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Profile: Paul Dicken
  1. What Can Bas Believe? Musgrave and Van Fraassen on Observability.Paul Dicken & Peter Lipton - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):226–233.
    There is a natural objection to the epistemic coherence of Bas van Fraassen’s use of a distinction between the observable and unobservable in his constructive empiricism, an objection that has been raised with particular clarity by Alan Musgrave. We outline Musgrave’s objection, and then consider how one might interpret and evaluate van Fraassen’s response. According to the constructive empiricist, observability for us is measured with respect to the epistemic limits of human beings qua measuring devices, limitations ‘which will be described (...)
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  2. Constructive Empiricism: Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science.Paul Dicken - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
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    Constructive Empiricism and the Vices of Voluntarism.Paul Dicken - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):189 – 201.
    Constructive empiricism - as formulated by Bas van Fraassen - makes no epistemological claims about the nature of science. Rather, it is a view about the aim of science, to be situated within van Fraassen's broader voluntarist epistemology. Yet while this epistemically minimalist framework may have various advantages in defending the epistemic relevance of constructive empiricism, I show how it also has various disadvantages in maintaining its internal coherence.
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  4.  23
    Normativity, the Base-Rate Fallacy, and Some Problems for Retail Realism.Paul Dicken - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):563-570.
    Recent literature in the scientific realism debate has been concerned with a particular species of statistical fallacy concerning base-rates, and the worry that no matter how predictively successful our contemporary scientific theories may be, this will tell us absolutely nothing about the likelihood of their truth if our overall sample space contains enough empirically adequate theories that are nevertheless false. In response, both realists and anti-realists have switched their focus from general arguments concerning the reliability and historical track-records of our (...)
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  5.  83
    The Primitivist Theory of Truth, by Jamin Asay. [REVIEW]Paul Dicken - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):816-816.
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  6.  72
    On the Syntax and Semantics of Observability: A Reply to Muller and Van Fraassen.Paul Dicken - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):38-42.
    In this journal, Peter Lipton and I discussed Musgrave's objection that the constructive empiricist cannot consistently maintain his own distinction between the observable and the unobservable, and van Fraassen's initial reply. We considered several possible interpretations of van Fraassen, and expressed misgivings about each. Muller and van Fraassen have consequently clarified the official constructive empiricist response to Musgrave, although some issues still remain.According to Muller and van Fraassen, Musgrave's objection assumes that constructive empiricism is to be understood in line with (...)
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  7.  54
    Tolerance and Voluntarism.Paul Dicken - 2013 - Philosophical Papers 42 (1):25 - 48.
    Carnap's mature philosophy of science is an attempt to dissolve the scientific realism debate altogether as a philosophical pseudo-question. His argument depends upon a logico-semantic thesis regarding the structure of a scientific theory, and more importantly, a meta-ontological thesis regarding the explication of existence claims. The latter commits Carnap to a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, which was allegedly refuted by Quine. The contemporary philosophy of science has therefore sought to distance itself from logico-semantic considerations, and has pursued (...)
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    Conditions May Apply.Paul Dicken - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):290-293.
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    On Some Limitations of Humean Disagreement: Miraculous Testimony and Contrary Religions.Paul Dicken - 2011 - Sophia 50 (3):345-355.
    As part of his wider critique of the credibility of miraculous testimony, Hume also offers a rather curious argument as to the mutual detriment of conflicting testimony for the miracles of contrary religious worldviews. Scholarship on this aspect of Hume’s reasoning has debated whether or not the considerations are to be understood as essentially probabilistic, and as to whether or not a probabilistic interpretation of the argument is logically valid. The consensus would appear to offer a positive answer to the (...)
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    Can the Constructive Empiricist Be a Nominalist? Quasi-Truth, Commitment and Consistency.Paul Dicken - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):191-209.
  11.  9
    Review of Robert Nola, Howard Sankey, Theories of Scientific Method[REVIEW]Paul Dicken - 2008 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (5).
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  12. Conditions May Apply.Paul Dicken - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):290-293.
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