59 found
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  1.  47
    Another Defence of Owen’s Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):147-153.
    David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appeal to other deliberative contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this response to Owens failed (...)
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  2.  63
    A Defence of Owens' Exclusivity Objection to Beliefs Having Aims.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):453-457.
    In this paper we argue that Steglich-Petersen’s response to Owens’ Exclusivity Objection does not work. Our first point is that the examples Steglich-Petersen uses to demonstrate his argument do not work because they employ an undefended conception of the truth aim not shared by his target (and officially eschewed by Steglich-Petersen himself). Secondly we will make the point that deliberating over whether to form a belief about p is not part of the belief forming process. When an agent enters into (...)
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  3. Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):426-455.
    A number of philosophers have argued in favour of the Dependency Thesis: if a subject sensorily imagines an F then he or she sensorily imagines from the inside perceptually experiencing an F in the imaginary world. They claim that it explains certain important features of imaginative experience, in brief: the fact that it is perspectival, the fact that it does not involve presentation of sensory qualities and the fact that mental images can serve a number of different imaginings. I argue (...)
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  4. Prospects for a Counterfactual Theory of Causation.Paul Noordhof - 2004 - In Phil Dowe & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World. Routledge.
     
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  5.  31
    Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument: A Response to Kim.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):115-18.
  6. In Defence of Influence?Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Analysis 61 (4):323–327.
    there is a substantial range of C1, C2, … of different not-too- distant alterations of C and a range E1, E2, of alterations of E, at least some of which differ, such that if C1 had occurred, E1 would have occurred, if C2 had occurred, E2 would have occurred and so on (Lewis 2000).
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  7.  85
    Tooley on Backward Causation.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Analysis 63 (2):157–162.
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  8.  73
    Probabilistic Causation, Preemption and Counterfactuals.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Mind 108 (429):95-125.
    Counter factual theories of Causation have had problems with cases of probabilistic causation and preemption. I put forward a counterfactual theory that seems to deal with these problematic cases and also has the virtue of providing an account of the alleged asymmetry between hasteners and delayers: the former usually being counted as causes, the latter not. I go on to consider a new type of problem case that has not received so much attention in the literature, those I dub catalysts (...)
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  9.  4
    Micro-Based Properties and the Supervenience Argument: A Response to Kim: Discussion.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):109-114.
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  10.  33
    Making the Change: The Functionalist's Way.Paul Noordhof - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):233-50.
    The paper defends Functionalism against the charge that it would make mental properties inefficacious. It outlines two ways of formulating the doctrine that mental properties are Functional properties and shows that both allow mental properties to be efficacious. The first (Lewis) approach takes functional properties to be the occupants of causal roles. Block [1990] has argued that mental properties should not be characterized in this way because it would make them properties of the ?implementing science?, e. g. neuroscience. I show (...)
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  11.  52
    Environment-Dependent Content and the Virtues of Causal Explanation.Paul Noordhof - 2006 - Synthese 149 (3):551-575.
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  12.  92
    Morgenbesser's Coin, Counterfactuals and Independence.Paul Noordhof - 2005 - Analysis 65 (287):261–263.
    In assessing counterfactuals, should we consider circumstances which match the actual circumstances in all probablistically independent fact or all causally independent fact? Jonathan Schaffer argues the latter and claims that the former approach, advanced by me, cannot deal with the case of Morgenbesser’s coin. More generally, he argues that, where there is a difference between the two, his account yields our intuitive verdicts about the truth of counterfactuals where mine does not (Schaffer 2004: 307, n. 16). In this brief note, (...)
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  13.  85
    Expressive Perception as Projective Imagining.Paul Noordhof - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (3):329–358.
    I argue that our experience of expressive properties (such as the joyfulness or sadness of a piece of music) essentially involves the sensuous imagination (through simulation) of an emotion-guided process which would result in the production of the properties which constitute the realisation of the expressive properties experienced. I compare this proposal with arousal theories, Wollheim’s Freudian account, and other more closely related theories appealing to imagination such as Kendall Walton’s. I explain why the proposal is most naturally developed in (...)
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  14.  42
    Do Tropes Resolve the Problem of Mental Causation?Paul Noordhof - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):221-26.
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  15. Outsmarting the McKinsey-Brown Argument?Paul Noordhof - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):48-56.
    Externalists about mental content are supposed to face the following dilemma. Either they must give up the claim that we have privileged access to our own mental states or they must allow that we have privileged access to the world. The dilemma is posed in its most precise form through the McKinsey-Brown argument (McKinsey 1991; Brown 1995). Over the years since it was ?rst published in 1991, our understanding of the precise character of the premisses which constitute the argument has (...)
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  16.  58
    Causation by Content?Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (3):291-320.
  17. More in Pain.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):153-154.
    made with any ambitions for ontological reduction (e.g. denying that there are pains but only states of having pain). So I'm afraid that Tye's objections deriving from attributing to me such a view and pointing out that Representationalism is needed to capture, amongst other things, the fact that we experience pains in phantom limbs are all beside the point. Instead, the question is entirely a matter of whether the inferences mentioned in my original paper and Tye's reply fail because, although (...)
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  18.  38
    Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):75-100.
    I argue that the extant theories of self-deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self-deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for Interpretism. Principles of reasoning—in particular, the requirement of (...)
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  19. Mental Causation : Ontology and Patterns of Variation.Paul Noordhof - 2013 - In Sophie C. Gibb & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Mental Causation and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
  20.  35
    A Coherentist Response to Stoneham's Reductio.Paul Noordhof - 2007 - Analysis 67 (295):267–268.
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  21.  83
    Problems for the M-Set Analysis of Causation.Paul Noordhof - 1998 - Mind 107 (426):457-463.
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  22.  65
    Believe What You Want.Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-265.
    The Uncontrollability Thesis is that it is metaphysically impossible consciously to believe that p at will. I review the standard ways in which this might be explained. They focus on the aim or purpose of belief being truth. I argue that these don't work. They either explain the aim in a way which makes it implausible that the Uncontrollability Thesis is true, or they fail to justify their claim that beliefs should be understood as aimed at the truth. I further (...)
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  23. Not Old... But Not That New Either: Explicability, Emergence, and the Characterisation of Materialism.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
     
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  24.  81
    Something Like Ability.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Australian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):21-40.
    One diagnosis of what is wrong with the Knowledge Argument rests on the Ability Hypothesis. This couples an ability analysis of knowing what an experience is like together with a denial that phenomenal propositions exist. I argue against both components. I consider three arguments against the existence of phenomenal propositions and find them wanting. Nevertheless I deny that knowing phenomenal propositions is part of knowing what an experience is like. I provide a hybrid account of knowing what an experience is (...)
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  25.  11
    The Essential Instability of Self-Deception.Paul Noordhof - 2009 - Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):45-71.
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  26.  67
    Sungho Choi and the ‘Actual Events’ Clause.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Analysis 62 (273):46–47.
    In order to keep matters brief, I shall assume knowledge of my Mind paper and Sungho Choi’s paper printed before this brief response (Noordhof 1999; Choi 2002). Sungho Choi claims that the example I gave to motivate my formulation of the ‘actual events’ clause fails to motivate it and that the formulation, in fact, contains a redundant element, namely my appeal to supersets. I think he is right that my example doesn’t work. However, I think he is wrong that the (...)
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  27.  18
    Aspects of Psychologism By Tim Crane.Paul Noordhof - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):676-678.
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  28.  12
    Reviews. [REVIEW]Paul Noordhof & Emma Borg - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (5):538–551.
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  29.  16
    Getting Personal: Pietroski's Dualism.Paul Noordhof - manuscript
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  30.  21
    For a (Revised) PCA-Analysis.Jonardon Ganeri, Paul Noordhof & Murali Ramachandran - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):45–47.
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  31.  41
    The Transmogrification of a Posteriori Knowledge: Reply to Brueckner.Paul Noordhof - 2005 - Analysis 65 (285):88-89.
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  32. Do Tropes Resolve the Problem of Mental Causation?Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):221-226.
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  33. Barnes, Annette. Seeing Through Self Deception. [REVIEW]Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Philosophical Books 40:180-183.
     
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  34.  39
    The Overdetermination Argument Versus the Cause-and-Essence Principle--No Contest.Paul Noordhof - 1999 - Mind 108 (430):367-375.
    Scott Sturgeon has claimed to undermine the principal argument for Physicalism, in his words, the view that 'actuality is exhausted by physical reality' (Sturgeon 1998, p. 410). In noting that actuality is exhausted by physical reality, the Physicalist is not claiming that all that there is in actuality are those things identified by physics. Rather the thought is that actuality is made up of all the things identified by physics and anything which is a compound of these things. So there (...)
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  35.  39
    Epiphenomenalism and Causal Asymmetry.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge.
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  36.  26
    Florida Institute for Human and Machine Cognition.Phil Dowe, Paul Noordhof & Clark Glymour - unknown
    For most of the contributions to this volume, the project is this: Fill out “Event X is a cause of event Y if and only if……” where the dots on the right are to be filled in by a claims formulated in terms using any of (1) descriptions of possible worlds and their relations; (2) a special predicate, “is a law;” (3) “chances;” and (4) anything else one thinks one needs. The form of analysis is roughly the same as that (...)
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  37.  28
    Personal Dualism and the Argument From Differential Vagueness.Paul Noordhof - 2002 - Philosophical Papers 31 (1):63-86.
    Abstract In Causing Actions, Pietroski defends a distinctive view of the relationship between mind and body which he calls Personal Dualism. Central to his defence is the Argument from Differential Vagueness. It moves from the claim that mental events have different vagueness of spatiotemporal boundaries from neural events to the claim that mental events are not identical to neural events. In response, I argue that this presupposes an ontological account of vagueness that there is no reason to believe in this (...)
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  38.  27
    More in Pain … 153.Paul Noordhof - manuscript
    In his response, Michael Tye writes as if I reject Representationalism about pain. But in my original paper (Noordhof 2001) I hoped to make clear that I did not. For instance, I remarked that I had sympathy with the position (95) and, on the subsequent page, outlined what I thought the Represen- tationalist should say. My proposal was that when we experience a pain in the finger, the experience is veridical only if the cause of this experience is a disordered (...)
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  39.  22
    The Success of Consciousness.Paul Noordhof - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 7-8):109-127.
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  40.  18
    Ramachandran's Four Counterexamples.Paul Noordhof - 2000 - Mind 109 (434):315-324.
    Murali Ramachandran has kindly provided me with four (alleged) counterexamples to the theory of causation which I recently put forward in Mind (Ramachandran 2000; Noordhof 1999). Space is limited for a response. Since this note will be published Ramachandran's paper, I will not set out the cases he gives. I refer the reader to the appropriate descriptions. I will also presume knowledge of the framework of my paper and just give page references in case this is helpful. I will try (...)
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  41.  6
    Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind, Edited by Simone Gozzano and Francesco Orilia.Paul Noordhof - 2014 - Mind 123 (491):913-916.
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  42.  17
    The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value - by Robert Audi.Paul Noordhof - 2008 - Philosophical Books 49 (2):175-178.
  43.  4
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Paul Noordhof - 1993 - Mind 102 (407):568-571.
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  44. In a State of Pain.Paul Noordhof - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press.
    Michael Tye and I are both Representationalists. Nevertheless, we have managed to disagree about the semantic character of ‘in’ in ‘There is a pain in my fingertip’ (see Noordhof (2001); Tye (2002); Noordhof (2002)). The first section of my commentary will focus on this disagreement. I will then turn to the location of pain. Here, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, there seems to be much more agreement between Tye and me. I restrict myself to three points. First, I argue that Tye has (...)
     
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  45.  2
    XII*-Believe What You Want.Paul Noordhof - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (3):247-266.
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  46.  7
    The Mysterious Grand Properties of Forrest.Paul Noordhof - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1):99 – 101.
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  47.  3
    Book Reviews. [REVIEW]Paul Noordhof - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):568-571.
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  48.  7
    Accidental Associations, Local Potency, and a Dilemma for Dretske.Paul Noordhof - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (2):216-22.
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  49.  6
    Book Review:Human Agency: Language, and Duty, and Value. Philosophical Essays in Honor of J. O. Urmson. Jonathan Dancy, J. M. E. Moravcsik, C. C. W. Taylor. [REVIEW]Paul Noordhof - 1990 - Ethics 100 (2):417-.
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  50.  2
    Causation, Probability, and Chance. [REVIEW]Paul Noordhof - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):855-875.
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