Results for 'Paul E. Smaldino'

997 found
Order:
  1.  63
    The Cultural Evolution of Emergent Group-Level Traits.Paul E. Smaldino - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):243-254.
    Many of the most important properties of human groups – including properties that may give one group an evolutionary advantage over another – are properly defined only at the level of group organization. Yet at present, most work on the evolution of culture has focused solely on the transmission of individual-level traits. I propose a conceptual extension of the theory of cultural evolution, particularly related to the evolutionary competition between cultural groups. The key concept in this extension is the emergent (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  2.  5
    Mills Made of Grist, and Other Interesting Ideas in Need of Clarification.Paul E. Smaldino & Michael J. Spivey - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    Heyes’ book is an important contribution that rightly integrates cognitive development and cultural evolution. However, understanding the cultural evolution of cognitive gadgets requires a deeper appreciation of complexity, feedback, and self-organization than her book exhibits.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  31
    Human Mate Choice is a Complex System.Paul E. Smaldino & Jeffrey C. Schank - 2012 - Complexity 17 (5):11-22.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4.  30
    Invariants of Human Emotion.Paul E. Smaldino & Jeffrey C. Schank - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (3):164-164.
    Because of the complexity of human emotional responses, invariants must be sought not in the responses themselves, but in their generating mechanisms. Lindquist et al. show that functional locationism is a theoretical dead end; their proposed mechanistic framework is a first step toward better models of emotional behavior. We caution, however, that emotions may still be quasi-natural perceptual types.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  7
    Group-Level Traits Emerge.Paul E. Smaldino - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):281-295.
  6.  7
    Paths to Polarization: How Extreme Views, Miscommunication, and Random Chance Drive Opinion Dynamics.Matthew A. Turner & Paul E. Smaldino - 2018 - Complexity 2018:1-17.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  35
    Cultural Group Selection Plays an Essential Role in Explaining Human Cooperation: A Sketch of the Evidence.Peter Richerson, Ryan Baldini, Adrian V. Bell, Kathryn Demps, Karl Frost, Vicken Hillis, Sarah Mathew, Emily K. Newton, Nicole Naar, Lesley Newson, Cody Ross, Paul E. Smaldino, Timothy M. Waring & Matthew Zefferman - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-71.
    Human cooperation is highly unusual. We live in large groups composed mostly of non-relatives. Evolutionists have proposed a number of explanations for this pattern, including cultural group selection and extensions of more general processes such as reciprocity, kin selection, and multi-level selection acting on genes. Evolutionary processes are consilient; they affect several different empirical domains, such as patterns of behavior and the proximal drivers of that behavior. In this target article, we sketch the evidence from five domains that bear on (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  8.  74
    The Collaborative Emergence of Group Cognition: Commentary on Paul E. Smaldino, “The Cultural Evolution of Emergent Group-Level Traits”.John Sutton - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):277-78.
    We extend Smaldino’s approach to collaboration and social organization in cultural evolution to include cognition. By showing how recent work on emergent group-level cognition can be incorporated within Smaldino’s framework, we extend that framework’s scope to encompass collaborative memory, decision-making, and intelligent action. We argue that beneficial effects arise only in certain forms of cognitive interdependence, in surprisingly fragile conditions.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  5
    A Modeling Approach That Integrates Individual Behavior, Social Networks, and Cross-Cultural Variation.Paul E. Smaldino - forthcoming - Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10.  5
    Let the Social Sciences Evolve.Paul E. Smaldino & Timothy M. Waring - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (4):437-437.
  11.  7
    Not Even Wrong: Imprecision Perpetuates the Illusion of Understanding at the Cost of Actual Understanding.Paul E. Smaldino - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12.  23
    Teaching as an Exaptation.Paul E. Smaldino & Emily K. Newton - 2015 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  16
    Cultural Group Selection Follows Darwin's Classic Syllogism for the Operation of Selection.Peter Richerson, Ryan Baldini, Adrian V. Bell, Kathryn Demps, Karl Frost, Vicken Hillis, Sarah Mathew, Emily K. Newton, Nicole Naar, Lesley Newson, Cody Ross, Paul E. Smaldino, Timothy M. Waring & Matthew Zefferman - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14.  6
    Integrating Models of Cognition and Culture Will Require a Bit More Math.Matthew R. Zefferman & Paul E. Smaldino - 2020 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43.
    We support the goal to integrate models of culture and cognition. However, we are not convinced that the free energy principle and Thinking Through Other Minds will be useful in achieving it. There are long traditions of modeling both cultural evolution and cognition. Demonstrating that FEP or TTOM can integrate these models will require a bit more math.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories.Paul E. Griffiths - 1997 - University of Chicago Press.
    Paul E. Griffiths argues that most research on the emotions has been as misguided as Aristotelian efforts to study "superlunary objects" - objects...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   324 citations  
  16.  91
    Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior.Paul E. Griffiths - 2002 - Mind 111 (441):178-182.
  17. Functional Analysis and Proper Functions.Paul E. Griffiths - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):409-422.
    The etiological approach to ‘proper functions’ in biology can be strengthened by relating it to Robert Cummins' general treatment of function ascription. The proper functions of a biological trait are the functions it is assigned in a Cummins-style functional explanation of the fitness of ancestors. These functions figure in selective explanations of the trait. It is also argued that some recent etiological theories include inaccurate accounts of selective explanation in biology. Finally, a generalization of the notion of selective explanation allows (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   128 citations  
  18. Squaring the Circle: Natural Kinds with Historical Essences.Paul E. Griffiths - 1999 - In Robert A. Wilson (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. MIT Press. pp. 209-228.
  19. What is Innateness?Paul E. Griffiths - 2001 - The Monist 85 (1):70-85.
    In behavioral ecology some authors regard the innateness concept as irretrievably confused whilst others take it to refer to adaptations. In cognitive psychology, however, whether traits are 'innate' is regarded as a significant question and is often the subject of heated debate. Several philosophers have tried to define innateness with the intention of making sense of its use in cognitive psychology. In contrast, I argue that the concept is irretrievably confused. The vernacular innateness concept represents a key aspect of 'folkbiology', (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   98 citations  
  20.  82
    Measuring Causal Specificity.Paul E. Griffiths, Arnaud Pocheville, Brett Calcott, Karola Stotz, Hyunju Kim & Rob Knight - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):529-555.
    Several authors have argued that causes differ in the degree to which they are ‘specific’ to their effects. Woodward has used this idea to enrich his influential interventionist theory of causal explanation. Here we propose a way to measure causal specificity using tools from information theory. We show that the specificity of a causal variable is not well-defined without a probability distribution over the states of that variable. We demonstrate the tractability and interest of our proposed measure by measuring the (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  21. Evolution, Dysfunction, and Disease: A Reappraisal: Table 1.Paul E. Griffiths & John Matthewson - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (2):301-327.
    Some ‘naturalist’ accounts of disease employ a biostatistical account of dysfunction, whilst others use a ‘selected effect’ account. Several recent authors have argued that the biostatistical account offers the best hope for a naturalist account of disease. We show that the selected effect account survives the criticisms levelled by these authors relatively unscathed, and has significant advantages over the BST. Moreover, unlike the BST, it has a strong theoretical rationale and can provide substantive reasons to decide difficult cases. This is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  22. Genes in the Postgenomic Era.Paul E. Griffiths & Karola Stotz - 2006 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (6):499-521.
    We outline three very different concepts of the gene—instrumental, nominal, and postgenomic. The instrumental gene has a critical role in the construction and interpretation of experiments in which the relationship between genotype and phenotype is explored via hybridization between organisms or directly between nucleic acid molecules. It also plays an important theoretical role in the foundations of disciplines such as quantitative genetics and population genetics. The nominal gene is a critical practical tool, allowing stable communication between bioscientists in a wide (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   51 citations  
  23.  11
    How Mouse-Tracking Can Advance Social Cognitive Theory.Paul E. Stillman, Xi Shen & Melissa J. Ferguson - 2018 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 22 (6):531-543.
  24.  36
    III. Basic Emotions, Complex Emotions, Machiavellian Emotions1: Paul E. Griffiths.Paul E. Griffiths - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:39-67.
    According to the distinguished philosopher Richard Wollheim, an emotion is an extended mental episode that originates when events in the world frustrate or satisfy a pre-existing desire. This leads the subject to form an attitude to the world which colours their future experience, leading them to attend to one aspect of things rather than another, and to view the things they attend to in one light rather than another. The idea that emotions arise from the satisfaction or frustration of desires—the (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  25.  10
    Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory.Paul E. Sigmund & John Finnis - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):129.
  26. Function, Homology and Character Individuation.Paul E. Griffiths - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (1):1-25.
    I defend the view that many biological categories are defined by homology against a series of arguments designed to show that all biological categories are defined, at least in part, by selected function. I show that categories of homology are `abnormality inclusive'—something often alleged to be unique to selected function categories. I show that classifications by selected function are logically dependent on classifications by homology, but not vice-versa. Finally, I reject the view that biologists must use considerations of selected function (...)
    Direct download (15 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  27. Modularity, and the Psychoevolutionary Theory of Emotion.Paul E. Griffiths - 1990 - Biology and Philosophy 5 (2):175-196.
    It is unreasonable to assume that our pre-scientific emotion vocabulary embodies all and only those distinctions required for a scientific psychology of emotion. The psychoevolutionary approach to emotion yields an alternative classification of certain emotion phenomena. The new categories are based on a set of evolved adaptive responses, or affect-programs, which are found in all cultures. The triggering of these responses involves a modular system of stimulus appraisal, whose evoluations may conflict with those of higher-level cognitive processes. Whilst the structure (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  28. Emotions as Natural and Normative Kinds.Paul E. Griffiths - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):901-911.
    In earlier work I have claimed that emotion and some emotions are not `natural kinds'. Here I clarify what I mean by `natural kind', suggest a new and more accurate term, and discuss the objection that emotion and emotions are not descriptive categories at all, but fundamentally normative categories.
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   44 citations  
  29. On the Logic of the Ontological Argument.Paul E. Oppenheimer & Edward N. Zalta - 1991 - Philosophical Perspectives 5:509-529.
    In this paper, the authors show that there is a reading of St. Anselm's ontological argument in Proslogium II that is logically valid (the premises entail the conclusion). This reading takes Anselm's use of the definite description "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" seriously. Consider a first-order language and logic in which definite descriptions are genuine terms, and in which the quantified sentence "there is an x such that..." does not imply "x exists". Then, using an ordinary logic (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  30. What is the Developmentalist Challenge?Paul E. Griffiths & Robin D. Knight - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (2):253-258.
  31.  68
    The Historical Turn in the Study of Adaptation.Paul E. Griffiths - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (4):511-532.
    A number of philosophers and ‘evolutionary psychologists’ have argued that attacks on adaptationism in contemporary biology are misguided. These thinkers identify anti-adaptationism with advocacy of non-adaptive modes of explanation. They overlook the influence of anti-adaptationism in the development of more rigorous forms of adaptive explanation. Many biologists who reject adaptationism do not reject Darwinism. Instead, they have pioneered the contemporary historical turn in the study of adaptation. One real issue which remains unresolved amongst these methodological advances is the nature of (...)
    Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  32. Crossing the Milvian Bridge: When Do Evolutionary Explanations of Belief Debunk Belief?Paul E. Griffiths & John S. Wilkins - 2015 - In Phillip R. Sloan, Gerald McKenny & Kathleen Eggleson (eds.), Darwin in the Twenty-First Century: Nature, Humanity, and God. University of Notre Dame Press. pp. 201-231.
    Ever since Darwin people have worried about the sceptical implications of evolution. If our minds are products of evolution like those of other animals, why suppose that the beliefs they produce are true, rather than merely useful? In this chapter we apply this argument to beliefs in three different domains: morality, religion, and science. We identify replies to evolutionary scepticism that work in some domains but not in others. The simplest reply to evolutionary scepticism is that the truth of beliefs (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  33. Replicator II – Judgement Day.Paul E. Griffiths & Russell D. Gray - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (4):471-492.
    The Developmental Systems approach to evolution is defended against the alternative extended replicator approach of Sterelny, Smith and Dickison (1996). A precise definition is provided of the spatial and temporal boundaries of the life-cycle that DST claims is the unit of evolution. Pacé Sterelny et al., the extended replicator theory is not a bulwark against excessive holism. Everything which DST claims is replicated in evolution can be shown to be an extended replicator on Sterelny et al.s definition. Reasons are given (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  34. Innateness, Canalization, and 'Biologicizing the Mind'.Paul E. Griffiths & Edouard Machery - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (3):397 – 414.
    This article examines and rejects the claim that 'innateness is canalization'. Waddington's concept of canalization is distinguished from the narrower concept of environmental canalization with which it is often confused. Evidence is presented that the concept of environmental canalization is not an accurate analysis of the existing concept of innateness. The strategy of 'biologicizing the mind' by treating psychological or behavioral traits as if they were environmentally canalized physiological traits is criticized using data from developmental psychobiology. It is concluded that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  35.  99
    Theory-Testing in Psychology and Physics: A Methodological Paradox.Paul E. Meehl - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (2):103-115.
    Because physical theories typically predict numerical values, an improvement in experimental precision reduces the tolerance range and hence increases corroborability. In most psychological research, improved power of a statistical design leads to a prior probability approaching 1/2 of finding a significant difference in the theoretically predicted direction. Hence the corroboration yielded by "success" is very weak, and becomes weaker with increased precision. "Statistical significance" plays a logical role in psychology precisely the reverse of its role in physics. This problem is (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  36. Gene.Paul E. Griffiths & Karola Stotz - 2005 - In David L. Hull & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge University Press.
    The historian Raphael Falk has described the gene as a ‘concept in tension’ (Falk 2000) – an idea pulled this way and that by the differing demands of different kinds of biological work. Several authors have suggested that in the light of contemporary molecular biology ‘gene’ is no more than a handy term which acquires a specific meaning only in a specific scientific context in which it occurs. Hence the best way to answer the question ‘what is a gene’, and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  37. Darwinism, Process Structuralism, and Natural Kinds.Paul E. Griffiths - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (3):S1-S9.
    Darwinists classify biological traits either by their ancestry (homology) or by their adaptive role. Only the latter can provide traditional natural kinds, but only the former is practicable. Process structuralists exploit this embarrassment to argue for non-Darwinian classifications in terms of underlying developmental mechanisms. This new taxonomy will also explain phylogenetic inertia and developmental constraint. I argue that Darwinian homologies are natural kinds despite having historical essences and being spatio-temporally restricted. Furthermore, process structuralist explanations of biological form require an unwarranted (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  38. How Biologists Conceptualize Genes: An Empirical Study.Karola Stotz, Paul E. Griffiths & Rob Knight - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 35 (4):647-673.
    Philosophers and historians of biology have argued that genes are conceptualized differently in different fields of biology and that these differences influence both the conduct of research and the interpretation of research by audiences outside the field in which the research was conducted. In this paper we report the results of a questionnaire study of how genes are conceptualized by biological scientists at the University of Sydney, Australia. The results provide tentative support for some hypotheses about conceptual differences between different (...)
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  39. Experimental Philosophy of Science.Paul E. Griffiths & Karola Stotz - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):507–521.
    Experimental philosophy of science gathers empirical data on how key scientific concepts are understood by particular scientific communities. In this paper we briefly describe two recent studies in experimental philosophy of biology, one investigating the concept of the gene, the other the concept of innateness. The use of experimental methods reveals facts about these concepts that would not be accessible using the traditional method of intuitions about possible cases. It also contributes to the study of conceptual change in science, which (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  40.  29
    What Kind of Expert Should a System Be?Paul E. Johnson - 1983 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 8 (1):77-97.
    Human experts are the source of knowledge required to develop computer systems that perform at an expert level. Human beings are not, however, able to reliably express what they know. As a result, experts often develop non-authentic accounts of their own expertise. These accounts, here termed reconstructed methods of reasoning, lead to computer systems that perform at a high level of proficiency but have the disadvantage that they often do not reflect the heuristics and processing constraints of a system user. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  41. The Concept of Emergence.Paul E. Meehl & Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - In Herbert Feigl & Michael Scriven (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. , Vol. pp. 239--252.
  42. Natural Law in Political Thought.Paul E. Sigmund - 1971 - University Press of America.
    Originally published in 1971 by Winthrop Publishers, Inc., this volume provides a discussion and analysis of the theory of natural law as it appears in contemporary political and social thought. This theory of natural law was used from the fifth century B.C. until the end of the eighteenth century to provide a universal, rational standard to determine the nature and limits of political obligation, the evaluation of competing forms of government, and the relation of law and politics to morals.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  43.  33
    The Case for Kidney Donation Before End-of-Life Care.Paul E. Morrissey - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics 12 (6):1-8.
    Donation after cardiac death (DCD) is associated with many problems, including ischemic injury, high rates of delayed allograft function, and frequent organ discard. Furthermore, many potential DCD donors fail to progress to asystole in a manner that would enable safe organ transplantation and no organs are recovered. DCD protocols are based upon the principle that the donor must be declared dead prior to organ recovery. A new protocol is proposed whereby after a donor family agrees to withdrawal of life-sustaining treatments, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  44. Evo-Devo Meets the Mind: Toward a Developmental Evolutionary Psychology.Paul E. Griffiths - 2007 - In Roger Sansom & Robert Brandon (eds.), Integrating Evolution and Development: From Theory to Practice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 195-225.
    The emerging discipline of evolutionary developmental biology has opened up many new lines of investigation into morphological evolution. Here I explore how two of the core theoretical concepts in ‘evo-devo’ – modularity and homology – apply to evolutionary psychology. I distinguish three sorts of module – developmental, functional and mental modules and argue that mental modules need only be ‘virtual’ functional modules. Evolutionary psychologists have argued that separate mental modules are solutions to separate evolutionary problems. I argue that the structure (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  45.  67
    Current Emotion Research in Philosophy.Paul E. Griffiths - 2013 - Emotion Review 5 (2):215-222.
    There remains a division between the work of philosophers who draw on the sciences of the mind to understand emotion and those who see the philosophy of emotion as more self-sufficient. This article examines this methodological division before reviewing some of the debates that have figured in the philosophical literature of the last decade: whether emotion is a single kind of thing, whether there are discrete categories of emotion, and whether emotion is a form of perception. These questions have been (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  46.  19
    Our Plastic Nature.Paul E. Griffiths - 2011 - In Snait Gissis & Eva Jablonka (eds.), Transformations of Lamarckism: From Subtle Fluids to Molecular Biology. MIT Press. pp. 319--330.
    This chapter analyzes the notion of human nature and the concept of inner nature from the perspective of developmental systems theory. It explores the folkbiology of human nature and looks at three features associated with traits that are expressions of the inner nature that organisms inherit from their parents: fixity, typicality, teleology.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  47.  24
    Diseases Are Not Adaptations and Neither Are Their Causes: A Response to Ardern’s "Dysfunction, Disease, and the Limits of Selection".Paul E. Griffiths & John Matthewson - 2020 - Biological Theory 15 (3):136-142.
    In a recent article in this journal, Zachary Ardern criticizes our view that the most promising candidate for a naturalized criterion of disease is the "selected effects" account of biological function and dysfunction. Here we reply to Ardern’s criticisms and, more generally, clarify the relationship between adaptation and dysfunction in the evolution of health and disease.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. Basic Emotions, Complex Emotions, Machiavellian Emotions.Paul E. Griffiths - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:39-67.
    The current state of knowledge in psychology, cognitive neuroscience and behavioral ecology allows a fairly robust characterization of at least some, so-called ?basic emotions? - short-lived emotional responses with homologues in other vertebrates. Philosophers, however are understandably more focused on the complex emotion episodes that figure in folk-psychological narratives about mental life, episodes such as the evolving jealousy and anger of a person in an unraveling sexual relationship. One of the most pressing issues for the philosophy of emotion is the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  49. On Building Arguments on Shifting Sands.Paul E. Mullen - 2007 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2):pp. 143-147.
    Psychopathy fascinates. Modernist writers construct out of it an image of alienated individualism pursuing the moment, killing they know not why, exploiting in passing, troubled, if troubled at all, not by guilt, but by perplexity (Camus 1989; Gide 1995; Mailer 1957; Musil 1996). Psychiatrists and psychologists—even those who should know better—are drawn by it to take off into philosophical speculation about morality, evil, and the beast in man (Mullen 1992; Simon 1996). Philosophers succumb to the temptation of attempting to ground (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  50.  84
    The Developmental Systems Perspective: Organism-Environment Systems as Units of Development and Evolution.Paul E. Griffiths & Russell D. Gray - 2002 - In Massimo Pigliucci & Katherine Preston (eds.), Phenotypic Integration: Studying the Ecology and Evolution of Complex Phenotypes. Oxford University Press. pp. 409-431.
    Developmental systems theory is an attempt to sum up the ideas of a research tradition in developmental psychobiology that goes back at least to Daniel Lehrman’s work in the 1950s. It yields a representation of evolution that is quite capable of accommodating the traditional themes of natural selection and also the new results that are emerging from evolutionary developmental biology. But it adds something else - a framework for thinking about development and evolution without the distorting dichotomization of biological processes (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
1 — 50 / 997