6 found
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  1.  11
    Reasoning About Equilibria in Game-Like Concurrent Systems.Julian Gutierrez, Paul Harrenstein & Michael Wooldridge - 2017 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 168 (2):373-403.
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  2.  55
    Characterization of Dominance Relations in Finite Coalitional Games.Felix Brandt & Paul Harrenstein - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (2):233-256.
    McGarvey (Econometrica, 21(4), 608–610, 1953) has shown that any irreflexive and anti-symmetric relation can be obtained as a relation induced by majority rule. We address the analogous issue for dominance relations of finite cooperative games with non-transferable utility (coalitional NTU games). We find any irreflexive relation over a finite set can be obtained as the dominance relation of some finite coalitional NTU game. We also show that any such dominance relation is induced by a non-cooperative game through β-effectivity. Dominance relations (...)
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  3.  9
    The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets.Felix Brandt, Felix Fischer & Paul Harrenstein - 2009 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 55 (4):444-459.
    Social choice rules are often evaluated and compared by inquiring whether they satisfy certain desirable criteria such as the Condorcet criterion, which states that an alternative should always be chosen when more than half of the voters prefer it over any other alternative. Many of these criteria can be formulated in terms of choice sets that single out reasonable alternatives based on the preferences of the voters. In this paper, we consider choice sets whose definition merely relies on the pairwise (...)
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  4.  5
    Logical Consequence and the Theory of Games.Paul Harrenstein - 2004 - Philosophia Scientiae 8 (2):179-193.
    Logical notions of consequence have frequently been related to game-theoretical solution concepts. The correspondence between a formula being classically valid and the existence of a winning strategy for a player in a related two-person game, has been most prominent in this context. We propose a conservative extension of the classical notion of consequence that is based on a generalization of the game-theoretical solution concept of Nash equilibrium.RésuméLes notions logiques de conséquence sont fréquemment reliées à des concepts de solution de la (...)
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  5.  3
    Logical Consequence and the Theory of Games.Paul Harrenstein - 2004 - Philosophia Scientae 8:179-193.
  6.  11
    Hard and Soft Preparation Sets in Boolean Games.Paul Harrenstein, Paolo Turrini & Michael Wooldridge - 2016 - Studia Logica 104 (4):813-847.
    A fundamental problem in game theory is the possibility of reaching equilibrium outcomes with undesirable properties, e.g., inefficiency. The economics literature abounds with models that attempt to modify games in order to avoid such undesirable properties, for example through the use of subsidies and taxation, or by allowing players to undergo a bargaining phase before their decision. In this paper, we consider the effect of such transformations in Boolean games with costs, where players control propositional variables that they can set (...)
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