Results for 'Peer disagreement'

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  1. A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement.Remco Heesen & Pieter van der Kolk - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1345-1368.
    In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers' rationality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies---in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the Conciliatory View---are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the Conciliatory Views can even (...)
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  2. Peer Disagreement, Rational Requirements, and Evidence of Evidence as Evidence Against.Andrew Reisner - 2016 - In Pedro Schmechtig & Martin Grajner (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 95-114.
    This chapter addresses an ambiguity in some of the literature on rational peer disagreement about the use of the term 'rational'. In the literature 'rational' is used to describe a variety of normative statuses related to reasons, justification, and reasoning. This chapter focuses most closely on the upshot of peer disagreement for what is rationally required of parties to a peer disagreement. This follows recent work in theoretical reason which treats rationality as a system (...)
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  3.  80
    Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality.David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaz Potrc & Hannah Tierney - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):194-225.
    The authors argue in favor of the “nonconciliation” (or “steadfast”) position concerning the problem of peer disagreement. Throughout the paper they place heavy emphasis on matters of phenomenology—on how things seem epistemically with respect to the net import of one’s available evidence vis-à-vis the disputed claim p, and on how such phenomenology is affected by the awareness that an interlocutor whom one initially regards as an epistemic peer disagrees with oneself about p. Central to the argument is (...)
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  4. Peer Disagreement Under Multiple Epistemic Systems.Rogier De Langhe - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2547-2556.
    In a situation of peer disagreement, peers are usually assumed to share the same evidence. However they might not share the same evidence for the epistemic system used to process the evidence. This synchronic complication of the peer disagreement debate suggested by Goldman (In Feldman R, Warfield T (eds) (2010) Disagreement. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 187–215) is elaborated diachronically by use of a simulation. The Hegselmann–Krause model is extended to multiple epistemic systems and used (...)
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  5.  28
    Rational Peer Disagreement Upon Sufficient Evidence: Leaving the Track to Truth?Frieder Bögner, Markus Seidel, Konstantin Schnieder & Thomas Meyer - 2018 - In Ludger Jansen & Paul Näger (eds.), Peter van Inwagen. Materialism, Free Will and God. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 17-39.
    In this paper, we will discuss Peter van Inwagen’s contribution to the epistemological debate about revealed peer disagreement. Roughly, this debate focuses on situations in which at least two participants disagree on a certain proposition based on the same evidence. This leads to the problem of how one should react rationally when peer disagreement is revealed. Van Inwagen, as we will show, discusses four possible reactions, all of which he rejects as unsatisfying. Our proposal will be (...)
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  6.  15
    Christianity, Epistemic Peer Disagreement, and the Abortion Debate.Michael S. Jones & John B. Molinari Jr - 2018 - Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 17 (49):32-45.
    The question of the morality of abortion has long been the subject of intense, sometimes acrimonious debate. Even people within the same religious or philosophical tradition often disagree on the issue. For example, there are Christians who are “pro- choice” and there are Christians who are “pro-life.” Both sides marshal biblical, theological, and philosophical arguments in support of their positions. The substance of the abortion debate seems to reduce to one tricky question: when does personhood begin? Christian experts in various (...)
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  7. Peer Disagreement and Two Principles of Rational Belief.Theodore J. Everett - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):273-286.
    This paper presents a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement that distinguishes two principles of rational belief, here called probability and autonomy. When we discover that we disagree with peers, there is one sense in which we rationally ought to suspend belief, and another in which we rationally ought to retain our original belief. In the first sense, we aim to believe what is most probably true according to our total evidence, including testimony from peers and (...)
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  8. Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
    My aim in this paper is to develop and defend a novel answer to a question that has recently generated a considerable amount of controversy. The question concerns the normative significance of peer disagreement. Suppose that you and I have been exposed to the same evidence and arguments that bear on some proposition: there is no relevant consideration which is available to you but not to me, or vice versa. For the sake of concreteness, we might picture.
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  9. Experts and Peer Disagreement.Jennifer Lackey - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 228-245.
  10. How to Solve the Puzzle of Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):83-96.
    While it seems hard to deny the epistemic significance of a disagreement with our acknowledged epistemic peers, there are certain disagreements, such as philosophical disagreements, which appear to be permissibly sustainable. These two claims, each independently plausible, are jointly puzzling. This paper argues for a solution to this puzzle. The main tenets of the solution are two. First, the peers ought to engage in a deliberative activity of discovering more about their epistemic position vis-à-vis the issue at stake. Secondly, (...)
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  11.  66
    Truth Approximation, Belief Merging, and Peer Disagreement.Gustavo Cevolani - 2014 - Synthese 191 (11):2383-2401.
    In this paper, we investigate the problem of truth approximation via belief merging, i.e., we ask whether, and under what conditions, a group of inquirers merging together their beliefs makes progress toward the truth about the underlying domain. We answer this question by proving some formal results on how belief merging operators perform with respect to the task of truth approximation, construed as increasing verisimilitude or truthlikeness. Our results shed new light on the issue of how rational (dis)agreement affects the (...)
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  12.  61
    How to Respond Rationally to Peer Disagreement: The Preemption View.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):129-142.
    In this paper, I argue that the two most common views of how to respond rationally to peer disagreement–the Total Evidence View (TEV) and the Equal Weight View (EWV)–are both inadequate for substantial reasons. TEV does not issue the correct intuitive verdicts about a number of hypothetical cases of peer disagreement. The same is true for EWV. In addition, EWV does not give any explanation of what is rationally required of agents on the basis of sufficiently (...)
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  13. Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but Not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement.David Enoch - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):953-997.
    How should you update your (degrees of) belief about a proposition when you find out that someone else — as reliable as you are in these matters — disagrees with you about its truth value? There are now several different answers to this question — the question of `peer disagreement' — in the literature, but none, I think, is plausible. Even more importantly, none of the answers in the literature places the peer-disagreement debate in its natural (...)
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  14. Group Peer Disagreement.J. Adam Carter - 2014 - Ratio 27 (3):11-28.
    A popular view in mainstream social epistemology maintains that, in the face of a revealed peer disagreement over p, neither party should remain just as confident vis-a-vis p as she initially was. This ‘conciliatory’ insight has been defended with regard to individual epistemic peers. However, to the extent that (non-summativist) groups are candidates for group knowledge and beliefs, we should expect groups (no less than individuals) to be in the market for disagreements. The aim here will be to (...)
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  15. Disagreement: What’s the Problem? Or A Good Peer is Hard to Find.Nathan L. King - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):249-272.
  16. Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - forthcoming - Topoi:1-11.
    One explanation of rational peer disagreement is that agents find themselves in an epistemically permissive situation. In fact, some authors have suggested that, while evidence could be impermissive at the intrapersonal level, it is permissive at the interpersonal level. In this paper, I challenge such a claim. I will argue that, at least in cases of rational disagreement under full disclosure, there cannot be more interpersonal epistemically permissive situations than there are intrapersonal epistemically permissive situations. In other (...)
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  17. Multi‐Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox.Kenneth Boyce & Allan Hazlett - 2014 - Ratio 27 (3):29-41.
    The problem of multi-peer disagreement concerns the reasonable response to a situation in which you believe P1 … Pn and disagree with a group of ‘epistemic peers’ of yours, who believe ∼P1 … ∼Pn, respectively. However, the problem of multi-peer disagreement is a variant on the preface paradox; because of this the problem poses no challenge to the so-called ‘steadfast view’ in the epistemology of disagreement, on which it is sometimes reasonable to believe P in (...)
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  18. The Problem with Uniform Solutions to Peer Disagreement.Amir Konigsberg - 2013 - Theoria 79 (2):96-126.
    Contributors to the recent disagreement debate have sought to provide a uniform response to cases in which epistemic peers disagree about the epistemic import of a shared body of evidence, no matter what kind of evidence they are disagreeing about. The varied cases addressed in the literature have included examples of disagreement about restaurant bills, court verdicts, weather forecasting, chess, morality, religious beliefs, and even disagreements about philosophical disagreements. The equal treatment of these varied cases has motivated the (...)
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  19. Peer Disagreement and the Limits of Coherent Error Attribution.Nicholas Tebben - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (2):179-197.
    I argue that, in an important range of cases, judging that one disagrees with an epistemic peer requires attributing, either to one's peer or to oneself, a failure of rationality. There are limits, however, to how much irrationality one can coherently attribute, either to oneself or to another. I argue that these limitations on the coherent attribution of rational error put constraints on permissible responses to peer disagreement. In particular, they provide reason to respond to one-off (...)
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  20.  43
    Peer-Disagreement About Restaurant Bills and Abortion.Martin Sticker - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):577-604.
    _ Source: _Page Count 28 The author defends Conciliationism as a response to peer-disagreement in ethics against a prominent objection: if in cases of peer-disagreement we have to move our credences towards those of our dissenting peers, then we have to adopt scepticism in fields where disagreement between peers abounds. For this objection, the case of ethics is particularly worrisome. The author argues that the objection from scepticism is based on a highly idealised notion of (...)
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  21. A Critique of Contextualist Approaches to Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2012 - Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):27-48.
    Contemporary epistemology devotes much attention to disagreements among epistemic peers, that is, disagreements in which subjects take themselves to be equals with respect to the evidence that bears on the matter at issue as well as general intellectual virtues. The crucial question is: what should you do when you disagree with an epistemic peer? The paper pursues three goals. First, it clarifies some as of yet unexplained details of the problem of peer disagreement. Second, it distinguishes between (...)
     
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  22.  53
    A Puzzle About the Agnostic Response to Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1253-1261.
    The paper argues that the view to the effect that one should suspend judgment in the face of a disagreement with a recognised epistemic peer results in a puzzle when applied to disagreements in which one party is agnostic. The puzzle is this: either the agnostic party retains her suspension of judgment, or she suspends it. The former option is discarded by proponents of the agnostic response; the latter leads the agnostic response to undermine itself.
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  23. Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness.Han van Wietmarschen - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):395-425.
    The central question of the peer disagreement debate is: what should you believe about the disputed proposition if you have good reason to believe that an epistemic peer disagrees with you? This article shows that this question is ambiguous between evidential support (or propositional justification) and well-groundedness (or doxastic justification). The discussion focuses on conciliatory views, according to which peer disagreements require you to significantly revise your view or to suspend judgment. The article argues that for (...)
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  24.  89
    Can Steadfast Peer Disagreement Be Rational?Weintraub Ruth - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):740-759.
    According to conciliatory views about peer disagreement, both peers must accord their disagreeing peer some weight, and move towards him. Non‐conciliatory views allow one peer, the one who responded correctly to the evidence, to remain steadfast. In this paper, I consider the suggestion that it may be rational for both disagreeing peers to hold steadfastly to their opinion. To this end, I contend with arguments adduced against the permissiveness the supposition involves, and identify some ways in (...)
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  25. Peer Disagreement’ and Evidence of Evidence.John Biro & Fabio Lampert - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):379-402.
    What the rational thing to do in the face of disagreement by an epistemic peer is has been much discussed recently. Those who think that a peer’s disagreement is itself evidence against one’s belief, as many do, are committed to a special form of epistemic dependence. If such disagreement is really evidence, it seems reasonable to take it into account and to adjust one’s belief accordingly. But then it seems that the belief one ends up (...)
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  26. Epistemic Peer Disagreement.Filippo Ferrari & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - forthcoming - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson, Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen & Jeremy Wyatt (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. London, UK:
    We offer a critical survey of the most discussed accounts of epistemic peer disagreement that are found in the recent literature. We also sketch an alternative approach in line with a pluralist understanding of epistemic rationality.
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  27. On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement.B. Lam - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (2):207-245.
    This paper considers two questions. First, what is the scope of the Equal Weight View? Is it the case that meeting halfway is the uniquely rational method of belief-revision in all cases of known peer disagreement? The answer is no. It is sometimes rational to maintain your own opinion in the face of peer disagreement. But this leaves open the possibility that the Equal Weight View is indeed sometimes the uniquely rational method of belief revision. Precisely (...)
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  28.  97
    The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement.Georgi Gardiner - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):83-95.
    Conciliatory views of peer disagreement hold that when an agent encounters peer disagreement she should conciliate by adjusting her doxastic attitude towards that of her peer. In this paper I distinguish different ways conciliation can be understood and argue that the way conciliationism is typically understood violates the principle of commutativity of evidence. Commutativity of evidence holds that the order in which evidence is acquired should not influence what it is reasonable to believe based on (...)
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  29.  77
    How Common is Peer Disagreement? On Self‐Trust and Rational Symmetry.Karl Schafer - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):25-46.
    In this paper I offer an argument for a view about the epistemology of peer disagreement, which I call the “Rational Symmetry View”. I argue that this view follows from a natural conception of the epistemology of testimony, together with a basic entitlement to trust our own faculties for belief formation. I then discuss some objections to this view, focusing on its relationship to other well-known views in the literature. The upshot of this discussion is that, if the (...)
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  30.  45
    Peer Disagreement: A Call for the Revision of Prior Probabilities.Sven Rosenkranz & Moritz Schulz - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (4):551-586.
    The current debate about peer disagreement has so far mainly focused on the question of whether peer disagreements provide genuine counterevidence to which we should respond by revising our credences. By contrast, comparatively little attention has been devoted to the question by which process, if any, such revision should be brought about. The standard assumption is that we update our credences by conditionalizing on the evidence that peer disagreements provide. In this paper, we argue that non-dogmatist (...)
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  31.  17
    Peer Disagreement and Counter-Examples.Ruth Weintraub - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    Two kinds of considerations are thought to be relevant to the correct response to the discovery of a peer who disagrees with you about some question. The first is general principles pertaining to disagreement. According to the second kind of consideration, a theory about the correct response to peer disagreement must conform to our intuitions about test cases. In this paper, I argue against the assumption that imperfect conformity to our intuitions about test cases must count (...)
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  32.  30
    A New Solution to the Problem of Peer Disagreement.Ruth Weintraub - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    ABSTRACTIn this paper, I defend a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement, the question as to how you should respond when you learn that your ‘epistemic peer’ disagrees with you about some...
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  33.  10
    Explanationism Provides the Best Explanation of the Epistemic Significance of Peer Disagreement.Matt Lutz - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-18.
    In this paper, I provide a novel explanationist framework for thinking about peer disagreement that solves many of the puzzles regarding disagreement that have troubled epistemologists over the last two decades. Explanationism is the view that a subject is justified in believing a proposition just in case that proposition is part of the best explanation of that subject’s total evidence. Applying explanationism to the problem of peer disagreement yields the following principle: in cases of (...) disagreement, the thing that the subjects ought to believe is the thing that is the best explanation of their total evidence, where part of their evidence is the fact that they happen to find themselves in disagreement with an epistemic peer. In what follows, I show how to understand and apply this core idea. (shrink)
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  34.  7
    A Diachronic Perspective on Peer Disagreement in Veritistic Social Epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    The main issue in the epistemology of peer disagreement is whether known disagreement among those who are in symmetrical epistemic positions undermines the rationality of their maintaining their respective views. Douven and Kelp have argued convincingly that this problem is best understood as being about how to respond to peer disagreement repeatedly over time, and that this diachronic issue can be best approached through computer simulation. However, Douven and Kelp’s favored simulation framework cannot naturally handle (...)
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  35.  23
    Should We Agree to Disagree? Pragmatism and Peer Disagreement.Susan Dieleman & Steven W. Visual Analogies and Arguments - unknown
    In this paper, I take up the conciliatory-steadfast debate occurring within social epistemology in regards to the phenomenon of peer disagreement. I will argue, because the conciliatory perspective al-lows us to understand argumentation pragmatically—as a method of problem-solving within a community rather than as a method for obtaining the truth—that in most cases, we should not simply agree to disagree.
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  36.  12
    Peer Disagreement: Special Cases.Eric Wiland - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (2):221-226.
    When you discover that an epistemic peer disagrees with you about some matter, does rationality require you to alter your views? Concessivists answer in the affirmative, but their view faces a problem in special cases. As others have noted, if concessivism itself is what’s under dispute, then concessivism seems to undermine itself. But there are other unexplored special cases too. This article identifies three such special cases, and argues that concessivists in fact face no special problem.
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  37.  28
    Epistemic Dimensions of Gaslighting: Peer-Disagreement, Self-Trust, and Epistemic Injustice.Andrew D. Spear - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    ABSTRACTMiranda Fricker has characterized epistemic injustice as “a kind of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower” (2007, Epistemic injustice: Power & the e...
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  38.  61
    Peer Disagreement and Independence Preservation.Carl Wagner - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (2):277-288.
    It has often been recommended that the differing probability distributions of a group of experts should be reconciled in such a way as to preserve each instance of independence common to all of their distributions. When probability pooling is subject to a universal domain condition, along with state-wise aggregation, there are severe limitations on implementing this recommendation. In particular, when the individuals are epistemic peers whose probability assessments are to be accorded equal weight, universal preservation of independence is, with a (...)
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  39.  59
    Peer Disagreement and the Dunning-Kruger Effect.Eric Wiland - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):481-498.
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  40. Peer Disagreement and Higher.Thomas Kelly - forthcoming - Social Epistemology: Essential Readings.
     
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  41.  71
    Conciliation and Peer-Demotion in the Epistemology of Disagreement.Juan Comesana - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (3):237-252.
    What should your reaction be when you find out that someone that you consider an "epistemic peer" disagrees with you? Two broad approaches to this question have gained support from different philosophers. Precise characterizations of these approaches will be given later, but consider for now the following approximations. First, there is the "conciliatory" approach, according to which the right reaction to a disagreement is to move one's opinion towards that of one's peer, in proportion to the degree (...)
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  42. The Value of Epistemic Disagreement in Scientific Practice. The Case of Homo Floresiensis.Helen De Cruz & Johan De Smedt - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (2):169-177.
    Epistemic peer disagreement raises interesting questions, both in epistemology and in philosophy of science. When is it reasonable to defer to the opinion of others, and when should we hold fast to our original beliefs? What can we learn from the fact that an epistemic peer disagrees with us? A question that has received relatively little attention in these debates is the value of epistemic peer disagreement—can it help us to further epistemic goals, and, if (...)
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  43. Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):767-794.
    What sort of doxastic response is rational to learning that one disagrees with an epistemic peer who has evaluated the same evidence? I argue that even weak general recommendations run the risk of being incompatible with a pair of real epistemic phenomena, what I call evidential attenuation and evidential amplification. I focus on a popular and intuitive view of disagreement, the equal weight view. I take it to state that in cases of peer disagreement, a subject (...)
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  44. Group Disagreement: A Belief Aggregation Perspective.Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4033-4058.
    The debate on the epistemology of disagreement has so far focused almost exclusively on cases of disagreement between individual persons. Yet, many social epistemologists agree that at least certain kinds of groups are equally capable of having beliefs that are open to epistemic evaluation. If so, we should expect a comprehensive epistemology of disagreement to accommodate cases of disagreement between group agents, such as juries, governments, companies, and the like. However, this raises a number of fundamental (...)
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  45.  47
    Non-Rational Action in the Face of Disagreement: An Argument Against Non-Conformism.Nikolaj Pedersen - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2935-2966.
    Recently there has been a surge of interest in the intersection between epistemology and action theory, especially in principles linking rationality in thought and rationality in action. Recently there has also been a surge of interest in the epistemic significance of perceived peer disagreement: what, epistemically speaking, is the rational response in light of disagreement with someone whom one regards as an epistemic peer? The objective of this paper is to explore these two issues—separately, but also (...)
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  46.  12
    Peer Review: Agreement and Disagreement[REVIEW]Domenic V. Cicchetti - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):534-536.
    Rl In response to Somit & Peterson's call for multiple journal manuscript submissions, and consistent with Cicchetti (1991a and 1991b), counterarguments are presented. The policy for multiple submissions is difficult to defend scientifically ana would place an unwarranted burden on both reviewers and journal editors. As such the policy is again rejected. R2 As earlier hypothesized, referee agreement on manuscripts submitted to a major journal in chemistry was significantly higher for acceptance than for rejection. This is consistent with the high (...)
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  47.  19
    Suspension and disagreement.Pieter van der Kolk & Sander Verhaegh - 2016 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 108 (1):37-52.
    Some sceptics claim that in cases of peer disagreement, we ought to suspend judgment about the topic of discussion. In this paper, we argue that the sceptic’s conclusions are only correct in some scenarios. We show that the sceptic’s conclusion is built on two premises (the principle of evidential symmetry and the principle of evidentialism) and argue that both premises are incorrect. First, we show that although it is often rational to suspend judgment when an epistemic peer (...)
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  48. Author's Response-Peer Review: Agreement and Disagreement.D. V. Cicchetti - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):536-536.
     
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  49. Religious Conversion, Transformative Experience, and Disagreement.Helen De Cruz - 2018 - Philosophia Christi 20 (1):265-276.
    Religious conversion gives rise to disagreement with one’s former self and with family and friends. Because religious conversion is personally and epistemically transformative, it is difficult to judge whether a former epistemic peer is still one’s epistemic peer post-conversion, just like it is hard for the convert to assess whether she is now in a better epistemic position than prior to her conversion. Through Augustine’s De Utilitate Credendi (The Usefulness of Belief) I show that reasoned argument should (...)
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  50. An Arrovian Impossibility Theorem for the Epistemology of Disagreement.Nicholaos Jones - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (1):97-115.
    According to conciliatory views about the epistemology of disagreement, when epistemic peers have conflicting doxastic attitudes toward a proposition and fully disclose to one another the reasons for their attitudes toward that proposition (and neither has independent reason to believe the other to be mistaken), each peer should always change his attitude toward that proposition to one that is closer to the attitudes of those peers with which there is disagreement. According to pure higher-order evidence views, higher-order (...)
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