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  1.  32
    Chance, Resiliency, and Humean Supervenience.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):1-19.
    This paper shows how a particular resiliency-centered approach to chance lends support for two conditions characterizing chance. The first condition says that the present chance of some proposition A conditional on the proposition about some later chance of A should be set equal to that later chance of A. The second condition requires the present chance of some proposition A to be equal to the weighted average of possible later chances of A. I first introduce, motivate, and make precise a (...)
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  2.  24
    Acting Upon Uncertain Beliefs.Miloud Belkoniene & Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (2):253-271.
    This paper discusses the conditions under which an agent is rationally permitted to leave some uncertain propositions relevant to her decision out of her deliberation. By relying on the view that belief involves a defeasible disposition to treat a proposition as true in one’s reasoning, we examine the conditions under which such a disposition can be overridden and under which an agent should take into account her uncertainty as to a proposition she believes in the course of a particular deliberation. (...)
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  3. Common Cause Abduction: Its Scope and Limits.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2012 - Filozofia Nauki 20 (4).
    This article aims to analyze the scope and limits of common cause abduction which is a version of explanatory abduction based on Hans Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause. First, it is argued that common cause abduction can be regarded as a rational inferential mechanism that enables us to accept hypotheses that aim to account for the surprising correlations of events. Three arguments are presented in support of common cause abduction: the argument from screening-off, the argument from likelihood, and the (...)
     
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  4.  15
    In Defence of Objective Bayesianism.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2012 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):348-351.
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 26, Issue 3, Page 348-351, September 2012.
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  5.  27
    Justifying Lewis’s Kinematics of Chance.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):439-463.
    In his ‘A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance’, Lewis argued that a particular kinematical model for chances follows from his principal principle. According to this model, any later chance function is equal to an earlier chance function conditional on the complete intervening history of non-modal facts. This article first investigates the conditions that any kinematical model for chance needs to satisfy to count as Lewis’s kinematics of chance. Second, it presents Lewis’s justification for his kinematics of chance and explains why (...)
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  6. Subjective Probability and the Problem of Countable Additivity.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 17 (1).
    The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Bruno de Finetti's view that the axiom of countable additivity of the probability calculus cannot be justified in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability. After presenting the core of the subjective theory of probability and the main de Finetti's argument against the axiom of countable additivity (the so called de Finetti's infinite lottery) I argue against de Finetti's view. In particular, I claim that de Finetti does not prove the (...)
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  7. Subiektywne prawdopodobieństwo i problem przeliczalnej addytywności.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2009 - Filozofia Nauki 17 (1).
    The aim of this paper is to present and analyse Bruno de Finetti's view that the axiom of countable additivity of the probability calculus cannot be justified in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability. After presenting the core of the subjective theory of probability and the main de Finetti's argument against the axiom of countable additivity (the so called de Finetti's infinite lottery) I argue against de Finetti's view. In particular, I claim that de Finetti does not prove the (...)
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  8.  5
    The Value of Cost-Free Uncertain Evidence.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz & Dominika Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13313-13343.
    We explore the question of whether cost-free uncertain evidence is worth waiting for in advance of making a decision. A classical result in Bayesian decision theory, known as the value of evidence theorem, says that, under certain conditions, when you update your credences by conditionalizing on some cost-free and certain evidence, the subjective expected utility of obtaining this evidence is never less than the subjective expected utility of not obtaining it. We extend this result to a type of update method, (...)
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  9.  13
    Decision-Theoretic and Risk-Based Approaches to Naked Statistical Evidence: Some Consequences and Challenges.Rafal Urbaniak, Alicja Kowalewska, Pavel Janda & Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2020 - Law, Probability and Risk 19 (1):67-83.
    In the debate about the legal value of naked statistical evidence, Di Bello argues that (1) the likelihood ratio of such evidence is unknown, (2) the decision-theoretic considerations indicate that a conviction based on such evidence is unacceptable when expected utility maximization is combined with fairness constraints, and (3) the risk of mistaken conviction based on such evidence cannot be evaluated and is potentially too high. We argue that Di Bello’s argument for (1) works in a rather narrow context, and (...)
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