If I have understood Pearson's use of “a practice” correctly my main objection to his project is that it gives the current practices of teaching far too much normative force over the educational beliefs of teachers. While the principles of practical reasoning advocated by Pearson may serve to test the coherence of the various beliefs which are part of current practice, they do not suffice to test the reasonableness of such beliefs. To do this we need, at least for some (...) of these beliefs, to draw upon the resources made available to us by such theoretical practices as psychology, philosophy, history, etc. None of these, of course, nullifies the significance of regarding teaching as a practice. Indeed, such a conception is a forceful reminder that the theoretical practices which are concerned with education need to focus on current teaching practices if they are to guard against the sort of empty rationalism despised by Oakeshott, while saying something to the teaching profession. This will not give us an educational theory, but rather theoretical perspectives on teaching as a practice. (shrink)

Kantian virtue can be construed as a condition of an agent which secures adherence to the requirements of morality in the face of the ever-present possibility of inner conflict with counter-ethical considerations. This paper claims that this conception of virtue does not fit in well with one essential characteristic of the virtuous agent; that he or she is attentive to the well-being of others. After some preliminary remarks about virtue-related evaluations, the paper criticises the Kantian conception of virtue in the (...) light of certain characteristics of ethical attentiveness. The paper concludes by developing a notion of ethical habituation which includes the training of attention. (shrink)