This book closely examines how the phenomenological lineage is received in deconstruction, especially the relation between deconstruction and Derrida's radical ...

It seems self-evident that people prefer painful experiences to be in the past and pleasurable experiences to lie in the future. Indeed, it has been claimed that, for hedonic goods, this preference is absolute (Sullivan, 2018). Yet very little is known about the extent to which people demonstrate explicit preferences regarding the temporal location of hedonic experiences, about the developmental trajectory of such preferences, and about whether such preferences are impervious to differences in the quantity of envisaged past and future (...) pain or pleasure. We find consistent evidence that, all else being equal, adults and children aged 7 and over prefer pleasure to lie in the future and pain in the past and believe that other people will too. They also predict that other people will be happier when pleasure is in the future rather than the past but sadder when pain is the future rather than the past. Younger children have the same temporal preferences as adults for their own painful experiences, but prefer their pleasure to lie in the past, and do not predict that others’ levels of happiness or sadness vary dependent on whether experiences lie in the past or the future. However, from the age of 7, temporal preferences were typically abandoned at the earliest opportunity when the quantity of past pain or pleasure was greater than the quantity located in the future. Past-future preferences for hedonic goods emerge early developmentally but are surprisingly flexible. (shrink)

This article will theorize how Derrida’s deconstruction signifies a fundamental ontological alterity. We will examine the use of both the tropes of “sacred” and ‘faith” as tropes to express this possibility. Wewill articulate how deconstruction, as a development of phenomenology, provides a theoretical nexus where the alterity of things and persons may be thought. We will arrive at the paradoxical formulation of“ontological alterity” as a key moment in deconstructive thinking. Essentially we will argue that deconstruction offers the resources to think (...) the relation between other person and things in the world asmotivated by a firm radicalization of Heideggerean worldliness and Levinasian alterity. (shrink)

This article will theorize how Derrida’s deconstruction signifies a fundamental ontological alterity. We will examine the use of both the tropes of “sacred” and ‘faith” as tropes to express this possibility. Wewill articulate how deconstruction, as a development of phenomenology, provides a theoretical nexus where the alterity of things and persons may be thought. We will arrive at the paradoxical formulation of“ontological alterity” as a key moment in deconstructive thinking. Essentially we will argue that deconstruction offers the resources to think (...) the relation between other person and things in the world asmotivated by a firm radicalization of Heideggerean worldliness and Levinasian alterity. (shrink)

Patrick O'Connor's contribution brings us back to the question with which this issue started, namely whether, after Husserl, phenomenology can still profit from a thinking of the epoché. In There is no World Without End : Derrida's Phenomenology of the Extra-Mundane O'Connor brings out the radicality of Jacques Derrida's philosophy with respect to a thinking of 'world'. Developing key Husserlian and Heideggerian themes to broaden Husserl's phenomenological theory of consciousness, Derrida's early work, according to O'Connor, assesses the capacity of the (...) phenomenological reduction to escape the mundane natural attitude. While working through phenomenology, Derrida still remains a post-phenomenological thinker, arriving at a more ontological albeit differential expression of phenomena. O'Connor then isolates the manner in which Derrida discusses phenomenological concepts such as the sensible and the intelligible, the natural attitude, immanence and transcendence, intentionality and finitude in order to reflect on how consciousness is pre-reflectively constituted by an irreducible intersection with the 'world' and the loss of world. O'Connor demonstrates that throughout his career, from his earliest work on genesis to his last works on spectrality and touch, Derrida always remained faithful to this centrality of a suspension of the phenomenologically mundane world. (shrink)