Results for 'Perceptual Experience'

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  1. Perceptual Experience and Degrees of Belief.Thomas Raleigh & Filippo Vindrola - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly (2):378-406.
    According to the recent Perceptual Confidence view, perceptual experiences possess not only a representational content, but also a degree of confidence in that content. The motivations for this view are partly phenomenological and partly epistemic. We discuss both the phenomenological and epistemic motivations for the view, and the resulting account of the interface between perceptual experiences and degrees of belief. We conclude that, in their present state of development, orthodox accounts of perceptual experience are still (...)
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  2. Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability.Somogy Varga - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):376-397.
    This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. ‘Low-level theorists’ argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low-level properties, ‘high-level theorists’ argue that we have perceptual experiences of high-level properties, while ‘disunified view theorists’ argue that perceptual seemings can present high-level properties. The paper explores how cognitive states can penetrate perceptual experience and provides an interpretation of cognitive penetration that offers some support (...)
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  3. Perceptual Experience and Seeing That P.Craig French - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1735-1751.
    I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this—states of seeing that $p$ —appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents—a Propositional View—has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that $p$ . And thus (...)
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  4. Perceptual Experience: Both Relational and Contentful.John McDowell - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):144-157.
  5. Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Knowledge.Johannes Roessler - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):1013-1041.
    Commonsense epistemology regards perceptual experience as a distinctive source of knowledge of the world around us, unavailable in ‘blindsight’. This is often interpreted in terms of the idea that perceptual experience, through its representational content, provides us with justifying reasons for beliefs about the world around us. I argue that this analysis distorts the explanatory link between perceptual experience and knowledge, as we ordinarily conceive it. I propose an alternative analysis, on which representational content (...)
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  6. Perceptual Experience.Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    In the last few years there has been an explosion of philosophical interest in perception; after decades of neglect, it is now one of the most fertile areas for new work. Perceptual Experience presents new work by fifteen of the world's leading philosophers. All papers are written specially for this volume, and they cover a broad range of topics dealing with sensation and representation, consciousness and awareness, and the connections between perception and knowledge and between perception and action. (...)
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  7. Perceptual Experience has Conceptual Content.Bill Brewer - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
    I take it for granted that sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs; indeed this claim forms the first premise of my central argument for (CC). 1 The subsequent stages of the argument are intended to establish that a person has such a reason for believing something about the way things are in the world around him only if he is in some mental state or other with a conceptual content: a conceptual state. Thus, given that sense experiential states (...)
     
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  8.  72
    Perceptual Experience is a Many-Layered Thing.Michael Tye - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:117-126.
  9.  48
    Affect, Perceptual Experience, and Disclosure.Daniel Vanello - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2125-2144.
    A prominent number of contemporary theories of emotional experience—understood as occurrent, phenomenally conscious episodes of emotions with an affective character that are evaluatively directed towards particular objects or states of affairs—are motivated by the claim that phenomenally conscious affective experience, when appropriate, grants us epistemic access not merely to features of the experience but also to features of the object of experience, namely its value. I call this the claim of affect as a disclosure of value. (...)
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  10. Perceptual Experience and the Capacity to Act.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 145.
    This paper develops and defends the capacity view, that is, the view that the ability to perceive the perspective-independent or intrinsic properties of objects depends on the perceiver’s capacity to act. More specifically, I argue that self-location and spatial know-how are jointly necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. Representing one’s location allows one to abstract from one’s particular vantage point to perceive the perspective-independent properties of objects. Spatial know-how allows one to perceive objects as the kind of (...)
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  11. The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.
    What is the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience? What evidence does experience provide us with? These questions are typically addressed in isolation. In order to make progress in answering both questions, perceptual experience needs to be studied in an integrated manner. I develop a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perceptual experience, by arguing that sensory states provide perceptual evidence due to their metaphysical structure. More specifically, I argue that (...)
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  12. Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States.José Luis Bermúdez - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):333-369.
    Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving (...)
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  13. The Content of Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosopical Quarterly 44 (175):190-205.
  14. Must Conceptually Informed Perceptual Experience Involve Nonconceptual Content?Sonia Sedivy - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):413-31.
    The idea of nonconceptual contents proposes that there are mental contents at the level of the experiencing person that are individuated independently of ‘anything to do with the mind.’ Such contents are posited to meet a variety of theoretical and explanatory needs concerning concepts and conceptual mental contents which are individuated in terms having to do with the mind. So to examine the idea of nonconceptual content we need to examine whether we really need to posit such content and whether (...)
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  15.  72
    Philosophy of Time and Perceptual Experience.Sean Enda Power - 2018 - New York, USA: Routledge.
    This book explores the important yet neglected relationship between the philosophy of time and the temporal structure of perceptual experience. It examines how time structures perceptual experience and, through that structuring, the ways in which time makes perceptual experience trustworthy or erroneous. -/- Sean Power argues that our understanding of time can determine our understanding of perceptual experience in relation to perceptual structure and perceptual error. He examines the general conditions (...)
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  16. The Phenomenological Directness of Perceptual Experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.
    When you have a perceptual experience of a given physical object that object seems to be immediately present to you in a way it never does when you consciously think about or imagine it. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) can provide a satisfying account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience while the content view (the view that (...)
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  17. The Objects of Perceptual Experience.Paul Snowdon & Howard Robinson - 1990 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64 (1):121-166.
  18.  34
    Perceptual Experience and Seeing-As.Daniel Enrique Kalpokas - 2015 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (1):123-144.
    According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main (...)
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  19. The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.
    I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not (...)
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  20. Not All Perceptual Experience is Modality Specific.Casey O'Callaghan - 2015 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 133-165.
    This paper presents forms of multimodal perceptual experience that undermine the claim that each aspect of perceptual experience is modality specific. In particular, it argues against the thesis that all phenomenal character is modality specific (even making an allowance for co-conscious unity). It concludes that a multimodal perceptual episode may have phenomenal features beyond those that are associated with the specific modalities.
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  21.  55
    The Content of Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):190.
  22. Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience.Christoph Hoerl - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-18.
    We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things moving or changing. I argue that such temporal experiences have a content that is tenseless, i.e. best characterized in terms of notions such as 'before' and 'after' (rather than, say, 'past', 'present' and 'future'), and that such experiences are essentially of the nature of a process that takes up time, viz., the same time as the process (...)
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  23. Introduction: Perceptual Experience.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2006 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 1--30.
    Much contemporary discussion of perceptual experience can be traced to two observations. The first is that perception seems to put us in direct contact with the world around us: when perception is successful, we come to recognize— immediately—that certain objects have certain properties. The second is that perceptual experience may fail to provide such knowledge: when we fall prey to illusion or hallucination, the way things appear may differ radically from the way things actually are. For (...)
     
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  24. Conscious Perceptual Experience as Representational Self-Prompting.John Dilworth - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 , pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. (...)
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  25. Perceptual Experience.John Heil - 1991 - In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  26. The Agential Profile of Perceptual Experience.Thomas Crowther - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):219-242.
    Reflection on cases involving the occurrence of various types of perceptual activity suggests that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be partly determined by agential factors. I discuss the significance of these kinds of case for the dispute about phenomenal character that is at the core of recent philosophy of perception. I then go on to sketch an account of how active and passive elements of phenomenal character are related to one another in activities like watching (...)
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  27. Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.
    This paper aims to shed new light on certain philosophical theories of perceptual experience by examining the semantics of perceptual ascriptions such as “Jones sees an apple.” I start with the assumption, recently defended elsewhere, that perceptual ascriptions lend themselves to intensional readings. In the first part of the paper, I defend three theses regarding such readings: I) intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions ascribe phenomenal properties, II) perceptual verbs are not ambiguous between intensional and (...)
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  28. The Relational and Representational Character of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - In B. Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content. Oxford University Press. pp. 199-219.
  29.  82
    The Sensory Content of Perceptual Experience.Jacob Berger - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):446-468.
    According to a traditional view, perceptual experiences are composites of distinct sensory and cognitive components. This dual-component theory has many benefits; in particular, it purports to offer a way forward in the debate over what kinds of properties perceptual experiences represent. On this kind of view, the issue reduces to the questions of what the sensory and cognitive components respectively represent. Here, I focus on the former topic. I propose a theory of the contents of the sensory aspects (...)
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  30. Lecture I: Sellars on Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (9):431-450.
  31.  56
    The Normative Nature of Perceptual Experience.S. D. Kelly - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 146.
  32.  12
    On Perceptual Experience.Lilian Alweiss - 2000 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 31 (3):264-276.
  33. Does the Phenomenality of Perceptual Experience Present an Obstacle to Phenomenal Externalism?Robert Schroer - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (1):93-110.
    : Although Externalism is widely accepted as a thesis about belief, as a thesis about experience it is both controversial and unpopular. One potential explanation of this difference involves the phenomenality of perceptual experience—perhaps there is something about how perceptual experiences seem that straightforwardly speaks against Externalist accounts of their individuation conditions. In this paper, I investigate this idea by exploring the role that the phenomenality of color experience plays in a prominent argument against Phenomenal (...)
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  34.  15
    Strength of Perceptual Experience Predicts Word Processing Performance Better Than Concreteness or Imageability.Louise Connell & Dermot Lynott - 2012 - Cognition 125 (3):452-465.
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  35.  29
    Mediating Mars: Perceptual Experience and Scientific Imaging Technologies. [REVIEW]Robert Rosenberger - 2013 - Foundations of Science 18 (1):75-91.
    The philosophical tradition of phenomenology, with its focus on human bodily perception, can be used to explore the ways scientific instrumentation shapes a user’s experience. Building on Don Ihde’s account of technological embodiment, I develop a framework of concepts for articulating the experience of image interpretation in science. These concepts can be of practical value to the analysis of scientific debates over image interpretation for the ways they draw out the relationships between the image-making processes and the rival (...)
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  36.  44
    Perceptual Experience and Concepts in Classical Indian Philosophy.Monima Chadha - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  37.  55
    What is the Bandwidth of Perceptual Experience?Michael A. Cohen, Daniel C. Dennett & Nancy Kanwisher - 2016 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 20 (5):324-335.
    Although our subjective impression is of a richly detailed visual world, numerous empirical results suggest that the amount of visual information observers can perceive and remember at any given moment is limited. How can our subjective impressions be reconciled with these objective observations? Here, we answer this question by arguing that, although we see more than the handful of objects, claimed by prominent models of visual attention and working memory, we still see far less than we think we do. Taken (...)
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  38. Ambiguous Figures and the Spatial Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Defense of Representationalism.René Jagnow - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):325-346.
    Representationalists hold that the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is identical with, or supervenes on, an aspect of its representational content. As such, representationalism could be disproved by a counter-example consisting of two experiences that have the same representational content but differ in phenomenal character. In this paper, I discuss two recently proposed counter-examples to representationalism that involve ambiguous or reversible figures. I pursue two goals. My first, and most important, goal is to show that the representationalist (...)
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  39.  28
    Perceptual Experience as a Cross-Time Relation.Takahiro Maeda - 2007 - Journal of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 35 (1):29-38.
  40.  17
    The Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Kantian Perspective.Anna Tomaszewska - 2014 - De Gruyter Open.
  41.  18
    The Sensorimotor Theory of Perceptual Experience.David Silverman - unknown
    The sensorimotor theory is an influential, non-mainstream account of perception and perceptual consciousness intended to improve in various ways on orthodox theories. It is often taken to be a variety of enactivism, and in common with enactivist cognitive science more generally, it de-emphasises the theoretical role played by internal representation and other purely neural processes, giving theoretical pride of place instead to interactive engagements between the brain, non-neural body and outside environment. In addition to offering a distinctive account of (...)
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  42.  91
    Perceptual Experience, Doxastic Practice, and the Rationality of Religious Commitment.Robert Audi - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Research 20:1-18.
    This paper is a constructive critical study of William P. Alston’s Perceiving God. It explores his account of perception of God, his doxastic practice epistemology, and his overall integration of faith and reason. In dealing with the first, it distinguishes some possible cases of theistic perception that have not generally been sorted out in the literature. In examining doxastic practices, it explores both the sense in which it is rational to engage in them and the epistemic status of beliefs formed (...)
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  43. The Non-Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain.Sean D. Kelly - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):601-608.
    I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke’s claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an over-emphasis on the "fine-grainedness" of perceptual content - a feature that is relatively unimportant to its non-conceptual structure. I go on to describe (...)
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  44. Representationalism and the Perspectival Character of Perceptual Experience.René Jagnow - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):227-249.
    Perceptual experiences inform us about objective properties of things in our environment. But they also have perspectival character in the sense that they differ phenomenally when objects are viewed from different points of view. Contemporary representationalists hold, at a minimum, that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Thus, in order to account for perspectival character, they need to indentify a type of representational content that changes in appropriate ways with the perceiver’s point of view. Many representationlists, including Shoemaker and (...)
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  45.  35
    Non-Passivity of Perceptual Experience.Isabelle Peschard - 2010 - Contemporary Pragmatism 7 (1):149-164.
    The main problems faced by a conception of perception as passive will be introduced through a critical examination of John McDowell's account of 'empirical thinking'. Overcoming these difficulties will lead to a conception of perception as involving an active cognitive participation of the perceiver, and an account of how observational judgment is warranted that is focused on the conditions of experience. In both cases, analogies to inquiry in scientific experimental practice will be explored.
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  46.  17
    Mcdowell and Hegel: Perceptual Experience, Thought and Action.Andre Abath & Federico Sanguinetti (eds.) - 2018 - Springer Verlag.
  47. Epistemic Responsibility and Perceptual Experience.Santiago Echeverri - 2011 - In David Lauer, Christophe Laudou, Robin Celikates & Georg W. Bertram (eds.), Expérience Et Réflexivité: Perspectives au-Delà de L’Empirisme Et de L’Idéalisme. L'harmattan.
    Any theory of perceptual experience should elucidate the way humans exploit it in activities proper to responsible agents, like justifying and revising their beliefs. In this paper I examine the hypothesis that this capacity requires the positing of a perceptual awareness involving a pre-doxastic actualization of concepts. I conclude that this hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient to account for empirical rationality. This leaves open the possibility to introduce a doxastic account, according to which the epistemic function (...)
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  48. The Given in Perceptual Experience.Erhan Demircioglu - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8).
    How are we to account for the epistemic contribution of our perceptual experiences to the reasonableness of our perceptual beliefs? It is well known that a conception heavily influenced by Cartesian thinking has it that experiences do not enable the experiencing subject to have direct epistemic contact with the external world; rather, they are regarded as openness to a kind of private inner realm that is interposed between the subject and the world. It turns out that if one (...)
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  49. What It is Like to See: A Sensorimotor Theory of Perceptual Experience.J. Kevin O’Regan - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):79-103.
    The paper proposes a way of bridging the gapbetween physical processes in the brain and the ''''felt''''aspect of sensory experience. The approach is based onthe idea that experience is not generated by brainprocesses themselves, but rather is constituted by theway these brain processes enable a particular form of''''give-and-take'''' between the perceiver and theenvironment. From this starting-point we are able tocharacterize the phenomenological differences betweenthe different sensory modalities in a more principledway than has been done in the past. We (...)
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  50.  84
    Defending the Liberal-Content View of Perceptual Experience: Direct Social Perception of Emotions and Person Impressions.Albert Newen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):761-785.
    The debate about direct perception encompasses different topics, one of which concerns the richness of the contents of perceptual experiences. Can we directly perceive only low-level properties, like edges, colors etc., or can we perceive high-level properties and entities as well? The aim of the paper is to defend the claim that the content of our perceptual experience can include emotions and also person impressions. Using these examples, an argument is developed to defend a liberal-content view for (...)
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