We investigate a simple game paradigm for intuitionistic logic, inspired by Wajsberg’s implicit inhabitation algorithm and Beth tableaux. The principal idea is that one player, ∃ros, is trying to construct a proof in normal form while his opponent, ∀phrodite, attempts to build a counter-model. The determinacy of the game implies therefore both completeness and semantic cut-elimination.

We study the intersection type assignment system as defined by Barendregt, Coppo and Dezani. For the four essential variants of the system (with and without a universal type and with and without subtyping) we show that the emptiness (inhabitation) problem is recursively unsolvable. That is, there is no effective algorithm to decide if there is a closed term of a given type. It follows that provability in the logic of "strong conjunction" of Mints and Lopez-Escobar is also undecidable.

RELIGIOUS RATIONALISM OF WISZOWATY AND LEIBNIZ The purpose of this article is to show that religious rationalism presented by Polish Socinian Andrzej Wiszowaty is different from Leibniz’s religious rationalism. At the beginning of the article the author analyzed the dispute between Wiszowaty and Leibniz about Trinity. While comparing religious and philosophical concept of Wiszowaty and Leibniz the author has proved that both philosophers presented different views related to the nature of God, perception of the truths of faith, predestination and miracles. (...) Wiszowaty in a dispute about the Trinity represented Socinian ideas and believed the dogma of the Trinity is contrary to the reason and inconsistent with the Bible, while Leibniz defended the Christian dogma against the alleged contradictions. (shrink)

For a fixed q  ℕ and a given Σ1 definition φ(d,x), where d is a parameter, we construct a model M of 1 Δ0 + ¬ exp and a non standard d  M such that in M either φ has no witness smaller than d or phgr; is equivalent to a formula ϕ(d,x) having no more than q alternations of blocks of quantifiers.

There is a simple technique, due to Dragalin, for proving strong cut-elimination for intuitionistic sequent calculus, but the technique is constrained to certain choices of reduction rules, preventing equally natural alternatives. We consider such a natural, alternative set of reduction rules and show that the classical technique is inapplicable. Instead we develop another approach combining two of our favorite tools—Klop’s ι-translation and perpetual reductions. These tools are of independent interest and have proved useful in a variety of settings; it is (...) therefore natural to investigate, as we do here, what they have to offer the field of sequent calculus. (shrink)

We give a syntactic translation from first-order intuitionistic predicate logic into second-order intuitionistic propositional logic IPC2. The translation covers the full set of logical connectives ∧, ∨, →, ⊥, ∀, and ∃, extending our previous work, which studied the significantly simpler case of the universal-implicational fragment of predicate logic. As corollaries of our approach, we obtain simple proofs of nondefinability of ∃ from the propositional connectives and nondefinability of ∀ from ∃ in the second-order intuitionistic propositional logic. We also show (...) that the ∀-free fragment of IPC2 is undecidable. (shrink)

Our life in this broken world requires tools to own and express our grief in ways that are connected to our faith in God. We find that the biblical genre of lament is appropriate to the task. However, we do not come to lament without baggage, and we sometimes require additional help in the form of symbolic capital borrowed from stories and songs. In this case, The Chronicles of Narnia provide such capital. As we reflect on these stories, we can (...) see lament in a new way that helps us bring our pain to God. As we engage in the discipline of lament, we are spiritually formed into the image of Jesus. (shrink)

One of Darwin’s purposes in writing The Origin of Species was to rebut the doctrine of separate creations. Moreover, the argument he was chiefly concerned with—which was both his target and the model of his own argument—was the familiar argument from design.

There is a simple technique, due to Dragalin, for proving strong cut-elimination for intuitionistic sequent calculus, but the technique is constrained to certain choices of reduction rules, preventing equally natural alternatives. We consider such a natural, alternative set of reduction rules and show that the classical technique is inapplicable. Instead we develop another approach combining two of our favorite tools—Klop's l-translation and perpetual reductions. These tools are of independent interest and have proved useful in a variety of settings; it is (...) therefore natural to investigate, as we do here, what they have to offer the field of sequent calculus. (shrink)

Partant d’une toile rassemblant une série d’esquisses peintes montrant un lionceau, cette étude propose d’aborder la production de Rosa Bonheur sous l’angle des biographies animales. L’article se focalise sur les modèles lion·ne·s cotoyés par l’artiste au cours de sa carrière. Il s’agit de mettre au jour la complexité de ces rapports à partir de l’étude de l’œuvre et de l’apport des données et des témoignages que les quelques biographies anciennes de l’artiste consacrent à ces animaux.

We study the cube of type assignment systems, as introduced in Giannini et al. 87–126), and confront it with Barendregt's typed gl-cube . The first is obtained from the latter through applying a natural type erasing function E to derivation rules, that erases type information from terms. In particular, we address the question whether a judgement, derivable in a type assignment system, is always an erasure of a derivable judgement in a corresponding typed system; we show that this property holds (...) only for systems without polymorphism. The type assignment systems we consider satisfy the properties ‘subject reduction’ and ‘strong normalization’. Moreover, we define a new type assignment cube that is isomorphic to the typed one. (shrink)

To be able to believe that a dog with a broken paw is not really in pain when it whimpers is a quite extraordinary achievement even for a philosopher. Yet according to the standard interpretaion, this is just what Descartes did believe. He held, we are informed, the ‘monstrous’ thesis that ‘animals are without feeling or awareness of any kind’. The Standard view has been reiterated in a recent collection on animal rights, which casts Descartes as the villain of the (...) piece for his alleged view that animals merely behave ‘ as if they feel pain when they are, say, kicked or stabbed’. The basis for this widely accepted interpretation is Descartes' famous doctrine of ‘animal machine’ ; a doctrine that one critic condemns as ‘a grim fortaste of a mechanically minded age’ which ‘brutally violates the old kindly fellowship of living things’. (shrink)

We seem to talk about repeatable artworks, like symphonies, films, and novels, all the time. We say things like, "The Moonlight Sonata has three movements" and "Duck Soup makes me laugh". How are these sentences to be understood? We argue against the simple subject/predicate view, on which the subjects of the sentences refer to individuals and the sentences are true iff the referents of the subjects have the properties picked out by the predicates. We then consider two alternative responses that (...) involve reading these sentences as generics, similar to "The polar bear has four paws". The first response takes these sentences to be about kinds, and the second takes the relevant noun-phrases to act as predicates. We reject these accounts, but offer a third alternative which is informed by both, and which enables us to deny the existence of repeatable artworks while endorsing the truth of sentences seemingly about them. (shrink)

Being sure of each other is the blossoming of Kimberley Brownlee’s earlier work on the intrinsic value and qualities of human connection (2013, 2016c, 2016b), opening with a scene from A. A. Milne’s House at Pooh Corner: lost in the woods together, Piglet takes Pooh’s paw ‘just to be sure’ of his friend. The importance of social connection is often overlooked because it is central to our lives, like breathable air. Brownlee’s work highlights the need for social connection, as deserving (...) of more philosophical attention and practical protection through rights. But her key insight is that receiving relational goods isn’t all that matters: being able and permitted to provide relational goods to others, as Piglet and Pooh receive and offer each other reassurance, is just as essential for our wellbeing. Brownlee argues these interests are strong enough to ground rights (2016c: 28). (shrink)

A number of philosophers from Hume on have claimed that it does not make sense to blame people for acting badly unless their bad acts were rooted in their characters. In this paper, I distinguish a stronger and a weaker version of this claim. The claim is false, I argue, if it is taken to mean that agents can only be blamed for bad acts when those acts are manifestations of character paws. However, what is both true and important is (...) the weaker claim that an act is not blameworthy unless it is rooted in some enduring aspect or aspects of the agent's character that may or may not be flaws, and that, if flaws, may or may not be bad in the same way that the act itself is. (shrink)

While virtually everyone recognizes the moral permissibility of whistleblowing under certain circumstances, most theorists offer relatively conservative accounts of when it is allowed, and are reluctant to offer a full recommendation of the practice as an important tool towards addressing ethical failures in the workplace. We think that accounts such as these tend to overestimate the importance of professional or personal obligations, and underestimate the moral obligation to shine light on severe professional malfeasance. Of course, a whistleblower, even an anonymous (...) one, often faces serious threats of retaliation and harm to their professional livelihoods and well-being. To address these challenges we argue in favor of a practice that we will call Preemptive Anonymous Whistleblowing (PAW). Such whistleblowing is preemptive in that a whistleblower provides information about malfeasance to a party in a position to do something about it without first raising the worry to one’s immediate superiors. At first blush, such preemption may seem unsettling, and PAW admittedly raises a number of worrisome issues. We defend PAW, however, as part of a larger argument that whistleblowing is morally required more often than is commonly thought. The availability of PAW as an option provides a method for allaying the concern that whistleblowing can be overly burdensome due to the risks of job and career. Insofar as that concern can be allayed, it is feasible for there to be substantial moral requirements to engage in whistleblowing in cases where severe harms can be prevented. With high enough stakes, there is a moral requirement for whistleblowing. (shrink)

“Not with that!” I shout. The hammer lies cradled in the Colonel’s folded arms. “You would not use a hammer on a beast, not on a beast!” In a terrible surge of rage I turn on the sergeant and hurl him from me. Godlike strength is mine. In a minute it will pass: let me use it while it lasts! “Look!” I shout. I point to the four prisoners who lie docilely on the earth, their lips to the pole, their (...) hands clasped to their faces like monkey’s paws, oblivious of the hammer, ignorant of what is going on behind them, relieved that the offending mark has been beaten from their backs, hoping that the punishment is at an end. I raise my broken hand to the sky. “Look!” I shout. “We are the great miracle of creation! But from.. (shrink)

Palaeontology developed as a field dependent upon comparison. Not only did reconstructing the fragmentary records of fossil organisms and placing them within taxonomic systems and evolutionary lineages require detailed anatomical comparisons with living and fossil animals, but the field also required thinking in terms of behavioural, biological and ecological analogies with modern organisms to understand how prehistoric animals lived and behaved. Yet palaeontological material often worked against making easy linkages, bringing a sense of mystery and doubt. This paper will look (...) at an animal whose study exemplified these problems: the Chalicothere. Increasingly recognized as a specific type from finds across North America and Eurasia from the early nineteenth century onwards, these prehistoric mammals showed short back legs terminating in pawed feet, long front limbs ending in sharp claws, a long flexible neck, and herbivorous grinding teeth. The Chalicothere became a significant organism within palaeontological studies, as the unexpected mix of characters made it a textbook example against the Cuvierian notion of “correlation of parts,” while explaining how the animal moved, fed and behaved became puzzling. However, rather than prevent comparisons, these actually led to comparative analogies becoming flexible and varied, with different forms of comparison being made with varying methods and degrees of confidence, and with the anatomy, movement and behaviour of giraffes, bears, horses, anteaters, primates and other organisms all serving at various points as potential models for different aspects of the animal. This paper will examine some of the attempts to reconstruct and define the Chalicotheres across a long timescale, using this to show how multiple comparisons and analogies could be deployed in a reconstructive and evolutionary science like palaeontology, and illustrate some of the limits and tensions in comparative methods, as they were used to reconstruct organisms which were thought to be incomparable to any modern animal. (shrink)

Contents: Preface. SCIENTIFIC WORKS OF MARIA STEFFEN-BATÓG AND TADEUSZ BATÓG. List of Publications of Maria Steffen-Batóg. List of Publications of Tadeusz Batóg. Jerzy POGONOWSKI: On the Scientific Works of Maria Steffen-Batóg. Jerzy POGONOWSKI: On the Scientific Works of Tadeusz Batóg. W??l??odzimierz LAPIS: How Should Sounds Be Phonemicized? Pawe??l?? NOWAKOWSKI: On Applications of Algorithms for Phonetic Transcription in Linguistic Research. Jerzy POGONOWSKI: Tadeusz Batóg's Phonological Systems. MATHEMATICAL LOGIC. Wojciech BUSZKOWSKI: Incomplete Information Systems and Kleene 3-valued Logic. Maciej KANDULSKI: Categorial Grammars with (...) Structural Rules. Miros??l??awa KO??L??OWSKA-GAWIEJNOWICZ: Labelled Deductive Systems for the Lambek Calculus. Roman MURAWSKI: Satisfaction Classes - a Survey. Kazimierz _WIRYDOWICZ: A New Approach to Dyadic Deontic Logic and the Normative Consequence Relation. Wojciech ZIELONKA: More about the Axiomatics of the Lambek Calculus. THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS. Jacek Juliusz JADACKI: Troubles with Categorial Interpretation of Natural Language. Maciej KARPI??N??SKI: Conversational Devices in Human-Computer Communication Using WIMP UI. Witold MACIEJEWSKI: Qualitative Orientation and Grammatical Categories. Zygmunt VETULANI: A System of Computer Understanding of Texts. Andrzej WÓJCIK: The Formal Development of van Sandt's Presupposition Theory. W??l??adys??l??aw ZABROCKI: Psychologism in Noam Chomsky's Theory . Ryszard ZUBER: Defining Presupposition without Negation. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCES. Jerzy KMITA: Philosophical Antifundamentalism. Anna LUCHOWSKA: Peirce and Quine: Two Views on Meaning. Stefan WIERTLEWSKI: Method According to Feyerabend. Jan WOLE??N??SKI: Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language. Krystyna ZAMIARA: Context of Discovery - Context of Justification and the Problem of Psychologism. (shrink)

This piece, included in the drift special issue of continent. , was created as one step in a thread of inquiry. While each of the contributions to drift stand on their own, the project was an attempt to follow a line of theoretical inquiry as it passed through time and the postal service(s) from October 2012 until May 2013. This issue hosts two threads: between space & place and between intention & attention . The editors recommend that to experience the (...) drifiting thought that attention be paid to the contributions as they entered into conversation one after another. This particular piece is from the BETWEEN SPACE & PLACE thread: April Vannini, Those Between the Common * Laura Dean & Jesse McClelland, Ballard: A Portrait of Placemaking * Amara Hark Weber, Crossroad * Isaac Linder & Berit Soli-Holt, The Call of the Wild: Terro(i)r Modulations * Ashley D. Hairston, Momma taught us to keep a clean house * Sean Smith, The Garage (Take One) * * * * Momma taught us to keep a clean house. Dust the wood furniture every two weeks. Clean the bathrooms once a week. Wipe down the baseboards once a season (Those damn baseboards. I still got bruises on my knees from scrubbing those things). Sweep away the cobwebs—and pray that those spiders are either dead or delirious (Livin in the country don’t mean you like bugs, especially the ones with too many legs ). Didn’t matter that the house was full of stuff: Great-Grandma’s heirloom dresser, that weird Mammy salt shaker and matching Uncle Tom pepper grinder (Where the hell did Momma get those P.O.S.’s?), the outdated drapes from Belks, Dad’s favorite wooden TV tray, and that uuuuugly love seat that some crazy uncle thought was a glorious find from the Salvation Army (Momma tried to make it pretty with some pillows, but no amount of love could help that seat). Spring Cleaning meant pullin all that furniture away from the walls and holdin your breath to see what time collected in the crevices. Then you gotta be careful not to breathe out too heavy cause the dust would go flying fore you got a chance to catch it. If you didn’t, you’d quickly find out if you’re allergic to dust. Quarter cup of lemon Lysol in a bucket of steaming water and an old wash rag. Maybe two. A dust towel and citrus-scent Pledge. Me and my brothers would fight over who cleaned what. Somehow the twins always got the easy stuff: vacuuming or moving dirt around with the feather-duster. Finishing in enough time to fly down the street on their bikes with the neighborhood kids. Older sister never got off that easy. Each of my stubby fingers morphed into plump, lemon-fresh golden raisins by the time that whole damn house was done. I would finish just in time to sit with Nadine on the porch, counting the seconds til the sun turned off and the fireflies fluttered on. The craziest thing: despite all that cleaning, the house still smelled like Momma’s cookin. That Old House. Might have been some of Grandma’s and Great-Grandma’s cookin mixed in there too. Pork chops. Ham hock soaked in collards. Pinto beans and mustard greens. Corn bread and my Auntie’s famous macaroni and cheese. Didn’t matter if the oven was cold and the valve of the gas stove had been shut for days. A stranger woulda thought someone’d been slavin away in that kitchen for a week straight. No Sweet Citrus & Zest Fabreze back then. Lysol would mask the odors for a little while. Not long enough to overpower the 50 years of goodness marinated in buttermilk, kneaded with lard, and fried in Crisco that’d been embedded in the wallpaper and window treatments. All that grime—dead skin, hair follicles, Carolina clay, carpet lint, yippee-little-dog fur—was evidence of life. We were a socially-awkward newly-minted teenager, two rowdy twin boys, a multi-tasking mother, and a road-warrior father. Eventually a strangely-feline Yorkie was added to the mix. And don’t forget about the stray distant relative stopping by unannounced. No corner of that damn house was unmarked. Hand-sewn pillows in the living room that we were forbidden to breathe on somehow had tiny burnt orange paw prints on them (sneaky little dog). It drove Momma crazy. And tore up my fingernails. They still won’t grow back right. Wipe all that shit off just for it to build up again. But that house was inherited and fully paid for. No reason to move. I did move. I was ready to move on. Move up. Move out. Over that small town. Into the big city. Here the streets take on the smells of Momma’s house. Plus piss, shit, and unbathed skin. A hot day means everything cooks and stews in its own juices, making the stench 10x more intense. The apartment is another story. 11 floors up. Big, east-facing windows. Great view of the skyline dotted with some green foliage. And the great lake. Immaculate. Odorless. Not even a trace of tobacco from the previous tenant’s bad habits. No lingering scent of lemon Lysol. No street stench seeping through the window panes. No stray cat hairs. Or dog fur. Not a speck of dust. Futon. Throw pillows. Photos. Knickknacks. Bowls of fresh citrus. Cursedly-assembled desk set from IKEA. Yet the void is too big to fill. Too clean. (shrink)

The bear, says Hierocles, is aware that its head is easily injured, and instinctively uses its paws as a protection. The three following lines in the papyrus are badly damaged– καν εί π.ε … δεηθεί Του | βαλανεíον κρημν | πáλιν ύ;β εθεíησιν ε | αυΤήν. This is followed by a description of what the bear does when it is pursued and comes to a precipice. It inflates itself and trusts to the inflation to break its fall. It is hardly (...) possible to restore the damaged lines. Von Arnim thinks that the sense required is: ‘wenn die Bärin, vom Jäger verfolgt, eines Bades bedarf oder auf ihrer Flucht an einen Abgrund kommt,πáλιν ύπ èψίησιν εαψτήν’ But a sensible bear would hardly think of taking a bath when pursued by the hunter. It might take to the water; but the Greek for this would be somewhat different. As I read the passage, there is no reference to the bear as pursued by the hunter till line 34, where I would read πоιεî δè τò τοιóνδε , since the phrase εί δ υν διοκμéνμ in line 38 is resumptive, and implies that the pursuit must have been alluded to before. But before line 35 H. is only describing what the bear does to protect its head in the ordinary routine of its life when it is not harassed by the hunter. It wants a bath, and finds that it cannot reach the water without clambering down an overhanging bank It will not climb down head foremost, but guards its head by sliding backwards down the bank. As the bear would want its bath because it was hot, it is perhaps not too hazardous to conjecture that some phrase such as xs03F0xs2135ν ει π ε<ζομéν πνíγηι δεμθεíν του β. should find its place in line 31. (shrink)

The first system of intersection types, Coppo and Dezani [3], extended simple types to include intersections and added intersection introduction and elimination rules (( $\wedge$ I) and ( $\wedge$ E)) to the type assignment system. The major advantage of these new types was that they were invariant under β-equality, later work by Barendregt, Coppo and Dezani [1], extended this to include an (η) rule which gave types invariant under βη-reduction. Urzyczyn proved in [6] that for both these systems it (...) is undecidable whether a given intersection type is empty. Kurata and Takahashi however have shown in [5] that this emptiness problem is decidable for the sytem including (η), but without ( $\wedge$ I). The aim of this paper is to classify intersection type systems lacking some of ( $\wedge$ I), ( $\wedge$ E) and (η), into equivalence classes according to their strength in typing λ-terms and also according to their strength in possessing inhabitants. This classification is used in a later paper to extend the above (un)decidability results to two of the five inhabitation-equivalence classes. This later paper also shows that the systems in two more of these classes have decidable inhabitation problems and develops algorithms to find such inhabitants. (shrink)

Leo Strauss’ controversial theory of esoteric philosophy, as presented in Persecution and the Art of Writing, sparked a fierce debate. Opponents and proponents of the theory utilised a wide range of perspectives to support their arguments. By investigating esoteric philosophy from a sociolinguistic perspective, this paper introduces a novel perspective to the Strauss dispute. In PAW Strauss is mistaken regarding esotericism and its role in philosophy. On one hand it is reasonable to endorse Strauss’ persuasive account on the origins of (...) esoteric writing. The Straussian account provides a plausible sociological background as to why philosophy, per se became an esoteric fliedH. On the other hand it seems as Strauss ascribed undue significance to possible clandestine massages that may be found within works of philosophy because philosophy is mostly already done in an esoteric linguistic space. (shrink)

The claim of consistent hemispheric specialisations across classes of chordates is undermined by the absence of population-based directional asymmetry of paw/hand use in rodents and primates. No homologue of the cerebral torque from right frontal to left occipital has been established in a nonhuman species. The null hypothesis that the torque is the sapiens-specific neural basis of language has not been disproved.

This paper offers a close reading of PAW Media animation My Name is Danny. Drawing across a growing body of recent Central and Western Desert experimental cinema, this paper asks what is at stake in the turn to animation. Rather than escapism or otherworldly fabrications which have little to do with lived experience of the “real,” animation in this context has potent everyday exigencies and politics. The capacity for bringing to life literally – animate – is here linked to the (...) primacy of a sentient landscape; an object world already alive and enlivened with motion, movement, sensation. The question for contemporary filmmaking is how to engage country and its viscera today. How to keep country/ancestor/story alive literally through sentient forms of affective exchange; a project which animation, as this paper will explore, uniquely provides. Drawing on the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze, as well as the animation theory of Cholodenko, Lemarre and others, this paper argues for a radical reconsideration of animation not as incompatible with tradition but in fact as facilitating traditional ontologies of affect and sensation in a national context of remote Aboriginal Australia “under occupation.”. (shrink)

The clearest instances of Time experience in music can be observed when the melodic and harmonic structure of a work announces the approach to a climax, for example, the finale. A goal is established in the awareness of the listener and acts as an independent system toward which music is striving. Most other examples that come to mind are extra-musical, that is, they refer to music in relation to something outside of it. A listener who instead of moving with the (...) flow of the musical happening remains outside of it and watches the arriving and passing of phrase after phrase as though he were watching a parade from a viewing stand places himself in a separate temporal system whose relation to that of the music itself is governed by Time. Compare also the radio performance scheduled to finish on the hour or the state of mind of a concertgoer anxious to make the 11:20 suburban train home. A literary narrative, like music, tends to be perceived as an ongoing flow. No reference to time is relevant for a description of the sequential action. The work sprouts and grows. But whenever the continuity is broken , the appearances may form separate systems. The only medium that can bridge the gap may be Time, in which both are embedded. This is generally considered a compositional flaw. A skillful narrator avoids such a break by providing a filament that connects past and present appearances "amodally," as psychologists call it, that is, the way a train's progress is seen as remaining uninterrupted even when it is hidden for a moment by a tunnel. But when Time is embodied as an authentic literary character, such as the "devouring Time" of Shakespeare's nineteenth sonnet, which blunts the lion's paws and plucks the tiger's teeth, it becomes an active system of its own and thus deserves the capitalization. Rudolf Arnheim is the author of Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye, Toward a Psychology of Art, and The Dynamics of Architectural Form. His contributions to Critical Inquiry are "On the Nature of Photography" and "A Plea for Visual Thinking". (shrink)

Beginning with Jacques Derrida’s Beast and the Sovereign, I identify two forms of curiosity: 1) scientific curiosity, which proceeds through objective dissection and 2) therapeutic curiosity, which proceeds through observational confinement. Through an analysis of Derrida’s treatment of both sorts of curiosity, I notice and develop a third, deconstructive form of curiosity. Through repeated turn to the work of Sarah Kofman, I characterize this third curiosity as, by turns, linguistic, animal, and critical. As linguistic, this curiosity is a penchant for (...) wordplay and a keenness for the unsteady reservoirs of signification, resisting any clean dissection of meaning or the confinement of terms. As animal, it tracks a scent, regularly suspending its paw, as if to emphasize the meandering and precarious quality of knowledge. And as critical, it combats the illusions of pure revelation and instead draws attention to the conjuring trick, the systematic substitution of signs, undergirding it. Finally, I consider in what way Derrida’s resistance to philosophy may be read on the grounds not of a singular wonder but of multiple curiosities. (shrink)

Tidak bisa disangkal bahwa filsafat Barat dewasa ini hampir identik dengan wacana filosofis (philosophical discourse), berupa konsep, teori, atau sistem, yang umumnya berkembang dinamis dan dipelajari sebagai disiplin keilmuan dalam lingkungan akademis melalui satuan kurikulum perguruan tinggi modern. Maka tidak mengherankan bila filsafat cenderung identik dengan filsafat akademis (academic philosophy). Namun berkat dua buku Pierre Hadot (1922-2010) kita terbantu untuk menyadari hilangnya sebagian besar pemahaman filsafat itu sendiri terutama wawasan klasik yang mengungkapkan fokus utama penghayatan maupun lintasan peralihan fokus utama (...) tersebut dalam perkembangan sejarah. Hadot berpendapat bahwa filsafat pada awalnya adalah bios atau way of life (manie de vivre). Filsafat sebagai way of life terungkap dalam serangkaian latihan rohani (melete dalam arti Platonis, askesis dalam arti Stoa dan Kekristenan Yunani, atau exercitium spirituale dalam arti Kekristenan Latin awal), dengan mengembangkan berbagai wacana filosofis sebagai sarana panduan untuk membentuk (to form) alih-alih hanya menginformasikan (to inform) pilihan hidup dan kebebasan eksistensial seseorang menurut bingkai penghayatannya dalam sekolah filsafat. Tujuannya adalah memandu pilihan hidup dan mengembangkan kebebasan eksistensial mereka sesuai kodrat insaninya (phusis tou anthropou), seperti menguasai diri (enkrateia) atau kemandirian diri (autarkheia) di hadapan pengaruh eksternal, serta menyadari tempat (topos) mereka dalam kosmos (phusis tou kosmou). Nilai absolut aktivitas berfilsafat lebih menekankan tindakan baik alih-alih mengetahui kebaikan. Berwacana filosofis tanpa pembalikan sekaligus penentuan arah baru (peristrophe - periagoge) melalui pelatihan rohani hanya akan membentuk seseorang menjadi sofistik atau ahli retorika alih-alih sosok filsuf. Pihak pertama dalam sejarah Yunani antik abad kelima dan keempat SM memang dikenal sebagai sosok terpelajar yang licin bersilat kata (elenkhos) memperdagangkan seni kecakapan dan pengetahuan demi memuaskan hasrat ego. Namun, pihak terakhir sosok filsuf selalu sadar akan ketidaktahuan maupun kekurangan diri (bahwa ia bukan sage atau orang bijak) sehingga ia selalu memandu hasratnya untuk terus mencintai dan mendekatkan diri ke arah kebijaksanaan. Hadot berupaya menjelaskan pandangannya, filsafat sebagai way of life, setidaknya melalui dua pembacaan. Dalam PWL (4 bagian dan 11 bab), ia membingkai pandangannya melalui pembacaan eksegese untuk menguraikan klaimnya dengan mengembangkan metode, materi, tokoh, dan tema terkait. Dalam PAW (3 bagian dan 12 bab), ia mengembangkan pembacaan eksegesenya dengan menelusuri fenomena kerohanian dalam sejarah filsafat Barat, meliputi awal kemunculannya pada era antik, peralihannya pada monastisisme Kristen, keterputusannya pada Abad Pertengahan, dan jejak kesinambungannya pada era modern. [] Akhirnya, dalam PWL dan PAW, Hadot benar-benar menyajikan bingkai pemahaman yang kokoh terhadap klaimnya mengenai filsafat sebagai way of life, termasuk implikasinya dalam merangsang diskusi lebih lanjut baik untuk mengungkap persetujuan atau bantahan maupun kemungkinan alternatif atas klaim tersebut berdasarkan sumber teks serupa. Selain itu, layak untuk diperhatikan bahwa melalui uraiannya yang rinci dan seksama dalam mendekati setiap konteks lintasan filsafat seturut Sitz im Leben, Hadot rupanya juga menawarkan pesan inspiratif dan relevan bagi pembaca budiman ahli, pengajar, pelajar, peminat filsafat, atau siapa saja yang selalu berhasrat mencintai kebijaksanaan untuk bertanya: apa makna berfilsafat dewasa ini? (Haryanto Cahyadi, peneliti filsafat dari Keuskupan Timika, Papua.). (shrink)

La Fontaine’s allegory of “montrer patte blanche / showing the white paw” – from his fable «The Wolf, the Goat, and the Kid – should help me trace the problem of documenting sex and/or gender. In the first decade of the 21st century, the legislative bodies of certain social democratic countries (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, Nepal, Germany) have made a change into the binary system of presenting sex or gender on official identification documents, by introducing a third possibility – that (...) of gender indeterminacy. Would it now be possible to issue an official Id without knowing the precise sex of the person? My questioning tackles this new practice, measuring it from the standpoint of social ontology. (shrink)

About a month ago, I went to a university to give a lecture. During the questions-and-answers and discussion, a young fellow standing in the last row drew a good deal of attention: "Some people today show concern for spiritual values but are very helpless where material life is concerned." However, he said, "more people are pursuing only material benefits and have absolutely no spiritual requirements." You may perhaps doubt that people today truly, as he indicated, regard the spiritual and the (...) material as "fish-and-bear's-paws"—if you want the one, you have to give up the other. (shrink)

Parkinson’s Disease can be treated with the use of microelectrode recording and stimulation. This paper presents a data stream classifier that analyses raw data from micro-electrodes and decides whether the measurements were taken from the subthalamic nucleus (STN) or not. The novelty of the proposed approach is based on the fact that distances based on raw data are used. Two distances are investigated in this paper, i.e. Normalized Compression Distance (NCD) and Lempel-Ziv Jaccard Distance (LZJD). No new features needed to (...) be extracted due to the fact that in the case of high-dimensional data the process is extremely time-consuming. The k-nearest neighbour (k-NN) was chosen as the classifier due to its simplicity, which is essential in data stream classification. Results obtained from classifiers based on k-NN: k-NN, k-NN were compared with Probabilistic Approximate Window (k-NN with PAW); k-NN with Probabilistic Approximate Window and Adaptive Windowing (k-NN with PAW and ADWIN); and Self Adjusting Memory k-NN (SAM k-NN), which use the proposed distances, with the performance of the same classifiers but using standard Euclidean distance. Prequential accuracy was chosen as the performance measure. The results of the experiments performed with the described approach are in most cases better, i.e. the performance measures for kNN classifiers that use NCD and LZJD distances are better by up to 8.5 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively. Moreover, the proposed approach performs better when compared with other stream classification algorithms, i.e. Hoeffding Tree, Naive Bayes, and Leveraging Bagging. In the discussed case, an improvement of classification rate of up to 17.9 per cent when using Lempel-Ziv Jaccard Distance instead of the Euclidean was noted. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Wild LoveCynthia Willett’s Biosocial Eros EthicsAnn V. MurphyI’ll frame my comments in honor of Cynthia Willett’s work in light of two recent anecdotes:Anecdote I: It happened that one evening as I was reading Willett’s most recent monograph Interspecies Ethics—in particular the chapter on animals’ capacity for laughter and humor—my wonderful (if somewhat insubordinate) Airedale terrier, Nora Mae Murphy, heard me laughing, trotted into the living room, jumped on the (...) couch, looked at me with concern, stared down at the book in my hand, then placed her paw on my arm as if to check my pulse, eyes wide and ears slicked back. Nora is used to me reading philosophy at night; but she is not used to me laughing loudly while doing so. Clearly, she was curious. I smiled in recognition of what Nora’s behavior had enabled me to realize: I don’t often laugh when I read philosophy, not like I did that night while reading Willett’s work.Anecdote II: Cindy came out to New Mexico last spring to give the keynote address at our department’s annual graduate student conference. The afternoon she arrived, a few graduate students had arranged to take her on a hike in a nature preserve, a beautiful tract of land alongside the Rio Grande, which winds through Albuquerque. The next day, two of [End Page 50] the graduate students were in my office and I asked how the hike went. The students looked at each other, shuffled a bit, and stared at the floor until one announced, “Well, we kind of got locked in the preserve.” Me: “You got locked in the nature preserve?” “Yep, but it all worked out okay. She was cool with it,” one student reported. The other added: “Yeah, she’s pretty wild.”That conversation happened months before I was asked to speak on and to Willett’s work, but that conversation, that compliment, that word—“wild”—came to mind many times as I was preparing these comments in her honor. And I mean “wild” in the best sense: as rowdy and irreverent and joyful. There is a wildness to Willett’s texts in their performative aspect, one that marks them as singular. Bucking certain philosophical tendencies to overindulge a metaphorics of war and violence, Willett’s own work evinces an entirely different philosophical orientation, one that takes love, and more specifically eros, as its bedrock. The wildness of Willett’s ethical philosophy comes into play in the truly variable scenes in which Willett locates eros and its promise. It’s a wild kind of love that informs Willett’s ethics, one that refuses domestication, refuses to be hemmed in by the borders between species, refuses to be fixed. The scope that Willett assigns eros is broad, countering the tendency to reduce it to the sexualized and sentimental contexts in which it is often placed.1At the heart of Willett’s deliberations across her four monographs and many articles is an abiding concern with, and celebration of, eros as a site of social, political, and ethical promise. A preoccupation with eros is evident in her work from the very beginning. In her first monograph, Maternal Ethics and Other Slave Moralities (1995), Willett frames her project in reference to Audre Lorde’s claim (in Lorde’s essay “Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power”) that European American culture has perpetuated an understanding of power that parses the erotic from the spiritual and political and as a consequence has “suppressed the deepest source of power and knowledge in our lives” (Lorde 1984, 55, cited in Willett 1995, 7). This first book suggests new conceptions of freedom and ethical subjectivity based on social eroticism, a project furthered in her second monograph The Soul of Justice: Social Bonds and Racial Hubris (2001), where hubris is understood with and against the Greeks as an assault on this primary sociality. “In response to the Greeks we might say that the person is born, not of honor, but of love. Sociality, or social eros, and not honor is the origin and the goal of the person and the positive core of freedom... (shrink)

Pooh rubbed his nose with his paw, and said that the Heffalump might be walking along, humming a little song, and looking up at the sky, wondering if it would rain, and so he wouldn't see the Very Deep Pit until he was half-way down, when it would be too late. Jerry Fodor is loath to have content be constituted, even in part, by inferential relations. This loathing, I will argue, gets him into trouble. In his latest book, Concepts, Fodor (...) contrasts informational atomism, his view of concepts and their content, with inferential role theory. The latter, he argues, is almost certainly false. This strikes cognitive science at its core, he adds, since the major theories of concepts currently in vogue in cognitive science are all variants on inferential role theory. (shrink)

Pooh rubbed his nose with his paw, and said that the Heffalump might be walking along, humming a little song, and looking up at the sky, wondering if it would rain, and so he wouldn't see the Very Deep Pit until he was half-way down, when it would be too late. Jerry Fodor is loath to have content be constituted, even in part, by inferential relations. This loathing, I will argue, gets him into trouble. In his latest book, Concepts, Fodor (...) contrasts informational atomism, his view of concepts and their content, with inferential role theory. The latter, he argues, is almost certainly false. This strikes cognitive science at its core, he adds, since the major theories of concepts currently in vogue in cognitive science are all variants on inferential role theory. (shrink)