Die Stellung Otto Neuraths zur Deutschen Schulsoziologie der Zwanziger und Dreißiger Jahre wkd dargestellt, zum Teü anhand von Zitaten aus seinen Schriften, zum Teü anhand von Auszügen aus Briefen an seinen Sohn, in denen er gegen dessen Wunsch, Soziologie zu studieren, argumentiert. Hauptargument: daß Soziologie kein "Fach" mit einem einigermaßen klar definierten Wissen sei, das man durch systematisches Studium erwerben und in dem man dann einem gesellschaftlich anerkannten Beruf nachgehen kann. Die Briefe enthalten einiges über Otto Neuraths, wie er sagt, (...) etwas zufälligen Weg zu den Sozialwissenschaften. (shrink)
Die Stellung Otto Neuraths zur Deutschen Schulsoziologie der Zwanziger und Dreißiger Jahre wkd dargestellt, zum Teü anhand von Zitaten aus seinen Schriften, zum Teü anhand von Auszügen aus Briefen an seinen Sohn, in denen er gegen dessen Wunsch, Soziologie zu studieren, argumentiert. Hauptargument: daß Soziologie kein "Fach" mit einem einigermaßen klar definierten Wissen sei, das man durch systematisches Studium erwerben und in dem man dann einem gesellschaftlich anerkannten Beruf nachgehen kann. Die Briefe enthalten einiges über Otto Neuraths, wie er sagt, (...) etwas zufälligen Weg zu den Sozialwissenschaften. (shrink)
During the interwar period, the encyclopaedia became a popular educative instrument for demonstrating knowledge. Within the field of cultural internationalism, the pioneer of documentation Paul Otlet redefined the encyclopaedia as a documentary product or as we would say today a "multi-media" product. This article discusses the exchange of ideas between Otlet, Patrick Geddes and Otto Neurath and shows how the graphic and scenographic demonstration of encyclopaedic knowledge at the beginning of the twentieth century applied the values of scientiic (...) universalism to programs of international education and cultural reform. (shrink)
The problem of explaining consciousness remains a problem about the meaning of language: the ordinary language of consciousness in which we define and express our sensations, thoughts, dreams and memories. This book argues that the problem arises from a quest that has taken shape over the twentieth century, and that the analysis of history provides new resources for understanding and resolving it. Paul Livingston traces the development of the characteristic practices of analytic philosophy to problems about the relationship of (...) experience to linguistic meaning, focusing on the theories of such philosophers as Carnap, Schlick, Neurath, Husserl, Ryle, Putnam, Fodor and Wittgenstein. Clearly written and avoiding technicalities, this book will be eagerly sought out by professionals and graduate students in philosophy and cognitive science. (shrink)
Some contemporary discussion about the explanation of consciousness substantially recapitulates a decisive debate about reference, knowledge and justification from an earlier stage of the analytic tradition. In particular, I argue that proponents of a recently popular strategy for accounting for an explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal facts – the so-called “phenomenal concept strategy” – face a problem that was originally fiercely debated by Schlick, Carnap, and Neurath. The question that is common to both the older and the contemporary (...) discussion is that of how the presence or presentation of phenomenal experiences can play a role in justifying beliefs or judgments about them. This problem is, moreover, the same as what was classically discussed as the problem of acquaintance. Interestingly, both physicalist and non-physicalist proponents of the phenomenal concept strategy today face this problem. I consider briefly some recent attempts to solve it and conclude that, although it is prima facie very plausible that acquaintance exists, we have, as yet, no good account of it. (shrink)
In philosophy, old theories never die, they just hibernate. For many years, no philosophical approach could have been more out of date than that of the British Hegelians: Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet. No theory has been “refuted” more often than their coherence account of truth, both as a definition of truth and as a criterion of truth. Coherence did enjoy a brief renaissance during the early days of logical positivism. Neurath put forth such an account. Carnap, during one of (...) his many periods, came under the influence of Neurath’s brand of physicalism and Carl Hempel defended the coherence view against the criticisms of Schlick, among others. (shrink)
The present article-based dissertation is a contribution to a historical and systematic recon- struction of Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy. Building on previous work on the same subject, this thesis continues a research effort exploring Feyerabend’s early ties to scientific philoso- phy, in particular Logical Empiricism and the Vienna Circle, as well as its continued effects on Feyerabend’s later philosophy. The main claim is that Feyerabend’s formative years in Vienna (1946-1955) happened in the context of scientific philosophy and that his early (...) philosophi- cal proposals should be interpreted as a critical contribution within this tradition. Secondly, it proposes a framework to connect Feyerabend’s early and later philosophy and explain the theoretical change involved. -/- The first article gives the reader an overview of Feyerabend’s philosophy, introducing key themes of Feyerabend’s writings. -/- The second article deals with the context and interpretation of Feyerabend’s earliest extant essay (1948) and identifies an early stage of Feyerabend’s philosophical formation, possibly preceding his acquaintance with Logical Empiricism, in which positivism as a concept of ”philosophy of physicists” is his primary interest. This helps to build a very fine-grained time sequence of his early philosophical interests and helps to disentangle the notion of scientific philosophy. -/- The third article deals with an objection by Thomas Oberdan to the claim that Feyerabend’s pragmatic theory of observation is a development of earlier proposals by Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath and Karl Popper in the early 1930s. In particular, Oberdan denies that Carnap ever proposed such a theory about protocol sentences. The article argues that Oberdan’s objection fails by reconstructing how such a theory can be found in Carnap’s 1932 writings. Feyerabend’s pragmatic theory of observation is indeed one major point of contact between Logical Empiricism, Feyerabend’s early philosophy and his later ’post-positivist’ philosophy. This completes one main interpretative claim in previous work, namely, that Feyerabend’s pragmatic theory of observation should be seen as a contribution to the project of a ”behavioristics of scholars”. -/- The fourth and last article is dedicated to Feyerabend’s role as a protagonist in the so-called historical turn in the philosophy of science in the 1960s. His early strong opposition and his later adherence to the turn is discussed and an explanation of the change involved is given. To this end I introduce a reconstruction of Feyerabend’s metaphilosophy, a framework called Decision-based Epistemology, and claim that specific changes on the metaphilosophical level can account for prominent changes on the level of Feyerabend’s philosophical contributions. -/- An introduction at the beginning of the collection of articles gives a rationale of the outline, the overall research project and provides more informations on how these articles fit in the overall research project. (shrink)
A new direction in philosophy Between 1920 and 1940 logical empiricism reset the direction of philosophy of science and much of the rest of Anglo-American philosophy. It began as a relatively organized movement centered on the Vienna Circle, and like-minded philosophers elsewhere, especially in Berlin. As Europe drifted into the Nazi era, several important figures, especially Carnap and Neurath, also found common ground in their liberal politics and radical social agenda. Together, the logical empiricists set out to reform traditional (...) philosophy with a new set of doctrines more firmly grounded in logic and science. Criticism and decline Because of Nazi persecution, most of the European adherents of logical empiricism moved to the United States in the late 1930s. During the 1940s, many of their most cherished tenets became targets of criticism from outsiders as well as from within their own ranks. Philosophers of science in the late 1950s and 1960s rejected logical empiricism and, starting in the 1970s, presented such alternative programs such as scientific realism with evolutionary epistemology. A resurgence of interest During the early 1980s, philosophers and historians of philosophy began to study logical empiricism as an important movement. Unlike their predecessors in the 1960s-for whom the debate over logical empiricism now seems to have been largely motivated by professional politics-these philosopher no longer have to take positions for or against logical empiricism. The result has been a more balanced view of that movement, its achievements, its failures, and its influence. Hard-to-find core writings now available This collection makes available a selection of the most influential and representative writings of the logical empiricists, important contemporary criticisms of their doctrines, their responses, as well as the recent reappraisals. Introductions to each volume examine the articles in historical context and provide importantbackground information that is vital to a full understanding of the issues discussed. They outline prevalent trends, identifying leading figures and summarize their positions and reasoning, as well as those of opposing thinkers. (shrink)
This is an important volume for rounding out our understanding of the origins and dimensions of the logical empiricist project. While the existence of a Berlin wing of logical empiricism—personified principally in Hans Reichenbach and Carl G. Hempel—has been well known, in the recent reappraisal literature the spotlight has been firmly on the Vienna Circle. [...] The essays give an expansive sense of the German-Berlin context of the work of not only Reichenbach and Hempel but also their philosophical colleagues Kurt (...) Grelling, Walter Dubislav, and Paul Oppenheim, their philosophical mentors and influences including Leonard Nelson and the Friesian School and Ernst Cassirer, their scientific and mathematical influences including Albert Einstein, David Hilbert, and Bertrand Russell, as well as their scientific colleagues such as Kurt Lewin and Wolfgang Köhler. (shrink)
An international team of four authors, led by distinguished philosopher of science, Nancy Cartwright, and leading scholar of the Vienna Circle, Thomas E. Uebel, have produced this lucid and elegant study of a much-neglected figure. The book, which depicts Neurath's science in the political, economic and intellectual milieu in which it was practised, is divided into three sections: Neurath's biographical background and the socio-political context of his economic ideas; the development of his theory of science; and his legacy (...) as illustrated by his contemporaneous involvement in academic and political debates. Coinciding with the renewal of interest in logical positivism, this is a timely publication which will redress a current imbalance in the history and philosophy of science, as well as making a major contribution to our understanding of the intellectual life of Austro-Germany in the inter-war years. (shrink)
Four distinguished authors have been brought together to produce this elegant study of a much-neglected figure. The book is divided into three sections: Neurath's biographical background and the economic and social context of his ideas; his theory of science; and the development of his role in debates on Marxist concepts of history and his own conception of science. Coinciding with the emerging serious interest in logical positivism, this timely publication will redress a current imbalance in the history and philosophy (...) of science. (shrink)
Neurath's proposal for the form of protocol statements explicates the multiple embedding of a singular sentence as specifying different conditions for the acceptance of such a sentence as a bona fide scientific datum. Before theories are accepted or rejected in the light of such evidence, however, a further condition must be met which Neurath did not formalize. The different conditions are discussed and shown to constitute a naturalistic theory of scientific data and a pragmatic theory of theory acceptance.
I examine the thesis that Otto Neurath anticipated the programme of naturalised epistemology already at the time of the Vienna Circle and consider the relation between Neurath's proposals and those of two contemporary theorists whose research programmes he would thus have broadly anticipated. The thesis is confirmed by reference to Neurath's own writings. The connection between Neurath's programme and the programmes of his two successors considered here, however, is found to be highly indirect in one case (...) and nonexistent in the other — despite their undeniable overlap. (shrink)
The Hans Reichenbach Papers comprise published and unpublished manuscripts, lectures, correspondence, photographs, drawings, and related materials from his early student days until his death. The correspondence contains about 9000 pages to and from Reichenbach; it ranges over his entire career. Those with whom Reichenbach maintained lifelong contact include Rudolf Carnap, Ernst Cassirer, Herbert Feigl, Philip Frank, Carl Hempel, Sidney Hook, Paul Oppenheim and Wolfgang Pauli. In addition, there is significant correspondence with von Astor, Bergmann, Bertalanffy, Dingler, Dubislav, Einstein, Fraenkel, (...) Frank, Freundlich, Grelling, Grünbaum, Paul Hertz, Hutten, Jordan, Landé, von Laue, Lewin, C.I. Lewis, Charles Morris, Nagel, Neurath, Northrop, Planck, Quine, Regener, Rougier, Salmon, Schillp, Schlick, Scholz, Schrödinger, Martin Strauss, Tarski, Vaihinger, Weiss, Williams, Zawarski, and Zilsel. The correspondence provides a valuable source of information about Reichenbach’s personal and philosophical development. It also provides primary source material for research into one of the 20th century most influential philosophical movements. Reichenbach’s manuscripts include many of his own notes as a student. Some go as far back as his university days in science and mathematics. Some of the most significant of these notes are those taken by him as a student of Albert Einstein on the special and general theories of relativity. There are four such notebooks dating from 1918. In addition there are his student notes on astronomy, Planck and electricity, Hilbert’s “Statistical Mechanics” and “Problems and Principles.” He also kept many of his lecture notes from Germany, Turkey, and the United States. The number of lectures runs to over 100 and provides a glimpse into the problems of philosophy and how he presented them to his students. Many of his lectures discussed principles of radio and issues in philosophy and modern science, often in form of popularizations of questions in relativity and quantum theory delivered on radio programs for a wider audiences. In addition to this there are an abundance of notes, calculations, and diagrams used to draft both published and unpublished papers. (shrink)
W. V. Quine is arguably the intellectual father of contemporary naturalism, the idea that there is no distinctively philosophical perspective on reality. Yet, even though Quine has always been a science-minded philosopher, he did not adopt a fully naturalistic perspective until the early 1950s. In this paper, I reconstruct the genesis of Quine’s ideas on the relation between science and philosophy. Scrutinizing his unpublished papers and notebooks, I examine Quine’s development in the first decades of his career. After identifying three (...) commitments supporting his naturalism—viz. empiricism, holism, and realism—I piece together the evolution of Quine’s position by examining the origins of these commitments one by one, showing how his early views gradually evolved into the mature naturalistic position that would have such an enormous impact on post-war analytic philosophy. (shrink)
Otto Neurath's thesis concerning the structure of protocol sentences is central to the famous Protocol Sentence Debate in the Vienna Circle. However, its precise nature is far from easy to discern in Neurath's writings. So far, only Thomas Uebel has attempted a closer analysis of Neurath's contribution to the debate. I argue that Uebel's interpretation is problematic in some respects and propose a novel analysis, which hopefully brings into a clearer light Neurath's position in the Protocol (...) Sentence Debate as well as his relevance to contemporary philosophies of science. (shrink)
In this article, I aim to reconstruct Otto Neurath’s naturalistic program for practical philosophy. This program, which he calls “felicitology,” was intended as a version of ethics suitable for the “scientific worldview” of the logical empiricists. I begin by situating Neurath’s ethical concerns in the context of the debate between his fellow Austro-Marxists and the Marburg neo-Kantians. I then show why, contrary to many logical empiricists, Neurath thought that ethical considerations had an important role to play in (...) scientific inquiry. I argue that this conclusion follows from his contribution to the protocol-sentence debate of the early 1930s. Finally, I show how Neurath’s advocacy of unified science, democratic socialism, a world economy, and his method of visual learning all relate to his program for felicitology. (shrink)
The term ‘Continental philosophy’ designates not philosophy on the continent of Europe as a whole, but rather a selective slice of Franco-German philosophy. Through a critical analysis of the arguments advanced by Otto Neurath, the paper addresses the issue of why Austrian philosophers in particular are not counted in the pantheon of Continental philosophers. Austrian philosophy is marked by the predominance of philosophical analysis and of the philosophy of science. The paper concludes that it is not Austria which is (...) the special case when seen against the background of contemporary mainstream philosophy, but rather Germany and France. (shrink)
Four distinguished authors have been brought together to produce this elegant study of a much-neglected figure. The book is divided into three sections: Neurath's biographical background and the economic and social context of his ideas; his theory of science; and the development of his role in debates on Marxist concepts of history and his own conception of science. Coinciding with the emerging serious interest in logical positivism, this timely publication will redress a current imbalance in the history and philosophy (...) of science. (shrink)
Carnap is still often portrayed as a “representationalist.” While the genealogy of this prejudice may not actually go back to Neurath’s response to Carnap’s embrace of Tarskian semantics, there is a continuity of motivation and rhetoric. However, based on a reading of the later Neurath-Carnap correspondence reproduced in this volume, it would appear that the apparent dispute between them over semantics really was largely terminological, with certain differences of emphasis amplified by personality differences and the long interruption of (...) personal contact due to the war. Their conceptions of a language of science can be reconciled. Carnap was neither a representationalist nor an anti-representationalist nor an inferentialist, since ultimately to embrace one of these positions is to endorse an “order of explanation” or ontological primacy, and Carnap rejected ontology. (shrink)
In this paper I introduce a broader context, and sketch an integrated account with the purpose of examining the significance of Neurath’s attention to logic in early works and subsequent positions. The specific attention to algebraic logic is important in integrating his own interest in mathematics and combining, since Leibniz, the ideals of a universal language and of a calculus of reasoning. The interest in universal languages constitutes a much broader, so-called tradition of pasigraphy that extended beyond philosophical projects. (...) I argue that Neurath’s works can be embedded in a richer intellectual landscape that includes developments in logic and their local reception in Vienna, and that his attention to logic developed a sustained symbolic standpoint – with semiotic and typographic expressions –; that specific aspects of the work in algebraic logic became a standard and a resource in subsequent work often thought independent, while its value was steadily challenged by the separate goal of empirical theorizing and practical application in social domains – including in the areas of economics, history and visual communication –; that, in particular, the presentation of systems of algebraic logic by Neurath’s sources such as Stanley Jevons and Schröder was not isolated from discussions of political economy; and finally that some of his positions in matters of language, unity and epistemology in the articulation of logical empiricism and its debates are better understood in terms of shared but diversified acquaintance with pasigraphy, formal standards and logical projects. (shrink)
Otto Neurath presents a very different picture from that of the standard logical positivist: not only with his mature theory of science, but also with his intellectual development. Given Neurath’s contribution to “the” philosophy of the Vienna Circle, the roots of logical empiricism must accordingly be located not only where they have long been recognized to lie, namely in the stunning advances of physical science and logic and mathematics in the late 19th and early 20th century, but also (...) in the comparatively less satisfying state of social science at the time. Neurath’s non-reductively naturalistic theory of science may be understood as much as a response to the state of early 20th century social science as, say, Carnap’s logically oriented rational reconstructionism may be understood as a response to the advances of the then new physics and new logic. (shrink)
