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  1. Norms Affect Prospective Causal Judgments.Paul Henne, Kevin O’Neill, Paul Bello, Sangeet Khemlani & Felipe De Brigard - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (1):e12931.
    People more frequently select norm-violating factors, relative to norm- conforming ones, as the cause of some outcome. Until recently, this abnormal-selection effect has been studied using retrospective vignette-based paradigms. We use a novel set of video stimuli to investigate this effect for prospective causal judgments—i.e., judgments about the cause of some future outcome. Four experiments show that people more frequently select norm- violating factors, relative to norm-conforming ones, as the cause of some future outcome. We show that the abnormal-selection effects (...)
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  2.  96
    Norms and the Meaning of Omissive Enabling Conditions.Paul Henne, Paul Bello, Sangeet Khemlani & Felipe De Brigard - 2019 - Proceedings of the 41st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 41.
    People often reason about omissions. One line of research shows that people can distinguish between the semantics of omissive causes and omissive enabling conditions: for instance, not flunking out of college enabled you (but didn’t cause you) to graduate. Another line of work shows that people rely on the normative status of omissive events in inferring their causal role: if the outcome came about because the omission violated some norm, reasoners are more likely to select that omission as a cause. (...)
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  3. On How to Build a Moral Machine.Paul Bello & Selmer Bringsjord - 2013 - Topoi 32 (2):251-266.
    Herein we make a plea to machine ethicists for the inclusion of constraints on their theories consistent with empirical data on human moral cognition. As philosophers, we clearly lack widely accepted solutions to issues regarding the existence of free will, the nature of persons and firm conditions on moral agency/patienthood; all of which are indispensable concepts to be deployed by any machine able to make moral judgments. No agreement seems forthcoming on these matters, and we don’t hold out hope for (...)
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  4.  10
    Ability, Breadth, and Parsimony in Computational Models of Higher-Order Cognition.Nicholas L. Cassimatis, Paul Bello & Pat Langley - 2008 - Cognitive Science 32 (8):1304-1322.
  5.  28
    Introspection and Mindreading as Mental Simulation.Paul Bello & Marcello Guarini - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 2022--2028.
  6. Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society.Paul Bello, Marcello Guarini, Marjorie McShane & Brian Scassellati (eds.) - 2014 - Cognitive Science Society.
     
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  7.  22
    Introduction to the Special Issue.Kevin Gluck, Paul Bello & Jerome Busemeyer - 2008 - Cognitive Science 32 (8):1245-1247.
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  8.  11
    Much Ado About Nothing: The Mental Representation of Omissive Relations.Sangeet Khemlani, Paul Bello, Gordon Briggs, Hillary Harner & Christina Wasylyshyn - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    When the absence of an event causes some outcome, it is an instance of omissive causation. For instance, not eating lunch may cause you to be hungry. Recent psychological proposals concur that the mind represents causal relations, including omissive causal relations, through mental simulation, but they disagree on the form of that simulation. One theory states that people represent omissive causes as force vectors; another states that omissions are representations of contrasting counterfactual simulations; a third argues that people think about (...)
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