Can there be knowledge and rational belief in the absence of a rational degree of confidence? Yes, and cases of "mistuned knowledge" demonstrate this. In this paper we leverage this normative possibility in support of advancing our understanding of the metaphysical relation between belief and credence. It is generally assumed that a Lockean metaphysics of belief that reduces outright belief to degrees of confidence would immediately effect a unification of coarse-grained epistemology of belief with fine-grained epistemology of confidence. Scott Sturgeon (...) has suggested that the unification is effected by understanding the relation between outright belief and confidence as an instance of the determinable-determinate relation. But determination of belief by confidence would not by itself yield the result that norms for confidence carry over to norms for outright belief unless belief and high confidence are token identical. We argue that this token-identity thesis is incompatible with the neglected phenomenon of “mistuned knowledge”—knowledge and rational belief in the absence of rational confidence. We contend that there are genuine cases of mistuned knowledge and that, therefore, epistemological unification must forego token identity of belief and high confidence. We show how partial epistemological unification can be secured given determination of outright belief by degrees of confidence even without token-identity. Finally, we suggest a direction for the pursuit of thoroughgoing epistemological unification. (shrink)
I explain why, from the perspective of knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology, objective act consequentialist theories of ethics imply skepticism about the moral status of our prospective actions and also tend to be self-defeating, undermining the justification of consequentialist theories themselves. For according to knowledge-centric anti-luck epistemology there are modal anti-luck demands on both knowledge and justification, and it turns out that our beliefs about the moral status of our prospective actions are almost never able to satisfy these demands if objective act (...) consequentialism is true. This kind of applied moral skepticism introduces problematic limits on our ability to use objective act consequentialism’s explanatory power as evidence for its truth. This is, in part, a product of higher-order defeat as I explain in the final section. There is, however, a silver lining for objective act consequentialists. For there is at least one type of objective act consequentialism, prior existence consequentialism, that is poised to avoid at least some of the epistemic problems discussed in this paper. (shrink)
The basing demand on doxastic justification is a widely held and highly intuitive dogma of contemporary epistemology. In Silva [2015, AJP], I argued that the dialectical significance of this dogma is severely limited by our lack of independent grounds for endorsing it. Oliveira [2015, AJP] sought to defend the basing demand on doxastic justification. Here I explain why Oliveira’s attempted defense of the basing demand misses its mark. I also briefly suggest that there is an alternative way of defending (...) the basing demand. The alternative way is reconciliatory: it shows that most epistemologists may have been right to insist on such a demand, but perhaps still wrong to treat it as a dialectically powerful tool in the assessment of certain substantive epistemological theories. (shrink)
While the term ‘glory’ appears most frequently in religious contexts, it is used to express concepts that are not fundamentally religious in character. Take what we consider to be our very best works of art, our most outstanding films, or our most impressive technological achievements. These are often acclaimed as being magnificent, dazzling, or spectacular. These notions are, if not quite synonymous with glory, close enough to justify the idea that the concept of glory is not far removed from common (...) ways of thinking about the world. For this reason, an analysis of glory promises to help illuminate concepts we commonly employ in thinking about highly valued aspects of our world. Nevertheless, concepts of glory also have a central place in religious thought, and even so little-to-no rigorous philosophical effort has been devoted to investigating concepts of glory in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. This paper aims to correct that and use the resulting accounts of glory to illuminate difficulties with a recent argument for atheism by Bayne and Nagasawa. (shrink)
When a belief is self-fulfilling, having it guarantees its truth. When a belief is self-defeating, having it guarantees its falsity. These are the cases of “self-impacting” beliefs to be examined below. Scenarios of self-defeating beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack sufficient reason to have any belief whatsoever. Scenarios of self-fulfilling beliefs can yield apparently dilemmatic situations in which we seem to lack reason to have any one belief over another. Both scenarios have been used (...) independently to challenge Evidentialism, on which what we may rationally believe is all and only what fits our current evidence. Here we tie the two scenarios together and explore what a knowledge-sensitive evidentialist approach to one implies for the other. (shrink)
The expression ‘aware of the fact that’ is a commonplace, not at all a philosopher’s term of art. We often criticize, excuse, admonish, and inform each other by relying on expressions of the form ‘S is (not) aware of the fact that p’ and such uses presuppose the existence of a state of awareness that one can be in or fail to be in with regard to some fact. Here lies the phenomenon of factual awareness. It is conventional in epistemology (...) to treat ‘S is aware of the fact that p’ as either expressing the same thought as ‘S knows that p’ or at least entailing it. As it happens with conventional philosophical views, learning of their failure is often both surprising and theoretically fruitful. This book provides a comprehensive case against the view that factual awareness just is knowledge or even essentially related to knowledge: factual awareness is not identical to, and it does not entail, knowing, being in a position to know, or being capable of knowing. This book provides a systematic exploration of the relation between knowledge and factual awareness, arguing that knowledge is but one species of factual awareness and that we can understand the possession of objective reasons, the normativity of knowledge, and the nature of knowledge in terms of factual awareness. In this way, the state of factual awareness is, structurally and substantively, a more basic type of state than knowledge. If correct, this undermines a number of ways in which knowledge has been regarded as ‘first’ in recent epistemology. (shrink)
The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification has been of undisputed theoretical importance in a wide range of contemporary epistemological debates. Yet there are a host of intimately related issues that have rarely been discussed in connection with this distinction. For instance, the distinction not only applies to an individual’s beliefs, but also to group beliefs and to various other attitudes that both groups and individuals can take: credence, commitment, suspension, faith, and hope. Moreover, discussions of propositional and doxastic justification (...) have rarely focused on broader meta-epistemological issues, and yet meta-epistemological positions can have important implications for first-order views about this distinction. This volume addresses these and other issues by bringing together 16 essays that advance the state-of-the-art thinking on propositional and doxastic justification and explore how such thinking shapes and is shaped by a range of issues previously neglected in contemporary epistemology. (shrink)
A comunicação tem como propósito uma análise comparativa sobre o problema filosófico da arte como expressão de verdade, tendo em vista o idealismo platônico e o idealismo estético moderno de G.W.Hegel. Parte-se da hipótese que a presente análise sustenta uma relação paradoxal entre ambas propostas idealistas, na medida em que se em Platão é afirmada a tese da arte como distanciamento da verdade, considerando o seu caráter essencialmente mimético, em Hegel, a arte ao constituir-se como momento de realização efetiva do (...) Espírito só pode ser assim compreendida a partir do paradigma da ideia, de inspiração platônica. Ressalta-se a compreensão da arte oriunda da teoria metafísica platônica e de sua concepção idealista de aisthesis, bem como o caráter científico da estética, segundo Hegel, cuja fundamentação filosófica reivindica a compreensão da ideia, enquanto razão absoluta que se autodesdobra historicamente e se efetiva nos limites da finitude sensível. Pretende-se mostrar que a pretensa superação hegeliana da concepção idealista platônica acerca da arte não pode prescindir do fundamento do platonismo - a idéia universal, o infinito.: The Communication aims a comparative analysis on the philosophical problem of the art as an expression of truth, considering the Platonic idealism and the modern esthetic idealism from Hegel. The starting point is the assumption that this analysis holds a paradoxical relationship between both idealistic proposals, Insofar as Plato affirms the art thesis as detachment from the truth, considering his character essentially mimetic, Hegel says that the art to establish itself as a moment of effective realization from the Spirit can only be understood from the paradigm of the idea, of Platonic inspiration. We emphasize the art understanding coming from the Platonic metaphysics theory and his idealistic conception of aisthesis, as well as the scientific character of aesthetics, according to Hegel, whose philosophical foundation claims the understanding of the idea, as absolute reason that self unfolds historically carries up within the limits of finitude sensitive. It is intended to show that the Hegelian overcoming supposed from Platonic idealist conception about the art can not prescind from foundation of Platonism - the universal idea, the infinity. Keywords: Plato, Hegel, Idea, art, truth,idealism. (shrink)
Discute-se a importância da tese do fim da arte, anunciada por Hegel em suas Preleções sobre a estética, como condição de possibilidade para uma reflexão hermenêutico-filosófica sobre a atualidade do belo. Mesmo considerando-se o conjunto de críticas hermenêuticas dirigidas à estética hegeliana, quando se trata de pensar a arte moderna a tese do “ fim da arte” sobressai como paradigmática, seja no que se refere a interpretação das mudanças das configurações artísticas, seja no tocante à sua ressignificação enquanto um acontecimento (...) e experiência de verdade. Ora, mas o que justifica o diálogo de Gadamer com Hegel quando se trata de pensar a atualidade do belo? Em que medida a tese hegeliana do fim da arte, em seu caráter paradigmático, é compatível com a reflexão hermenêutica da arte como experiência que acontece no médium da linguagem e sob a vigilância da efetividade histórica? Se, por um lado, a sentença do “ fim da arte”, ou mesmo caráter pretérito da arte, nos remete a pensar em sua insuficiência enquanto darstellung, convertendo-a em objeto do pensamento, ou mesmo em sua dissolução em favor da religião e da filosofia, o que no idealismo estético hegeliano apenas pode ser entendido no devir histórico da Ideia; por outro, a referida tese possibilita uma reflexão filosófica da arte que, por sua vez, reivindica uma pretensão de verdade diferente da tradicional. Eis porque, na compreensão gadameriana, a tese hegeliana do caráter passado da arte corresponde a uma pré-formulação acerca de nossas questões sobre a arte quando se trata de repensarmos a atualidade do belo. Ressalta-se que o diálogo hermenêutico entre Gadamer e Hegel só é possível pela evidência de uma proximidade a partir da diferença, e pelo reconhecimento de que em ambos o domínio do belo artístico é tomado enquanto uma declaração atualizada de verdade. (shrink)
A comunicação tem como propósito uma análise comparativa sobre o problema filosófico da arte como expressão de verdade, tendo em vista o idealismo platônico e o idealismo estético moderno de G.W.Hegel. Parte-se da hipótese que a presente análise sustenta uma relação paradoxal entre ambas propostas idealistas, na medida em que se em Platão é afirmada a tese da arte como distanciamento da verdade, considerando o seu caráter essencialmente mimético, em Hegel, a arte ao constituir-se como momento de realização efetiva do (...) Espírito só pode ser assim compreendida a partir do paradigma da ideia, de inspiração platônica. Ressalta-se a compreensão da arte oriunda da teoria metafísica platônica e de sua concepção idealista de aisthesis, bem como o caráter científico da estética, segundo Hegel, cuja fundamentação filosófica reivindica a compreensão da ideia, enquanto razão absoluta que se autodesdobra historicamente e se efetiva nos limites da finitude sensível. Pretende-se mostrar que a pretensa superação hegeliana da concepção idealista platônica acerca da arte não pode prescindir do fundamento do platonismo - a idéia universal, o infinito. (shrink)
Knowledge-first theories of justification give knowledge priority when it comes to explaining when and why someone has justification for an attitude or an action. The emphasis of this entry is on knowledge-first theories of justification for belief. As it turns out there are a number of ways of giving knowledge priority when theorizing about justification, and in what follows I offer an opinionated survey of more than a dozen existing options that have emerged in the last two decades since the (...) publication of Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and Its Limits. I first trace several of the general theoretical motivations that have been offered for putting knowledge first in the theory of justification. I then go on to examine existing knowledge-first theories of justification and their standing objections. These objections are largely, but not exclusively, concerned with the extensional adequacy of knowledge-first theories of justification. There are doubtless more ways of giving knowledge priority in the theory of justification than I cover here, but the resulting survey will be instructive as it highlights potential shortcomings that would-be knowledge-first theorists of justification may wish either to avoid or else to be prepared with a suitable error theory. (shrink)
Various sexist and racist beliefs ascribe certain negative qualities to people of a given sex or race. Epistemic allies are people who think that in normal circumstances rationality requires the rejection of such sexist and racist beliefs upon learning of many counter-instances, i.e. members of these groups who lack the target negative quality. Accordingly, epistemic allies think that those who give up their sexist or racist beliefs in such circumstances are rationally responding to their evidence, while those who do not (...) are irrational in failing to respond to their evidence by giving up their belief. This is a common view among philosophers and non-philosophers. But epistemic allies face three problems. First, sexist and racist beliefs often involve generic propositions. These sorts of propositions are notoriously resilient in the face of counter-instances since the truth of generic propositions is typically compatible with the existence of many counter-instances. Second, background beliefs can enable one to explain away counter-instances to one’s beliefs. So even when counter-instances might otherwise constitute strong evidence against the truth of the generic, the ability to explain the counter-instances away with relevant background beliefs can make it rational to retain one’s belief in the generic despite the existence of many counter-instances. The final problem is that the kinds of judgements epistemic allies want to make about the irrationality of sexist and racist beliefs upon encountering many counter-instances is at odds with the judgements that we are inclined to make in seemingly parallel cases about the rationality of non-sexist and non-racist generic beliefs. Thus epistemic allies may end up having to give up on plausible normative supervenience principles. All together, these problems pose a significant prima facie challenge to epistemic allies. In what follows I explain how a Bayesian approach to the relation between evidence and belief can neatly untie these knots. The basic story is one of defeat: Bayesianism explains when one is required to become increasingly confident in chance propositions, and confidence in chance propositions can make belief in corresponding generics irrational. (shrink)
Certain plausible evidential requirements and coherence requirements on rationality seem to yield dilemmas of rationality (in a specific, objectionable sense) when put together with the possibility of misleading higher-order evidence. Epistemologists have often taken such dilemmas to be evidence that we’re working with some false principle. In what follows I show how one can jointly endorse an evidential requirement, a coherence requirement, and the possibility of misleading higher-order evidence without running afoul of dilemmas of rationality. The trick lies in observing (...) the difference between attitudes it is rational to hold (= propositional justification) and rationally holding those attitudes (= doxastic justification). (shrink)
ABSTRACTWhat conditions must be satisfied if a group is to count as having a justified belief? Jennifer Lackey has recently argued that any adequate account of group justification must be sensitive to both the evidence actually possessed by enough of a group's operative members as well as the evidence those members should have possessed. I first draw attention to a range of objections to Lackey's specific view of group justification and a range of concrete case intuitions any plausible view of (...) group justification must explain. I then offer an alternative view of group justification where the basic idea is that group justification is a matter of groups responsibly responding to their total evidence. This view both avoids the problems facing Lackey's account and also explains the relevant concrete case intuitions. (shrink)
According to an orthodox account of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, basing one’s belief in P on one’s source of propositional justification to believe P suffices for having a doxastically justified belief. But in an increasingly recognized work Turri argues that this thesis fails and proposes a new view according to which having propositional justification depends on having the ability to acquire doxastic justification. Turri’s novel position has surprisingly far-reaching epistemological consequences, ruling out some common epistemological positions that (...) afford one propositional justification in the absence of an ability to acquire doxastic justification. In what follows I show Turri’s novel position to be problematic and go on to suggest a more modest revision to orthodoxy. The first section presents the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification and Turri’s counterexample to it. The second section introduces Turri’s novel view of that relationship and draws out some of its epistemological implications. The third section gives counterexamples to Turri’s proposal. The fourth section defends a modest revision to orthodoxy. (shrink)
According to many, to have epistemic justification to believe P is just for it to be epistemically permissible to believe P. Others think it is for believing P to be epistemically good. Yet others think it has to do with being epistemically blameless in believing P. All such views of justification encounter problems. Here, a new view of justification is proposed according to which justification is a kind of composite normative status. The result is a view of justification that offers (...) hope of solving some longstanding epistemological problems. (shrink)
I provide a novel knowledge-first account of justification that avoids the pitfalls of existing accounts while preserving the underlying insight of knowledge-first epistemologies: that knowledge comes first. The view I propose is, roughly, this: justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (know-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). I first refine my thesis in response to immediate objections. In subsequent sections I explain the various ways in which this thesis is theoretically superior to existing knowledge-first accounts of justification. The (...) upshot is a virtue-theoretic, knowledge-first view of justification that is internalist-friendly and able to explain more facts about justification than any other available view. (shrink)
The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification is the distinction between having justification to believe P (= propositional justification) versus having a justified belief in P (= doxastic justification). The focus of this paper is on doxastic justification and on what conditions are necessary for having it. In particular, I challenge the basing demand on doxastic justification, i.e., the idea that one can have a doxastically justified belief only if one’s belief is based on an epistemically appropriate reason. This demand (...) has been used to refute versions of coherentism and conservatism about perceptual justification as well as to defend phenomenal “conservatism” and other views besides. In what follows I argue that there is virtually no reason to think there is a basing demand on doxastic justification. I also argue that even if the basing demand were true, it would still fail to serve the dialectical purposes for which it has been employed in arguments concerning coherentism, conservatism, and phenomenal “conservatism”. I conclude by discussing the fact that knowledge has a basing demand and show why this needn’t raise the same sort of problems for coherentism and conservatism that doxastic justification’s basing demand seemed to. (shrink)
In order for a reason to justify an action or attitude it must be one that is possessed by an agent. Knowledge-centric views of possession ground our possession of reasons, at least partially, either in our knowledge of them or in our being in a position to know them. On virtually all accounts, knowing P is some kind of non-accidental true belief that P. This entails that knowing P is a kind of non-accidental true representation that P. I outline a (...) novel theory of the epistemic requirement on possession in terms of this more general state of non-accidental true representation. It is just as well placed to explain the motivations behind knowledge-centric views of possession, and it is also better placed to explain the extent of the reasons we possess in certain cases of deductive belief-updates and cases involving environmental luck. I conclude with three reflections. First, I indicate how my arguments generate a dilemma for Errol Lord’s view that possessing reasons is just a matter of being in a position to manifest one’s knowledge how to use them. Second, I explain how my view can simultaneously manage cases of environmental luck without falling prey to lottery cases. Finally, I sketch the direction for a further range of counterexamples to knowledge-centric theories of possession. (shrink)
The special composition question asks, roughly, under what conditions composition occurs. The common sense view is that composition only occurs among some things and that all and only ‘ordinary objects’ exist. Peter van Inwagen has marshaled a devastating argument against this view. The common sense view appears to commit one to giving what van Inwagen calls a ‘series-style answer’ to the special composition question, but van Inwagen argues that series-style answers are impossible because they are inconsistent with the transitivity of (...) parthood. In what follows I answer this objection in addition to other, less troubling objections raised by van Inwagen. (shrink)
There are two different kinds of enkratic principles for belief: evidential enkratic principles and normative enkratic principles. It’s frequently taken for granted that there’s not an important difference between them. But evidential enkratic principles are undermined by considerations that gain no traction at all against their normative counterparts. The idea that such an asymmetry exists between evidential and normative enkratic principles is surprising all on its own. It is also something that calls out for explanation. Similarly, the considerations that undermine (...) evidential enkratic principles also undermine certain narrow-scope evidential principles. This too generates explanatory questions. I show how a knowledge-first view of rationality can easily address these explanatory questions. Thus we have one more reason to put knowledge first in epistemology. (shrink)
Orthodox epistemology tells us that knowledge requires belief. While there has been resistance to orthodoxy on this point, the orthodox position has been ably defended and continues to be widely endorsed. In what follows I aim to undermine the belief requirement on knowledge. I first show that awareness does not require belief. Next I turn my attention to the relation between knowledge and awareness, showing that awareness entails knowledge and thus that the cases of awareness without belief that I discuss (...) are also cases of knowledge without belief. Throughout I draw attention to the fact that these are not isolated cases, and that beliefless knowledge is a rather common phenomenon. I conclude by arguing that beliefless knowledge is consistent with the idea that all knowledge is grounded in belief and the idea that knowledge is essentially a representational state. (shrink)
In this essay, I defend theology against a recent argument made by Peter Byrne. According to Byrne, any discipline of thought that can be interpreted realistically shows the accumulation of reliable or widespread belief about the reality it investigates. I challenge this claim, first, by showing how theology, so construed as an exercise of ‘faith seeking understanding’, can and should be interpreted realistically, even if it does not show the accumulation of reliable or widespread belief about divine reality. Second, I (...) give a plausible account of why theology is beset by internal disagreement and division, even if the goal of theological enquiry is to overcome such disagreement and division. (shrink)
Conservatism about perceptual justification tells us that we cannot have perceptual justification to believe p unless we also have justification to believe that perceptual experiences are reliable. There are many ways to maintain this thesis, ways that have not been sufficiently appreciated. Most of these ways lead to at least one of two problems. The first is an over-intellectualization problem, whereas the second problem concerns the satisfaction of the epistemic basing requirement on justified belief. I argue that there is at (...) least one Conservative view that survives both difficulties, a view which has the further ability to undercut a crucial consideration that has supported Dogmatist views about perceptual justification. The final section explores a tension between Conservatism and the prospects of having a completely general account of propositional justification. Ironically, the problem is that Conservatives seem committed to making the acquisition of propositional justification too easy. My partial defense of Conservatism concludes by suggesting possible solutions to this problem. (shrink)
Many have found it plausible that knowledge is a constitutively normative state, i.e. a state that is grounded in the possession of reasons. Many have also found it plausible that certain cases of proprioceptive knowledge, memorial knowledge, and self-evident knowledge are cases of knowledge that are not grounded in the possession of reasons. I refer to these as cases of basic knowledge. The existence of basic knowledge forms a primary objection to the idea that knowledge is a constitutively normative state. (...) In what follows I offer a way through the apparent dilemma of having to choose between either basic knowledge or the normativity of knowledge. The solution involves homing in on a state of awareness (≈non-accidental true representation) that is distinct from knowledge and which in turn grounds the normativity of knowledge in a way that is fully consistent with the existence of basic knowledge. An upshot of this is that externalist theories of knowledge turn out to be fully compatible with the thesis that knowledgeable beliefs are always beliefs that are justified by the reasons one possesses. (shrink)
Este artigo investiga as mudanças conceituais revolucionárias que ocorreram quando a teoria do flogisto de Stahl foi substituída pela teoria do oxigênio de Lavoisier. Utilizando técnicas extraídas da inteligência artificial, o artigo descreve os estágios cruciais no desenvolvimento conceitual de Lavoisier, de 1772 até 1789. Em seguida, é esboçada uma teoria computacional da mudança conceitual de modo a explicar a descoberta de Lavoisier da teoria do oxigênio e a substituiçáo da teoria do flogisto. Este artigo é uma traduçáo de “The (...) Conceptual Structure of The Chemical Revolution”, publicado originalmente em Philosophy of Science , número 57, p. 183-209, 1990. Todos os direitos do artigo pertencem à revista Philosophy of Science , editada pela University of Chicago Press. O copyright do artigo original é de 1990, da Philosophy of Science Association. Os tradutores agradecem a Paul Thagard e a Philosophy of Science a permissáo para esta traduçáo. [NT.]. (shrink)
An argument is epistemically self-defeating when either the truth of an argument’s conclusion or belief in an argument’s conclusion defeats one’s justification to believe at least one of that argument’s premises. Some extant defenses of the evidentiary value of intuition have invoked considerations of epistemic self-defeat in their defense. I argue that there is one kind of argument against intuition, an unreliability argument, which, even if epistemically self-defeating, can still imply that we are not justified in thinking intuition has evidentiary (...) value. (shrink)
The author – a European “companion” of H. T. Engelhardt during the two last decades of the 20th century – describes his meetings with and impressions of Tris Engelhardt. He clarifies how open mindedness was the main concern in their common activities.
Este ensayo analiza las fuentes de origen medieval y moderno sobre la historia de Y^arba en el Ima-mato rustamí en un intento de aclarar la naturaleza de la relación histórica e historiográfica entre ellos. Se empieza por discutir las fuentes primarias y secundarias disponibles, incluyendo los retos historiográficos que plantean y se presenta a continuación un análisis de las evidencias textuales y arqueológicas que conectan a los rustamíes con Y^arba. Se intenta después sintetizar las piezas dispersas de la evidencia disponible (...) en el registro histórico con el fin de presentar una imagen más clara de Y^arba durante el período rustamí. Con base en esta evidencia textual y arqueológica, se argumentará que Y^arba era hogar de una comunidad iba-dí independiente del gobierno en Ta-hert durante la mayor parte (si no en su totalidad) de la existencia del Ima-mato, distinguiendo así la isla de los alrededores del Y^arid (en el sur de Túnez), partes de la Ifri-qiya Aglabí y el Y^abal Nafu-sa. Se muestra por último que la evidencia sugiere que esta independencia no era solamente política, sino religiosa. (shrink)
In this essay, I discuss and defend Augustine’s and Aquinas’s respective epistemologies of faith. This entails analyzing central claims both thinkers make in order to determine the ways in which the true beliefs about God the faithful form and hold are reasonable as well as properly grounded. In the first two sections of the essay, I highlight what I take to be some of Augustine’s enduring epistemological insights concerning the reasonableness and origins of faith. I read Aquinas’s own account of (...) faith in a distinctly Augustinian light, so in the third section of the essay, I turn to Aquinas to explain more fully how faith-beliefs are adequately or rationally grounded—that is, based on a specifically truth-conducive ground. Like Augustine, Aquinas sees love, or desire more broadly, as an essential component of faith (specifically what Aquinas calls “formed faith”): it is our love of God, infused in our will by God’s grace, that draws us to believe what our intellect also recognizes in the infused “light of faith” to be true revelations from God. In the final section of the essay, I consider and then counter three main objections to my reading of Augustine and Aquinas. Thus, by the end of the essay, I not only discuss some of the main features of the accounts of faith that Augustine and Aquinas respectively offer; I also defend those accounts, as well as the epistemology of faith that I derive from them. (shrink)
In this collection, thirteen prominent philosophers and political scientists address the nature of liberalism, its origins, and its meaning and proper interpretation. Some essays examine the writings of liberalism's earliest defenders, like John Locke and Adam Smith, or the influence of classical liberalism on the American founders. Some focus on the Progressive movement and the rise of the administrative state, while others defend particular conceptions of liberalism or examine liberal theories of justice, including those of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. (...) Several essays discuss the U.S. Constitution, seeking to determine whether it is best viewed as empowering the federal government to achieve certain ends, or as strictly limiting its power to ensure the broadest freedom for individuals to pursue their own ends. Other essays address the limits of economic freedom or focus on the nature and extent of property rights and the government's power of eminent domain. (shrink)
What constitutes a just tax system, and what are its moral foundations? Should a society's tax regime be designed to achieve a just distribution of wealth among its citizens, or should such a regime be designed to promote economic growth, rising standards of living, and increasing levels of employment? Are these two goals compatible or incompatible? Why should justice not require, or at least lead to, an increase in general prosperity? The essays in this volume examine the history of tax (...) policies and the normative principles that have informed the selection of various types of taxes and tax regimes; economic data to discover which tax policies lead to economic growth; particular theories of justice or property rights regarding the design of tax systems; and other essays propose specific tax reforms. Still others challenge traditional theories of taxation, offering new ways of understanding the fiscal relationship between governments and their citizens. (shrink)
Shakespeare's romantic comedies, interpreted in the light of doctrinal material familiar to Shakespeare and his contemporaries, reveal Shakespeare's close and consistent affinity with St. Paul.