Results for 'Patrick Michael Greenough'

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  1. The Semantic Error Problem for Epistemic Contextualism.Patrick Michael Greenough & Dirk Kindermann - 2017 - In Jonathan Ichikawa (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Routledge. pp. 305--320.
    Epistemic Contextualism is the view that “knows that” is semantically context-sensitive and that properly accommodating this fact into our philosophical theory promises to solve various puzzles concerning knowledge. Yet Epistemic Contextualism faces a big—some would say fatal—problem: The Semantic Error Problem. In its prominent form, this runs thus: speakers just don’t seem to recognise that “knows that” is context-sensitive; so, if “knows that” really is context-sensitive then such speakers are systematically in error about what is said by, or how to (...)
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  2. Knowledge for Nothing.Patrick Michael Greenough - 2018 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Pedersen (eds.), New Essays on Entitlement. Oxford University Press.
    Let Entitlement Epistemology be the theory of knowledge which says that entitlement—a special kind of unearned warrant to accept or believe—can help us successfully address a range of sceptical arguments. Prominent versions of this theory urge that epistemology should not be concerned with knowledge (and similar externalist states) but rather with justification, warrant, and entitlement (at least insofar as these are conceived of as internalist states). Knowledge does not come first, half-way, or even last in epistemological theorising—rather, it ought to (...)
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  3. Review: Patrick Greenough and Michael P. Lynch (Eds): Truth and Realism. [REVIEW]J. Mantykoski - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):183-186.
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  4. Truth and Realism.Patrick Greenough & Michael Patrick Lynch (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Is truth objective or relative? What exists independently of our minds? The essays in this book debate these two questions, which are among the oldest of philosophical issues and have vexed almost every major philosopher, from Plato, to Kant, to Wittgenstein. Fifteen eminent contributors bring fresh perspectives, renewed energy, and original answers to debates of great interest both within philosophy and in the culture at large.
  5. Truth and Realism – Patrick Greenough and Michael P. Lynch.Fritz J. McDonald - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):178–180.
    Review of Truth and Realism, edited by Patrick Greenough and Michael Lynch.
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  6.  77
    Review of Patrick Greenough (Ed.), Michael P. Lynch (Ed.), Truth and Realism[REVIEW]Tim Maudlin - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (6).
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  7.  59
    II—Patrick Greenough: Contextualism About Vagueness and Higher‐Order Vagueness.Patrick Greenough - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):167-190.
  8.  74
    Patrick Greenough.Stewart Shapiro & Patrick Greenough - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):167-190.
  9.  23
    Three Case Studies: Aurochs, Mammoths and Passenger Pigeons.Douglas Ian Campbell & Patrick Michael Whittle - 2017 - In Resurrecting Extinct Species: Ethics and Authenticity. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 29-48.
    This chapter examines three prime candidates for de-extinction—namely, the aurochs, the woolly mammoth, and the passenger pigeon. It will be about what these animals were like, why people want to resurrect them, and the methods by which their resurrections could be accomplished.
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  10.  36
    Conservation in a Brave New World.Douglas Ian Campbell & Patrick Michael Whittle - 2017 - In Resurrecting Extinct Species: Ethics and Authenticity. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 1-28.
    This chapter introduces the two main philosophical questions that are raised by the prospect of extinct species being brought back from the dead—namely, the ‘Authenticity Question’ and the ‘Ethical Question’. It distinguishes different types of de-extinction, and different methods by which de-extinction can be accomplished. Finally, it examines the aims of wildlife conservation with a view to whether they are compatible with de-extinction, or not.
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  11.  65
    Ethical Arguments For and Against De-Extinction.Douglas Ian Campbell & Patrick Michael Whittle - 2017 - In Resurrecting Extinct Species Ethics and Authenticity. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 87-124.
    This chapter surveys and critically evaluates all the main arguments both for and against de-extinction. It presents a qualified defence of the claim that conservationists should embrace de-extinction. It ends with a list of do’s and don’ts for conservationist de-extinction projects.
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  12.  36
    Real or Fake? The Authenticity Question.Douglas Ian Campbell & Patrick Michael Whittle - 2017 - In Resurrecting Extinct Species: Ethics and Authenticity. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 49-86.
    Is the resurrection of an extinct species genuinely possible, or not? Will organisms produced by de-extinction technology be authentic new members of the species that died out, or just convincing fakes? We seek to answer these questions in this chapter. Critics of de-extinction have offered many reasons for thinking that the products of de-extinction will be inauthentic. The bulk of the chapter is taken up with surveying their arguments. We attempt to show that none are convincing. We end the chapter (...)
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  13.  55
    Resurrecting Extinct Species: Ethics and Authenticity.Douglas Ian Campbell & Patrick Michael Whittle - 2017 - London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
    This book is about the philosophy of de-extinction. -/- CHAPTER 1 introduces the two main philosophical questions that are raised by the prospect of extinct species being brought back from the dead—namely, the ‘Authenticity Question’ and the ‘Ethical Question’. It distinguishes the many different types and methods of de-extinction. Finally, it examines the aims of wildlife conservation with a view to whether they are compatible with de-extinction, or not. -/- CHAPTER 2 examines three prime candidates for de-extinction—namely, the aurochs, the (...)
  14.  14
    Book Review Section 2. [REVIEW]Richard R. Renner, Patrick Michael Socoski, Dianne G. Kanawati, Garvey F. Lundy, Aziz Talbani, Ignacio L. Götz & Audrey Thompson - 1995 - Educational Studies 26 (4):368-397.
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  15. Knowledge for Nothing.Patrick Greenough - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press.
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  16. "Horatio Greenough. The First American Sculptor": Nathalia Wright. [REVIEW]Michael Eastham - 1964 - British Journal of Aesthetics 4 (4):372.
     
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  17.  4
    II—Patrick Greenough.Stewart Shapiro - 2005 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 79 (1):167-190.
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  18. Contextualism About Vagueness and Higher-Order Vagueness.Patrick Greenough - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):167–190.
    To get to grips with what Shapiro does and can say about higher-order vagueness, it is first necessary to thoroughly review and evaluate his conception of (first-order) vagueness, a conception which is both rich and suggestive but, as it turns out, not so easy to stabilise. In Sections I–IV, his basic position on vagueness (see Shapiro [2003]) is outlined and assessed. As we go along, I offer some suggestions for improvement. In Sections V–VI, I review two key paradoxes of higher-order (...)
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    Commentary on the Debate Between James Hansen and Patrick Michaels, November 1998.Simon Shackley - 2000 - Social Epistemology 14 (2 & 3):181 – 186.
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  20. Neutralism and the Observational Sorites Paradox.Patrick Greenough - forthcoming - In Ali Abasnezhad & Otavio Bueno (eds.), Synthese Special Edition. Springer.
    Neutralism is the broad view that philosophical progress can take place when (and sometimes only when) a thoroughly neutral, non-specific theory, treatment, or methodology is adopted. The broad goal here is to articulate a distinct, specific kind of sorites paradox (The Observational Sorites Paradox) and show that it can be effectively treated via Neutralism.
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  21. Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion.Patrick Greenough - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.
    The main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. (...)
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  22. Free Assumptions and the Liar Paradox.Patrick Greenough - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2):115 - 135.
    A new solution to the liar paradox is developed using the insight that it is illegitimate to even suppose (let alone assert) that a liar sentence has a truth-status (true or not) on the grounds that supposing this sentence to be true/not-true essentially defeats the telos of supposition in a readily identifiable way. On that basis, the paradox is blocked by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sequent-calculus. The lesson of the liar is that not all (...)
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  23.  7
    Self-Knowledge.Patrick Greenough - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  24. Vagueness: A Crash Course.Patrick Greenough - manuscript
    Touching your mother's foot is incest because all the rest is a matter of degree (or so said Diogenes). That's just one expression of the puzzle of vagueness. Here's another: the passage of one second cannot mark the transition from being a pupa to being a butterfly--if something is a pupa at one time then in all close instants it remains a pupa; alas, it follows from this, via trivial logic, that there are no butterflies. Or again: it's vague where (...)
     
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  25. Neutralism and Conceptual Engineering.Patrick Greenough - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Conceptual Engineering alleges that philosophical problems are best treated via revising or replacing our concepts (or words). The goal here is not to defend Conceptual Engineering but rather show that it can (and should) invoke Neutralism—the broad view that philosophical progress can take place when (and sometimes only when) a thoroughly neutral, non-specific theory, treatment, or methodology is adopted. A neutralist treatment of one form of skepticism is used as a case study and is compared with various non-neutral rivals. Along (...)
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  26. Norm-Relativism, and Assertion.Patrick Greenough - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 197.
     
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  27.  27
    Knowledge, Lies and Vagueness : A Minimalist Treatment.Patrick Greenough - unknown
    Minimalism concerning truth is the view that that all there is to be said concerning truth is exhausted by a set of basic platitudes. In the first part of this thesis, I apply this methodology to the concept of knowledge. In so doing, I develop a model of inexact knowledge grounded in what I call minimal margin for error principles. From these basic principles, I derive the controversial result that epistemological internalism and internalism with respect to self-knowledge are untenable doctrines. (...)
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  28. Hold the Context Fixed - Vagueness Still Remains.Jonas Åkerman & Greenough & Patrick - 2010 - In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
     
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  29. Deflationism and Truth-Value Gaps.Patrick Greenough - 2010 - In Nikolaj Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), New Waves inTruth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Central to any form of Deflationism concerning truth (hereafter ‘DT’) is the claim that truth has no substantial theoretical role to play. For this reason, DT faces the following immediate challenge: if truth can play no substantial theoretical role then how can we model various prevalent kinds of indeterminacy—such as the indeterminacy exhibited by vague predicates, future contingents, liar sentences, truth-teller sentences, incomplete stipulations, cases of presupposition failure, and such-like? It is too hasty to assume that these phenomena are all (...)
     
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  30. Discrimination and Self-Knowledge.Patrick Greenough - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper I show that a variety of Cartesian Conceptions of the mental are unworkable. In particular, I offer a much weaker conception of limited discrimination than the one advanced by Williamson (2000) and show that this weaker conception, together with some plausible background assumptions, is not only able to undermine the claim that our core mental states are luminous (roughly: if one is in such a state then one is in a position to know that one is) but (...)
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  31. Conceptual Marxism and Truth: Inquiry Symposium on Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth.Patrick Greenough - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):403-421.
    In Replacing Truth, Scharp takes the concept of truth to be fundamentally incoherent. As such, Scharp reckons it to be unsuited for systematic philosophical theorising and in need of replacement – at least for regions of thought and talk which permit liar sentences and their ilk to be formulated. This replacement methodology is radical because it not only recommends that the concept of truth be replaced, but that the word ‘true’ be replaced too. Only Tarski has attempted anything like it (...)
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  32. Indeterminate Truth.Patrick Greenough - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241.
    In §2-4, I survey three extant ways of making sense of indeterminate truth and find each of them wanting. All the later sections of the paper are concerned with showing that the most promising way of making sense of indeterminate truth is via either a theory of truthmaker gaps or via a theory of truthmaking gaps. The first intimations of a truthmaker–truthmaking gap theory of indeterminacy are to be found in Quine (1981). In §5, we see how Quine proposes to (...)
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  33. On What It is to Be in a Quandary.Patrick Greenough - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):399 - 408.
    A number of serious problems are raised against Crispin Wright’s quandary conception of vagueness. Two alternative conceptions of the quandary view are proposed instead. The first conception retains Wright’s thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. However a further problem is seen to beset this conception. The second conception, in response to this further problem, does not enjoin the thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. The (...)
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  34. Vagueness: A Minimal Theory.Patrick Greenough - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):235-281.
    Vagueness is given a philosophically neutral definition in terms of an epistemic notion of tolerance. Such a notion is intended to capture the thesis that vague terms draw no known boundary across their range of signification and contrasts sharply with the semantic notion of tolerance given by Wright (1975, 1976). This allows us to distinguish vagueness from superficially similar but distinct phenomena such as semantic incompleteness. Two proofs are given which show that vagueness qua epistemic tolerance and vagueness qua borderline (...)
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  35. Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox.Patrick Greenough - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):547 - 563.
    Consider the following sentences: The neighbouring sentence is not true. The neighbouring sentence is not true. Call these the no-no sentences. Symmetry considerations dictate that the no-no sentences must both possess the same truth-value. Suppose they are both true. Given Tarski’s truth-schema—if a sentence S says that p then S is true iff p—and given what they say, they are both not true. Contradiction! Conclude: they are not both true. Suppose they are both false. Given Tarski’s falsity-schema—if a sentence S (...)
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  36. Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (Eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford: OUP (2009). [REVIEW]Luca Moretti - 2012 - Mind 121 (484):1069-1073.
  37. Williamson on Knowledge.Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Eighteen leading philosophers offer critical assessments of Timothy Williamson's ground-breaking work on knowledge and its impact on philosophy today. They discuss epistemological issues concerning evidence, defeasibility, scepticism, testimony, assertion, and perception, and debate Williamson's central claim that knowledge is a mental state.
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  38. Truth as a Democratic Value.Michael Patrick Lynch - 2021 - In Melissa Schwartzberg & Philip Kitcher (eds.), Truth and evidence. NYU Press.
     
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  39.  21
    Review of Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard (Eds.), Williamson on Knowledge[REVIEW]Tim Black - 2010 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (7).
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  40. Methphysical Vagueness.Stewart Shapiro & Patrick Greenough - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79:147-165.
    After a brief account of the problem of higher-order vagueness, and its seeming intractability, I explore what comes of the issue on a linguistic, contextualist account of vagueness. On the view in question, predicates like 'borderline red' and 'determinately red' are, or at least can be, vague, but they are different in kind from 'red'. In particular, 'borderline red' and 'determinately red' are not colours. These predicates have linguistic components, and invoke notions like 'competent user of the language'. On my (...)
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  41. Higher-Order Vagueness.Stewart Shapiro & Patrick Greenough - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79:167-190.
    To get to grips with what Shapiro does and can say about higher-order vagueness, it is first necessary to thoroughly review and evaluate his conception of vagueness, a conception which is both rich and suggestive but, as it turns out, not so easy to stabilise. In Sections I-IV, his basic position on vagueness is outlined and assessed. As we go along, I offer some suggestions for improvement. In Sections V-VI, I review two key paradoxes of higher-order vagueness, while in Section (...)
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  42. Book Review: Beacons of Dharma: Spiritual Exemplars for the Modern Age—Ed. Christopher Patrick Miller, Michael Reading, and Jeffery D. Long Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2020. [REVIEW]Patrick M. Beldio - 2022 - Journal of Dharma Studies 5 (2-3):191-196.
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  43. Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution.Michael Bergmann & Patrick Kain (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief contains fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists on challenges to moral and religious belief from disagreement and evolution. Three main questions are addressed: Can one reasonably maintain one's moral and religious beliefs in the face of interpersonal disagreement with intellectual peers? Does disagreement about morality between a religious belief source, such as a sacred text, and a non-religious belief source, such as a society's moral intuitions, make it irrational to continue trusting (...)
  44.  32
    Michael Oakeshott as a Critic of Hobbes's Theory of the Will.Patrick Riley - 2004 - Rivista di Storia Della Filosofia 1.
    Michael Oakeshott as a Critic of Hobbes's Theory of the Will - ABSTRACT: Patrick Riley asks why the post-War Oakeshott stopped speaking of the incoherence of Hobbes’s philosophy of volition, as he had in his Hobbes studies before the War. One answer is that he became more and more sensitive to the necessity of counterbalancing the determinist reading of Hobbes, which tended to be dominant in the 1970s’ Hobbes studies. He cites the example of Thomas Spragens’s The Politics (...)
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  45.  10
    In Search of a Usable Past: Conservative Thought in America.Patrick Allitt & Michael Kimmage - 2010 - Modern Intellectual History 7 (2):479-494.
  46. Diagrammatic Representation and Reasoning.Michael Anderson, Bernd Meyer & Patrick Olivier - 2000 - London, England: Springer.
    The rise in computing and multimedia technology has spawned an increasing interest in the role of diagrams and sketches, not only for the purpose of conveying information but also for creative thinking and problem-solving. This book attempts to characterise the nature of "a science of diagrams" in a wide-ranging, multidisciplinary study that contains accounts of the most recent research results in computer science and psychology. Key topics include: cognitive aspects, formal aspects, and applications. It is a well-written and indispensable survey (...)
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  47. Patrick Riley, Leibniz's Universal Jurisprudence. Justice as the Charity of the Wise Reviewed By.Michael J. Seidler - 1997 - Philosophy in Review 17 (6):436-438.
     
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  48.  3
    Truth as One and Many.Michael Patrick Lynch - 2009 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    What is truth? Michael Lynch defends a bold new answer to this question. Traditional theories hold that all truths are true in the same way. More recent theories claim that the concept of truth is of no real importance. Lynch argues against both these extremes: truth is a functional property whose function can be performed in more than one way.
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    Aware and Unaware Perception in Hemispatial Neglect: Evidence From a Stem Completion Priming Task.Michael Esterman, Regina McGlinchey-Berroth, Mieke Verfaellie, Laura Grande, Patrick Kilduff & William Milberg - 2002 - Cortex 38 (2):233-246.
  50. Refereeing in 1997.Patrick Baert, Brian Baigrie, Stanley Barrett, Pascal Boyer, Michael Chiarello, R. H. Coase, Lorraine Code, Wes Cooper, Timothy M. Costelloe & Robert D’Amico - 2000 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30 (3):480.
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