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Paul Skokowski [17]Paul G. Skokowski [4]Paul Gregory Skokowski [1]
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Paul Skokowski
Stanford University
  1. I, Zombie.Paul Skokowski - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (1):1-9.
    Certain recent philosophical theories offer the prospect that zombies are possible. These theories argue that experiential contents, or qualia, are nonphysical properties. The arguments are based on the conceivability of alternate worlds in which physical laws and properties remain the same, but in which qualia either differ or are absent altogether. This article maintains that qualia are, on the contrary, physical properties in the world. It is shown how, under the burden of the a posteriori identification of qualia with physical (...)
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  2.  26
    Sensing Qualia.Paul Skokowski - 2022 - Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 16:1-16.
    Accounting for qualia in the natural world is a difficult business, and it is worth understanding why. A close examination of several theories of mind—Behaviorism, Identity Theory, Functionalism, and Integrated Information Theory—will be discussed, revealing shortcomings for these theories in explaining the contents of conscious experience: qualia. It will be argued that in order to overcome the main difficulty of these theories the senses should be interpreted as physical detectors. A new theory, Grounded Functionalism, will be proposed, which retains multiple (...)
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  3. Structural Content: A Naturalistic Approach to Implicit Belief.Paul Skokowski - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (3):362-369.
    Various systems that learn are examined to show how content is carried in connections installed by a learning history. Agents do not explicitly use the content of such states in practical reasoning, yet the content plays an important role in explaining behavior, and the physical state carrying that content plays a role in causing behavior, given other occurrent beliefs and desires. This leads to an understanding of the environmental reasons which are the determinate content of these states, and leads to (...)
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  4. Is the Pain in Jane Felt Mainly in Her Brain?Paul Skokowski - 2007 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 15 (1):58-71.
  5.  74
    Can Computers Carry Content "Inexplicitly"?Paul G. Skokowski - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (3):333-44.
    I examine whether it is possible for content relevant to a computer''s behavior to be carried without an explicit internal representation. I consider three approaches. First, an example of a chess playing computer carrying emergent content is offered from Dennett. Next I examine Cummins response to this example. Cummins says Dennett''s computer executes a rule which is inexplicitly represented. Cummins describes a process wherein a computer interprets explicit rules in its program, implements them to form a chess-playing device, then this (...)
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  6.  30
    Naturalizing the Mind.Paul Skokowski - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (4):452-457.
  7.  29
    Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument.Paul Skokowski - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):287-299.
    It is argued that the knowledge argument fails against externalist theories of mind. Enclosing Mary and cutting her off from some properties denies part of the physical world to Mary, which has the consequence of denying her certain kinds of physical knowledge. The externalist formulation of experience is shown to differ in vehicle, content, and causal role from the internalist version addressed by the knowledge argument, and is supported by results from neuroscience. This means that though the knowledge argument has (...)
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  8.  3
    Information and Mind.Paul Skokowski - 2020 - Stanford, CA, USA: CSLI Press.
    This volume examines a selection of topics that Fred Dretske addressed in his philosophical career. The topics range from one of the earliest problems Dretske analyzed, the nature of seeing an object, to epistemological issues that he worked on from mid-career onwards, to issues he focused on later in his career, including information, mental representation, and conscious experience. The papers in the volume are by former colleagues and students from the University of Wisconsin and Stanford University, and celebrate Dretske’s life (...)
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  9. Introspection and Superposition.Paul Skokowski - 2019 - In J. De Barros & Carlos Montemayor (eds.), Quanta and Mind. Springer Verlag.
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  10. Nachshon Meiran, Bernhard Hommel, Uri Bibi, and Idit Lev. Consciousness and Control in Task.Paul Skokowski, Daniel J. Simons, Christopher F. Chabris, Tatiana Schnur, Daniel T. Levin, Boris Kotchoubey, Andrea Kübler, Ute Strehl, Niels Birbaumer & Jürgen Fell - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10:598.
     
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  11. The Philosophy of Westworld.Paul Skokowski - 2021 - In Cybermedia: New Approaches to Sound, Music and Media. New York, NY, USA: pp. 207-222.
    What exactly does an android experience? Could an android have experiences as rich as humans, or are there limits? The Westworld T V series (Jonathan Noland, 2016- ) offers the opportunity to explore philosophical questions related to human and android experiences through its depiction of a fictional Wild West theme park with androids playing the main characters. Among the most fascinating scenes in the Westworld TV series are the interviews between the android characters Bernard Lowe and Dolores Abernathy. These interviews (...)
     
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  12.  48
    One Philosopher is Correct (Maybe).Paul Skokowski - 2010 - Australian Journal of Logic 9 (1):1-3.
    It is argued that there may be a philosopher who is correct.
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  13.  44
    Networks with Attitudes.Paul Skokowski - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Society 22 (3):461-470.
    Does connectionism spell doom for folk psychology? I examine the proposal that cognitive representational states such as beliefs can play no role if connectionist models - - interpreted as radical new cognitive theories -- take hold and replace other cognitive theories. Though I accept that connectionist theories are radical theories that shed light on cognition, I reject the conclusion that neural networks do not represent. Indeed, I argue that neural networks may actually give us a better working notion of cognitive (...)
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  14.  46
    Information, Belief, and Causal Role.Paul G. Skokowski - 1999 - In L. S. Moss, J. Ginzburg & M. de Rijke (eds.), Logic, Language, and Computation Vol 2. CSLI Press.
  15.  46
    Belief in Networks.Paul G. Skokowski - manuscript
  16.  17
    Networks with Attitudes.Paul Skokowski - 2009 - AI and Society 23 (4):461-470.
  17.  35
    Review of Gregg Rosenberg, A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World[REVIEW]Paul Skokowski - 2005 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (10).
  18.  16
    How Do We Satisfy Our Goals?Paul G. Skokowski - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (2):224-224.
  19.  30
    Neural Computation, Architecture, and Evolution.Paul Skokowski - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):80-80.
    Biological neural computation relies a great deal on architecture, which constrains the types of content that can be processed by distinct modules in the brain. Though artificial neural networks are useful tools and give insight, they cannot be relied upon yet to give definitive answers to problems in cognition. Knowledge re-use may be driven more by architectural inheritance than by epistemological drives.
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  20.  1
    Observing a Superposition.Paul Skokowski - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7107-7129.
    The bare theory is a no-collapse version of quantum mechanics which predicts certain puzzling results for the introspective beliefs of human observers of superpositions. The bare theory can be interpreted to claim that an observer can form false beliefs about the outcome of an experiment which produces a superpositional result. It is argued that, when careful consideration is given to the observer’s belief states and their evolution, the observer does not end up with the beliefs claimed. This result leads to (...)
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  21.  22
    The Right Kind of Content for a Physicalist About Color.Paul Skokowski - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):790-790.
    Color experiences have representational content. But this content need not include a propositional component, particularly for reflectance physicalists such as Byrne & Hilbert (B&H). Insisting on such content gives primacy to language where it is not required, and makes the extension of the argument to nonhuman animals suspect.
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