In this paper, drawing on evidence internal to the Platonic dialogues (supplemented with some ancient testimonia), I answer the question, “How did Plato teach in the Academy?” My reconstruction of Plato’s pedagogy in the Academy is that there was a single person who read the dialogue aloud like a rhapsode (this is in contrast to the dramatic theatrical hypothesis, in which several speakers function as actors in the performance of a dialogue). After the rhapsodic reading, students were allowed to ask (...) that portions of the text to be re-read, to ask a question about the text, and were encouraged to enter into a broader conversation about the topic and themes brought out by the text. This later pedagogical method of interrogating and investigating a dialogue is of more importance than the mere reading of a dialogue. I contend that Plato’s experiences teaching were woven into some of the dialogues, and that Plato’s pedagogy reflects some of the ways that he taught in the Academy. I propose that excellent points made by students may have been written into revised forms of the dialogue. And not only good points, but also mistakes in reasoning may have been added into the dialogues. I suggest that the way certain dialogues are organized with “guest lecturers” and “tag-team” philosophical debates reflect Plato’s pedagogy in the Academy. Plato’s broadmindedness, his openness to various and opposing viewpoints, is also evident from both outside and inside of the dialogue. Lastly, drawing on the idea of Socratic mimēsis, I give a plausible curriculum for how Plato may have used the dialogues to teach them: he had his students “play” with them. Plato may have asked his students to enter into the roles of the characters in the dialogues to better understand them and the type of person they represent. Plato may have also asked students to take over from the position of the character in the dialogue and to suggest a better, truer account of things than what the characters said or did. (shrink)

In the "Republic," Plato has Socrates attack poetry’s use of mimēsis, often translated as ‘imitation’ or ‘representation.’ Various scholars (e.g. Blondell 2002; Frank 2018; Halliwell 2009; K. Morgan 2004) have noticed the tension between Socrates’ theory critical of mimēsis and Plato’s literary practice of speaking through various characters in his dialogues. However, none of these scholars have addressed that it is not only Plato the writer who uses mimēsis but also his own character, Socrates. At crucial moments in several dialogues, (...) Socrates takes on a role and speaks as someone else. I call these moments “Socratic mimēsis.” While previous commentators have noticed some of these moments, they have either overstated their rarity or they have not studied them collectively. My dissertation is the first in-depth investigation of this phenomenon in the dialogues. Socrates’ dramatic imitation of others is way of teaching in a voice separate from his own, and it is also a way for Plato to speak to, and to educate, different kinds of audiences. Although “Socratic mimēsis” occurs throughout the Platonic corpus, I focus on three passages from three different dialogues, which are paradigm instances: [1] in the "Crito" Socrates plays the part of ‘the Laws’ (50a-54c); [2] in the "Theaetetus" he acts the part of ‘Protagoras’ (166a-168c); and [3] in the "Menexenus" he recites a funeral speech learned from ‘Aspasia’ (236d-249c). Instead of one-sidedly reading the dialogues as either only literary works of art or as only a series of philosophical arguments, this study gleans philosophic insights from the literary and dramatic details of the dialogues. In chapter one I argue that in the "Crito" Socrates tries to convince Crito of a universal and absolute ethics based on never committing injustice, but Crito is not able to understand. In order to make Crito more just—but not yet at the level of Socratic ethics—Socrates creates ‘the Laws’ to persuade Crito to expand his personal notion of justice. Socrates instills a political obedience in place of Crito’s existing lawlessness as a second-best recourse. Plato expects the astute listener or reader to see the contrast between Socrates’ earlier ethical principles, said in his own voice, with what he says in the voice of ‘the Laws.’ In chapter two I argue that in the part of the "Theaetetus" where Socrates defends Protagoras (often called ‘the Defense’), Socrates, by imitating ‘Protagoras,’ is actually criticizing Protagorean relativism. The Protagorean theory cannot account for mimēsis and Socrates’ mimetic act performatively contradicts the identity of appearance and reality, which the theory presupposes. Finally, in chapter three I argue that in the Menexenus the funeral oration that Socrates recounts for Menexenus that he heard from ‘Aspasia’ is actually a disguised criticism of political rhetoric and of Athenian imperialism. Although the speech is never interrogated within the dialogue, Plato provokes the listener or reader outside the dialogue to question its message and to see how it conflicts with many of Socrates’ positions in other dialogues. Beyond reconsidering the long-standing and persistent view that Plato was against poetry and mimetic performance, I re-examine the role that performance and role-playing can have in philosophy and pedagogy more generally. Actors, by taking on other personas, and audience members, in observing actors and their actions, are both involved in acts of imagination that can expand their horizon of thinking and feeling. (shrink)

«Obra en Blanco» es un libro sobre la obra temprana de Julio Enrique Blanco de la Rosa (1890-1986), un olvido más en la historia de la filosofía colombiana. Salvo en notas al margen, a Blanco no se lo encuentra en los estudios sobre la historia de la filosofía. Algunos han atribuido su desconocimiento a la incomprensión de un medio que no supo de su genialidad, otros creen que se debe a que su filosofía fue una necedad que consistió en poner (...) nuevos nombres a las viejas cosas. «Obra en Blanco» no intenta defender su genialidad o censurar a quienes lo han acusado de necedad: analiza y presenta una selección de un periodo juvenil de su obra, comprendido entre 1909-1920. Con ello sólo se busca aportar a la construcción de una historia de la filosofía nacional, y alimentar la discusión sobre la historia de la contribución filosófica de un hombre, cuyas páginas se encuentran aún en blanco. (shrink)

Las acciones que articulan simbióticamente élites empresariales y políticas, mafias, grupos militares legales e ilegales, se posibilitan bajo la búsqueda de dos fines: uno, reordenar el territorio de manera violenta hiper-acumulando tierras, con el fin de salvaguardar sus intereses económicos e inversiones; dos, hiper-acumular poder político con el fin de sostener sus privilegios, usando dicho poder para la reconfiguración del diseño institucional y la planeación de los territorios imponiendo sus condiciones. Este fenómeno que marca la historia de Colombia es lo (...) que ampliamente podríamos comprender como Criminalidad Corporativa Instaurada. Es el caso y modelo impuesto en el Urabá el cual se fue extendiendo al resto del país. (shrink)

Este volumen es el resultado del deseo común de un grupo de amigos de ofrecer un texto, el texto que cada uno ha juzgado oportuno, a un eminente profesor de la Universidad española; un profesor al que, ciertamente, la edad ha jubilado, pero que en absoluto ha dejado, y no solo por su actual condición de Emérito, de mantenerse en activo; un maestro del pensamiento cuyo recorrido intelectual ha suscitado en esos amigos suficiente atención y simpatía como para avenirse a (...) participar en esta tarea de reconocimiento. El profesor en cuestión es Félix Duque; un nombre que cualquiera que haya mínimamente seguido las aventuras filosóficas europeas de los últimos decenios, incluidas las españolas, sin duda habrá de reconocer de inmediato. Pues se trata de alguien que ha practicado con éxito todas las artes que se supone ha de frecuentar un universitario de primer rango, un transmisor crítico del saber, un investigador de vanguardia: el profesor Félix Duque, en efecto, no solo ha ocupado multitud de estrados, universitarios o no, multitud de aulas y de salas, universitarias o no; también ha dedicado no pocas horas a ofrecer al investigador traducciones y ediciones, tan rigurosas como útiles, de textos clásicos de la filosofía; y ha encontrado tiempo, además, para ofrecer una panorámica monumental de esa aventura crucial del intelecto que fue el idealismo alemán brotado de la crítica kantiana. Pero tampoco se ha detenido ahí una actividad como la suya, infatigable y paciente —aunque también a las veces, cómo no, relampagueante—. Y así, Félix (que es como le conocemos sus amigos), no ha vacilado en poner su ordenador al servicio de cuestiones estéticas, y políticas, y ciudadanas, como tampoco ha dudado en embarcarse, cuando la ocasión lo requería, en alguna polémica de fuste; intervenciones hechas siempre en el contexto de un análisis poderoso, y en absoluto complaciente, de las muchas tradiciones difíciles que heredamos los europeos. (shrink)

This is a short entry on "Metatheatre" in Section 4, "Concepts, Themes and Topics Treated in the Dialogues," in The Bloomsbury Handbook of Plato, edited by Gerald Press and Mateo Duque.

This is a short entry on "Comedy" in Section 3, "Important Features of the Dialogues," in The Bloomsbury Handbook of Plato, edited by Gerald Press and Mateo Duque.

Versiones revisadas de las conferencias pronunciadas en el congreso "Pensamiento, arte, poesía.

At the end of the first hypothesis, Parmenides gets Aristotle to agree that being [οὐσίας] must be in time; that is, that being must partake in at least one of the temporal modes: either to have been in the past, to be in the present, or it will be in the future (140e-142a). If this is true, then “the one does not partake in being” (141e7-8), meaning temporal being—to which Aristotle agrees, saying “Apparently not” (141e9). Parmenides then gets Aristotle to (...) agree that “Therefore, ‘the one’ in no way is” (141e9-10). This, however, contradicts the very first premise that begins Parmenides’ entire gymnastic exercise, “if one is” (137c4). The problem with the previous conclusion—that to be is to be in time—is that in professing his assent to it, Aristotle, in fact, gainsays it. He performatively contradicts the very thing he wants to assert. Aristotle answers Parmenides question, “Therefore could something partake of being in any way other than in one of those ways?” (141e7-8) with a two-word answer in Greek: “οὐκ ἔστιν [It’s not possible].” We can, therefore, ask of the very claim Aristotle is making—that it is impossible for something to be and not be in time—when in time does it hold true? At what time is it “not possible [οὐκ ἔστιν]” for something to not partake of temporal being? Is it not possible only in the present moment, in the past, or in the future? If Aristotle’s assertion is to have any force it must hold always. It has the same tenselessness as mathematical propositions, like ‘1+1=2.’ Forms, like mathematical entities, must necessarily have atemporal existence. Accordingly, in atemporally maintaining that anything that is must be in time, Aristotle undermines his own assertion. He performatively contradicts the very thing that he wants to affirm. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This study analyses the impact of Oswald Spengler’s work in Spain during the interwar period. It proceeds with three steps as follows: The first part investigates the reception of Spengler’s historic morphology of cultures in the so-called circle of the Revista de Occidente. The second part delves into the early echo of Spengler’s work among the Spanish left up to the Second Spanish Republic. The third part focuses on the impact of Spengler’s historic morphology among conservative traditionalists and members (...) of the radical right prior to the Spanish Civil War. This analysis point towards broad, transideological debate on Spengler in Spain that the Spanish right then usurped and radicalised during the 1930s. (shrink)

In the Preface to the second edition of the Science of Logic, Hegel speaks of an instinctive and unconscious logic whose forms and determinations 'always remain imperceptible and incapable of becoming objective even as they emerge in language.' In spite of Hegel's ambitions to provide a philosophical system that might transcend messy human nature, Félix Duque argues that human nature remains stubbornly present in precisely this way. In this book he responds to the 'remnants' of Hegel's work not to (...) explicate his philosophy, but instead to explore the limits of his thought. He begins with the tension between singularity and universality, both as a metaphysical issue in terms of substance and subject, and as a theological issue in terms of ideas about the human and divine nature of Jesus. Duque argues that the questions these issues bring out require a search for some antecedent authority, for which he turns to Hegel's theory of "second nature" and the idea of nature as reflected in the nation state. He considers Hegel's evaluation of the French Revolution in the context of political and civil life, and in a religious context, how Hegel saw considerations of authority and guilt sublimated and purified in the development of Christianity. (shrink)

Brian Cutter objected to the consequence argument due to its dependence on the principle that miracle workers are metaphysically impossible. A miracle worker is someone who has the ability to act in a way such that the laws of nature would be violated. While there is something to the thought that agents like us do not have this ability, Cutter claims that there is no compelling reason to regard miracle workers as metaphysically impossible. However, the paper contends that miracle workers (...) are indeed impossible according to well-known theories concerning the laws of nature. This result highlights the reliance of the consequence argument on a plausible premise, which is widely accepted by proponents of non-Humean views of laws. The paper also provides a way to explain away the intuition that miracle workers are possible, but this has the upshot that a recent, two-dimensional formulation of the consequence argument is unsound. (shrink)

In topological modal logic, it is well known that the Cantor derivative is more expressive than the topological closure, and the ‘elsewhere’, or ‘difference’, operator is more expressive than the ‘somewhere’ operator. In 2014, Kudinov and Shehtman asked whether the combination of closure and elsewhere becomes strictly more expressive when adding the Cantor derivative. In this paper we give an affirmative answer: in fact, the Cantor derivative alone can define properties of topological spaces not expressible with closure and elsewhere. To (...) prove this, we develop a novel theory of morphisms which preserve formulas with the elsewhere operator. (shrink)

We prove that every weakly square compact cardinal is a strong limit cardinal, and therefore weakly compact. We also study Aronszajn trees with no uncountable finitely splitting subtrees, characterizing them in terms of being Lindelöf with respect to a particular topology. We prove that the class of such trees is consistently non-empty and lies between the classes of Suslin and Aronszajn trees.

I argue that the opening line of the _Phaedrus_ proleptically encapsulates the major themes of the dialogue and that paying attention to the opening line enables us to strengthen the identification of psychagogy as the key unifying thread of the whole dialogue. In particular, I argue that the opening line foreshadows the quarrel between Lysias and Socrates over the practical guidance of Phaedrus’ soul; the prominence of friendship in the philosophical form of life; the pertinence of Socrates’ one-on-one, custom-built speeches, (...) vis-à-vis the later conceptualization of rhetoric; the definition of the soul as a source of never-ending movement; as well as the origin (_arché_) and destiny (_télos_) of human souls, following the lines of the Palinode. (shrink)

b>—Several paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integra- tion) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. However, those studies almost always rely on explicit reports. It remains a possibility that the visual system can implicitly detect change, but that in the absence of focused attention, the change does not (...) reach awareness and consequently is not reported. To test this possibility, we used a simple change detection paradigm coupled with a speeded orien- tation discrimination task. Even when observers reported being unaware of a change in an item’s orientation, its nal orientation effectively biased their response in the orientation discrimination task. Both in aware and unaware trials, errors were most frequent when the changed item and the probe had incongruent orientations. These results demonstrate that the _nature _of the change can be represented in the absence of awareness. (shrink)

Evidence from many different paradigms (e.g. change blindness, inattentional blindness, transsaccadic integration) indicate that observers are often very poor at reporting changes to their visual environment. Such evidence has been used to suggest that the spatio-temporal coherence needed to represent change can only occur in the presence of focused attention. In four experiments we use modified change blindness tasks to demonstrate (a) that sensitivity to change does occur in the absence of awareness, and (b) this sensitivity does not rely on (...) the redeploy- ment of attention. We discuss these results in relation to theories of scene percep- tion, and propose a reinterpretatio n of the role of attention in representing change. (shrink)

Metacognition refers to any knowledge or cognitive process that monitors or controls cognition. We highlight similarities between metacognitive and executive control functions, and ask how these processes might be implemented in the human brain. A review of brain imaging studies reveals a circuitry of attentional networks involved in these control processes, with its source located in midfrontal areas. These areas are active during conflict resolution, error correction, and emotional regulation. A developmental approach to the organization of the anatomy involved in (...) executive control provides an added perspective on how these mechanisms are influenced by maturation and learning, and how they relate to metacognitive activity. (shrink)

v. 1. Estética, fenomenología y hermenéutica -- v. 2. Filosofía de la ciencia, filosofía del lenguaje y filosofía de la psiquiatría -- v. 3. Ética y filosofía política, filosofía de la religión e historia de la filosofía.

We offer a review of some of the most influential views on the status of Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause (RPCC) for genuinely indeterministic systems. We first argue that the RPCC is properly a conjunction of two distinct claims, one metaphysical and another methodological. Both claims can and have been contested in the literature, but here we simply assume that the metaphysical claim is correct, in order to focus our analysis on the status of the methodological claim. We briefly (...) review the most entrenched or classical positions, including Salmon’s ‘interactive forks’, van Fraassen’s scepticism, and Cartwright’s generalisation of the fork criterion. We then go on to review the results of the ‘Budapest school’ on the existence of formally defined screening­ off events for any correlation —by means of the ideas of probability space extensibility and (Reichenbachian common cause) completability. We distinguish the Budapest doctrine clearly from any of the classical conceptions, and thus present an overall framework for discussions of causal inference in quantum mechanics. We argue that this review is preliminary essential work for a thorough assessment of the conditions under which RCCP may be a reliable tool for causal inference in a genuinely probabilistic (indeterministic) context. (shrink)