Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue S1, Page S3-S11, March‐April 2022.

Recent calls to address racism in bioethics reflect a sense of urgency to mitigate the lethal effects of a lack of action. While the field was catalyzed largely in response to pivotal events deeply rooted in racism and other structures of oppression embedded in research and health care, it has failed to center racial justice in its scholarship, pedagogy, advocacy, and practice, and neglected to integrate anti-racism as a central consideration. Academic bioethics programs play a key role in determining the (...) field’s norms and practices, including methodologies, funding priorities, and professional networks that bear on equity, inclusion, and epistemic justice. This article describes recommendations from the Racial Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion (REDI) Task Force commissioned by the Association of Bioethics Program Directors to prioritize and strengthen anti-racist practices in bioethics programmatic endeavors and to evaluate and develop specific goals to advance REDI. (shrink)

Health care in the United States, being a microcosm of the broader society in which it developed, possesses a sordid legacy concerning racial prejudices, biases, and the perpetuation of health and...

The environmental impacts of anthropogenic climate change, from an increase in global temperatures melting polar ice caps to the generation of extreme weather events, appear to be happening even mo...

Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue S1, Page S50-S56, March‐April 2022.

This paper argues that it is permissible for computer scientists and engineers—working with advanced militaries that are making good faith efforts to follow the laws of war—to engage in the research and development of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Research and development into a new weapons system is permissible if and only if the new weapons system can plausibly generate a superior risk profile for all morally relevant classes and it is not intrinsically wrong. The paper then suggests that these conditions (...) are satisfied by at least some potential LAWS development programs. More specifically, since LAWS will lead to greater force protection, warfighters are free to become more risk-acceptant in protecting civilian lives and property. Further, various malicious motivations that lead to war crimes will not apply to LAWS or will apply to no greater extent than with human warfighters. Finally, intrinsic objections—such as the claims that LAWS violate human dignity or that it creates ‘responsibility gaps’—are rejected on the basis that they rely upon implausibly idealized and atomized understandings of human decision-making in combat. (shrink)

This paper develops a novel, neo-republican account of just state surveillance in the information age. The goal of state surveillance should be to avoid and prevent domination, both public and private. In light of that conception of justice, the paper makes three substantive points. First, it argues that modern state surveillance based upon information technology and predicated upon a close partnership with the tech sector gives the state significant power and represents a serious potential source of domination. Second, it argues (...) that, nonetheless, state surveillance can serve legitimate republican ends and so unilateral and private technological attempts to block it may be wrongful. Third, it argues that, despite the serious normative failings of current institutions, state surveillance can be justly regulated and made accountable through a legal liability regime that incentivizes tech company intermediaries to ally with civil society groups in order to safeguard the privacy rights of potential subjects of state surveillance. (shrink)

Questions about dirty hands have often focused on legitimate, secure leaders deciding whether to violate important deontological principles or the rules of interpersonal morality. The purpose of this paper is to show that revolutionaries have dirty hands; revolutionaries do wrong by engaging in unilateral usurpation of the existing system with the hope that latter benefits will justify their actions. Yet, once the revolution securely generates improvements for the common good, the initial usurpation becomes increasingly irrelevant to judgments of the new (...) government’s legitimacy. The paper argues that only retroactive justification—where later success forces opponents and advocates to reinterpret the wrongness of the initial action—can fully capture the complex moral dynamics of revolutions. (shrink)

Collaboration between the arts and health sectors is gaining momentum. Artists are contributing significantly to public health efforts such as vaccine confidence campaigns. Artists and the arts are well positioned to contribute to the social conditions needed to build trust in the health sector. Health professionals, organizations, and institutions should recognize not only the power that can be derived from the insights, artefacts, and expertise of artists and the arts to create the conditions that make trust possible. The health sector (...) must also recognize that, while it can gain much from partnership with artists, artists risk much—namely, the public's trust—when they are in such partnerships. This essay unpacks these claims and considers the care and ethical considerations that must be brought to these partnerships to yield constructive pathways for ethical collaboration as well as for both establishing public trust and continuing to hold the health care profession accountable for becoming more trustworthy. (shrink)

McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier’s article seeks to bridge a gap between theological and secular bioethics (McCarthy, Homan, and Rozier 2020). It should be noted that the “theological” emphasis in the a...

Ramsey sees life as a gift and a trust given to people by God. This theological understanding of human life frames his judgment of the immorality of euthanasia in its many forms. Assuming Ramsey’s theological insights and framing of this issue, I highlight a particular way of thinking about euthanasia that both seems to capture the essence of the debate and does not necessarily build the moral evaluation into its description. I aim to identify and unpack the description most consistent (...) with the claims made by Ramsey of how other end-of-life (EOL) care options are seen as life choices in order to die well enough. If this project is right-headed, it can be used as a backdrop for assessing how many of the currently accepted and perhaps developing options in EOL and palliative care may or may not be morally distinct from euthanasia. Therefore, those who oppose euthanasia while wanting also to maintain the appropriateness of many of other EOL care options in certain situations are not acting inconsistently. This primarily conceptual work is done in service to those who take Ramsey’s theological framework seriously. (shrink)

Engineering the Climate: The Ethics of Solar Radiation Management is a wide-ranging and expert analysis of the ethics of the intentional management of solar radiation. This book will be a useful tool for policy-makers, a provocation for ethicists, and an eye-opening analysis for both the scientist and the general reader with interest in climate change.

Since cyberattacks are nonphysical, standard theories of casus belli — which typically rely on the violent and forceful nature of military means — appear inapplicable. Yet, some theorists have argued that cyberattacks nonetheless can constitute just causes for war — generating a unilateral right to defensive military action — when they cause significant physical damage through the disruption of the target's computer systems. I show that this view suffers from a serious drawback: it is too permissive concerning the types of (...) actions that generate casus belli since many essentially peaceful and non-violent mechanisms can nonetheless cause physical damage. I resolve this difficulty by developing a sovereignty-based account of casus belli and applying it to cyberwarfare. I argue that legitimate states have a constrained right to unilaterally respond with military force to unfriendly actions that bypass or overwhelm the political deliberations of the target state in order to force a change in behaviour contrary to the determinations of the people of the target state. This new account of casus belli avoids the problems of the consequence-based view by plausibly restricting the types of unfriendly action that give rise to casus belli and yet offers an attractive explanation for why some cyberattacks nonetheless do generate a potential right to a unilateral defensive response. (shrink)

David Morrow argues that solar radiation management falls afoul of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing. If we were to engage in large-scale climate engineeri...

This essay highlights an argument for the moral impermissibility of physician-assisted death based on the prohibition of killing innocents that unfolds in four phases. First, I identify the operative moral principle and then develop a moral argument based upon it. Second, I raise challenges to such an argument designed to mitigate the force of the conclusion. Third, I sketch out a potential defense of the argument in light of these counter-responses for those who want to maintain moral opposition to physician-assisted (...) death based upon the prohibition of killing innocents. Finally, I conclude with a brief postscript that highlights the limits of the philosophical approach taken in this essay in conversation with the role of moral psychology in moral judgment. (shrink)

Health justice seeks, both conceptually and in practice, to strengthen community engagement and empowerment as an integral means of addressing health disparities. In this essay, we explore the nature of communities and their roles in health care/public health. We propose that an ethical principle of respect for communities is a requisite part of health justice. It is this respect for communities that ethically grounds health justice’s calls for greater community engagement and empowerment. Conceptions of health justice, we claim, will gain (...) ethical power and coherence as this principle is more clearly recognized and further developed. (shrink)

This essay claims that one can consistently maintain a sanctity of human life principle that is explicitly grounded in theology, while making a kind of quality-of-life judgment regarding withholding or discontinuing life-sustaining treatments for those with advanced illnesses. For those who embrace them, resources that are specific to the Christian tradition delineate the parameters of responsibility for people dying with advanced illness and those who care for them. Those who embrace the sanctity of human life for the theological reasons provided (...) in this essay are under no moral obligation to continue merely to sustain life at the end of life—that is, when, in view of our best available judgment, the human being (who remains inherently valuable nonetheless) will not ever be able to exemplify other human values that contribute to human flourishing, theologically understood. (shrink)

Torbjörn Tännsjö has argued that the practice of palliative, or terminal, sedation can be distinguished from the practice of euthanasia in a morally relevant way. He seeks to develop a coherent conceptual model for those who accept the sanctity-of-life doctrine, affirm the ethical permissibility of palliative/terminal sedation, and reject various forms of euthanasia. The author argues that Tännsjö has not sufficiently distinguished the practices of palliative/terminal sedation and euthanasia in a morally relevant way for those who accept sanctity-of-life values in (...) end-of-life health care. His argument is a philosophical critique of the soundness of Tännsjö’s conceptual model. With respect to moral theology, the author claims that, in Tännsjö’s attempt to make his case, he uses the wrong conceptual tools, and the tools he does use, he uses wrongly. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 15.2 : 287–301. (shrink)

Laura Valentini’s Justice in a Globalized World presents, with admirable clarity, a new, hybrid conception of global justice that builds on insights from both cosmopolitans and statists, especially their relational variants. Relational cosmopolitans generally argue that substantial economic cooperation and interdependence (i.e., the relevant economic relations) trigger robust obligations of distributive justice. They then argue that, as a matter of fact, these relations obtain globally in virtue of intensifying global trade, capital flows, and labor migration. Thus, relational cosmopolitans conclude that (...) obligations of distributive justice directly apply to the global economic order. Relational statists, by contrast, argue that obligations of distributive justice are trigged by coercive, political relations. Furthermore, these coercive relations only obtain—and can only be justified—within a state. As a consequence, the global order is a ‘secondary site’ of justice that ought to be con. (shrink)

J. L. Schellenberg has provided a rigorous and robust philosophical defense of religious skepticism through various modes of reasoning and employs an epistemic defeat strategy that appeals to unrecognized evidence. He contends on this framework that reason requires religious skepticism. This essay focuses on Schellenberg’s basic epistemic defeat strategy. I argue that his methodology is problematic because his key skeptical argument rests on an equivocation on the notion of total evidence, which makes it difficult to implement his epistemic defeat strategy (...) in favor of his claim that reason requires us to be religious skeptics. (shrink)