Results for 'Perceptual Experience'

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  1. Perceptual Experience and Seeing That P.Craig French - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1735-1751.
    I open my eyes and see that the lemon before me is yellow. States like this—states of seeing that $p$ —appear to be visual perceptual states, in some sense. They also appear to be propositional attitudes (and so states with propositional representational contents). It might seem, then, like a view of perceptual experience on which experiences have propositional representational contents—a Propositional View—has to be the correct sort of view for states of seeing that $p$ . And thus (...)
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  2. Perceptual Experience and Degrees of Belief.Thomas Raleigh & Filippo Vindrola - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly (2):378-406.
    According to the recent Perceptual Confidence view, perceptual experiences possess not only a representational content, but also a degree of confidence in that content. The motivations for this view are partly phenomenological and partly epistemic. We discuss both the phenomenological and epistemic motivations for the view, and the resulting account of the interface between perceptual experiences and degrees of belief. We conclude that, in their present state of development, orthodox accounts of perceptual experience are still (...)
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  3. Perceptual Experience: Both Relational and Contentful.John McDowell - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):144-157.
  4. Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability.Somogy Varga - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):376-397.
    This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. ‘Low-level theorists’ argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low-level properties, ‘high-level theorists’ argue that we have perceptual experiences of high-level properties, while ‘disunified view theorists’ argue that perceptual seemings can present high-level properties. The paper explores how cognitive states can penetrate perceptual experience and provides an interpretation of cognitive penetration that offers some support (...)
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  5. Perceptual Experience.Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
    In the last few years there has been an explosion of philosophical interest in perception; after decades of neglect, it is now one of the most fertile areas for new work. Perceptual Experience presents new work by fifteen of the world's leading philosophers. All papers are written specially for this volume, and they cover a broad range of topics dealing with sensation and representation, consciousness and awareness, and the connections between perception and knowledge and between perception and action. (...)
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  6. Joint Attention and Perceptual Experience.Lucas Battich & Bart Geurts - 2021 - Synthese 198 (9):8809-8822.
    Joint attention customarily refers to the coordinated focus of attention between two or more individuals on a common object or event, where it is mutually “open” to all attenders that they are so engaged. We identify two broad approaches to analyse joint attention, one in terms of cognitive notions like common knowledge and common awareness, and one according to which joint attention is fundamentally a primitive phenomenon of sensory experience. John Campbell’s relational theory is a prominent representative of the (...)
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  7. How Can Perceptual Experiences Explain Uncertainty?Susanna Siegel - 2020 - Mind and Language 37 (2):134-158.
    Can perceptual experiences be states of uncertainty? We might expect them to be, if the perceptual processes from which they're generated, as well as the behaviors they help produce, take account of probabilistic information. Yet it has long been presumed that perceptual experiences purport to tell us about our environment, without hedging or qualifying. Against this long-standing view, I argue that perceptual experiences may well occasionally be states of uncertainty, but that they are never probabilistically structured. (...)
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  8. Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Knowledge.Johannes Roessler - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):1013-1041.
    Commonsense epistemology regards perceptual experience as a distinctive source of knowledge of the world around us, unavailable in ‘blindsight’. This is often interpreted in terms of the idea that perceptual experience, through its representational content, provides us with justifying reasons for beliefs about the world around us. I argue that this analysis distorts the explanatory link between perceptual experience and knowledge, as we ordinarily conceive it. I propose an alternative analysis, on which representational content (...)
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  9. Perceptual Experience has Conceptual Content.Bill Brewer - 2005 - In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
    I take it for granted that sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs; indeed this claim forms the first premise of my central argument for (CC). 1 The subsequent stages of the argument are intended to establish that a person has such a reason for believing something about the way things are in the world around him only if he is in some mental state or other with a conceptual content: a conceptual state. Thus, given that sense experiential states (...)
     
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  10.  61
    Affect, Perceptual Experience, and Disclosure.Daniel Vanello - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2125-2144.
    A prominent number of contemporary theories of emotional experience—understood as occurrent, phenomenally conscious episodes of emotions with an affective character that are evaluatively directed towards particular objects or states of affairs—are motivated by the claim that phenomenally conscious affective experience, when appropriate, grants us epistemic access not merely to features of the experience but also to features of the object of experience, namely its value. I call this the claim of affect as a disclosure of value. (...)
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  11.  96
    Everything is Clear: All Perceptual Experiences Are Transparent.Laura Gow - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):412-425.
    The idea that perceptual experience is transparent is generally used by naïve realists and externalist representationalists to promote an externalist account of the metaphysics of perceptual experience. It is claimed that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience can be explained solely with reference to the externally located objects and properties which (for the representationalist) we represent, or which (for the naïve realist) partly constitute our experience. Internalist qualia theorists deny this, and claim (...)
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  12. Can Perceptual Experiences Be Rational?Alan Millar - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):251-263.
    © Millar 2018This bold, provocative, and highly original book is in three Parts. Part I outlines a problem, sketches a solution, and defends a claim that is crucial to the solution—that ‘perceptual experiences and the processes by which they arise can be rational or irrational’. This claim is The Rationality of Perception. In Part II Siegel argues that the power of experiences to justify beliefs can be downgraded or upgraded by psychological precursors. Part III applies, and further develops, the (...)
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  13.  81
    Perceptual Experience is a Many-Layered Thing.Michael Tye - 1996 - Philosophical Issues 7:117-126.
  14. Perceptual Experience.T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne - 2009 - Critica 41 (122):124-132.
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  15.  39
    Perceptual Experience and Seeing-As.Daniel Enrique Kalpokas - 2015 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (1):123-144.
    According to Rorty, Davidson and Brandom, to have an experience is to be caused by our senses to hold a perceptual belief. This article argues that the phenomenon of seeing-as cannot be explained by such a conception of perceptual experience. First, the notion of experience defended by the aforementioned authors is reconstructed. Second, the main features of what Wittgenstein called “seeing aspects” are briefly presented. Finally, several arguments are developed in order to support the main (...)
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  16.  68
    Perceptual Experience in Kant and Merleau-Ponty.Antich Peter - 2019 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 50 (3):220-233.
    I argue that the descriptions of perceptual experience offered by Kant and Merleau-Ponty are, contrary to what many commentators suppose, largely compatible. This is because the two are simply referring to different things when they talk about experience: Kant to empirical cognition and Merleau-Ponty to perception. Consequently, while Merleau-Ponty correctly denies that Kant accurately describes the conditions for the possibility of perception, Kant nevertheless provides a plausible account of the conditions of empirical judgment. Further, the two approach (...)
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  17. Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States.José Luis Bermúdez - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (4):333-369.
    Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving (...)
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  18. Perceptual Experience and the Capacity to Act.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 145.
    This paper develops and defends the capacity view, that is, the view that the ability to perceive the perspective-independent or intrinsic properties of objects depends on the perceiver’s capacity to act. More specifically, I argue that self-location and spatial know-how are jointly necessary to perceive the intrinsic spatial properties of objects. Representing one’s location allows one to abstract from one’s particular vantage point to perceive the perspective-independent properties of objects. Spatial know-how allows one to perceive objects as the kind of (...)
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  19.  66
    Can Perceptual Experiences Be Rational?Susanna Siegel - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):149-174.
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  20. The Content of Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosopical Quarterly 44 (175):190-205.
  21. The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.
    What is the metaphysical nature of perceptual experience? What evidence does experience provide us with? These questions are typically addressed in isolation. In order to make progress in answering both questions, perceptual experience needs to be studied in an integrated manner. I develop a unified account of the phenomenological and epistemological role of perceptual experience, by arguing that sensory states provide perceptual evidence due to their metaphysical structure. More specifically, I argue that (...)
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  22. Time and Tense in Perceptual Experience.Christoph Hoerl - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-18.
    We can not just see, hear or feel how things are at a time, but we also have perceptual experiences as of things moving or changing. I argue that such temporal experiences have a content that is tenseless, i.e. best characterized in terms of notions such as 'before' and 'after' (rather than, say, 'past', 'present' and 'future'), and that such experiences are essentially of the nature of a process that takes up time, viz., the same time as the process (...)
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  23.  27
    Perceptual Experience and Aspect.Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):103-120.
    A number of contemporary philosophers of mind have brought considerations from the study of aspect to bear on the ontological question how perceptual experiences persist over time. But, apart from rare exceptions, relatively little attention has been devoted to assess whether the way we talk about perceptual occurrences is of any relevance for discussions of ontological matters in general, let alone discussions about the ontological nature of perception. This piece examines whether considerations derived from the study of lexical (...)
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  24.  87
    Perceptual Experiences of Particularity.Błażej Skrzypulec - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Philosophers of perception often claim that usual perceptual experiences not only present particulars but also phenomenally present them as particulars. Nevertheless, despite the initial plausibility of this thesis, it is not clear what exactly it means to say that particularity is phenomenally presented. The paper aims to provide a deeper analysis of the claim that perceptual experiences phenomenally present objects as particulars. In doing so, I distinguish two theses regarding phenomenally presented particularity: Generic Particularity and Specific Particularity. According (...)
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  25. The Structure of Perceptual Experience: A New Look at Adverbialism.Frances Egan - forthcoming - In Deflating Mental Representation (The 2021 Jean Nicod Lectures).
    In the philosophy of perception, representationalism is the view that all phenomenological differences among mental states are representational differences, in other words, differences in content. In this paper I defend an alternative view which I call external sortalism, inspired by traditional adverbialism, and according to which experiences are not essentially representational. The central idea is that the external world serves as a model for sorting, conceptualizing, and reasoning surrogatively about perceptual experience. On external sortalism, contents are construed as (...)
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  26. The Phenomenological Directness of Perceptual Experience.Boyd Millar - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):235-253.
    When you have a perceptual experience of a given physical object that object seems to be immediately present to you in a way it never does when you consciously think about or imagine it. Many philosophers have claimed that naïve realism (the view that to perceive is to stand in a primitive relation of acquaintance to the world) can provide a satisfying account of this phenomenological directness of perceptual experience while the content view (the view that (...)
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  27. Not All Perceptual Experience is Modality Specific.Casey O'Callaghan - 2015 - In Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press. pp. 133-165.
    This paper presents forms of multimodal perceptual experience that undermine the claim that each aspect of perceptual experience is modality specific. In particular, it argues against the thesis that all phenomenal character is modality specific (even making an allowance for co-conscious unity). It concludes that a multimodal perceptual episode may have phenomenal features beyond those that are associated with the specific modalities.
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  28. A Processive View of Perceptual Experience.Sebastián Sanhueza Rodriguez - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (1):130-151.
    The goal of this piece is to put some pressure on Brian O’Shaughnessy’s claim that perceptual experiences are necessarily mental processes. The author targets two motivations behind the development of that view. First, O’Shaughnessy resorts to pure conceptual analysis to argue that perceptual experiences are processes. The author argues that this line of reasoning is inconclusive. Secondly, he repeatedly invokes a thought experiment concerning the total freeze of a subject’s experiential life. Even if this case is coherent, however, (...)
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  29.  61
    The Content of Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):190.
  30. Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience.David Bourget - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):381-408.
    This paper aims to shed new light on certain philosophical theories of perceptual experience by examining the semantics of perceptual ascriptions such as “Jones sees an apple.” I start with the assumption, recently defended elsewhere, that perceptual ascriptions lend themselves to intensional readings. In the first part of the paper, I defend three theses regarding such readings: I) intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions ascribe phenomenal properties, II) perceptual verbs are not ambiguous between intensional and (...)
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  31. The Objects of Perceptual Experience.Paul Snowdon & Howard Robinson - 1990 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64 (1):121-166.
  32. The Sensory Content of Perceptual Experience.Jacob Berger - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):446-468.
    According to a traditional view, perceptual experiences are composites of distinct sensory and cognitive components. This dual-component theory has many benefits; in particular, it purports to offer a way forward in the debate over what kinds of properties perceptual experiences represent. On this kind of view, the issue reduces to the questions of what the sensory and cognitive components respectively represent. Here, I focus on the former topic. I propose a theory of the contents of the sensory aspects (...)
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  33. The Agential Profile of Perceptual Experience.Thomas Crowther - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):219-242.
    Reflection on cases involving the occurrence of various types of perceptual activity suggests that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be partly determined by agential factors. I discuss the significance of these kinds of case for the dispute about phenomenal character that is at the core of recent philosophy of perception. I then go on to sketch an account of how active and passive elements of phenomenal character are related to one another in activities like watching (...)
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  34. Are Emotions Perceptual Experiences of Value?Demian Whiting - 2012 - Ratio 25 (1):93-107.
    A number of emotion theorists hold that emotions are perceptions of value. In this paper I say why they are wrong. I claim that in the case of emotion there is nothing that can provide the perceptual modality that is needed if the perceptual theory is to succeed (where by ‘perceptual modality’ I mean the particular manner in which something is perceived). I argue that the five sensory modalities are not possible candidates for providing us with ‘emotional (...)
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  35. Must Conceptually Informed Perceptual Experience Involve Nonconceptual Content?Sonia Sedivy - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):413-31.
    The idea of nonconceptual contents proposes that there are mental contents at the level of the experiencing person that are individuated independently of ‘anything to do with the mind.’ Such contents are posited to meet a variety of theoretical and explanatory needs concerning concepts and conceptual mental contents which are individuated in terms having to do with the mind. So to examine the idea of nonconceptual content we need to examine whether we really need to posit such content and whether (...)
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  36. The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.
    I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not (...)
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  37. Perceptual Experience: Assembling a Medieval Puzzle.Juhana Toivanen - 2018 - In Margaret Cameron (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 2. London, UK: pp. 134-156.
  38.  72
    Perceptual Experience and its Contents.Josefa Toribio - 2002 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (4):375-392.
    The contents of perceptual experience, it has been argued, often include a characteristic “non-conceptual” component (Evans, 1982). Rejecting such views, McDowell (1994) claims that such contents are conceptual in every respect. It will be shown that this debate is compromised by the failure of both sides to mark a further, and crucial, distinction in cognitive space. This is the distinction between what is doubted here as mindful and mindless modes of perceiving: a distinction which cross-classifies the conceptual / (...)
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  39. Perceptual Experience.John Heil - 1991 - In Dretske and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  40. Conscious Perceptual Experience as Representational Self-Prompting.John Dilworth - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 no. 2 , pp. 135-156. The self-prompting theory of consciousness holds that conscious perceptual experience occurs when non-routine perceptual data prompt the activation of a plan in an executive control system that monitors perceptual input. On the other hand, routine, non-conscious perception merely provides data about the world, which indicatively describes the world correctly or incorrectly. Perceptual experience instead involves data that are about the perceiver, not the world. (...)
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  41.  19
    The Contents of Perceptual Experience: A Kantian Perspective.Anna Tomaszewska - 2014 - De Gruyter Open.
    The book addresses the debate on whether the representational content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, by bringing out the points of comparison between Kant s conception of intuition and contemporary accounts of non-conceptual content. It is argued that intuition provides the most basic form of intentionality pre-conceptual reference to objects, which underlies the acts of conceptualization and judgment.".
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  42. Perceptual Experience, Conscious Content, and Nonconceptual Content.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-14.
    One of the promising approaches to the problem of perceptual consciousness has been the representational theory, or representationalism. The idea is to reduce the phenomenal character of conscious perceptual experiences to the representational content of those experiences. Most representationalists appeal specifically to non-conceptual content in reducing phenomenal character to representational content. In this paper, I discuss a series of issues involved in this representationalist appeal to non-conceptual content. The overall argument is the following. On the face of it, (...)
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  43. Introduction: Perceptual Experience.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2006 - In John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 1--30.
    Much contemporary discussion of perceptual experience can be traced to two observations. The first is that perception seems to put us in direct contact with the world around us: when perception is successful, we come to recognize— immediately—that certain objects have certain properties. The second is that perceptual experience may fail to provide such knowledge: when we fall prey to illusion or hallucination, the way things appear may differ radically from the way things actually are. For (...)
     
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  44.  8
    Does perceiving require perceptual experience?David John Bennett - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-28.
    In Section I, I clarify turning point issues in the Phillips and Block debate about whether there is unconscious perception. These include questions about whether uptake of certain visual information is an individual or person level accomplishment, as required for genuine unconscious perceiving. Section II takes up a recent reorientation proposed in Block towards the question of whether there is unconscious perceiving, where we are to look for the pervasive role of unconscious perceiving in, perhaps especially, the online control of (...)
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  45. Can Perceptual Experiences Justify Beliefs?Karol Polcyn - 2011 - Filozofia Nauki 19 (2).
    The question whether perceptual experiences justify perceptual beliefs is ambiguous. One problem is the well familiar skeptical one. How can perceptual experiences justify beliefs if those experiences may systematically deceive us? Our experiences might be just as they are and yet the world might be radically different. But there is also another problem about the justification of perceptual beliefs which arises independently of the above skeptical worry. This other problem has to do with our understanding of (...)
     
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  46.  82
    Philosophy of Time and Perceptual Experience.Sean Enda Power - 2018 - New York, USA: Routledge.
    This book explores the important yet neglected relationship between the philosophy of time and the temporal structure of perceptual experience. It examines how time structures perceptual experience and, through that structuring, the ways in which time makes perceptual experience trustworthy or erroneous. -/- Sean Power argues that our understanding of time can determine our understanding of perceptual experience in relation to perceptual structure and perceptual error. He examines the general conditions (...)
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  47.  13
    On Perceptual Experience.Lilian Alweiss - 2000 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 31 (3):264-276.
  48.  69
    The Normative Nature of Perceptual Experience.S. D. Kelly - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 146.
  49. Perceptual Experience.Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.
    In the last few years there has been an explosion of philosophical interest in perception; after decades of neglect, it is now one of the most fertile areas for new work. Perceptual Experience presents new work by fifteen of the world's leading philosophers. All papers are written specially for this volume, and they cover a broad range of topics to do with sensation and representation, consciousness and awareness, and the connections between perception and knowledge and between perception and (...)
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  50. Lecture I: Sellars on Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (9):431-450.
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