Gift and gratitude are examined as moral realities and are found to play a variety of roles in the moral life and in moral discourse. Some of these have to do with obligations arising from the gift relation while others stand in some tension with the idea of obligation. The relation between these two kinds of elements is explored. Gift and gratitude are also examined in relation to moral agenthood. The analysis is then tested for its usefulness in relation to (...) some problematic gifts cited in Christian ethics. Finally, some normative implications of the analysis are briefly suggested. (shrink)

We should seek an ethic internal to marketing arising from marketing's societal function, rather than imposing some add-on ethic. This suggests that marketing should enhance the information and the freedom the potential customer brings to the market transaction. Defining and achieving this information and freedom is difficult, but marketers suggest that the market itself drives out major violators, a suggestion less persuasive concerning increasingly complex goods and services. Marketing also is tempted to appeal to our baser, darker side. These problems (...) are better addressed through self-regulation guided by a vision of advertising and business in the service of society, and by the marketer's own sense of integrity than through external regulation. (shrink)

The issues of profit, its moral meaning, justification and role, need careful examination. Mistakes to be avoided in making moral sense of profit include the assumption that profitability establishes a company's moral rectitude. Profit is too complex a phenomenon to establish any such thing. Steps toward clarifying these issues include distinguishing profit as the goal of the corporation from the larger goals of the economy itself, and clarifying what we mean by profit. Profit often includes the moral or value consideration (...) of having been rightly or fairly earned. This provides one starting point internal to business for formulating standards for business ethics. (shrink)

The author first examines the usefulness of argument by analogy in moral discussions, the way argument by analogy works and three ways in which it can miscarry. He then uses this understanding of argument by analogy to see if the conceptionalists' position on the emergence of the value of life, on which rests their opposition to virtually all direct abortion, can be illumined and strengthened by analogies drawn from our other experiences of the emergence of value. The fact that no (...) such analogies can be located is presented as a significant, but not necessarily fatal obstacle to the understanding and the acceptance of the conceptionalist position. (shrink)

Arguing that the grounding of philosophical ethics is more complex than De George's reference to reason and human experience reflects, and that religious ethics is less doctrinaire and less given to indoctrination than De George suggests, Camenisch maintains that De George has portrayed an artifically wide gap between the two fields. Rejecting De George's typology of religious ethics as unhelpful, Camenisch suggests that the crucial distinction between philosophical and religious/theological ethics is the community or lived nature of the latter. The (...) implications of this dimension of religious ethics for business ethics is briefly explored in relation to the use of cases, the role of the lives of moral exemplars, corporate responsibility, and obligations to future generations, to indicate not that religious ethics generates answers different from those of philosophy, but that it provides a different perspective on some central moral matters. (shrink)