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Paul Horwich [126]Paul Gordon Horwich [1]
  1.  52
    Truth.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
    Paul Horwich gives the definitive exposition of a prominent philosophical theory about truth, `minimalism'. His theory has attracted much attention since the first edition of Truth in 1990; he has now developed, refined, and updated his treatment of the subject, while preserving the distinctive format of the book. This revised edition appears simultaneously with a new companion volume, Meaning; the two books demystify central philosophical issues, and will be essential reading for all who work on the philosophy of language.
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  2. Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
    What is truth. Paul Horwich advocates the controversial theory of minimalism, that is that the nature of truth is entirely captured in the trivial fact that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true, and that truth is therefore an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. The first edition of Truth, published in 1980, established itself as the best account of minimalism and as an excellent introduction to the debate for students. For this new edition, Horwich has refined and developed (...)
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  3.  82
    Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    In this new book, the author of the classic Truth presents an original theory of meaning, demonstrates its richness, and defends it against all contenders. He surveys the diversity of twentieth-century philosophical insights into meaning and shows that his theory can reconcile these with a common-sense view of meaning as derived from use. Meaning and its companion volume Truth (now published in a revised edition) together demystify two central issues in philosophy and offer a controversial but compelling view of the (...)
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  4.  31
    Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Paul Horwich - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):163-171.
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  5. Reflections on Meaning.Paul Horwich - 2005 - Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.
    Paul Horwich's main aim in Reflections on Meaning is to explain how mere noises, marks, gestures, and mental symbols are able to capture the world--that is, how words and sentences (in whatever medium) come to mean what they do, to stand for certain things, to be true or false of reality. His answer is a groundbreaking development of Wittgenstein's idea that the meaning of a term is nothing more than its use. While the chapters here have appeared as individual essays, (...)
  6. Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism.Huw Price, Simon Blackburn, Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich & Michael Williams - 2013 - Cambridge University Press.
    Pragmatists have traditionally been enemies of representationalism but friends of naturalism, when naturalism is understood to pertain to human subjects, in the sense of Hume and Nietzsche. In this volume Huw Price presents his distinctive version of this traditional combination, as delivered in his René Descartes Lectures at Tilburg University in 2008. Price contrasts his view with other contemporary forms of philosophical naturalism, comparing it with other pragmatist and neo-pragmatist views such as those of Robert Brandom and Simon Blackburn. Linking (...)
     
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  7. Truth -- Meaning -- Reality.Paul Horwich - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
    What is truth? -- Varieties of deflationism -- A defense of minimalism -- The value of truth -- A minimalist critique of Tarski -- Kripke's paradox of meaning -- Regularities, rules, meanings, truth conditions, and epistemic norms -- Semantics : what's truth got to do with it? -- The motive power of evaluative concepts -- Ungrounded reason -- The nature of paradox -- A world without 'isms' -- The quest for reality -- Being and truth -- Provenance of chapters.
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  8.  76
    Asymmetries in Time.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Noûs 24 (5):804-806.
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  9.  85
    Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this influential study of central issues in the philosophy of science, Paul Horwich elaborates on an important conception of probability, diagnosing the failure of previous attempts to resolve these issues as stemming from a too-rigid conception of belief. Adopting a Bayesian strategy, he argues for a probabilistic approach, yielding a more complete understanding of the characteristics of scientific reasoning and methodology. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Colin Howson, illuminating its (...)
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  10. Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy.Paul Horwich - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Paul Horwich presents a bold new interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work. He argues that it is Wittgenstein's radically anti-theoretical metaphilosophy - and not his identification of the meaning of a word with its use - that underpins his discussions of specific issues concerning language, the mind, mathematics, knowledge, art, and religion.
     
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  11.  16
    The Nature of Explanation.Paul Horwich - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (4):583.
  12. The Value of Truth.Paul Horwich - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):347–360.
  13. A Defense Of Minimalism.Paul Horwich - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1):149-165.
    My aim in this paper is to clarify and defend a certain ‘minimalist’ thesis about truth: roughly, that the meaning of the truth predicate is fixed by the schema, ’The proposition that p is true if and only if p’.1 The several criticisms of this idea to which I wish to respond are to be found in the recent work of Davidson, Field, Gupta, Richard, and Soames, and in a classic paper of Dummett’s.
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  14. Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science.Paul Horwich - 1989 - Bradford Books.
    Time is generally thought to be one of the more mysterious ingredients of the universe. In this intriguing book, Paul Horwich makes precise and explicit the interrelationships between time and a large number of philosophically important notions.Ideas of temporal order and priority interact in subtle and convoluted ways with the deepest elements in our network of basic concepts. Confronting this conceptual jigsaw puzzle, Horwich notes that there are glaring differences in how we regard the past and future directions of time. (...)
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  15. Ungrounded Reason.Paul Horwich - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):453-471.
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  16. Meaning, Use and Truth.Paul Horwich - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):355-368.
  17. Being and Truth.Paul Horwich - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):258-273.
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  18. On Some Alleged Paradoxes of Time Travel.Paul Horwich - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (14):432-444.
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  19.  95
    Is Truth a Normative Concept?Paul Horwich - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1127-1138.
    My answer will be ‘no’. And I’ll defend it by: distinguishing a concept’s having normative import from its being functionally normative; sketching a method for telling whether or not a concept is of the latter sort; responding to the antideflationist, Dummettian argument in favor of the conclusion that truth is functionally normative; proceeding to address a less familiar route to that conclusion—one that’s consistent with deflationism about truth, but that depends on the further assumption that meaning is intrinsically normative; and (...)
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  20. World Changes. Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science.Paul Horwich (ed.) - 1993 - MIT Press.
    Thomas Kuhn is viewed as one of the most influential philosophers of science, and this re-release of a classic examination of one of his seminal works reflects his continuing importance. In _World Changes,_ the contributors examine the work of Kuhn from a broad philosophical perspective, comparing earlier logical empiricism and logical positivism with the new philosophy of science inspired by Kuhn in the early 1960s. The nine chapters offer interpretations of his major work _The Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ and subsequent (...)
     
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  21.  39
    Gibbard's Theory of Norms. [REVIEW]Paul Horwich - 1993 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1):67 - 78.
  22.  33
    From a Deflationary Point of View.Paul Horwich - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    "Deflationism" has emerged as one of the most significant developments in contemporary philosophy. It is best known as a story about truth -- roughly, that the traditional search for its underlying nature is misconceived, since there can be no such thing. However, the scope of deflationism extends well beyond that particular topic. For, in the first place, such a view of truth substantially affects what we should say about neighboring concepts such as "reality," "meaning," and "rationality." And in the second (...)
  23. On the Nature and Norms of Theoretical Commitment.Paul Horwich - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (1):1-14.
    It is not uncommon for philosophers to maintain that one is obliged to believe nothing beyond the observable consequences of a successful scientific theory. This doctrine is variously known as instrumentalism, fictionalism, constructive empiricism, theoretical skepticism and the philosophy of "as if". The purpose of the present paper is to subject such forms of scientific antirealism to a two-pronged critique. In the first place it is argued that there is no genuine difference between believing a theory and being disposed to (...)
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  24.  13
    Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science.Richard Healey & Paul Horwich - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (1):125.
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  25. The Minimalist Conception of Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.), Truth. Oxford University Press.
  26. Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2):161-166.
     
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  27.  99
    Implicit Definition, Analytic Truth, and Aprior Knowledge.Paul Horwich - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):423-440.
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  28. Three Forms of Realism.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Synthese 51 (2):181 - 201.
  29.  22
    Wittgenstein on Truth and Meaning.Paul Horwich - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):285-298.
    ABSTRACTMy topic is Wittgenstein’s eventual abandonment of his Tractatus idea that a sentence is true if and only if it depicts a possible fact that obtains, and his coming...
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  30. Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1985 - Erkenntnis 23 (2):213-219.
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  31. What’s Truth Got to Do with It?Paul Horwich - 2008 - Linguistics and Philosophy 31 (3):309-322.
    This paper offers a critique of mainstream formal semantics. It begins with a statement of widely assumed adequacy conditions: namely, that a good theory must (1) explain relations of entailment, (ii) show how the meanings of complex expressions derive from the meanings of their parts, and (iii) characterize facts of meaning in truth-theoretic terms. It then proceeds to criticize the orthodox conception of semantics that is articulated in these three desiderata. This critique is followed by a sketch of an alternative (...)
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  32. Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 47 (4):687-688.
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  33. On the Existence of Time, Space and Space-Time.Paul Horwich - 1978 - Noûs 12 (4):397-419.
  34. The Quest for REALITY.Paul Horwich - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (1):5–16.
    A widespread concern within philosophy has been, and continues to be, to determine which domains of discourse address real, robust, not‐merely‐deflationary facts, and which do not. But a threat to the legitimacy of this concern is the extreme lack of consensus amongst philosophers on the question of how to tell whether or not a given domain is oriented towards ‘robust reality’. The present paper criticizes Kit Fine’s attempt to settle that question. This discussion is followed by some considerations suggesting that (...)
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  35. Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):659-660.
     
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  36.  46
    Norms of Truth and Meaning.Paul Horwich - 2000 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47:19-34.
    It is widely held that the normativity of truth and meaning puts a severe constraint on acceptable theories of these phenomena. This constraint is so severe, some would say, as to rule out purely ‘naturalistic’ or ‘factual’ accounts of them. In particular, it is commonly supposed that the deflationary view of truth and the use conception of meaning, in so far as they are articulated in entirely non-normative terms, must for that reason be inadequate.
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  37. The Essence of Expressivism.Paul Horwich - 1994 - Analysis 54 (1):19 - 20.
    It is argued, in light of the deflationist conception of truth, that expressivism (emotivism, non-cognitivism) about ethical pronouncements should be formulated merely as the thesis that such pronouncements are expressions of desire, and should not incorporate the further thesis (traditionally associated with expressivism) that they have no truth value.
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  38.  54
    The Sharpness of Vague Terms.Paul Horwich - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (1):83--92.
  39.  88
    Deflating Compositionality.Paul Horwich - 2001 - Ratio 14 (4):369–385.
  40.  2
    Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (4):547.
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  41.  81
    Realism and Truth.Paul Horwich - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:187 - 197.
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  42. How to Choose Between Empirically Indistinguishable Theories.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):61-77.
  43.  1
    Theory and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (12):775-781.
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  44. Wittgenstein's Definition of 'Meaning' as 'Use'.Paul Horwich - 2010 - In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
     
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  45. A Minimalist Critique of Tarski on Truth.Paul Horwich - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter contrasts Alfred Tarski's compositional conception (whereby the truth-values of sentences are explained in terms of the referential characteristics of their component words) unfavorably with minimalism (which relies merely on the schema, ‘(p) is true ↔ p’). First, it argues against Tarski that his approach is: (i) misdirected, insofar as it doesn't elucidate our actual concept of truth, which applies to propositions rather than sentences; (ii) ill-motivated, insofar as it reflects an insistence on explicit definitions; (iii) not generally workable, (...)
     
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  46.  67
    The Composition of Meanings.Paul Horwich - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (4):503-532.
    Let me start with an example. Presumably our understanding of the sentence ‘dogs bark’ arises somehow from our understanding of its components and our appreciation of how they are combined. That is to say, ‘dogs bark’ somehow gets its meaning from the meanings of the two words ‘dog’ and ‘bark’, from the meaning of the generalization schema ‘ns v’, and from the fact that the sentence results from placing those words in that schema in a certain order. However, as Davidson (...)
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  47. What is It Like to Be a Deflationary Theory of Meaning?Paul Horwich - 1994 - Philosophical Issues 5:133-154.
    Russian translation of Horwich P. What Is It Like to Be a Deflationary Theory of Meaning? // Philosophical Issues, 5, 1994. Translated by Lev Lamberov with kind permission of the author.
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  48. The Frege‐Geach Point.Paul Horwich - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):78–93.
  49. A Use Theory of Meaning.Paul Horwich - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):351–372.
    How should we go about identifying the particular non-semantic property of a given word that is responsible for its meaning? And what sort of property will that turn out to be? The use theory, as I want to develop it, offers answers to these questions. It begins with the observation that the meaning of a word is a common factor in the explanations of its various occurrences and proceeds to argue, on that basis, that each word means what it does (...)
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  50.  65
    Chomsky Versus Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction.Paul Horwich - 1991 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92:95 - 108.
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