217 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Christopher Peacocke [206]C. Peacocke [11]
See also
Profile: Christopher Peacocke (Columbia University)
  1. A Study of Concepts.Peacocke Christopher - 1992 - MIT Press.
  2.  86
    The Realm of Reason.Christopher Peacocke - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
    The Realm of Reason develops a new, general theory of what it is for a thinker to be entitled to form a given belief. The theory locates entitlement in the nexus of relations between truth, content, and understanding. Peacocke formulates three principles of rationalism that articulate this conception. The principles imply that all entitlement has a component that is justificationally independent of experience. The resulting position is thus a form of rationalism, generalized to all kinds of content. To show how (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   68 citations  
  3. Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
    Introduction This book is about the nature of the content of psychological states. Examples of psychological states with content are: believing today is a ...
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   150 citations  
  4.  75
    Being Known.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
    Being Known is a response to a philosophical challenge which arises for every area of thought: to reconcile a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements in a given area with a credible account of how we can know those statements. Christopher Peacocke presents a framework for addressing the challenge, a framework which links both the theory of knowledge and the theory of truth with the theory of concept-possession.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   83 citations  
  5.  76
    Truly Understood.Christopher Peacocke - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    A theory of understanding -- Truth's role in understanding -- Critique of justificationist and evidential accounts -- Do pragmatist views avoid this critique? -- A realistic account -- How evidence and truth are related -- Three grades of involvement of truth in theories of understanding -- Anchoring -- Next steps -- Reference and reasons -- The main thesis and its location -- Exposition and four argument-types -- Significance and consequences of the main thesis -- The first person as a case (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   29 citations  
  6. Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (5):239-264.
  7. New Essays on the A Priori.Paul Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.) - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    A stellar line-up of leading philosophers from around the world offer new treatments of a topic which has long been central to philosophical debate, and in ...
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   33 citations  
  8.  55
    Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Christopher Peacocke - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Book description: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. * Comprises 20 newly commissioned essays on hotly debated issues in the philosophy of mind * Written by a cast of leading experts in their fields, essays take opposing views on 10 central contemporary debates * A thorough introduction provides a comprehensive background to the issues explored * Organized into three sections which explore the ontology of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  9. Nonconceptual Content Defended. [REVIEW]Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):381-388.
  10. The a Priori.Christopher Peacocke - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
  11.  70
    Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Christopher Peacocke - 2008 - In Lucy F. O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Action. Oxford University Press.
    We often know what we are judging, what we are deciding, what problem we are trying to solve. We know not only the contents of our judgements, decidings and tryings; we also know that it is judgement, decision and attempted problem-solving in which we are engaged. How do we know these things?
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   14 citations  
  12. Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation.Christopher Peacocke - 1981 - Synthese 49 (2):187-217.
  13.  76
    Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge: II. Christopher Peacocke: Entitlement, Self-Knowledge and Conceptual Redeployment.Tyler Burge & Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:117 - 158.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  14. Objectivity.C. Peacocke - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):739-769.
    Judgement, perception, and other mental states and events have a minimal objectivity in this sense: making the judgement or being in the mental state does not in general thereby make the judgement correct or make the perception veridical. I offer an explanation of this minimal objectivity by developing a form of constitutive transcendental argument. The argument appeals to the proper individuation of the content of judgements and perceptions. In the case of the conceptual content of judgements, concepts are individuated by (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content.Christopher Peacocke - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):609-615.
    This note aims to clarify which arguments do, and which arguments do not, tell against Conceptualism, the thesis that the representational content of experience is exclusively conceptual. Contrary to Sean Kelly’s position, conceptualism has no difficulty accommodating the phenomena of color constancy and of situation-dependence. Acknowledgment of nonconceptual content is also consistent with holding that experiences have nonrepresentational subjective features. The crucial arguments against conceptualism stem from animal perception, and from a distinction, elaborated in the final section of the paper, (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   15 citations  
  16. Implicit Conceptions, Understanding, and Rationality.Christopher Peacocke - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Philosophical Issues. MIT Press. pp. 43-88.
  17. Sensational Properties: Theses to Accept and Theses to Reject.Christopher Peacocke - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62:7-24.
    The subjective properties of an experience are those which specify what having the experience is like for its subject. The sensational properties of an experience are those of its subjective properties that it does not possess in virtue of features of the way the experience represents the world as being (its representational content). Perhaps no topic in the philosophy of mind has been more vigorously debated in the past quarter-century than whether there are any sensational properties, so conceived. The existence (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  18. Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - In C. Wright, B. Smith & C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 83.
    What is involved in the consciousness of a conscious, "occurrent" propositional attitude, such as a thought, a sudden conjecture or a conscious decision? And what is the relation of such consciousness to attention? I hope the intrinsic interest of these questions provides sufficient motivation to allow me to start by addressing them. We will not have a full understanding either of consciousness in general, nor of attention in general, until we have answers to these questions. I think there are constitutive (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   19 citations  
  19. Depiction.Christopher Peacocke - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (3):383-410.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   23 citations  
  20. Colour Concepts and Colour Experience.Christopher Peacocke - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):365-82.
  21.  26
    The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness.Christopher Peacocke - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness--perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal--and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22. Magnitudes: Metaphysics, Explanation, and Perception.Christopher Peacocke - 2015 - In Annalisa Coliva, Volker Munz & Danièle Moyal-Sharrock (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. De Gruyter. pp. 357-388.
    I am going to argue for a robust realism about magnitudes, as irreducible elements in our ontology. This realistic attitude, I will argue, gives a better metaphysics than the alternatives. It suggests some new options in the philosophy of science. It also provides the materials for a better account of the mind’s relation to the world, in particular its perceptual relations.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  80
    How Are A Priori Truths Possible?Christopher Peacocke - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):175-199.
  24. Phenomenal Content, Space, and the Subject of Consciousness.C. Peacocke - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):320-329.
  25.  48
    Holistic Explanation.Christopher Peacocke - 1979 - Clarendon Press.
    INTRODUCTION The philosophy of action and the philosophy of space and time may well seem to be unconnected areas. I will argue that in each of these areas ...
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  26.  2
    Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.Christopher Peacocke & John R. Searle - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (4):603.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   28 citations  
  27. The Mirror of the World: Subjects, Consciousness, and Self-Consciousness.Christopher Peacocke - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Christopher Peacocke presents a new theory of subjects of consciousness, together with a theory of the nature of first person representation. He identifies three sorts of self-consciousness--perspectival, reflective, and interpersonal--and argues that they are key to explaining features of our knowledge, social relations, and emotional lives.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28.  53
    Interpersonal Self-Consciousness.Christopher Peacocke - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):1-24.
    If one were to write a book titled TheVarieties of Self-Consciousness, one would start off with some distinctions. It will help to locate my topic in relation to those distinctions.The first distinction concerns that kind of self-consciousness which involves only the minimal ability on the part of a subject to self-represent, to be in mental states with first person content, be it conceptual or nonconceptual. This minimal ability involves very little as compared with the more sophisticated states of which humans (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  29.  70
    Explanation in Computational Psychology: Language, Perception and Level.Christopher Peacocke - 1986 - Mind and Language 1 (2):101-23.
  30. Metaphysical Necessity: Understanding, Truth and Epistemology.C. Peacocke - 1997 - Mind 106 (423):521-574.
    This paper presents an account of the understanding of statements involving metaphysical modality, together with dovetailing theories of their truth conditions and epistemology. The account makes modal truth an objective matter, whilst avoiding both Lewisian modal realism and mind-dependent or expressivist treatments of the truth conditions of modal sentences. The theory proceeds by formulating constraints a world-description must meet if it is to represent a genuine possibility. Modal truth is fixed by the totality of the constraints. To understand modal discourse (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  31. Implicit Conceptions, Understanding and Rationality.Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:43-88.
  32. Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press UK.
    The topics of this book lie in the intersection of three areas: the philosophy of mind, the theory of meaning and content, and the philosophy of psychology. The book grew out of a desire to treat the nature of the content of psychological states in much greater detail than was attempted in Holistic Explanation. The present work is based on material presented in classes at Oxford University in the years 1979 to 1982.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  33. Principles for Possibilia.Christopher Peacocke - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):486–508.
    It seems to be an obvious truth that There could be something that doesn't actually exist. That is, it seems to be obiously true that ◊∃×). It is sufficient for the truth of that there could be more people, or trees, or cars, than there actually are. It is also sufficient for the truth of that there could be some pepole, or trees, or cars that are distinct from all those that actually exist. Do and suchlike statements involve a commitment (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  34. Rationale and Maxims in the Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):167-78.
    Is there any good reason for thinking that a concept is individuated by the condition for a thinker to possess it? Why is that approach superior to alternative accounts of the individuation of concepts? These are amongst the fundamental questions raised by Wayne Davis.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  35. Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to Common Knowledge.Christopher Peacocke - 2005 - In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 298.
    The openness of joint awareness between two or more subjects is a perceptual phenomenon. It involves a certain mutual awareness between the subjects, an awareness that makes reference to that very awareness itself. Properly characterized, such awareness can generate iterated awareness ‘x is aware that y is aware that x is aware...’ to whatever level the subjects can sustain. The openness should not be characterized in terms of Lewis–Schiffer common knowledge, the conditions for which are not met in many basic (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  36. Content, Computation, and Externalism.Christopher Peacocke - 1995 - Philosophical Issues 6 (3):227-264.
  37.  78
    Descartes Defended.Christopher Peacocke - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):109-125.
    Drawing upon a conception of the metaphysics of conscious states and of first-person content, we can argue that Descartes's transition ‘Cogito ergo sum’ is both sound and one he is entitled to make. We can nevertheless formulate a version of Lichtenberg's objection that can still be raised after Bernard Williams's discussion. I argue that this form of Lichtenberg's revenge can also be undermined. In doing so it helps to compare the metaphysics of subjects, worlds and times. The arguments also apply (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  38.  82
    Externalist Explanation.Christopher Peacocke - 1993 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 67:203-30.
  39.  78
    Mental Action and Self-Awareness : Epistemology.Christopher Peacocke - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press.
    We often know what we are judging, what we are deciding, what problem we are trying to solve. We know not only the contents of our judgements, decidings and tryings; we also know that it is judgement, decision and attempted problem-solving in which we are engaged. How do we know these things?
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  40.  15
    Review: Nonconceptual Content Defended. [REVIEW]Christopher Peacocke - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):381 - 388.
  41. Scenarios, Concepts, and Perception.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  42. The Metaphysics of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):525-46.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  43.  75
    Necessity and Truth Theories.Christopher Peacocke - 1978 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 7 (1):473 - 500.
  44. What is a Logical Constant?Christopher Peacocke - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (9):221-240.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  45.  75
    Nonconceptual Content: Kinds, Rationales, and Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1994 - Mind and Language 4 (4):419-29.
  46.  62
    Computation as Involving Content: A Response to Egan.Christopher Peacocke - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (2):195-202.
    Only computational explanations of a content‐involving sort can answer certain ‘how’‐questions; can support content‐involving counterfactuals; and have the generality characteristic of psychological explanations. Purely formal characteriza‐tions of computations have none of these properties, and do not determine content. These points apply not only to psychological explanation, but to Turing machines themselves. Computational explanations which involve content are not opposed to naturalism. They are also required if we are to explain the content‐involving properties of mental states.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  47.  6
    Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge & Christopher Peacocke - 1996 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1):91-116.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   12 citations  
  48.  70
    Understanding Logical Constants: A Realist's Account.Christopher Peacocke - 2004 - In T. J. Smiley & Thomas Baldwin (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge. Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press. pp. 163.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  49. Interrelations: Concepts, Knowledge, Reference and Structure.Christopher Peacocke - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):85-98.
    What are the relations between the items mentioned in my title? This question is raised by Jerry Fodor.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  50. Justification, Realism and the Past.Christopher Peacocke - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):639-670.
    This paper begins by considering Dummett's justificationist treatment of statements about the past in his book Truth and the Past (2004). Contrary to Dummett's position, there is no way of applying the intuitionistic distinction in the arithmetical case between direct and indirect methods of establishing a content to the case of past-tense statements. Attempts to do so either give the wrong truth conditions, or rely on notions not available to a justificationist position. A better, realistic treatment makes ineliminable use of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 217