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Patrick Maher [47]Patrick Leslie Maher [1]
  1. Subjective and Objective Confirmation.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (2):149-174.
    Confirmation is commonly identified with positive relevance, E being said to confirm H if and only if E increases the probability of H. Today, analyses of this general kind are usually Bayesian ones that take the relevant probabilities to be subjective. I argue that these subjective Bayesian analyses are irremediably flawed. In their place I propose a relevance analysis that makes confirmation objective and which, I show, avoids the flaws of the subjective analyses. What I am proposing is in some (...)
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  2.  90
    Probability Captures the Logic of Scientific Confirmation.Patrick Maher - 2004 - In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. pp. 69--93.
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  3. The Concept of Inductive Probability.Patrick Maher - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):185-206.
    The word ‘probability’ in ordinary language has two different senses, here called inductive and physical probability. This paper examines the concept of inductive probability. Attempts to express this concept in other words are shown to be either incorrect or else trivial. In particular, inductive probability is not the same as degree of belief. It is argued that inductive probabilities exist; subjectivist arguments to the contrary are rebutted. Finally, it is argued that inductive probability is an important concept and that it (...)
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  4. Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox.Patrick Maher - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (1):50-70.
    Hempel's paradox of the ravens arises from the inconsistency of three prima facie plausible principles of confirmation. This paper uses Carnapian inductive logic to (a) identify which of the principles is false, (b) give insight into why this principle is false, and (c) identify a true principle that is sufficiently similar to the false one that failure to distinguish the two might explain why the false principle is prima facie plausible. This solution to the paradox is compared with a variety (...)
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  5.  23
    Probabilities for Multiple Properties: The Models of Hesse and Carnap and Kemeny. [REVIEW]Patrick Maher - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (2):183-215.
    In 1959 Carnap published a probability model that was meant to allow forreasoning by analogy involving two independent properties. Maher (2000)derived a generalized version of this model axiomatically and defended themodel''s adequacy. It is thus natural to now consider how the model mightbe extended to the case of more than two properties. A simple extension waspublished by Hess (1964); this paper argues that it is inadequate. Amore sophisticated one was developed jointly by Carnap and Kemeny in theearly 1950s but never (...)
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  6.  98
    Explication Defended.Patrick Maher - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):331-341.
    How can formal methods be applied to philosophical problems that involve informal concepts of ordinary language? Carnap answered this question by describing a methodology that he called “explication." Strawson objected that explication changes the subject and does not address the original philosophical problem; this paper shows that Carnap’s response to that objection was inadequate and offers a better response. More recent criticisms of explication by Boniolo and Eagle are shown to rest on misunderstandings of the nature of explication. It is (...)
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  7.  30
    Explication of Inductive Probability.Patrick Maher - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):593 - 616.
    Inductive probability is the logical concept of probability in ordinary language. It is vague but it can be explicated by defining a clear and precise concept that can serve some of the same purposes. This paper presents a general method for doing such an explication and then a particular explication due to Carnap. Common criticisms of Carnap's inductive logic are examined; it is shown that most of them are spurious and the others are not fundamental.
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  8.  55
    Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.Patrick Maher - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (1):73-81.
    James Joyce's 'Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism' gives a new argument for the conclusion that a person's credences ought to satisfy the laws of probability. The premises of Joyce's argument include six axioms about what counts as an adequate measure of the distance of a credence function from the truth. This paper shows that (a) Joyce's argument for one of these axioms is invalid, (b) his argument for another axiom has a false premise, (c) neither axiom is plausible, and (d) without (...)
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  9.  45
    Prediction, Accommodation, and the Logic of Discovery.Patrick Maher - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:273 - 285.
    A widely endorsed thesis in the philosophy of science holds that if evidence for a hypothesis was not known when the hypothesis was proposed, then that evidence confirms the hypothesis more strongly than would otherwise be the case. The thesis has been thought to be inconsistent with Bayesian confirmation theory, but the arguments offered for that view are fallacious. This paper shows how the special value of prediction can in fact be given Bayesian explanation. The explanation involves consideration of the (...)
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  10.  64
    Diachronic Rationality.Patrick Maher - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):120-141.
    This is an essay in the Bayesian theory of how opinions should be revised over time. It begins with a discussion of the principle that van Fraassen has dubbed "Reflection". This principle is not a requirement of rationality; a diachronic Dutch argument, that purports to show the contrary, is fallacious. But under suitable conditions, it is irrational to actually implement shifts in probability that violate Reflection. Conditionalization and probability kinematics are special cases of the principle not to implement shifts that (...)
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  11. 10. Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution Selection, Drift, and the “Forces” of Evolution (Pp. 550-570).Paul Teller, Stefano Gattei, Kent W. Staley, Eric Winsberg, James Hawthorne, Branden Fitelson, Patrick Maher, Peter Achinstein & Mathias Frisch - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4).
  12.  9
    Probabilities for Two Properties.Patrick Maher - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (1):63-91.
    Let R(X, B) denote the class of probability functions that are defined on algebra X and that represent rationally permissible degrees of certainty for a person whose total relevant background evidence is B. This paper is concerned with characterizing R(X, B) for the case in whichX is an algebra of propositions involving two properties and B is empty. It proposes necessary conditions for a probability function to be in R(X, B), some of which involve the notion of statistical dependence. The (...)
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  13.  37
    Book Review: David Christensen. Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. [REVIEW]Patrick Maher - 2006 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 47 (1):133-149.
  14.  23
    Howson and Franklin on Prediction.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):329-340.
    Evidence for a hypothesis typically confirms the hypothesis more if the evidence was predicted than if it was accommodated. Or so I argued in previous papers, where I also developed an analysis of why this should be so. But this was all a mistake if Howson and Franklin (1991) are to be believed. In this paper, I show why they are not to be believed. I also identify a grain of truth that may have been dimly grasped by those Bayesians (...)
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  15.  39
    Physical Probability.Patrick Maher - unknown
    By “physical probability” I mean the empirical concept of probability in ordinary language. It can be represented as a function of an experiment type and an outcome type, which explains how non-extreme physical probabilities are compatible with determinism. Two principles, called specification and independence, put restrictions on the existence of physical probabilities, while a principle of direct inference connects physical probability with inductive probability. This account avoids a variety of weaknesses in the theories of Levi and Lewis.
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  16.  53
    Depragmatized Dutch Book Arguments.Patrick Maher - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (2):291-305.
    Recently a number of authors have tried to avoid the failures of traditional Dutch book arguments by separating them from pragmatic concerns of avoiding a sure loss. In this paper I examine defenses of this kind by Howson and Urbach, Hellman, and Christensen. I construct rigorous explications of their arguments and show that they are not cogent. I advocate abandoning Dutch book arguments in favor of a representation theorem.
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  17.  23
    What is Probability?Patrick Maher - unknown
    In October 2009 I decided to stop doing philosophy. This meant, in particular, stopping work on the book that I was writing on the nature of probability. At that time, I had no intention of making my unfinished draft available to others. However, I recently noticed how many people are reading the lecture notes and articles on my web site. Since this draft book contains some important improvements on those materials, I decided to make it available to anyone who wants (...)
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  18.  89
    Why Scientists Gather Evidence.Patrick Maher - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):103-119.
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  19.  82
    A Conception of Inductive Logic.Patrick Maher - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):513-523.
    I conceive of inductive logic as a project of explication. The explicandum is one of the meanings of the word `probability' in ordinary language; I call it inductive probability and argue that it is logical, in a certain sense. The explicatum is a conditional probability function that is specified by stipulative definition. This conception of inductive logic is close to Carnap's, but common objections to Carnapian inductive logic (the probabilities don't exist, are arbitrary, etc.) do not apply to this conception.
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  20. Bayesian Probability.Patrick Maher - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):119 - 127.
    Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be the concept of probability used in that theory. Bayesian probability is usually identified with the agent’s degrees of belief but that interpretation makes Bayesian decision theory a poor explication of the relevant concept of rational choice. A satisfactory conception of Bayesian decision theory is obtained by taking Bayesian probability to be an explicatum for inductive probability given the agent’s evidence.
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  21.  21
    Bayesianism and Irrelevant Conjunction.Patrick Maher - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):515-520.
    Bayesian confirmation theory offers an explicatum for a pretheoretic concept of confirmation. The “problem of irrelevant conjunction” for this theory is that, according to some people's intuitions, the pretheoretic concept differs from the explicatum with regard to conjunctions involving irrelevant propositions. Previous Bayesian solutions to this problem consist in showing that irrelevant conjuncts reduce the degree of confirmation; they have the drawbacks that (i) they don't hold for all ways of measuring degree of confirmation and (ii) they don't remove the (...)
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  22.  17
    Levi on the Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes.Patrick Maher - 1989 - Economics and Philosophy 5 (1):69.
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  23.  44
    Acceptance Without Belief.Patrick Maher - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:381-392.
    Van Fraassen has maintained that acceptance of a scientific theory does not involve the belief that the theory is true. Blackburn, Mitchell and Horwich have claimed that acceptance, as understood by van Fraassen, is the same as belief; in which case, van Fraassen's position is incoherent. Van Fraassen identifies belief with subjective probability, so the question at issue is really whether acceptance of a theory involves a high subjective probability for the theory. Van Fraassen is not committed to this, and (...)
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  24.  9
    How Prediction Enhances Confirmation.Patrick Maher - 1990 - In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 327--343.
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  25. 1. Preface Preface (Pp. I-Ii).Laura Ruetsche, Chris Smeenk, Branden Fitelson, Patrick Maher, Martin Thomson‐Jones, Bas C. van Fraassen, Steven French, Juha Saatsi, Stathis Psillos & Katherine Brading - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5).
     
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  26.  27
    The Irrelevance of Belief to Rational Action.Patrick Maher - 1986 - Erkenntnis 24 (3):363 - 384.
  27.  23
    Causality in the Logic of Decision.Patrick Maher - 1987 - Theory and Decision 22 (2):155-172.
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  28.  44
    Probabilities for New Theories.Patrick Maher - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):103 - 115.
  29.  34
    The Hole in the Ground of Induction.Patrick Maher - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):423 – 432.
  30.  26
    On The Descriptive Adequacy of Levi's Decision Theory.Patrick Maher & Yoshihisa Kashima - 1991 - Economics and Philosophy 7 (1):93-100.
  31.  23
    Symptomatic Acts and the Value of Evidence in Causal Decision Theory.Patrick Maher - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (3):479-498.
    A "symptomatic act" is an act that is evidence for a state that it has no tendency to cause. In this paper I show that when the evidential value of a symptomatic act might influence subsequent choices, causal decision theory may initially recommend against its own use for those subsequent choices. And if one knows that one will nevertheless use causal decision theory to make those subsequent choices, causal decision theory may favor the one-box solution in Newcomb's problem, and may (...)
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  32.  51
    Qualitative Confirmation and the Ravens Paradox.Patrick Maher - 2005 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):89-108.
    In From Instrumentalism to Constructive Realism Theo Kuipers presents a theory of qualitative confirmation that is supposed to not assume the existence of quantitative probabilities. He claims that this theory is able to resolve some paradoxes in confirmation theory, including the ravens paradox. This paper shows that there are flaws in Kuipers' qualitative confirmation theory and in his application of it to the ravens paradox.
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  33.  11
    Probability in Hume's Science of Man.Patrick Maher - 1981 - Hume Studies 7 (2):137-153.
  34.  16
    Acceptance in Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Patrick Maher - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:153 - 160.
    Can Bayesians make sense of the notion of acceptance? And should they want to? This paper argues that the answer to both questions is yes. While these answers have been defended before, the way of making sense of acceptance offered here differs from what others have proposed, and the reasons given for why Bayesians should want to make sense of acceptance are also different.
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  35.  32
    Confirmation Theory.Patrick Maher - unknown
    Predictions about the future and unrestricted universal generalizations are never logically implied by our observational evidence, which is limited to particular facts in the present and past. Nevertheless, propositions of these and other kinds are often said to be confirmed by observational evidence. A natural place to begin the study of confirmation theory is to consider what it means to say that some evidence E confirms a hypothesis H.
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  36.  7
    Preference Reversal in Ellsberg Problems.Patrick Maher & Yoshihisa Kashima - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (2):187-207.
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  37.  9
    Confirmation Theory.Patrick Maher - 2005 - In Donald M. Borchert (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd Ed.
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  38. James H. Fetzer, Ed., Probability and Causality: Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Salmon Reviewed By.Patrick Maher - 1988 - Philosophy in Review 8 (10):390-393.
     
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  39.  15
    Book Review:The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance Isaac Levi. [REVIEW]Patrick Maher - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):690-.
  40. Leibniz and Contingency.Patrick Maher - 1980 - Studia Leibnitiana 12:236.
    Dieser Aufsatz bringt eine Darstellung des Problems der Kontingenz, die mit Leibniz's Philosophie übereinstimmt und -vor allem -die den folgenden Bedingungen genügt: 1) einige Eigenschaften von Substanzen sind kontingent; 2) einige Eigenschaften von Substanzen sind notwendig; 3) das Gegenteil einer kontingenten Wahrheit impliziert keinen Widerspruch ; 4) es ist ein kontingentes Faktum, daß Gott immer das Beste wählt. -Eine Darstellung der Leibnizschen Theorie der Kontingenz muß diese Bedingungen erfüllen, denn bei ihnen handelt es sich um Prinzipien, an denen Leibniz -zumindest (...)
     
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  41.  3
    Bayesian Probability.Patrick Maher - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):119-127.
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  42. John Earman, Bayes or Bust? Reviewed By.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Philosophy in Review 13 (4):151-153.
     
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  43.  11
    Dissertation Format Guidelines.Patrick Maher - manuscript
    On other formatting matters, follow the 15th edition of the Chicago Manual of Style (CMS). The online edition is free with a uiuc internet connection and there are non-circulating paper copies in many campus libraries, including the History and Philosophy Library.
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  44.  3
    How Prediction Enhances Confirmationi.Patrick Maher - 1990 - In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 327.
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  45.  4
    What is Wrong with Strict Bayesianism?Patrick Maher - 1986 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:450 - 457.
    Bayesian decision theory, in its classical or strict form, requires agents to have a determinate probability function. In recent years many decision theorists have come to think that this requirement should be weakened to allow for cases in which the agent makes indeterminate probability judgments. It has been claimed that this weakening makes the theory more realistic, and that it makes the theory more tenable as a normative ideal. This paper shows that the usual technique for weakening strict Bayesianism has (...)
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  46.  26
    Betting on Theories.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a major contribution to decision theory, focusing on the question of when it is rational to accept scientific theories. The author examines both Bayesian decision theory and confirmation theory, refining and elaborating the views of Ramsey and Savage. He argues that the most solid foundation for confirmation theory is to be found in decision theory, and he provides a decision-theoretic derivation of principles for how many probabilities should be revised over time. Professor Maher defines a notion of (...)
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  47. 10. Can Philosophy Offer Help in Resolving Contemporary Biological Controversies?Laura Ruetsche, Chris Smeenk, Branden Fitelson, Patrick Maher, Martin Thomson‐Jones, Bas C. van Fraassen, Steven French, Juha Saatsi, Stathis Psillos & Katherine Brading - 2006 - In Borchert (ed.), Philosophy of Science. Macmillan.