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Profile: Paul Faulkner (University of Sheffield)
  1. Knowledge on Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Paul Faulkner presents a new theory of testimony - the basis of much of what we know. He addresses the questions of what makes it reasonable to accept a piece of testimony, and what warrants belief formed on that basis. He rejects rival theories and argues that testimonial knowledge and testimonially warranted belief are based on trust.
     
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  2.  91
    On Telling and Trusting.Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):875-902.
    A key debate in the epistemology of testimony concerns when it is reasonable to acquire belief through accepting what a speaker says. This debate has been largely understood as the debate over how much, or little, assessment and monitoring an audience must engage in. When it is understood in this way the debate simply ignores the relationship speaker and audience can have. Interlocutors rarely adopt the detached approach to communication implied by talk of assessment and monitoring. Audiences trust speakers to (...)
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  3. The Social Character of Testimonial Knowledge.Paul Faulkner - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):581-601.
    Through communication, we form beliefs about the world, its history, others and ourselves. A vast proportion of these beliefs we count as knowledge. We seem to possess this knowledge only because it has been communicated. If those justifications that depended on communication were outlawed, all that would remain would be body of illsupported prejudice. The recognition of our ineradicable dependence on testimony for much of what we take ourselves to know has suggested to many that an epistemological account of testimony (...)
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  4.  86
    A Genealogy of Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Episteme 4 (3):305-321.
    In trusting a speaker we adopt a credulous attitude, and this attitude is basic: it cannot be reduced to the belief that the speaker is trustworthy or reliable. However, like this belief, the attitude of trust provides a reason for accepting what a speaker says. Similarly, this reason can be good or bad; it is likewise epistemically evaluable. This paper aims to present these claims and offer a genealogical justification of them.
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  5.  78
    Norms of Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2010 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Should we tell other people the truth? Should we believe what other people tell us? This paper argues that something like these norms of truth-telling and belief govern our production and receipt of testimony in conversational contexts. It then attempts to articulate these norms and determine their justification. More fully specified these norms prescribe that speakers tell the truth informatively, or be trustworthy, and that audiences presume that speakers do this, or trust. These norms of trust, as norms of conversational (...)
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  6.  92
    What Is Wrong with Lying?Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):535-557.
    One thing wrong with lying is that it can be manipulative. Understanding why lying can be a form of manipulation involves understanding how our telling someone something can give them a reason to believe it, and understanding this requires seeing both how our telling things can invite trust and how trust can be a reason to believe someone. This paper aims to outline the mechanism by means of which lies can be manipulative and through doing so identify a unique reason (...)
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  7.  67
    Understanding Knowledge Transmission.Paul Faulkner - 2006 - Ratio 19 (2):156–175.
    We must allow that knowledge can be transmitted. But to allow this is to allow that an individual can know a proposition despite lacking any evidence for it and reaching belief by an unreliable means. So some explanation is required as to how knowledge rather than belief is transmitted. This paper considers two non-individualistic explanations: one in terms of knowledge existing autonomously, the other in terms of it existing as a property of communities. And it attempts to decide what is (...)
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  8. The Moral Obligations of Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):332-345.
    Moral obligation, Darwall argues, is irreducibly second personal. So too, McMyler argues, is the reason for belief supplied by testimony and which supports trust. In this paper, I follow Darwall in arguing that the testimony is not second personal ?all the way down?. However, I go on to argue, this shows that trust is not fully second personal, which in turn shows that moral obligation is equally not second personal ?all the way down?
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  9.  23
    A Virtue Theory of Testimony.Paul Faulkner - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):189-211.
    This paper aims to outline, evaluate, and ultimately reject a virtue epistemic theory of testimony before proposing a virtue ethical theory. Trust and trustworthiness, it is proposed, are ethical virtues; and from these ethical virtues, epistemic consequences follow.
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  10.  5
    Replies.Paul Faulkner - 2012 - Abstracta 6 (3):117-137.
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  11. David Hume's Reductionist Epistemology of Testimony.Paul Faulkner - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):302–313.
    David Hume advances a reductionist epistemology of testimony: testimonial beliefs are justified on the basis of beliefs formed from other sources. This reduction, however, has been misunderstood. Testimonial beliefs are not justified in a manner identical to ordinary empirical beliefs; it is true, they are justified by observation of the conjunction between testimony and its truth, it is the nature of the conjunctions that has been misunderstood. The observation of these conjunctions provides us with our knowledge of human nature and (...)
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  12.  48
    The Practical Rationality of Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2012 - Synthese (9):1-15.
    Most action can be explained in Humean or teleological terms; that is, in most cases, one can explain why someone acted by reference to that person’s beliefs and desires. However, trusting and being trustworthy are actions that do not permit such explanation. The action of trusting someone to do something is a matter of expecting someone to act for certain reasons, and acting trustworthily is one of acting for these reasons. It is better to say that people act out of (...)
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  13.  4
    Lying and Deceit.Paul Faulkner - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  14.  83
    Two-Stage Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, Dualism and the Problem of Sufficiency.Paul Faulkner - 2013 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (8):121-138.
    Social epistemology should be truth-centred, argues Goldman. Social epistemology should capture the ‘logic of everyday practices’ and describe socially ‘situated’ reasoning, says Fuller. Starting from Goldman’s vision of epistemology, this paper aims to argue for Fuller’s contention. Social epistemology cannot focus solely on the truth because the truth can be got in lucky ways. The same too could be said for reliability. Adding a second layer of epistemic evaluation helps only insofar as the reasons thus specified are appropriately connected to (...)
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  15.  35
    The Attitude of Trust is Basic.Paul Faulkner - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):424-429.
    Most philosophical discussion of trust focuses on the three-place trust predicate: X trusting Y to φ. This article argues that it is the one-place and two-place predicates – X is trusting, and X trusting Y – that are fundamental.
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  16.  62
    Really Trying or Merely Trying.Paul Faulkner - 2013 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 41 (3):363-380.
    We enjoy first-person authority with respect to a certain class of actions: for these actions, we know what we are doing just because we are doing it. This paper first formulates an epistemological principle that captures this authority in terms of trying to act in a way that one has the capacity to act. It then considers a case of effortful action – running a middle distance race – that threatens this principle. And proposes the solution of changing the metaphysics (...)
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  17.  61
    Cooperation and Trust in Conversational Exchanges.Paul Faulkner - 2008 - Theoria 23 (1):23-34.
    A conversation is more than a series of disconnected remarks because it is conducted against a background presumption of cooperation. But what makes it reasonable to presume that one is engaged in a conversation? What makes it reasonable to presume cooperation? This paper considers Grice’s two ways ofanswering this question and argues for the one he discarded. It does so by means of considering a certain problem and analysis of trust.
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  18.  43
    On Dreaming and Being Lied To.Paul Faulkner - 2005 - Episteme 2 (3):149-159.
    As sources of knowledge, perception and testimony are both vulnerable to sceptical arguments. To both arguments a Moorean response is possible: both can be refuted by reference to particular things known by perception and testimony. However, lies and dreams are different possibilities and they are different in a way that undercuts the plausibility of a Moorean response to a scepticism of testimony. The condition placed on testimonial knowledge cannot be trivially satisfi ed in the way the Moorean would suggest. This (...)
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  19. Epistemology of Testimony.Paul Faulkner - 2011 - In Östman & Verschueren (eds.), Handbook of Pragmatics. John Benjamins.
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  20.  43
    Relativism and Our Warrant for Scientific Theories.Paul Faulkner - 2004 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12 (3):259 – 269.
    We depend upon the community for justified belief in scientific theory. This dependence can suggest that our individual belief in scientific theory is justified because the community believes it to be justified. This idea is at the heart of an anti-realist epistemology according to which there are no facts about justification that transcend a community's judgement thereof. Ultimately, knowledge and justified belief are simply social statuses. When conjoined with the lemma that communities can differ in what they accept as justified, (...)
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  21.  2
    Cooperation and Trust in Conversational Exchanges.Paul Faulkner - 2008 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 23 (1):23-34.
    A conversation is more than a series of disconnected remarks because it is conducted against a background presumption of cooperation. But what makes it reasonable to presume that one is engaged in a conversation? What makes it reasonable to presume cooperation? This paper considers Grice’s two ways ofanswering this question and argues for the one he discarded. It does so by means of considering a certain problem and analysis of trust.
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  22.  5
    IX-A Virtue Theory of Testimony.Paul Faulkner - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):189-211.
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  23.  45
    Review: Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge. [REVIEW]Paul Faulkner - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):346-349.
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  24.  16
    "Précis of" Knowledge on Trust".Paul Faulkner - 2012 - Abstracta 6 (3):4-5.
  25.  34
    Review: Thinking About Knowing. [REVIEW]Paul Faulkner - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):390-394.
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  26.  26
    Can We Agree to Disagree?Paul Faulkner - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):282-285.
  27.  17
    Carson , Thomas L. Lying and Deception: Theory and Practice .Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Pp. 288. $65.00 (Cloth). [REVIEW]Paul Faulkner - 2011 - Ethics 121 (4):799-803.
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  28.  3
    A Genealogy of Trust.Paul Faulkner - 2007 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 4 (3):305-321.
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  29.  1
    Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge.Paul Faulkner - 2003 - Mind 112 (446):346-349.
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  30.  1
    Thinking About Knowing.Paul Faulkner - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):390-394.
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  31. Conspiracies And Lyes: Scepticism And The Epistemology of Testimony.Paul Faulkner - 1998 - Dissertation, University College London
    In Conspiracies and Lyes I aim to provide an epistemological account of testimony as one of our faculties of knowledge. I compare testimony to perception and memory. Its similarity to both these faculties is recognised. A fundamental difference is stressed: it can be rational to not accept testimony even if testimony is fulfilling its proper epistemic function because it can be rational for a speaker to not express a belief; or, as I say, it can be rational for a speaker (...)
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  32. Losing the Rose Tinted Glasses: Neural Substrates of Unbiased Belief Updating in Depression.Neil Garrett, Tali Sharot, Paul Faulkner, Christoph W. Korn, Jonathan P. Roiser & Raymond J. Dolan - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.