue 43 (2):227-237.
    The control of action has traditionally been described as "automatic". In particular, movement control may occur without conscious awareness, in contrast to normal visual perception. Studies on rapid visuomotor adjustment of reaching movements following a target shift have played a large part in introducing such distinctions. We suggest that previous studies of the relation between motor performance and perceptual awareness have confounded two separate dissociations. These are: (a) the distinction between motoric and perceptual representations, and (b) an orthogonal distinction between (...)
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  24.  30
    Intentionality as a Constituting Condition for the Own Self--And Other Selves.Andreas Wohlschläger, Kai Engbert & Patrick Haggard - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):708-716.
    Introspectively, the awareness of actions includes the awareness of the intentions accompanying them. Therefore, the awareness of self-generated actions might be expected to differ from the awareness of other-generated actions to the extent that access to one's own and to other's intentions differs. However, we recently showed that the perceived onset times of self- vs. other-generated actions are similar, yet both are different from comparable events that are conceived as being generated by a machine. This similarity raises two interesting possibilities. (...)
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  25. What Are Intentions?Elisabeth Pacherie & Patrick Haggard - 2010 - In L. Nadel & W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), Conscious Will and Responsibility. A tribute to Benjamin Libet. Oxford University Press. pp. 70--84.
    The concept of intention can do useful work in psychological theory. Many authors have insisted on a qualitative difference between prospective and intentions regarding their type of content, with prospective intentions generally being more abstract than immediate intentions. However, we suggest that the main basis of this distinction is temporal: prospective intentions necessarily occur before immediate intention and before action itself, and often long before them. In contrast, immediate intentions occur in the specific context of the action itself. Yet both (...)
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  26. Poor Judgment of Distance Between Nociceptive Stimuli.Flavia Mancini, Hannah Steinitz, James Steckelmacher, Gian Domenico Iannetti & Patrick Haggard - 2015 - Cognition 143:41-47.
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  27. Conscious Intention and the Sense of Agency.Patrick Haggard - 2006 - In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.
  28.  10
    The Relationship Between Human Agency and Embodiment.Emilie A. Caspar, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Haggard - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:226-236.
  29. Embodying Bodies and Worlds.Matteo Candidi, Salvatore Maria Aglioti & Patrick Haggard - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):109-123.
    Sensorimotor representations are essential for building up and maintaining corporeal awareness, i.e. the ability to perceive, know and evaluate one's own body as well as the bodies of others. The notion of embodied cognition implies that abstract forms of conceptual knowledge may be ultimately instantiated in such sensorimotor representations. In this sense, conceptual thinking should evoke, via mental simulation, some underlying sensorimotor events. In this review we discuss studies on the relation between embodiment and corporeal awareness. We approach the question (...)
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  30.  9
    Learning to Like It: Aesthetic Perception of Bodies, Movements and Choreographic Structure.Guido Orgs, Nobuhiro Hagura & Patrick Haggard - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (2):603-612.
    Appreciating human movement can be a powerful aesthetic experience. We have used apparent biological motion to investigate the aesthetic effects of three levels of movement representation: body postures, movement transitions and choreographic structure. Symmetrical and asymmetrical sequences of apparent movement were created from static postures, and were presented in an artificial grammar learning paradigm. Additionally, “good” continuation of apparent movements was manipulated by changing the number of movement path reversals within a sequence. In an initial exposure phase, one group of (...)
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  31.  13
    Touchant-Touché: The Role of Self-Touch in the Representation of Body Structure.Simone Schütz-Bosbach, Jason Jiri Musil & Patrick Haggard - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):2-11.
    The “body image” is a putative mental representation of one’s own body, including structural and geometric details, as well as the more familiar visual and affective aspects. Very little research has investigated how we learn the structure of our own body, with most researchers emphasising the canonical visual representation of the body when we look at ourselves in a mirror. Here, we used non-visual self-touch in healthy participants to investigate the possibility that primary sensorimotor experience may influence cognitive representations of (...)
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  32. How Do We Know What We Are Doing?: Time, Intention and Awareness of Action.Jean-Christophe Sarrazin, Axel Cleeremans & Patrick Haggard - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):602-615.
    Time is a fundamental dimension of consciousness. Many studies of the “sense of agency” have investigated whether we attribute actions to ourselves based on a conscious experience of intention occurring prior to action, or based on a reconstruction after the action itself has occurred. Here, we ask the same question about a lower level aspect of action experience, namely awareness of the detailed spatial form of a simple movement. Subjects reached for a target, which unpredictably jumped to the side on (...)
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  33.  2
    Seeing and Feeling for Self and Other: Proprioceptive Spatial Location Determines Multisensory Enhancement of Touch.Flavia Cardini, Patrick Haggard & Elisabetta Ladavas - 2013 - Cognition 127 (1):84-92.
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  34.  31
    Experiences of Voluntary Action.Patrick Haggard & Henry C. Johnson - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):72-84.
    Psychologists have traditionally approached phenomenology by describing perceptual states, typically in the context of vision. The control of actions has often been described as 'automatic', and therefore lacking any specific phenomenology worth studying. This article will begin by reviewing some historical attempts to investigate the phenomenology of action. This review leads to the conclusion that, while movement of the body itself need not produce a vivid conscious experience, the neural process of voluntary action as a whole has distinctive phenomenological consequences. (...)
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  35.  5
    I Could Have Done Otherwise: Availability of Counterfactual Comparisons Informs the Sense of Agency.Eugenia Kulakova, Nima Khalighinejad & Patrick Haggard - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 49:237-244.
  36.  5
    Does Brain Science Change Our View of Free Will?Patrick Haggard - 2011 - In Richard Swinburne (ed.), Free Will and Modern Science. Oup/British Academy.
    This chapter explores the interaction between neuroscience and free will. First, it considers how freely willed actions should be defined. Second, it outlines current understanding of brain mechanisms preceding action, showing in what respects these mechanisms meet the philosophical criteria for freely willed action, and in what respects they do not. Finally, it concludes that the philosophical criteria themselves are based on two underlying psychological facts: human action involves complex mappings between environmental stimuli and goal-directed responses, and human action is (...)
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  37. Conscious Awareness of Intention and of Action.Patrick Haggard - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Clarendon Press.
     
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  38.  19
    Experiences of Voluntary Action.Patrick Haggard & Helen Johnson - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):9-10.
    Psychologists have traditionally approached phenomenology by describing perceptual states, typically in the context of vision. The control of actions has often been described as 'automatic', and therefore lacking any specific phenomenology worth studying. This article will begin by reviewing some historical attempts to investigate the phenomenology of action. This review leads to the conclusion that, while movement of the body itself need not produce a vivid conscious experience, the neural process of voluntary action as a whole has distinctive phenomenological consequences. (...)
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  39.  40
    Commentary on How Something Can Be Said About Telling More Than We Can Know: On Choice Blindness and Introspection.James Moore & Patrick Haggard - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4):693-696.
  40.  21
    Look and Feel.Patrick Haggard - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (11):462-463.
  41.  29
    Action, Arousal, and Subjective Time.K. Yarrow, Patrick Haggard & J. Rothwell - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):373-390.
    Saccadic chronostasis refers to the subjective temporal lengthening of the first visual stimulus perceived after an eye movement. It has been quantified using a duration discrimination task. Most models of human duration discrimination hypothesise an internal clock. These models could explain chronostasis as a transient increase in internal clock speed due to arousal following a saccade, leading to temporal overestimation. Two experiments are described which addressed this hypothesis by parametrically varying the duration of the stimuli that are being judged. Changes (...)
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  42.  2
    Voluntary Motor Commands Reveal Awareness and Control of Involuntary Movement.Jack De Havas, Arko Ghosh, Hiroaki Gomi & Patrick Haggard - 2016 - Cognition 155:155-167.
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  43. How Something Can Be Said About Telling More Than We Can Know: On Choice Blindness and Introspection. Commentary and Authors' Reply.James Moore, Patrick Haggard, Lars Hall, Petter Johansson, Sverker SIKSTRÖM, Betty TÄRNING, Andreas Lind, Cd Frith & Hc Lau - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (4).
     
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  44.  48
    The Timing of Brain Events: Authors' Response to Libet's 'Reply'.David A. Oakley & Patrick Haggard - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):548-550.
  45.  11
    Neuroethics of Free Will.Patrick Haggard - 2011 - In Judy Illes & Barbara J. Sahakian (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Neuroethics. Oxford University Press. pp. 219.
    The concept of individual free will is difficult to reconcile with a materialist view of the brain. The debate over “free will” involves a series of several questions about the origin of human actions, and their resulting social, legal, and ethical implications. This article sets out the reasons that scientific questions regarding free will have important ethical and social consequences. It then considers the neuroscientific debate over whether a conscious experience of volition does or does not precede the brain's preparation (...)
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  46.  4
    Action-Outcome Learning and Prediction Shape the Window of Simultaneity of Audiovisual Outcomes.Andrea Desantis & Patrick Haggard - 2016 - Cognition 153:33-42.
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  47.  24
    Who Knows Best? Awareness of Divided Attention Difficulty in a Neurological Rehabilitation Setting.Josephine Cock, Claire Fordham, Janet Cockburn & Patrick Haggard - 2003 - Brain Injury 17 (7):561-574.
  48.  5
    Twisted Pairs: Does the Motor System Really Care About Joint Configurations?Patrick Haggard, Chris Miall & John Stein - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):758.
  49.  5
    Re-Construction of Action Awareness Depends on an Internal Model of Action-Outcome Timing.Max-Philipp Stenner, Markus Bauer, Judith Machts, Hans-Jochen Heinze, Patrick Haggard & Raymond J. Dolan - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 25 (1):11-16.
    The subjective time of an instrumental action is shifted towards its outcome. This temporal binding effect is partially retrospective, i.e., occurs upon outcome perception. Retrospective binding is thought to reflect post-hoc inference on agency based on sensory evidence of the action – outcome association. However, many previous binding paradigms cannot exclude the possibility that retrospective binding results from bottom-up interference of sensory outcome processing with action awareness and is functionally unrelated to the processing of the action – outcome association. Here, (...)
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  50.  5
    Hedonic Value of Intentional Action Provides Reinforcement for Voluntary Generation but Not Voluntary Inhibition of Action.Jim Parkinson & Patrick Haggard - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1253-1261.
    Intentional inhibition refers to stopping oneself from performing an action at the last moment, a vital component of self-control. It has been suggested that intentional inhibition is associated with negative hedonic value, perhaps due to the frustration of cancelling an intended action. Here we investigate hedonic implications of the free choice to act or inhibit. Participants gave aesthetic ratings of arbitrary visual stimuli that immediately followed voluntary decisions to act or to inhibit action. We found that participants for whom decisions (...)
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