Results for 'Perceptual Content'

946 found
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  1. Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.
    Recently, the thesis that experience is fundamentally a matter of representing the world as being a certain way has been questioned by austere relationalists. I defend this thesis by developing a view of perceptual content that avoids their objections. I will argue that on a relational understanding of perceptual content, the fundamental insights of austere relationalism do not compete with perceptual experience being representational. As it will show that most objections to the thesis that experience (...)
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  2. II*—Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience.Martin Davies - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92:21-46.
    Martin Davies; II*—Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 21–46, https://do.
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  3. Perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.Bence Nanay - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1723-1736.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that the phenomenal similarity between perceiving and visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these two different mental states. And this puts important constraints on how we should think about perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.
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    Does Perceptual Content Have to Be Objective? A Defence of Nonconceptualism.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):201-214.
    In this paper, I discuss the conceptualist claim that we cannot speak of perceptual content unless we assume it is objective content. The conceptualist argues that only conceptual content can meet the requirement of being objective, so that the view that perceptual experience has nonconceptual content is not tenable. I start out by presenting the argument from objectivity as it can be found in McDowell. I then present the following objections: First, perceptual objectivity (...)
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  5. Attention and perceptual content.Bence Nanay - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):263-270.
    I argue that perceptual content is always affected by the allocation of one’s attention. Perception attributes determinable and determinate properties to the perceived scene. Attention makes (or tries to make) our perceptual attribution of properties more determinate. Hence, a change in our attention changes the determinacy of the properties attributed to the perceived scene.
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  6. Rich perceptual content and aesthetic properties.Dustin Stokes - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Both common sense and dominant traditions in art criticism and philosophical aesthetics have it that aesthetic features or properties are perceived. However, there is a cast of reasons to be sceptical of the thesis. This paper defends the thesis—that aesthetic properties are sometimes represented in perceptual experience—against one of those sceptical opponents. That opponent maintains that perception represents only low-level properties, and since all theorists agree that aesthetic properties are not low-level properties, perception does not represent aesthetic properties. I (...)
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  7. Perceptual content.Elka Shortsleeve & Kelly Trogdon - 2006 - ProtoSociology 22.
    Sketch of an account of perceptual content that satisfies conditions concerning accuracy, transparency, and richness.
     
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  8. Enriched Perceptual Content and the Limits of Foundationalism.Errol Lord - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):151-171.
    This paper is about the epistemology of perceptual experiences that have enriched high-level content. Enriched high-level content is content about features other than shape, color, and spatial relations that has a particular etiology. Its etiology runs through states of the agent that process other perceptual content and output sensory content about high-level features. My main contention is that the justification provided by such experiences is not foundational justification. This is because the justification provided (...)
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  9. Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):602-627.
    According to Sparse views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by the experiential presentation of ‘low-level’ properties such as (in the case of vision) shapes, colors, and textures Whereas, according to Rich views of perceptual content, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can also sometimes involve experiencing ‘high-level’ properties such as natural kinds, artefactual kinds, causal relations, linguistic meanings, and moral properties. An important dialectical tool in the debate between (...)
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  10.  83
    Perceptual Content in the Stoics.Richard Sorabji - 1990 - Phronesis 35 (1):307-314.
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    Fixing internalism about perceptual content.Gregory Bochner - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3):404-419.
    Suppose that Paul, while looking at a tree, sees that that thing over there is a red bird. Paul is having what we may call a ‘singular’ perceptual experience. How should we characterise the representational content of his perceptual experience? I will sketch an original answer to this question, building on the internalist accounts propounded by Searle (1983. Intentionality. Cambridge University Press. Ch. 2) and Recanati (2007. Perspectival Thought. Oxford University Press. Ch. 17). Pace Searle, the (...) of Paul's experience is not a (general) proposition. Pace Recanati, whose account draws on Lewis’s (1979. “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se.” Philosophical Review 88 (4): 513–543) internalist view of de se attitudes, it is not a property of the perceiving subject. Instead, I submit, it is a property of the perceived object. The content is the property of being a red bird, which determines a set of centred worlds whose centre (an object taken at a time) is a red bird; the object (here, the bird) is part of the relevant situation of evaluation for the experience; and the experience is veridical only if the actual world centred on the object belongs to the set of centred worlds determined by that property. I will argue that this view retains the benefits of Searle's and Recanati's accounts while improving on them. (shrink)
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  12. Perceptual content, information, and the primary/secondary quality distinction.John Kulvicki - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):103-131.
    Our perceptual systems make information about the world available to our cognitive faculties. We come to think about the colors and shapes of objects because we are built somehow to register the instantiation of these properties around us. Just how we register the presence of properties and come to think about them is one of the central problems with understanding perceptual cognition. Another problem in the philosophy of perception concerns the nature of the properties whose presence we register. (...)
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  13. Perceptual content.Christopher Peacocke - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  14. Reconsidering perceptual content.William T. Wojtach - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):22-43.
    An important class of teleological theories cannot explain the representational content of visual states because they fail to address the relationship between the world, projected retinal stimuli, and perception. A different approach for achieving a naturalized theory of visual content is offered that rejects the traditional internalism/externalism debate in favor of what is termed “empirical externalism.” This position maintains that, while teleological considerations can underwrite a broad understanding of representation, the content of visual representation can only be (...)
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  15. Perceptual content and Fregean myth.Ruth G. Millikan - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):439-459.
  16. Perceptual content.Christopher Peacocke - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  17. Perceptual content, cognitive penetrability, and realism.Johathan Lowe - 2015 - In John Zeimbekis & Athanassios Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     
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  18. Is perceptual content ever conceptual?Michael R. Ayers - 2002 - Philosophical Books 43 (1):5-17.
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    Epicurean Perceptual Content.Ana Gavran Miloš - 2015 - Prolegomena 14 (2).
    Epicurean epistemology is usually summarised in a controversial thesis according to which all perceptions are true. Although it seems very problematic and counterintuitive, careful investigation of the main sources shows us that Epicurus ’ claim for the truth of perceptions is not so hasty but is supported with some serious arguments. In the paper, I examine the thesis according to which “all perceptions are true”, but my main focus is to analyse the content of Epicurean perception through the following (...)
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  20. Perceptual content and sensorimotor expectations.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):383-391.
    I distinguish between two kinds of sensorimotor expectations: agent- and object-active ones. Alva Noë's answer to the problem of how perception acquires volumetric content illicitly privileges agent-active expectations over object-active expectations, though the two are explanatorily on a par. Considerations which Noë draws upon concerning how organisms may ‘off-load’ internal processes onto the environment do not support his view that volumetric content depends on our embodiment; rather, they support a view of experience which is restrictive of the body's (...)
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  21. (1 other version)Attention, Perceptual Content, and Mirrors: Two Medieval Models of Active Perception in Peter Olivi and Peter Auriol.Lukáš Lička - 2017 - Perception in Scholastics and Their Interlocutors.
    In the paper I argue that medieval philosophers proposed several notions of the senses’ activity in perception. I illustrate the point using the example of two Franciscan thinkers – Peter Olivi (ca. 1248–1298) and Peter Auriol (ca. 1280–1322). Olivi’s notion of active perception assumes that every perceptual act demands a prior focusing of the mind’s attention. Furthermore, Olivi is partially inspired by the extramissionist theories of vision and reinterprets the notion of a visual ray postulated by them as a (...)
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  22. Blur and perceptual content.Bence Nanay - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):254-260.
    Intentionalism about visual experiences is the view according to which the phenomenal character of a visual experience supervenes on the content of this experience. One of the most influential objections to this view is about blur: seeing a fuzzy contour clearly and seeing a sharp contour blurrily have different phenomenal character but the same content. I argue that this objection does not work if we understand perceptual content simply, and not particularly controversially, as partly constituted by (...)
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  23. Perceptual Content is Vertically Articulate.John Kulvicki - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):357-369.
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    Perceptual content is indexed to attention.Adrienne Prettyman - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4039-4054.
    Attention seems to raise a problem for pure representationalism, the view that phenomenal content supervenes on representational content. The problem is that shifts of attention sometimes seem to bring about a change in phenomenal content without a change in representational content. I argue that the representationalist can meet this challenge, but that doing so requires a new view of the representational content of perception. On this new view, the representational content of perception is always (...)
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  25.  57
    Social-Eyes: Rich Perceptual Contents and Systemic Oppression.Dylan Ludwig - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):939-954.
    There is ongoing philosophical debate about the kinds of properties that are represented in visual perception. Both “rich” and “thin” accounts of perceptual content are concerned with how prior assumptions about the world influence the construction of perceptual representations. However, the idea that biased assumptions resulting from oppressive social structures contribute to the contents of perception has been largely neglected historically in this debate in the philosophy of perception. I draw on neurobiological evidence of the role of (...)
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  26. Perceptual Content and the Unity of Perception.David de Bruijn - 2022 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):540-569.
    In recent work, Scott Soames (2010, 2013, 2015, 2019) and Peter Hanks (2011, 2013, 2015) have developed a theory of propositions on which these are constituted by complexes of intellectual acts. In this article, I adapt this type of theory to provide an account of perceptual content. After introducing terminology in section 1, I detail the approach proffered by Soames and Hanks in section 2, focusing on Hanks’s version. In section 3, I introduce a problem that these theories (...)
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  27. Perceptual content and the subpersonal.York H. Gunther - 1995 - Conference 6 (1):31-45.
     
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  28. Perceptual content.Christopher Peacocke - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 297–329.
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  29. Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth: On Cappelen and Hawthorne's Relativism and Monadic Truth.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - Philosophical Books 50 (4):213-226.
    I will begin with a brief presentation of C & H’s arguments against nonindexical contextualism, temporalism, and relativism. I will then offer a general argument against the monadic truth package. Finally, I will offer arguments in favor of nonindexical contextualism and temporalism.
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  30. Biological functions and perceptual content.Mohan Matthen - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):5-27.
    Perceptions "present" objects as red, as round, etc.-- in general as possessing some property. This is the "perceptual content" of the title, And the article attempts to answer the following question: what is a materialistically adequate basis for assigning content to what are, after all, neurophysiological states of biological organisms? The thesis is that a state is a perception that presents its object as "F" if the "biological function" of the state is to detect the presence of (...)
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  31. “Can perceptual content be conceptual and non-theory-laden?”.Costas Pagondiotis - 2005 - In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Nova Science.
  32. Theories of Perceptual Content and Cases of Reliable Spatial Misperception.Andrew Rubner - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):430-455.
    Perception is riddled with cases of reliable misperception. These are cases in which a perceptual state is tokened inaccurately any time it is tokened under normal conditions. On the face of it, this fact causes trouble for theories that provide an analysis of perceptual content in non-semantic, non-intentional, and non-phenomenal terms, such as those found in Millikan (1984), Fodor (1990), Neander (2017), and Schellenberg (2018). I show how such theories can be extended so that they cover such (...)
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  33. Individualism and perceptual content.Martin Davies - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):461-84.
  34. Object Files, Properties, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):283-307.
    Object files are mental representations that enable perceptual systems to keep track of objects as numerically the same. How is their reference fixed? A prominent approach, championed by Zenon Pylyshyn and John Campbell, makes room for a non-satisfactional use of properties to fix reference. This maneuver has enabled them to reconcile a singularist view of reference with the intuition that properties must play a role in reference fixing. This paper examines Campbell’s influential defense of this strategy. After criticizing it, (...)
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  35.  88
    Epistemic internalism and perceptual content: how a fear of demons leads to an error theory of perception.Robert J. Howell - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2153-2170.
    Despite the fact that many of our beliefs are justified by perceptual experience, there is relatively little exploration of the connections between epistemic justification and perceptual content. This is unfortunate since it seems likely that some views of justification will require particular views of content, and the package of the two might be quite a bit less attractive than either view considered alone. I will argue that this is the case for epistemic internalism. In particular, epistemic (...)
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  36. Perceptual representation/perceptual content.Bence Nanay - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.
     
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  37. Perceptual Content.M. Merleau-Ponty - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press.
  38. Levels of perceptual content.Élisabeth Pacherie - 2000 - Philsophical Studies 100 (3):237-54.
    My main thesis is this paper is that, although Dretske's distinction between simple perception and cognitive perception constitutes an important milestone in contemporary theorizing on perception, it remains too coarse to account for a number of phenomena that do not seem to fall squarely on either side of the divide. I argue that what is needed in order to give a more accurate account of perceptual phenomena is not a twofold distinction of the kind advocated by Dretske but a (...)
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    Perceptual content.Gerald Vision - 1998 - Philosophy 73 (3):395-427.
  40. Colour vision, evolution, and perceptual content.Evan Thompson - 1995 - Synthese 104 (1):1-32.
    b>. Computational models of colour vision assume that the biological function of colour vision is to detect surface reflectance. Some philosophers invoke these models as a basis for 'externalism' about perceptual content (content is distal) and 'objectivism' about colour (colour is surface reflectance). In an earlier article (Thompson et al. 1992), I criticized the 'computational objectivist' position on the basis of comparative colour vision: There are fundmental differences among the colour vision of animals and these differences do (...)
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  41. Kant on Perceptual Content.Colin McLear - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):95-144.
    Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. (...)
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  42. Perceptual Representation / Perceptual Content.Bence Nanay - 2015 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 153-167.
    A straightforward way of thinking about perception is in terms of perceptual representation. Perception is the construction of perceptual representations that represent the world correctly or incorrectly. This way of thinking about perception has been questioned recently by those who deny that there are perceptual representations. This article examines some reasons for and against the concept of perceptual representation and explores some potential ways of resolving this debate. Then it analyzes what perceptual representations may be: (...)
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  43. Why do we need perceptual content?Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):776-788.
  44. Ambiguous figures, attention, and perceptual content: reply to Jagnow.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):557-561.
    I argued in Nanay 2010 that we cannot characterize perceptual content without reference to attention. Here, I defend this account from three objections raised by Jagnow 2011. This mainly takes the form of clarifying some details not sufficiently elaborated in the original article and dispelling some potential misunderstandings.
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  45.  78
    Twin Earth and perceptual content.Jan Almäng - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6089-6109.
    This paper presents a framework for analysing perceptual Twin Earth thought experiments. Visual content normally has an analogue character, and it is argued in this paper that this sets certain constraints on the extent to which Twin Earth thought experiments can be successful. The argumentation in the paper is developed by using examples from visual spatial content. It is argued that visual spatial content can only be “twin-earthed” in a very limited way. Whereas the metrics of (...)
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  46. What makes perceptual content non-conceptual?Sean D. Kelly - 2002 - Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
    the world. 1 Whereas the content of our beliefs, thoughts, and judgements necessarily involves "conceptualization" or "concept application", the content of our perceptual experiences is, according to Evans, "non-conceptual". Because Evans takes it for granted that we are often able to entertain thoughts about an object in virtue of having perceived it, a central problem in.
     
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  47. Perceptual content and relations.Susanna Schellenberg - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):49-55.
  48. Cross-modal illusions and perceptual content: Lessons from cross-modal illusions.Casey O'Callaghan - 2006 - Electroneurobiolog 14 (2):211-224.
    I argue that a class of recently-discovered cross-modal illusions gives reason to posit a dimension of content shared across perceptual modalities and to abandon the traditional view according to which perceptual content is exclusively constituted by discrete modality-specific contents.
     
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  49.  7
    Perceptual Content.Stephen Everson - 1997 - In Aristotle on perception. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Everson examines Aristotle's use of the term empeiria, particularly as it appears in Metaphysics I.1 and Posterior Analytics II.19. Empeiria is usually translated as ‘experience’, but Everson argues that it ought to be interpreted as ‘an acquired perceptual concept’. Such concepts are involved in determining the content of perceptual experience. On this account, perceptual awareness is a combination of phantasia and the presence or absence of a certain empeiria, i.e. of the acquired perceptual concept appropriate (...)
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  50. Aristotle on Complex Perceptual Content. The Metaphysics of the Common Sense.Anna Marmodoro - 2011 - Philosophical Inquiry 34 (1-2):15-65.
    In his theory of perception Aristotle is committed to the principle that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a sensible quality, the modification of a sense organ by that quality, and the content of the perceptual experience of it. But on the basis of this principle, simultaneous perceptions of different sensible qualities give rise only to distinct perceptual contents. This generates the problem of how we become aware of complex perceptual content, e.g. in discerning red (...)
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