I. The framework. 1, Aristotle's project and methods. 2, The perceptual capacity of the soul. 3, The sensory apparatus. 4, The common sense and the related capacities -- II. The terminology. 1, Overlooked occurrences of the phrase 'common sense'. 2, De anima III.1 425a27. 3, De partibus animalium IV.10 686a31. 4, De memoria et reminiscentia 1 450a10. 5, De anima III.7 431b5. 6, Conclusions on the terminology -- III. Functions of the common sense. 1, Simultaneous perception and cross-modal binding. 2, (...) Perceptual discrimination. 3, Waking, sleep, and control of the senses. 4, Perceiving that what we see and hear, and monitoring of the senses. 5, Other roles of the common sense -- Conclusion. (shrink)
In this paper we argue that Aristotle operates with a particular theoretical model in his explanation of animal locomotion, what we call the ‘centralized incoming and outgoing motions’ model. We show how the model accommodates more complex cases of animal motion and how it allows Aristotle to preserve the intuition that animals are self-movers, without jeopardizing his arguments for the eternity of motion and the necessary existence of one eternal unmoved mover in Physics VIII. The CIOM model helps to elucidate (...) Aristotle’s two central yet problematic claims, namely that the soul is the efficient cause of animal motion and that it is the internal supporting-point necessary for animal motion. Moreover, the CIOM model helps us to explain the difference between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary motions, and to square Aristotle’s cardiocentrism with his hylomorphism, but also, more generally, it provides an interesting way of thinking about the place of intentionality in the causal structure of the world. (shrink)
The concept of species is one of the core concepts in biology and one of the cornerstones of evolutionary biology, yet it is rife with conceptual problems. Philosophers of biology have been discussing the concept of species for decades, and in doing so they sometimes appeal to the views of biologists. However, their statements as to what biologists think are seldom supported by empirical data. In order to investigate what biologists actually think about the key issues related to the problem (...) of species, we have conducted a survey on the sample of 193 biologists from the population of biologists from over 150 biology departments at universities in the US and the EU. This article presents and discusses the results of the survey. Some results confirm and others falsify the reiterated statements of philosophers of biology as to what biologists think, but all results we obtained should be informative and relevant for future discussions of the problem of species. (shrink)
Aristotel je vpeljal pojem skupnega čuta, zaznavno zmožnost višjega reda, ki združuje in nadzoruje posamezne čute. Osnovni namen prispevka je predstaviti, kako je skupni čut in njegove funkcije razumel Aristotelov najodličnejši antični komentator Aleksander iz Afrodizijade. Avtor je pri tem pozoren na Aleksandrovo ujemanje z Aristotelom ali odmikanje od njega, opozarja pa tudi na njegove prispevke k problematiki. Drugi cilj prispevka je obravnava enega posebnega odmika, ki je prevladoval v kasnejših razlagah Aristotelovega pojma skupnega čuta, tj. analogije med skupnim čutom (...) in središčem kroga, v katerem se srečujejo različni polmeri. (shrink)
Aristotle's notion of experience plays an important role in his epistemology as the link between perception and memory on the one side, and higher cognitive capacities on the other side. However, Aristotle does not say much about it, and what he does say seems inconsistent. Notably, some passages suggest that it is a non-rational capacity, others that it is a rational capacity and that it provides the principles of science. This paper presents a unitary account of experience. It explains how (...) experience grows from perception and memory into a rational capacity, and in what way it provides the principles. (shrink)
Both Plato and Aristotle see a connection between two unique features of human beings: their erect posture and their ability to think. Moreover, both philosophers think that human beings have the erect posture precisely for the sake of thinking. However, their explanations are very different. Plato argues that erect posture is a necessary condition of unimpeded observation of the heaven, and unimpeded observation of the heaven is in turn a necessary condition of thinking. Aristotle claims that a particular bodily proportion (...) is a necessary condition of both thinking and erect posture – a hypothetical necessity for thinking, and a simple necessity for erect posture. I compare the two explanations and suggest reasons for Aristotle’s dissent from Plato. (shrink)
Plato’s Timaeus gives an account of the creation of the world and of human race. The text suggests that there was a first generation of human beings, and that they were all men. The paper raises difficulties for this traditional view, and considers an alternative, suggested in more recent literature, according to which humans of the first generation were sexually undifferentiated. The paper raises difficulties for the alternative view as well, and examines the third possibility, advocated by some ancient as (...) well as modern interpreters, according to which there were no first humans, strictly speaking. Although the latter view avoids the pitfalls of the former two views, it crucially rests on a metaphorical reading of the creation story in the Timaeus. (shrink)
