The Pelagian controversy has secured an enduring place for Pelagius in the history of western Christian thought. Few of Pelagius' writings, however, have been preserved, and until recently none was available in English translation. This volume presents Pelagius' commentary on Romans for the first time in English. The commentary, one of thirteen on the Pauline epistles, dates from the time when Pelagius was active in Rome, before he became embroiled in controversy. But already there are adumbrations (...) of the later debate and signs of different currents of thought in Italy and beyond. In his introduction Theodore de Bruyn discusses the context in which Pelagius wrote the commentary and the issues which shaped his interpretation of Romans. He also takes up questions about the edition of the commentary. The translation is annotated with references to Pelagius' contemporaries. A new recension of Pelagius' text of Romans is presented in an appendix. (shrink)

This article will explore Jerome's understanding of sinlessness and will argue that he saw himself just as opposed to Augustine as to Pelagius. I begin by exposing Jerome's context in the Pelagian Controversy. I then expose his understanding of sinlessness. Next, I turn to his arguments in Ep. 133 and the first two books of his Dialogi contra Pelagianos. In book three of that text, we notice a change in his arguments which indicates that Jerome is no longer arguing (...) only against Pelagius; he now disagrees with Augustine as well. I then examine a variety of issues besides sinlessness in the third book of the Dialogi that reveal that Jerome disagreed with Augustine on multiple topics, showing that his opposition to Augustine's position on sinlessness was not exceptional. Finally I turn to statements by Jerome that seem to indicate a positive appreciation for the Bishop of Hippo, but which on closer inspection are seen to contain latent criticisms. (shrink)

Once upon a time Dr Thomas Svengali was walking by the side of a lake when he saw some children playing with their boats. They were model boats of course, but it was possible to control them by short–wave radio. In this way they could be made to go through all the manoeuvres which life–sized boats could execute, but in an unrealistically jerky way, like mice pretending to be elephants.

Alvarus Pelagius’ Speculum regum and Diogo Lopes Rebelo’s De republica gubernanda per regem are “mirrors for princes”, dedicated to monarchs of whom, in light of the common good envisaged by their governance, a virtuous line of action was expected. Both texts echo St. Augustine’s discussion, in book XIX of De civitate Dei, of peace as the end to which any and the whole human community aspires. The preservation of peace, as a means for the king to accomplish the common (...) good, even if doing so involved waging war, obeys precise conditions of justice differently identified by the authors. In this study, we examine the positions of Alvarus Pelagius and Diogo Lopes Rebelo on the relations between power and peace in what concerns the right to wage war, during war, and after war. In both cases, the references to peace and war are sparse, but they allow us to identify positions that, despite the common political tradition, manifest significant divergences. (shrink)

Scholars have often remarked on the surprising frequency with which medieval Irish writers referred to the heresiarch Pelagius and the extent to which they borrowed from his works. While there has been nothing like unanimity on the question of why the Irish showed such a liking for him, all are agreed that they were not true Pelagians, in the sense that the famous theological arguments for which Pelagius was eventually condemned never found favor with Irish writers. There is (...) one document, however — and that an important one — which explicitly accuses the Irish of Pelagianism: the letter of 640 to the northern Irish clergy from the pope-elect John IV and three others of the Roman curia, as reported by Bede. The letter has proved a mystery to modern writers, and one of the most recent has gone so far as to say that “Bede's intriguing and puzzling reference must remain just that.”. (shrink)

This book is the first major study of the theme of misanthropy, its history, arguments both for and against it, and its significance for us today. Misanthropy is not strictly a philosophy. It is an inconsistent thought, and so has often been mocked. But from Timon of Athens to Motörhead it has had a very long life, vast historical purchase and is seemingly indomitable and unignorable. Human beings have always nursed a profound distrust of who and what they are. This (...) book does not seek to rationalize that distrust, but asks how far misanthropy might have a reason on its side, if a confused reason. There are obvious arguments against misanthropy. It is often born of a hatred of physical being. It can be historically explained. It particularly appears in undemocratic cultures. But what of the misanthropy of terminally defeated and disempowered peoples? Or born of progressivisms? Or the misanthropy that quarrels with specious or easy positivities (from Pelagius to Leibniz to the corporate cheer of contemporary `total capital`)? From the Greek Cynics to Roman satire, St Augustine to Jacobean drama, the misanthropy of the French Ancien Regime to Swift, Smollett and Johnson, Hobbes, Schopenhauer and Rousseau, from the Irish and American misanthropic traditions to modern women`s misanthropy, the book explores such questions. It ends with a debate about contemporary culture that ranges from the `dark radicalisms`, queer misanthropy, posthumanism and eco-misanthropy to Houellebecq, punk rock and gangsta rap. (shrink)

The Myth of Pelagianism is a ground-breaking interdisciplinary work that combines textual research with sociological analysis and evidence from previously unpresented manuscripts. It offers a revision to our understanding of Pelagius and the formation of Christian doctrine.

Meritocracy is gaining momentum in public discourse, being close to the determinants of people’s demand of social justice. Conversely, in Academia meritocracy is the object of harsh critiques. The meritocratic rhetoric brings people to overlook the factors which contributed to their success over their individual actions, legitimating socioeconomic inequalities. Recently, it has been argued that market-driven societies foster the problems related to meritocracy. The concept of merit, conceived as the value of the individual contribution to the common good of society, (...) is absorbed by market value. While we share the concerns on meritocracy, we question the idea that those are necessarily connected to the market sphere. To prove that, our paper digs in the theological roots of the concept of merit to better understand meritocracy. We inquire Pelagius–Augustine debate on human merit and salvation, and its influence on Rawls’s critique of meritocracy. We base on the “Augustinian” Rawls our argument that market is not a meritocratic domain, but that in market there is space for merit conceived as ‘legitimate expectations.’ Our aim is to prove that merit can find some space in market societies without incurring in the problems of meritocracy. (shrink)

Amor Dei, “love of God” raises three questions: How do we know God is love? How do we experience love of God? How free are we to love God? This book presents three kinds of love, worldly, spiritual, and divine to understand God’s love. The work begins with Augustine’s Confessions highlighting his Manichean and Neoplatonic periods before his conversion to Christianity. Augustine’s confrontation with Pelagius anticipates the unresolved disputes concerning God’s love and free will. In the sixteenth-century the Italian (...) humanist, Gasparo Contarini introduces the notion of “divine amplitude” to demonstrate how God’s goodness is manifested in the human agent. Pierre de Bérulle, Guillaume Gibieuf, and Nicolas Malebranche show connections with Contarini in the seventeenth-century controversies relating free will and divine love. In response to the free will dispute, the Scottish philosopher, William Chalmers, offers his solution. Cornelius Jansen relentlessly asserts his anti-Pelagian interpretation of Augustine stirring up more controversy. John Norris, Malebranche’s English disciple, exchanges his views with Mary Astell and Damaris Masham. In the tradition of Cambridge Platonism, Ralph Cudworth conveys a God who “sweetly governs.” The organization of sections represents the love of God in ascending-descending movements demonstrating that, “human love is inseparable from divine love.”. (shrink)

Orosius is generally considered Augustine’s companion in the debate with Pelagius; however, a careful analysis of his Liber Apologeticus shows that Orosius shares the main features of Jerome’s polemic against Pelagius, thus moving away from Augustine’s approach. Orosius and Jerome used the same source, unknown to Augustine. They depicted Pelagius as the heir of Christian heretics, such as Origen, Priscillian and Jovinian; they both employed offensive language; and, finally, they agreed on the main theological problems involved in (...) the controversy. All of these issues are at odds with what Augustine believed was the right approach against Pelagius. At the end of his Palestinian experience, Orosius was no longer Augustine’s disciple, but rather Jerome’s companion in the struggle against Pelagius. (shrink)

This article discusses a respect in which modern thought differs from ancient: the role of hope. Although mentioned in ancient philosophy, hope is not a cardinal virtue, much less a presupposition of moral action. By contrast, hope takes center stage in the thought of Kant. Kant maintains that moral perfection is possible and always in the process of being realized but never actually comes to pass. No matter how much progress is made, there will always be something more to be (...) accomplished. In this way, the gap between is and ought becomes smaller but is never completely closed. Because it gets smaller, hope is always justified; because it is never completely closed, hope is always needed. But Kant, by his own admission, can offer no systematic reason why human behavior always falls short of its goal. If it is possible to overcome evil, I am perfectly justified in hoping that one day it will be overcome. Kant rejects this position because it would put him dangerously close to Pelagius, whose works were declared heretical because they denied the doctrine of original sin. (shrink)

This article discusses a respect in which modern thought differs from ancient: the role of hope. Although mentioned in ancient philosophy, hope is not a cardinal virtue, much less a presupposition of moral action. By contrast, hope takes center stage in the thought of Kant. Kant maintains that moral perfection is possible and always in the process of being realized but never actually comes to pass. No matter how much progress is made, there will always be something more to be (...) accomplished. In this way, the gap between is and ought becomes smaller but is never completely closed. Because it gets smaller, hope is always justified; because it is never completely closed, hope is always needed. But Kant, by his own admission, can offer no systematic reason why human behavior always falls short of its goal. If it is possible to overcome evil, I am perfectly justified in hoping that one day it will be overcome. Kant rejects this position because it would put him dangerously close to Pelagius, whose works were declared heretical because they denied the doctrine of original sin. (shrink)

The political history of the twentieth century can be viewed as the history of democracy’s struggle against its external enemies: fascism and communism. This struggle ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet regime. Some people think that democracy now faces new enemies: Islamic fundamentalism, religious extremism and international terrorism and that this is the struggle that will define our times. Todorov disagrees: the biggest threat to democracy today is democracy itself. Its enemies are (...) within: what the ancient Greeks called 'hubris'. Todorov argues that certain democratic values have been distorted and pushed to an extreme that serves the interests of dominant states and powerful individuals. In the name of ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’, the United States and some European countries have embarked on a crusade to enlighten some foreign populations through the use of force. Yet this mission to ‘help’ others has led to Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, to large-scale destruction and loss of life and to a moral crisis of growing proportions. The defence of freedom, if unlimited, can lead to the tyranny of individuals. Drawing on recent history as well as his own experience of growing up in a totalitarian regime, Todorov returns to examples borrowed from the Western canon: from a dispute between Augustine and Pelagius to the fierce debates among Enlightenment thinkers to explore the origin of these perversions of democracy. He argues compellingly that the real democratic ideal is to be found in the delicate, ever-changing balance between competing principles, popular sovereignty, freedom and progress. When one of these elements breaks free and turns into an over-riding principle, it becomes dangerous: populism, ultra-liberalism and messianism, the inner enemies of democracy. (shrink)

In his Commentarium in Hieremiam, as well as in other contemporary works, Jerome accuses Pelagius of conducting a defamatory campaign against him by accusing him of Origenism, contempt for marriage and more generally, of wishing others ill. Did Jerome really seek to discredit his adversary, or were such accusations even circulating? This paper takes into consideration Pelagius’s surviving works and intends to give – within the limits admitted by the sources – an answer to this question, coming to (...) the conclusion that the conflict between the two writers was not lacking in personal attacks, and that Jerome’s report is thus trustworthy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:ST. AUGUSTINE'S NOVELISTIC CONVERSION Tyler Graham Syracuse University In his famous biography of St. Augustine, Peter Brown attempts to explainwhat set the Confessions "apart from the intellectual tradition to which Augustine belonged" (Augustine ofHippo 169). While he concedes that "the Confessions are a masterpiece ofstrictly intellectual autobiography" (167), he concludes that it is more important to realize that they "are, quite succinctly, the story of Augustine's 'heart,' or of (...) his 'feelings'—his affectus"(169). He continues to explain that "in the Confessions, however, the evocation of Augustine's feelings forms part of the wider study of the evolution ofhis will" (172). Thus, Brown suggests that Augustine's central anthropological concern is to determine the origin and/or causes ofhuman desire (i.e. the "evolution of will"). Augustine's "exhaustive analysis ofhis motives" (as Brown describes it) is linked to his lifetime struggle to explain the complex interaction between his free will and a divine will (grace) to transform his "sinful" desires and create a "new heart" within him. In Brown's view, the Confessions reflect Augustine's struggle to discover whether desire originates in God or man. We can agree with Brown that this theological agenda is important to Augustine, for it will resurface in all of his theological struggles stretching from his pre-Christian engagement with the Manichees to his final battle with Pelagius. Nevertheless, I will argue in this paper that the Confessions reflect another important dimension to Augustine's morphology ofdesire. Regardless 136Tyler Graham of its divine or human source, Augustine's desires often begin with the imitation of another person. In portraying examples of his life up to and including his famous conversion in the year 386 (Book VIII), Augustine consistently shows that his desires have been copies or imitations ofvarious models whom he has chosen to follow. Writers such as Brown have considered the importance ofdesire (or the will) in the Confessions, and critics like Geoffrey Harpham (whom we will address later) have examined Augustine's interest in mimesis during various scenes in the book. Yet, with the exception ofAvitol Wohlman, no one (to my knowledge) has adequately considered the combination of the two: mimetic desire. In the first book ofthe Confessions, Augustine recounts his childhood, and, by the eighth chapter, he has already introduced a theme which will haunt the entire work: the link between desire and language. My desires were internal; adults were external to me and had no means ofentering into my soul. So I threw my limbs about and uttered sounds, signs resembling my wishes. (1:8) Language is born as a result ofthe need to express desire. For Augustine, words, gestures, and all utterances connect the "internal" wants to the "external" object ofcommunication (in this case, adults). In fact, ifAugustine links desire with the soul (external adults could not "enter his soul"), then language becomes the bridge between souls: it communicates desire from soul to soul. When Augustine reaches boyhood, and he begins to learn the accepted modes of articulation, the link between language and desire remains: "By groans and various sounds and various movements of parts of my body I would endeavor to express the intentions ofmy heart to persuade people to bow to my will" (1:13). Language communicates desire, but it also seeks to transform and generate desire. Beyond simply explaining his wishes, Augustine's language is persuasive, seeking to get others to "bow to my will." Whereas some people would like to remember their childhood as a time of innocence, joy, and peace, Augustine depicts his early life as "sinful," unhappy, and fraught with tears and conflicting interests. For an infant ofthat age, could itbe reckoned good to use tears in trying to obtain what it would have been harmful to get?.. The feebleness of infant limbs is innocent, not the infant's mind. (1:11) St. Augustine 's Novelistic Conversion137 Although he does notrememberbis own infancy, Augustine extrapolates from his analysis ofother children. I have personally watched and studied a jealous baby. He could not yet speak and, pale with jealousy and bitterness, glared at his brother sharing his mother's milk. Who is unaware ofthis fact ofexperience? Envy among infants is universal... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Escalation to Academic Extremes?Revisiting Academic Rivalry in the Möhler/Baur DebateGrant Kaplan (bio)INTRODUCTION: THEOLOGY AS THE SITE OF CONFLICTOne way to understand the history of Christian theology is as a history of rivalries. In the Letter to the Galatians, Paul and Peter seem like rivals when Paul recounts "opposing Peter to his face" (Gal. 2:11). The key theological discoveries in the fourth and fifth century are mostly borne of rivalry: (...) Eunomius versus the Cappadocians, and Pelagius versus Augustine. The Middle Ages contain the Eucharistic controversies between Pascasius and Ratramnus, and later controversies about the nature of authority in the theology between Abelard and Lombard. By the sixteenth century, not only the history of theology but the history of the Western churches seems to be intertwined with rivalry, with the Protestant Reformation being the most obvious example. One could also tell the history of religious orders as a history of rivalries between, among others, Franciscans and Dominicans, and later Jesuits. The teachings on justification arose from rivalries, and most of modern Catholic ecclesiology arose from Bellarmine's disputatious interactions with leading Lutherans like Flacius [End Page 163] and Chemnitz. In the past century, much of the theological terrain seems to be shaped by disputes between figures who had once been aligned: Barth and Brunner, Balthasar and Rahner, Cone and Jones.In retrospect, the nineteenth century seemed primed for theological rivalry. Due to social, political, and institutional factors, the nineteenth century was profoundly destabilizing for theology, particularly in Germany, where political realignment threatened to unsettle whatever truce had emerged after the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War in 1648. A number of factors contributed to this climate; perhaps foremost among them was the rapid expansion of academic journals. Without being in the same room, scholars could argue and respond to one another in what must have felt like "real time." Journals, to put it crudely, were the online comment section of their day, and they provided a new medium for theological dispute. Although public debate still figured prominently in the sixteenth century, even as the printing press was making it less central to theological argument, in the nineteenth century, one could escalate debate through asynchronous modes of communication.Both political destabilization and technological innovation made possible a range of intraconfessional disputes: among both Protestants—between mediating and confessing, Kantian and Hegelian, authoritarian, and scientific theologies—and Catholics—between scholastic and modern, German and Roman, Gallican and ultramontanist theologies. These circumstances also occasioned a redoubling of confessional identity. Olaf Blaschke has described the nineteenth century as a "second confessional age."1 By this he means that the nineteenth century, on the scale of confessional identity, looked more like the sixteenth century than the eighteenth did; instead of manifesting an increase in secularizing and nationalizing forces that downplayed religious identities, the nineteenth, according to a variety of measures, witnessed an upsurge in confessional identity.2 This upsurge affected Württemberg, the primarily Protestant territory in the southwestern part of Germany, where Tübingen was located. The newly constituted Württemberg combined a number of tiny, mono-confessional states into a larger, multi-confessional state as part of the reconfigurations brought about by Napoleon. Practically, this meant a loss in political autonomy for Catholic areas within Württemberg.According to one account, the confessional conflicts that memorably marked the 1870s (the Kulturkampf) and also the 1830s and 1840s (the Cologne Troubles and the Kniebeugungsstreiten) were already on the increase in the 1810s in Württemberg, in part due to the massive anniversary celebrations (Wartburgfeier) of the Reformation in 1817.3 This was the same year that the government relocated the newly established Catholic theological faculty from Ellwangen [End Page 164] to Tübingen, a long-time Protestant stronghold with a reputable theological faculty.The Catholic theologians in Tübingen were eager to engage critically with the leading theological issues of the day, resisting the urge to hide behind confessional barriers or pious pretenses. This decision led to a variety of conflicts that could be called rivalrous, and that fall into three categories: The first was within the Catholic faculty itself, as exemplified in the debate over celibacy. Their journal... (shrink)

The political history of the twentieth century can be viewed as the history of democracy’s struggle against its external enemies: fascism and communism. This struggle ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet regime. Some people think that democracy now faces new enemies: Islamic fundamentalism, religious extremism and international terrorism and that this is the struggle that will define our times. Todorov disagrees: the biggest threat to democracy today is democracy itself. Its enemies are (...) within: what the ancient Greeks called 'hubris'. Todorov argues that certain democratic values have been distorted and pushed to an extreme that serves the interests of dominant states and powerful individuals. In the name of ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’, the United States and some European countries have embarked on a crusade to enlighten some foreign populations through the use of force. Yet this mission to ‘help’ others has led to Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, to large-scale destruction and loss of life and to a moral crisis of growing proportions. The defence of freedom, if unlimited, can lead to the tyranny of individuals. Drawing on recent history as well as his own experience of growing up in a totalitarian regime, Todorov returns to examples borrowed from the Western canon: from a dispute between Augustine and Pelagius to the fierce debates among Enlightenment thinkers to explore the origin of these perversions of democracy. He argues compellingly that the real democratic ideal is to be found in the delicate, ever-changing balance between competing principles, popular sovereignty, freedom and progress. When one of these elements breaks free and turns into an over-riding principle, it becomes dangerous: populism, ultra-liberalism and messianism, the inner enemies of democracy. (shrink)

In this study, based in the main political works of D. Fr. Alvarus Pelagius O. Min. (c. 1270- c.1350) we analyze his conception on the origin or efficient cause of the spiritual power and, also, his thought about the finality or final cause of the mentioned power. Referring to the first topic, the Bishop of Silves wants principally refutes some Marsilius of Padua’s thesis contained in the Second Dictio of his Defensor Pacis, completely different of the theology of the (...) catholic priesthood and their hierarchic degrees and the Peter’s Primacy. With this purpose, ad litteram, he bases, between other sources, specially, in James’ of Viterbo OSA De regimine christiano (1301). Concerning the finality of the spiritual power, on the one hand, Alvarus supports the Church’s traditional thought about this matter and, the other hand, by consequence, as member and defender of the hierocratic thought, he defends the thesis according which, in the Societas Christiana, the priests, the bishops and, principally, the Roman Pontiff hold the most important position concerning the secular rulers. (shrink)

This major study of Hegel's intellectual development up to the writing of The Phenomonology of Spirit argues that his work is best understood in the context of the liberalisation of German Protestantism in the eighteenth century. 'The scholarship with which Dickey presents his case is remarkable for both its depth and its range: his account of German protestantism, for example, involves a discussion of the theological doctrines of St Clement, St Augustine and Pelagius, and, despite his scepticism about the (...) Kant-Fichte-Schelling-Hegel succession, these philosophers, among others, all receive their due. Dickey also reflects continuously on his own intellectual procedures, and provides much insightful discussion of historical methodology. Yet despite all this, he never loses his sense of direction or lapses into unreadability. His book is a remarkable one and will prove indispensable to Hegel specialists, but also of great interest to historians of ideas in general.' -- Michael Inwood, The Times Literary Supplement. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS I05 1120a): these and much else form models of the meticulousness and also the daring with which such discussions should be conducted. THOMAS G. ROSENMEYER University of Washington Religious Philosophy, A Group ol Essays.By Harry Austryn Wolfson. (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1961. Pp. xii + 278. $6.00.) For those who have never dared to take the plunge into one of Professor Wolfson's massive studies--the two-volume sets (...) on Philo and Spinoza, for instance, or the first part of The Philosophy of the Church Fathers--these ten essays offer a series of brief but enlightening introductory paddles. The eleventh piece, a concluding Sermonette, is neither enlightening nor a happy introduction to a rigorous mind. The essays, ranging over a considerable number of Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and secular thinkers, are entitled as follows: "The Philonic God of Revelation and His Latter-day Deniers"; "Extradeical and Intradeical Interpretations of Platonic Ideas"; "Immortality and Resurrection in the Philosophy of the Church Fathers"; "Philosophical Implications of the Theology of Cyril of Jerusalem"; "Philosophical Implications of Arianism and Apollinarianism"; "Saint Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy"; "Ibn Khaldun on Attributes and Predestination "; "Causality and Freedom in Descartes, Leibniz, and Hume"; "The Veracity of Scripture from Philo to Spinoza"; "Spinoza and the Religion of the Past." Despite this wide variety of topics, the book is held together, Wolfson assures us, by a "common theme" (p. v). To accept this theme is, in effect, to look at the history of Western religious philosophy from New Testament times to Spinoza's in a very special way. Picking up three histories of philosophy at random, I find that Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy mentions the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria (20? mC.--A.D. 54?) on two pages; B. A. G. Fuller's History of Philosophy devotes about three and a half pages to Philo but concludes that "Philo seems to have had no disciples of note and no direct influence, at any rate, upon the century and a half that intervenes between his death and the birth of Plotinus" (p. 305); W. T. Jones in his History of Western Philosophy (Vol. I) rates Philo's worth at just over a page and a caustic footnote. If, however, we look at religious philosophy in Wolfson's way, we see Philo as the root and determining origin of all medieval philosophizing, Jewish, Christian and Muslim ; we further see the medieval philosophy begun by Philo as a homogeneous system of thought, lying between pagan Greek speculations and the secular systems of the seventeenth century. Wolfson writes: 106 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Ostensibly Philo is only the interpreter of the Hebrew Scriptures in terms of Greek philosophy. But actually he is more than that. He is the interpreter of Greek philosophy in terms of certain fundamental teachings of his Hebrew Scripture, whereby he revolutionised philosophy and remade it into what became the common philosophy of the three religions with cognate Scriptures, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (p. v). In all the essays the topics are taken partly as Philonic in origin; it is Wolfson's aim to make the quarrels of medieval and later thinkers more intelligible in the light of their positions' intellectual ancestry. The result of his approach is a series of amazingly dexterous historical investigations; the reader moves with quite unexpected ease through intricate thirty-page discussions, each carrying some hundred or so footnotes of far-flung references to Plato, Aristotle, Scripture, Jewish and Arabic commentators, Patristic hagglers, Spinoza, Hume, Mill, et alii. The burden of erudition is wielded with simplicity and grace. Where there are historical obscurities and misunderstandings to be cleared up, one reads Wolfson with gratitude and enjoyment. Perhaps I can best fulfill my role as reviewer by summarizing part of his sixth and most exciting chapter, that on the controversy of Pelagius and Augustine over human freedom. Here Wolfson sets out to reverse history's verdict: to show Pelagius' account of freedom as keeping to "the original Christian belief"; to show Augustine's views as heretical by the measure of previous Christian tradition. He begins with much-documented observations that Greek pagan philosophy establishes a tension in man between the powers of... (shrink)

This work looks at the ontology of personalism in his major fiction and opens a door to a fresh understanding of Dostoevsky's version of the origin of human evil. In his philosophical novels, Dostoevski's view of original conflict and inevitable evil goes far beyond Augustine, Pelagius, and Luther. The authors are the first to build a case for viewing Dostoevsky as a philosophical personalist whose approach to nature provides insight to ecologists. They offer a radically new analysis of the (...) themes of suffering, incarnation, and atonement that will appeal to both psychologists and students of religion and theology. The section on atonement and its relation to the classical theory of tragedy breaks new ground. (shrink)

abstract: The debate between St. Augustine of Hippo and the British monk Pelagius is a famous event in the history of Christianity. While Pelagius emphasized the idea that we could achieve salvation via our own free effort, Augustine argued for the opposite: That due to original sin, humans are unable to reach liberation alone and must be saved by God's grace. Augustine won the debate, and the doctrine of original sin became a key theological cornerstone of Western Christianity. (...) What is less well known is that two philosophical positions within the Buddhist tradition corresponded to this debate. One from the Buddha Shakyamuni himself, who taught that all could attain nirvana freely, and one from the medieval Japanese monk and philosopher Shinran, who, disagreeing with his master, taught that we live in a fallen era. We are unable to achieve enlightenment ourselves and thus must rely on the saving grace of Amida Buddha to transport us to a place where the goal is achievable. This paper seeks to highlight these similarities between these two debates and, in the process, show that the philosophical issue of free will versus determinism is one that crosses the boundaries of Eastern and Western thought. It is hoped that the revelation of such a shared debate will increase understanding between Christianity and Buddhism, as well as between other diverse traditions of thought. (shrink)

The following article examines Augustine’s efforts in De gestis Pelagii, the bishop of Hippo’s commentary on the acts of the Synod of Diospolis at which Pelagius was acquitted of heresy in December 415 CE. Gest. Pel. is far from an attempt to offer an impartial account of the synod’s events. Rather, it forms a key part of Augustine’s efforts in the aftermath of Diospolis to re-interpret what appeared to be a disaster for the anti-Pelagian cause. In this sense, gest. (...) Pel. is a work with a clear rhetorical purpose. The question at the heart of this article is whether, as two scholars have recently suggested, Augustine’s rhetorical aims in this work led him to consciously misrepresent the facts—about the synod’s decision, Pelagius’s views, and his own history with Pelagius. I will argue that we can plausibly take Augustine at his word in gest. Pel. (shrink)

Among the “patristic” authorities that Augustine invokes near the end of his anti-Pelagian work De natura et gratia is a couplet from Ambrose’s hymn, “Iam Surgit Hora Tertia.” While these lines have been cited as evidence of the hymn’s authenticity, few have examined their function and meaning in the context of the treatise. I argue that the lines illustrate Augustine’s distinctive use of authorities in De natura et gratia and that this use is driven by two primary motives: first, Augustine (...) wants to counter Pelagius’s use and citation of authorities in Pelagius’s work De natura; and, second, Augustine wants to advance his own views on the necessity of the grace of Christ. Turning to “Iam Surgit,” I first show that Augustine seeks to counter a potential Pelagian “abuse” of the hymn, and especially the way the Pelagians might exploit its reference to “merit.” I then speculate that Augustine uses the hymn to offer implicit support for his own understanding of grace since, according to his reading, the source of forgiveness in Ambrose’s hymn is the gratia Christi. Augustine thus shows not only that Ambrose’s words are media, that is, equally supportive of both sides in the dispute, but also that they advance Augustine’s developing views on the priority of the grace of Christ in the prayers of humanity. (shrink)

Em boa parte do Artigo 68 do Livro Primeiro de seu Estado e Pranto da Igreja, Álvaro Pais, O. Min. (c. 1270-1349) refuta 5 proposições com implicações políticas atribuídas a Marsílio de Pádua (1280-1342). Neste artigo, analisamos a refutação dessas proposições feitas pelo Menorita galego, comparando-as, de um lado, com os textos, efetivamente escritos pelo Médico paduano, que se encontram em sua obra Defensor da Paz (1324) e, de outro, cotejando-o com uma Epistula ad quosdam cardinales, de autoria do mencionado (...) Frade, escrita pelo menos dois anos antes. Desse estudo resultaram as seguintes conclusões: 1 – Frei Álvaro, sem fazer nenhuma alusão, apoiou-se basicamente na mencionada Epistula. 2 – Sob o aspecto doutrinal, essencialmente, não há diferença entre ambos os textos alvarinos. 3 – Nos dois textos, o Franciscano galego não compulsou o Defensor da Paz, tendo utilizado as teses que os censores dessa obra imputaram ao seu autor; em 1327, quando o Papa João XXII condenou-a como herética. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Álvaro Pais. Marsílio de Pádua. Plenitude do poder. Filosofia política. ABSTRACT In a large part of the Article 68 of the Book one of his Status et Planctus Ecclesiae, Alvarus Pelagius O. Min. (c. 1270-1349) refutes five propositions, having political implications, attributed to Marsilius Patavinus (1280-1342). In this study, we analyze the refutation of these propositions made by Alvarus, comparing, on the one hand, with the texts, really, written by Marsilius, which are in his book entitled Defensor pacis (1324), and on the other hand, quoting Alvarus’ text with the Epistula ad quosdam cardinales, also written by the mentioned Franciscan friar two years before. From this study, resulted the following conclusions: 1 – Without to do any mention in the Article 68, the principal Alvarus’ source was the referred Epistula. 2 – Considering the two texts written by Fr. Alvarus, according the doctrinal aspect, they are essentially equal. 3 – In both texts we could see that Alvarus not had in his hands the Defensor Pacis, having used the thesis which the censors of this book imputed to Marsilius in 1327, when this book was condemned as heretic by the Pope John XXII. KEY WORDS – Alvarus Pelagius. Marsilius of Padua. Plentitude of power. Political philosophy. (shrink)

This article will explore Jerome's understanding of sinlessness and will argue that he saw himself just as opposed to Augustine as to Pelagius. I begin by exposing Jerome's context in the Pelagian Controversy. I then expose his understanding of sinlessness. Next, I turn to his arguments in Ep. 133 and the first two books of his Dialogi contra Pelagianos. In book three of that text, we notice a change in his arguments which indicates that Jerome is no longer arguing (...) only against Pelagius; he now disagrees with Augustine as well. I then examine a variety of issues besides sinlessness in the third book of the Dialogi that reveal that Jerome disagreed with Augustine on multiple topics, showing that his opposition to Augustine's position on sinlessness was not exceptional. Finally I turn to statements by Jerome that seem to indicate a positive appreciation for the Bishop of Hippo, but which on closer inspection are seen to contain latent criticisms. (shrink)

The reception of rhetorical elements in the Letter to Philemon by Patristic exegetes. The aim of this study is to offer an overview of the way in which Patristic exegetes interpreted the rhetorical aspects of Paul’s Letter to Philemon. Although a rhetorical analysis of the letter was not the matter which interested them as such, one can still obtain a fairly good idea of the way in which they perceived such aspects by reading their explanations of this letter. Accordingly, the (...) contributions of all the Patristic exegetes in this regard are studied systematically in this study. The interpretations of the letters by Ambrosiaster, Jerome, John Chrysostom, Pelagius, Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret of Cyrus are investigated from this angle. In each case, the most important comments on Paul’s rhetorical strategy are identified and discussed.Keywords: Pauline Letters; Letter to Philemon; Rhetorical Analaysis; Patristic Exegetes. (shrink)

Paul, the peacemaker. On the reception of the Letter to Philemon in the 4th and 5th centuries AD. By means of his letter to Philemon Paul attempted to make peace between Philemon and his slave, Onesimus. The theological aspects of this endeavour have been discussed often in academic circles, but thus far little attention has been given to what the practical implications of this would have been for Philemon’s household. In this article, this issue is addressed from a particular perspective, (...) namely how this aspect was interpreted by Christians in the 4th and 5th centuries CE. The interpretations of the Letter to Philemon by Ambrosiaster, Jerome, John Chrysostom, Pelagius, Theodore of Mopsuestia and Theodoret of Cyrus are then investigated systematically in order to determine what their views were in this regard. It is shown that they all agreed that Philemon would (or would have no choice but to) forgive Onesimus, and that Onesimus would have turned into a better slave. All of these interpreters agreed that there would not be any drastic social changes in Philemon’s household although it does seem as if one of them, Ambrosiaster, realised that what Paul expected of Philemon could have had serious consequences for the relationship between Philemon and Onesimus. (shrink)